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For the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA), developmental pathways and future economic 
opportunities are inherently tied to either the stabilisation and perpetuation of the oil 
markets or the diversification and development of new capabilities and resource streams. 
In spite of such pressures and the past decade of constrained growth and development, 
political forces continue to affect the capacity for private enterprise and business start-
ups to gain a strong and sustainable foothold within this national economy. Additional 
research is essential to the identification and evaluation of strategic pathways and support 
systems that can be applied to the KSA resource problem in order to improve the 
opportunity for long-term, sustainable development. The primary aim of this research is 
to critically assess the risks and vulnerabilities to commercial banking stability in the 
KSA by comparing the structural, institutional, and governmental effects and influences 
on lending and profitability outcomes across the Saudi Arabian and Qatari financial 
sectors. 
This research aim focuses on addressing both internal and external forces that are 
influencing the commercial banking industry and its capacity to perform. In addition, this 
research aim focuses on the accomplishments and progress that have been made in 
another resource-dependent nation, Qatar.  
The research combines primary (qualitative and quantitative research) with secondary 
data research. The outcome of the research is that Qatar is a country which has taken 
several steps towards liberating its market and shifting away from dependence on oil. It 
has developed services in various markets including financial services, tourism, 
education, and events. In contrast, KSA remains dependent on oil, meaning that its 
banking system and its institution are vulnerable to shock effects, especially to changes 
in the price of oil. For this reason, KSA needs a set of changes and reforms so as to open 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 Research Background 
Following the 2008 global financial crisis and the reverberations of financial uncertainty 
and indiscretion which destabilised international markets, institutional governance has 
become a critical and necessary precondition for future stability (Mehran et al., 2011). 
Internal factors affecting bank risk, including credit or liquidity risk, are monitored and 
assessed through a diversified platform of risk identification, assessment, and mitigation 
tools (Ghosh, 2012). Outside the scope of such internal monitoring systems, banks 
continue to be exposed to external and systemic risks. The IMF (2001) defines these 
external and system risks as the possibility of any event which “triggers a loss of 
economic value or confidence in . . . a substantial portion of the financial system” and 
“that is serious enough to have significant adverse effects on the real economy” (p. 126). 
Measures of stability and sustainability within a given financial sector include interest 
rates, asset rates, financial stock flows, investor sentiment, and macroeconomic stability. 
These measures predict a financial system’s vulnerability to shocks and uncertainties. 
However, they fail to account for the consequences of market-upending risks (e.g. the 
cessation of dependence on oil), which could have a severe impact on any given national 
economy (Gerlach, 2009).  
Within the Gulf, in countries such as the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) and Qatar, the 
banking sector remains exposed to a high level of external risks which are directly 
correlated with persistent domestic dependence on fossil fuel generated rents (Niblock 
and Malik, 2007; Auty, 2001a; Ross, 1999). Tverberg (2010) observes that during 
prosperity, domestic economies have thrived on an unprecedented rate of economic gains, 
increasing dependence and simultaneously exposing markets to the risk of systemic 
collapse. For financial institutions, the accelerated inflows of capital have created stable, 
prosperous markets for investing in exploratory and extractive industries, increasing the 
outflows of credit for a variety of developmental objectives (Egan, 2015). As oil prices 
have collapsed over the past several months within the global marketplace, the liability 
exposure of these banks to loan defaults and liquidity challenges has resulted in extreme 
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stability vulnerabilities in the short to medium term (Das, 2015; Kane, 2015; Moody’s, 
2015). 
In the Gulf Corporation Council (GCC) banking industry, dependency on oil and gas for 
increasing liquidity and developing investment opportunities has created significant 
vulnerabilities that must be addressed through proactive diversification strategies (Das, 
2015). Whilst Moody’s (2015) predicts that the resiliency of oil-rich nations and their 
financial institutions is structurally sound, the high breakeven costs of oil extraction and 
the vulnerability of reserve buffers to market shocks and uncertainties raise concerns 
about the stability of these industries. As a result, dependency on oil resources for 
liquidity and institutional development creates a variety of risks that may ultimately be 
overwhelming to banks and financial markets within these vulnerable national systems 
(Das, 2015). Effective institutional governance is inherently dependent on a diversified 
range of financial products and a domestic infrastructure which promotes trade and 
development that is less vulnerable to external, systemic shocks (Kaufman and Scott, 
2003; Soysa, 2007). Specifically.  
The high level of dependency on a single stream of petroleum-based income renders 
nations like the KSA vulnerable to a broad spectrum of shocks and changing market 
conditions. Characterised by Basedau and Lay (2009) as the “resource curse”, the high 
dependency on a valuable resource like oil creates internal dependencies and external 
partnerships that facilitate and perpetuate long-term reliance on outflows of domestic 
resources for economic stability (p. 759). Gilberthorpe and Papyrakis (2015) further 
define the resource curse as “the tendency of mineral-rich economies to underperform in 
economic growth and other development outcomes” (p. 383). The causal factors 
associated with such underperformance are linked to a variety of socio-political and 
socio-economic forces and tie governmental strength and resiliency to extractive 
industries (Basedau and Lay, 2009). For the KSA, recent news reports and public 
criticism (e.g., Frankel, 2012; Lubin, 2012; Gabr, 2014; Kenny, 2015) demonstrate a 
persistent state of resource dependency on which deficiencies in governmental 
accountability and domestic investment have perpetuated the interpretation of abundance 
as a developmental curse. 
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For the KSA, the consequences of the resource curse are both institutional and 
developmental, stagnating the potential of a large and wealthy economic system to 
overcome a variety of deficiencies and limitations. For example, Lubin (2012) observes 
that in 2010 the share of Saudi workers employed in a governmental capacity rose to 90%, 
a 7% increase from 2000. In the mid-2000s, the domestic policy of Saudisation was 
introduced as a solution to the high level of unemployment plaguing the Saudi economy 
(Fakeeh, 2009). However, even after the private sector had been compelled to achieve 
employment quotas for Saudi nationals, manipulation of data, hiring statistics, and 
employment commitments were observed to constrain the effectiveness of this 
programme (Mustafa, 2013). Between 2012 and 2014, the Saudi unemployment rate 
increased from 5.6% to more than 6%, ultimately falling to just over 5.7% in 2015 
(Trading Economics, 2016). In spite of this relatively low indicator (compared to the 
global average), the Arab News (2016) recently observed that Saudi nationals represented 
just 40% of the total employed population and, in the private sector, just 15%.  
Despite the fact that the primary catalyst for stagnant economic and social development 
in the KSA is the nation’s dependency on oil resources, Kenny (2015) predicts that the 
recent price collapse will not decrease dependency or reliance, but will instead destabilise 
the political infrastructure and could lead to economic collapse in the KSA. One of the 
challenges for a government in which fiscal planning is predicated on income that is 
almost wholly derived from natural resources is that “commodity prices are highly 
volatile”, and, therefore, the KSA is vulnerable to cyclical shifts, low short-run elasticities 
(supply and demand), and systemic risks and vulnerabilities (Frankel, 2012, p. 7). Further, 
there is a “crowding-out” phenomenon, which is perpetuated by the overarching 
dependency on a single stream of income rather than the diversification of national 
outputs and resources (Frankel, 2012, p. 8). This reduction in competitiveness in 
agricultural and manufacturing exports “crowds out other productive sectors and makes 
the diversification of the economy particularly difficult” (Karl, 2004, p. 663). As a result, 
nations like the KSA enter a persistent state of dependence on oil resources, undermining 




On an internal level, the increased value of oil over the past two decades has resulted in 
an accelerated state of liquidity and a persistent increase in government rents and 
domestic investments. Since 1971, oil rents in Saudi Arabia have averaged 41.9% of the 
gross domestic product (GDP) (World Bank, 2016). Rents peaked in 1980 at 78.93% of 
GDP and again in 2007, just prior to the global financial crisis, achieving a 58.8% 
penetration in this economic network, and finally collapsed to just 38.24% in the wake of 
the international crisis and financial network shocks (World Bank, 2016). Between 2014 
and 2015, the “sharp decline in oil prices generated a heavy macroeconomic shock to net 
oil exporters” (Dabrowski, 2015, p. 1). The IMF recently reported that a central 
government fiscal deficit of 19.5% of GDP was projected in 2015, with an anticipated 
recovery targeting 2016 market developments (IMF; 2015). For the banking industry, this 
price-influenced market decline resulted in a 4.7% ($13.5 billion) decrease in the demand 
for deposits, leading to intra-bank lending and borrowing tactics that significantly 
increased the overnight rates (Oil and Gas 360, 2015). In addition, the Saudi Interbank 
Offered Rate climbed by 13 basis points in October of 2015 alone, the highest rate since 
April of 2009 (Oil and Gas 360, 2015). 
The over-dependence on oil and gas resources has resulted in banking cycles that include 
high credit risk, non-performing loans, and liquidity issues when oil price crashes occur 
(Al-Hassan et al., 2010; Oil and Gas 360, 2015). Such market shifts catalyse a fall in 
deposits and a rise in non-performing loans throughout the banking networks, increasing 
the dependence of these institutions on the national government to intervene, bail out 
banks, and solve liquidity issues (Al-Hassan et al., 2010; Thomsen and Goton, 2012). 
Government income deficiencies as a result of lower oil and gas revenues also impact 
other critical, internal services within the Gulf such as healthcare, education, and even 
banking, all of which are heavily reliant on government generated funds (Sahoo, 2016). 
The result of this high-risk, high-vulnerability cycle is an unsustainable model of 
governance, enterprise, and banking that must be reformed and rehabilitated in order to 
withstand the pressures and uncertainties of the complex global marketplace (Albatel, 
2000; Rodriguez, 2006; Niblock and Malik, 2007). 
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In response to the pressures currently influencing the growth and performance of the oil 
and gas marketplace, KSA advisors have begun to adopt a policy of diversification which 
involves selective and strategic investment in new enterprise, industry, education, and 
strategic partnerships. Over the past decade, government investment in infrastructure, for 
example, stimulated rapid growth in this part of the private sector, succumbing to market 
pressures and lower demand once the infrastructure and construction was deemed 
sufficient to stop government subsidies (Niblock and Malik, 2007; Hvidt, 2013). This 
pattern of government spending is a key contributor to bank risk, as banks are likely to 
lend to the private sector, only to later face non-performing loans once the sector collapses 
(Arab News, 2015; Martin, 2016). In addition, political economy issues such as the 
government’s ownership of enterprises and unsustainability caused by the population’s 
dependence on lucrative benefit packages create political risk (Niblock and Malik, 2007; 
Auty, 2001a). These internal risks and market vulnerabilities create performance 
challenges for developing commercial banks, creating patterns of dependency or 
uncertainty which fail to achieve a more resilient and sustainable performance pattern. 
Within the KSA, and within the Gulf in general, very few studies have investigated the 
relationship between the long-standing oil dependence and the government spending and 
banking risk. There is an urgent need to research this topic as oil reserves are diminishing, 
political instability in the Middle East is rising, and diversification efforts are yet to 
replace oil dependence sufficiently (Chau et al., 2014; Niblock and Malik, 2007). In the 
Gulf, royal families, respected elders, and religious leaders control politics and the 
economy in a manner which depends on oil-generated rents. Given the recent changes in 
Arab politics and increased instability in the region, banks need to be watchful of the 
political economy of oil dependence and the political instability, as these two factors pose 
great risks to lucrative banking. Indeed, these factors threaten not only the political 
economy but also banks.  
The identification, control and effective management of operational risk is important for 
the proper development of banks in order to maintain the broader financial system and 
set new rules with the central banks and national institutions. The banks that meet these 
criteria will have to use risk mitigation methods to reduce capital commitments, such as 
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credit derivatives, guarantees, collateral and clearing items in the balance sheet. Pillar II 
of Basel II focuses on the need for the calculation of capital adequacy, ensuring that there 
is participation in the calculation of all risks undertaken and that the regulators adapt to 
these measurements by making prudent surveillance. Banks should have a capital 
adequacy calculation system and should identify the necessary funds to cover their risks 
(Panjer, 2006). At minimum, the rating for the identification of risks and the rating of the 
level of capital adequacy must be calculated. It is necessary to strictly assess the ability 
of banks and supervisors alike to account for all the risks and continually review the 
supervisory process. The supervisory authorities have to assess the risks as well as control 
and monitor the procedures in the case that the banks do not comply in accordance with 
Pillar I. In this case, the authorities should install additional capital requirements 
(Cummins and Embrechts, 2006). 
The need which emerged from the oil crisis was based on designing and implementing 
controls or stress tests which use extreme scenarios, namely cases of extreme financial 
statements, in order to measure the impact of such statements on a banking institution’s 
operations. With the help of these tests, bank institutions enact sanctions, which are in 
turn imposed through higher-interest margins in interbank loans and issued debt 
(Mohamed and Al-Mualla, 2010). 
Bigger banks have already begun to address operational risk management. Originally, 
operational risk management was undertaken to develop competence for internal risk 
management mechanisms in the case of crisis. The banks then proceeded to create risk 
management systems to ensure that the banks have enough funds available to face credit 
and market risks (Cummins and Embrechts, 2006). When operational risk management 
methods become more familiar, bank institutions are able to sell part of their capital to 
cover any operational risk that may arise. Measurement of operational risk requires 
knowledge of two parameters: (1) the probability of a loss which may occur due to an 
operational incident and (2) the size of the damage. This measurement is important in 
regards to the collection of historical data on operating losses. Several banks carry out the 
collection of such data with reference to historical experience of losses from operational 
risk events and create their own databases (Balestra, 2000).  
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1.2 Research Aim and Objectives 
For the KSA, developmental pathways and future economic opportunities are inherently 
tied to either the stabilisation and perpetuation of the oil markets or the diversification 
and development of new capabilities and resource streams. In spite of such pressures and 
the past decade of constrained growth and development, political forces continue to affect 
the capacity for private enterprise and business start-ups to gain a strong and sustainable 
foothold within this national economy. As a result, additional research is essential to the 
evaluation and determination of strategic pathways and support systems that can be 
applied to the KSA resource problem in order to improve the opportunity for long-term, 
sustainable development. For this reason, the primary aim of this research is to critically 
assess the risks and vulnerabilities regarding commercial banking stability in the KSA by 
comparing the structural, institutional, and governmental effects and influences on 
lending and profitability outcomes across the Saudi Arabian and Qatari financial sectors. 
This research aim focuses on several critical dimensions, addressing both internal and 
external forces that are influencing the commercial banking industry and its capacity to 
perform. In addition, this research aim focuses on the accomplishments and progress that 
have been made in Qatar, which is also a resource-dependent nation. Over the course of 
this critical and comparative investigation, the following primary research objectives 
have been accomplished: 
To assess the effects of resource dependency on market development and financial 
architecture in the KSA and Qatar 
Current predictions by Moody’s (2015) suggest that as market prices of oil resources 
decline throughout the global community, GCC banks will be exposed to lower liquidity 
and lower lending rates, pressure that could inhibit development if not strategically 
managed.  
To determine the relationship between external factors and the profitability and 
performance of commercial banks in the KSA and Qatar 
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From market variability to commodity prices to supply chain uncertainty, the effects of a 
single-stream income on KSA banks and financial systems are an important predictor of 
future stability and sustainable growth. 
To assess and compare the vulnerability of commercial banks in the KSA and Qatar 
to systemic shocks and changing market conditions 
By focusing on the performance measures and outcomes within the commercial banking 
industry, this study has evaluated the link between the external and domestic economic 
forces and the internal risk-management initiatives and strategies. 
To demonstrate the influence of socio-cultural forces on commercial bank risk and 
profitability in the KSA and Qatar 
In spite of strategic objectives and prudent business practices, the dynamics and pressures 
within the socio-cultural framework of the KSA continue to play a role in corporate 
governance, corporate structure, and corporate investment. In addition, expectations 
imposed on government agencies have perpetuated the conditions for a resource-
dependent standard that has affected the performance and growth of the banking industry. 
This research seeks to evaluate the role which these forces play in exposing commercial 
banks to market risks and network vulnerabilities. 
 
To recommend a model of intervention and risk mitigation for the future 
management of risk in Saudi commercial banks 
This final objective is designed to synthesise these findings into a meaningful and 
transferrable model of diversification and development strategies applicable to KSA 
commercial banking institutions.  
1.3 Research Rationale 
It is widely accepted that political risk is an important bank management issue, especially 
given the interplay between resource abundance and war (Kaufman, 1994; Kaufman and 
Scott, 2003; Wicker, 1996; Collier and Hoeffler, 1998; Collier and Hoeffler, 2004; Soysa, 
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2007). Laeven and Levine (2009) draw distinctions between banking theory and 
corporate governance theories, emphasising a risk-based tension between regulations and 
responsibility (banking) and internal structural interventions (governance), both of which 
affect the nature of risk-taking incentives.  
Oil price shocks on banking governance show that this presents a major risk as far as 
banking systems are concerned, primarily because of the governments’ systems. The 
infrastructure of government spending is concerned with GDP growth and bank lending 
to public-sector entities and their private contractors, a fact that may affect the credit risk 
of the banks (Malik and Hammoudeh, 2007). Most GCC countries seem to have large 
buffers regarding slowdowns in their spending with regards to oil prices, and they are 
expected to limit credit risks. In addition, the prudential frameworks are an effort to 
comply with the rules of the Basel III. Credit risk can become higher with respect to high 
loan concentrations, particularly those concentrations that are more cyclically sensitive, 
such as in the construction sector (Maghyereh and Al-Kandari, 2007). The risks 
concerning financial stability are higher in some of the oil exporters. Though several bank 
vulnerabilities exist, the effort to mitigate the risks is small due to the smaller macro-
prudential frameworks in addition to the crisis management ones.  
Algeria and Iraq seem to have a bank dependence on deposits of oil, due to their weak 
corporate governance. This dependence increases the credit and liquidity risk (Morales 
and Andreosso-O’Callaghan, 2011). Meanwhile, the banking system of Iran weakens the 
underwriting standards and puts its quality assets at risk. In Iraq and Yemen, the banking 
sector is also exposed to credit and liquidity risk due to excessive exposure of their oil-
dependent governance, which has a weakened fiscal position (Maghyereh and Al-
Kandari, 2007). Noguera-Santaella (2016) claims that the banking systems of these 
countries are highly exposed to their oil prices and that liquidity is present in the banking 
sector. In Jordan and Lebanon, as well as in Egypt, banks receive high official grants from 
the GCC. The high bank exposure can increase the financial stability risk if there is a 
slowdown in the GCC economies. Cyclical and sensitive real estate is also significant in 
these countries.  
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The contingent claims analysis (CCA) banking system in these countries is affected by a 
series of channels. Low oil prices have an impact, and the prices themselves are affected 
by the slowdown in Russia; the slowdown increases the interest rates with regards to the 
rise of inflation in some of these countries (Tokic, 2015). The credit growth in the private 
sector at the same time also affects the oil price shocks. In countries such as Armenia and 
Azerbaijan, the likelihood of asset quality deterioration has been increasing due to their 
slowing economies. In Tajikistan, the weak governance concerning the banking system 
also creates credit risks. These credit risks in turn create instability risks in countries like 
Azerbaijan and Tajikistan, where there is an important gap concerning the crisis 
management framework (Cipollini et al., 2009).  
Currently, there are several indicators that show that there is a weakening in the banking 
soundness in some CCA countries. Profitability is declining and, rather than remaining 
high, the capital adequacy ratios are also declining in most of these countries. Foreign 
exchange has been weakened and exchange rates that show losses and capital erosion. 
Meanwhile, there are indirect credit risks regarding the borrowers who are using foreign 
currencies (Rodhan, 2005). This means that the private sector has been weakened in dollar 
terms across the CCA countries.  
The aggregate indicators understate the deterioration in banking soundness. Moreover, 
economic shock is reflected in the NPL numbers. Some of the banks make efforts to 
reconstruct their loans, while others make efforts to ameliorate their performance. The 
depreciations in the exchange rate have a high and profound impact on the soundness of 
the banking system concerning the balance sheets and the banks’ borrowers (Diebold and 
Yilmaz, 2009). Devaluation helps the preservation of the international reserves and 
partially improves fiscal position while reducing the demand for loans with respect to 
foreign currencies (Corey et al., 2016). However, the mismatches concerning the 
currencies between the assets of the banks and their liabilities increase the banks’ losses 
and constrain the currency loans due to the absence of hedging instruments. The exchange 
rates of depreciation also increase credit risks which concern the borrowers who deal with 
foreign currencies. All of these issues tighten the local currencies’ liquidity in countries 
such as Armenia and Kazakhstan (Fatough, 2007).  
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Several policy responses have aimed at balancing the facilitation of the economies of 
these countries. Administrative measures and moderate exchange rate pressures have 
been enacted in some of these countries to provide liquidity support to the banks. Those 
actions have improved the overall liquidity conditions due to the reduced reserve deposits 
and exchange deposits concerning the banks that are commercial (Gallo et al., 2008). In 
addition, other measures such as using foreign exchange swaps are helping the deposits. 
The increased foreign exchange requirements can in this way increase the capital 
requirements concerning the banks. In some countries, the state is being ameliorated, yet, 
in Saudi Arabia and in the Emirates, the liquidity of the banks has remained high. 
Meanwhile, the credit growth has seemed to slow down even in Qatar, where investments 
lead to credit demand (Feldstine, 2014). The GCC bank sector performs well and offers 
a solid economic foundation that leads to less vulnerability. The impact on economic 
activity is limited due to the large financial buffers which allow governments to spend 
less and bolster their customers’ confidence. Banks benefit from abundant retail deposits, 
and drawdowns are eliminated (Hammoudeh and Aleisa, 2004). However, for the non-
GCC oil exporters, the banking sector remains in a mixed situation. This situation reflects 
a series of vulnerabilities in the banking sector’s structure which predate any shocks in 
the oil prices. The exchange rate in Algeria shows that its economy is slowing down, and 
the foreign exposures concerning the exchanges mute the credit risks of the banks. At the 
same time, there are strains in Iran’s banking system of Iran due to the effects of sanctions. 
In Iran, the effect on oil prices is less apparent. In Iraq, the economic crisis due to low oil 
prices has increased fiscal operations. In Yemen, the lowering of oil prices is weakening 
the country’s fiscal position and raising the sovereign credit and liquidity risk for its 
banking sector (Khalifa et al., 2014a).  
For the oil importers of MENA, the banking system benefits from improvements in the 
banks’ performance. The lower oil prices alleviate fiscal pressures, while the GCC helps 
sustain and support bank liquidity. The low oil prices are expected to persist, and the 
banks are expected to remain challenging. The banks take most of their income from the 
marketplace and from their lending processes. Thus, the slowdown in oil prices increases 
credit risk. A higher decline in oil prices may also slow the deposits and loans in the 
private sector, even though there may be central bank facilities (Khalifa et al., 2014b).  
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Analyses of several countries show that there is a strong relation between the oil prices 
and the bank performance in MENA and GCC countries. GDP growth has a high impact 
on NPL growth. This means that oil prices affect the GDP and other economic variables 
such as the exchange rates. This impact seems to be persistent. For the banks of the CCA, 
the sustained low oil prices also affect the weakening in the balance sheets of the banks. 
The low prices thereby mitigate the liquidity risks and create gaps in the frameworks of 
supervision. The banks face a challenging operational environment due to the effect of 
the slowdown in the domestic economy (Rathmell and Schulze, 2000).  
In the non-GCC MENA oil exporters, there is a dominance of state-owned banks, a fact 
that increases systematic bank risks. Fiscal pressures heighten these risks. The stress tests 
conducted show that there is a series of differences between the CCA and MENA 
countries (Al Ariss, 2014). In general, credit risk is the most important risk for the banking 
sector, particularly as far as countries such as Iran are concerned. There, the amplified 
rate and concentration risk are higher. This process can leave a series of banks 
undercapitalised.  
There are, however, several policies in place to mitigate the risks. Sound macroeconomic 
policies and supervision are two factors that can reduce financial instability in the 
countries mentioned above. The lower oil prices may affect the stability of the banks and 
may have an impact on the economy in general; however, macroeconomic changes that 
create growth can help these countries stabilise. Some of the measures include the 
liquidity surveying and stress testing (Culp, 2001). The public sector in these countries 
has to be ready to deal with bank distress and to avoid forbearance. Moreover, 
coordination between central banks and governments may lead to a minimisation of 
liquidity shocks. This can in turn lead to investment opportunities and create a balance. 
Meanwhile, the exposure of banks to the real estate sector needs to be supported by a 
series of metrics that capture the risks and facilitate the implementation of macro-
prudential policies. Such metrics will help enhance the resilience of the banking sector 
and eliminate the cyclical risks (Doerig and Hans-Ulrich, 2000).  
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1.4 Research Questions 
Although this study is comparative in its foundations, the underlying aim and objectives 
of this research emphasise the genesis and implementation of structural, policy, and 
governance solutions for the KSA. The evidence gathered from Qatar and its evolution 
of institutional and structural policies towards a diversified, sustainable paradigm is 
indicative of a targeted pathway for the KSA that may be applicable in future industry 
iterations. However, to address the vulnerability and compatibility hurdles which are 
likely to be encountered during this process, the following core research questions are 
considered over the course of this investigation: 
1. What impact has resource dependency had on the development of the financial 
markets and banking institutions in the KSA? 
2. What internal and external factors have influenced the profitability and 
performance of commercial banks in the KSA? 
3. What are the different risks and vulnerabilities confronting commercial banks in 
the KSA and Qatar? 
4. What risk management solutions could be implemented in the KSA to enhance 
performance, diversify the economy and improve sustainable institutional growth? 
1.5 Research Contribution and Justification 
Data collated over the course of the research will be presented at international meetings 
and used to create recommendations for banks in the Gulf on how to manage risks 
generated from oil dependence and the resultant political economy. This report analyses 
banking risk in oil-dependent GCC countries, the problems that those countries face with 
their finances, and the option of using renewable energy sources.  
Research on the Gulf continues to be an important and relevant area of study. Following 
the end of the twentieth century – a period of scientific and technological developmental 
revolution – case studies and research on the subject of oil dependency have proliferated, 
with many studies aimed at potential applications for implementation (Kropski et al., 
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2012). This research intends to maintain interest in the GCC countries. A literature review 
and questionnaire are used to generate conclusions on the field of resources (Kennedy, 
2011). Capital adequacy has always been a major issue for the survival of banks. 
Especially now, when the challenges faced by banks are more complex, there is a need 
for a revision of the practices by which banks deal with operational risk. In the case of 
the treatment of operational risk, the Basel II Treaty intended to make the banking sector 
safer through the identification and management of operational risk in banking (Currie, 
2004). The nature and significance of the application of attention to operational risk is 
based on more modern systems and functions.  
To achieve the required quality controls, credit institutions have to focus on several 
targets (Cummins and Embrechts, 2006). Thus, operational risk management tends only 
to deal with systemic errors and routine treatment failures. That is, rather than attempting 
to prevent functional events from ever occurring, operational risk management tends to 
determine the actions to take after the event takes place.  
The theories concerning operational risk management indicate that risk cannot be 
eliminated. There will always be an operational risk in all forms of institutional activity. 
The goal, however, is to at least minimise it. The institutional framework for these 
changes is therefore left to the banks. The objective is that the context has to be applied 
by the bank’s upper management. However, integration into the bank’s culture and into 
the business practices of the lower management is a major challenge (Currie, 2004). 
Operational risk is directly related to human resources. Human errors, omissions, and 
misguided actions can be fatal for the smooth operation of a banking institution. 
Generally, there is a difficulty in transferring principles, practices, and standards to 
personnel when reporting an operational risk. We must not forget that operational risk is 
a risk that needs a collective and global approach, as individual actions cannot achieve an 
effective reduction (Sbracia, 2003).  
In the Middle East, oil-rich states today face for the first time several budget deficits that 
come from shifts in their economy due to a reduction in their dependence on oil revenues. 
These deficits create a banking risk in the Gulf countries. The risk is increasingly felt by 
today’s generation, as some of these countries already suffer from massive 
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unemployment, with many people unable to find a job in the private or public sector 
(Otranto, 2005). This risk will also affect future generations. Banking risks create an issue 
of debt management as well. Debt management is considered to be a top priority in 
Middle Eastern countries looking to stabilise their economy, even if in the past sovereign 
wealth funds in these countries provided liquidity and maintained the countries’ banking 
systems. The growth in credit trading and rising fiscal budget deficits in the West 
distorted the asset market, which is no longer sustainable. This distortion also led to a 
quick collapse in commodity prices, and there was no recovery during the last decade 
(Otranto, 2015).  
The justification for this thesis is clear, as the existing literature provides a great area of 
interest, and the current socio-political and economic situation in the Gulf demands 
further research. Through the critical comparison of the KSA with Qatar, this research 
contributes to the field an in-depth analysis of the current state of banking risks in the 
KSA and recommendations for risk management going forward. This research not only 
fills gaps in the body of literature concerning banking in the Gulf by way of a 
comprehensive consideration of KSA specifics, but also determines a series of applicable 
recommendations to be implemented in the KSA banking sector. As such, this thesis 
functions as both a scholarly review of banking in the Gulf, as well as a practical guide 
for future banking risk minimisation and mitigation.       
1.6 Methodological Overview 
Through a comprehensive review of the methods and techniques employed in research in 
this field, a mixed methods approach to empirical research was adopted for the current 
study (Creswell and Clark, 2012; Watkins and Gioia, 2015). The core objective of this 
approach was to generate evidence from three distinct sources of data: a performance-
based assessment from secondary industry publications and quantitative and qualitative 
findings from bank managers in the KSA and Qatar. The industry performance data was 
examined using correlation and multiple regression analyses in order to determine 
whether banking performance outcomes tracked similarly against patterns and pricing 
within the oil and gas industry. Given the disparate states of development in the KSA and 
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Qatar, the following hypothesis was developed and tested against this assessment of 
industry-derived evidence: 
Hypothesis 1: Due to the diversification of Qatari markets, commercial bank 
performance during the periods of oil price retracement will remain stable or 
increase, whilst the commercial bank performance during these same periods in 
the KSA will decline. 
The merits of the secondary evidence are introduced and justified in later chapters, 
focusing on the depth and range of these findings in relation to the phenomena that 
currently impact the KSA developmental process. However, it was essential that industry 
experiences, opinions, and perspectives were also evaluated in order to compare the 
beliefs held by bank managers in two disparate economic environments, the KSA and 
Qatar. This research process involved a convergent parallel design which Watkins and 
Gioia (2015) suggest is representative of the strengths and opportunities underlying the 
mixed methods approach to empirical study. Specifically, a survey and an interview were 
developed simultaneously and then administered to bank managers within these 
geographically distributed organisations in the KSA and Qatar. The survey was 
quantitative, structured, and multidimensional in its architecture and was designed to 
evaluate key factors related to risk management, economic dependency, the resource 
curse, and diversification. The interview was qualitative, open-ended, and semi-
structured and prompted the interviewees to reflect on their experiences and agenda 
regarding performance management and sustainable growth in the commercial banking 
sector. Despite the mixed methods structure of this primary research process, a secondary 
hypothesis was also developed and then tested against the feedback and responses offered 
by these two groups of bank managers: 
Hypothesis 2: As a direct result of diversification and economic growth, Qatari 
bank managers will report enhanced resiliency and improved performance 
outcomes in the commercial banking sector, which is in direct contrast to the bank 
managers in the KSA. 
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The empirical findings were captured, analysed statistically and thematically, and then 
compared, providing a comprehensive overview of the experiences and values 
represented in these two developing, yet variable nations. Despite oil and gas exploitation 
in both nations continuing to affect the scope and dynamics of the economic 
infrastructure, through this surveying process, the findings suggest that transformative 
processes in Qatar are inherently dependent on both industrial and political investment in 
diversification. Further observations and essential recommendations are presented 
throughout the data analysis and discussion chapters. 
Regarding the quantitative analysis, two main research hypotheses were tested.  
The first hypothesis and null hypothesis were as follows: 
H1: There is a significant difference between the responses of the participants from Qatar 
and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. 
H0: There is no differentiation of the results by Qatari/Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 
ethnicity.  
The second hypothesis and null hypothesis were as follows: 
H2: The characteristics of the sample influence their responses to the questionnaire. 
H0: The characteristics of the participants do not influence their responses to the 
questionnaire. 
1.7 Research Overview 
The remainder of this thesis has been organised from a general to progressively empirical 
focus, introducing theories and models, and then critically assessing these models within 
the context of the problems facing banks within the KSA. The following is a brief 
overview of these subsequent chapters and their core objectives and focus. 
Chapter 2: Literature Review: This chapter focuses on academic theories and empirical 
findings related to institutional development and sustainable growth within the market 
environment confronted with variable socio-economic forces. Addressing theories related 
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to the resource curse, corporate governance, and diversification, this chapter draws on a 
robust field of research to explore the risks and vulnerabilities that are currently 
confronting GCC nations, and, in particular, the KSA. 
Chapter 3: Research Methodology: The selection and implementation of empirical 
research methods that were appropriate and targeted to the KSA was essential to the 
architecture of this investigation. This chapter critically evaluates the methodological 
choices, selects a specific, mixed methods paradigm, and describes the sources of 
evidence and approaches used to complete this research process. 
Chapter 4: The KSA and Qatar – An Institutional Overview: Narrowing the focus of 
this investigation, this chapter explores the transitional state of the Saudi Arabian 
financial system in relation to that of Qatar. In relation to the KSA, this chapter considers 
transformative initiatives underscoring government investment, commercial bank 
development, and market evolution. In order to contrast the changes in the Saudi Arabian 
marketplace with those in Qatar, the transformative agenda undertaken over the past 
decade is described within the context of resource dependency and financial market 
developments. This chapter not only offers a transitional benchmark for comparison 
between the KSA and Qatar, but also discusses the persistent risks and limitations within 
the Qatari efforts that continue to influence commercial banking performance. The 
purpose of this chapter is to highlight the risks and vulnerabilities currently confronting 
this evolving marketplace, whilst simultaneously critically comparing the KSA with the 
financial situation in Qatar. 
Chapter 5: Presentation of Empirical Results and Findings: Based on the critical 
comparison of experiences and perspectives from commercial bank managers in both the 
KSA and Qatar, this chapter assesses the nature of institutional development and risk 
management within the broader context of the socio-economic environment. In addition, 
statistical evidence relating resource dependency to commercial bank performance is 
presented for both of these markets, distinguishing between market-level differences and 
outcomes in the KSA and Qatar. 
  
19 
Chapter 7: Discussion and Analysis of Findings: Drawing on the literature and past 
research in this field, this chapter discusses the significance of the empirical findings, 
highlighting several critical patterns related to the evolution of financial markets and the 
diversification of industry within resource dependent nations such as the KSA and Qatar. 
Through this emphasis on the evolution of both industry and banking systems, in-depth 
analysis of these findings will predict a model of governmental intervention and 
developmental opportunity for the KSA in the short to medium term. 
Chapter 8: Conclusions, Limitations, and Recommendations: This final chapter 
draws summative conclusions from the full scope of this research, addressing key 
findings and highlighting the implications and significance of this evidence within the 
broader context of KSA banking. In addition, the primary limitations of this study are 
discussed and recommendations for bank positioning and strategy making are offered as 
an actionable solution to the current problems facing this industry. 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
2.1 Introduction 
The following section explores the economic malaise of resource-rich countries. It delves 
into the existing models and literature to appraise the risks and factors that lead to the 
market distortions found in oil rich economies like the GCC states.  
There is an appraisal of the factors, both economic and socio-cultural, that have impeded 
efforts to diversify the economy and escape the resource  curse.  This is all viewed through 
the prism of the banking sector. 
In reviewing the existing literature related to the aims and objectives of this thesis, this 
chapter also indicates the gaps that the research aims fill. The primary aim of this research 
is to critically assess the risks and vulnerabilities of commercial banking in the KSA. The 
chapter begins by outlining the risks involved in banking in oil-dependent nations such 
as the KSA. This review thus illustrates both where this research fits within the current 
knowledge in the field and the gaps that it fills in the existing literature.  
2.2 Risks and Vulnerabilities in Resource-Abundant Nations  
2.2.1 The Resource Curse and Oil Dependency  
Colgan (2014) observes that, because of the high-value, high-yield output of the oil and 
gas industry, domestic politics and policies are industry centric and export oriented. The 
resource curse is not a singular event or phenomenon; instead, it is a spectrum of 
consequences and effects that perpetuate the instability and under-development of oil-
dependent nations, contributing to several political and economic outcomes, including 
the following (Colgan, 2014, p. 199):  
 High levels of income inequality 
 Currency volatility and inflation 
 Uneven regional economic development 
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 High unemployment 
 Low rates of female participation in the labour force  
 Increased state ownership of business 
Facilitated by a resilient and durable authoritarianism, resource states succumb to low 
levels of political accountability, and opportunistic industry policies that are exploitative, 
biased, and narrow (Colgan, 2014). Gilberthorpe and Papyrakis (2014) posit that the 
consequences and impacts of resource dependency affect domestic social, economic, and 
political development on macro, meso, and micro levels (p. 383). On a macro scale, as 
the terms of trade deteriorate over time, resource-rich nations are tasked with increasing 
their exports to offset the influx of imported manufactured commodities (Gilberthorpe 
and Papyrakis, 2014). On a meso scale, Gilberthorpe and Papyrakis (2014) observe that 
differences in intra-regional development in resource dependent nations demonstrate the 
negative, development-mitigating effects of export dependency, increasing poverty rates 
over the long term and stagnating the development of financial networks. On a micro 
scale, poverty and socio-economic inequalities are exacerbated by mineral extraction, 
whilst support for a persistent rentier standard is perpetuated by the subsistence level 
opportunities that exist outside of the extractive industries (Gilberthorpe and Papyrakis, 
2014). These three spectrums of impact and influence represent a paradigm of 
dependence which spans the full scope and all domains of industry, economy, polity, and 
society as nations struggle to overcome dependency. 
Recent predictions regarding the impacts and implications of price changes in the global 
oil market suggest that banks in the GCC have the potential to improve credit worthiness 
and debt-service capacity (Kane, 2015). However, the same opportunities create conflict 
among the liquidity objectives entrenched in this industry following the financial crisis, 
limiting lending capabilities and restricting investment funding (Kane, 2015). 
Due to the persistence of the resource curse in GCC states, Colgan (2014) observes that 
nations like the USA invest heavily in regional security and protectionist tactics that are 
designed to mitigate the aggressive tendencies of resource-rich nations with authoritarian 
governments. Whilst other policies such as social reform, capacity building, and foreign 
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investment are developed in the name of governmental evolution, policies and state 
practices inhibit the transitional agendas that aspire to affect meaningful changes across 
these states (Colgan, 2014). 
2.2.2 The Rentier State and the Rule of the Elite  
For rentier governments, the primary, basic responsibility is to “distribute rents”, an 
ambiguous and under-defined expectation that has the potential to encourage 
opportunism and corruption in systems without a robust or effective political agency 
(Basedau and Lay, 2009, p. 760). Strategically, the rentier strategy involves two essential 
commitments including the taxation effect and the spending effect (Anyanwu and 
Erhijakpor, 2014). The taxation effect is designed to lower tax levels to negligible rates 
by assimilating the economic returns from the core domestic industry, namely the oil & 
gas industry, to fund the national government (Anyanwu and Erhijakpor, 2014). The 
spending effect involves the leverage of oil rents to support the domestic population, 
investments in infrastructure, and development of military capabilities (Anyanwu and 
Erhijakpor, 2014).  
 
From a stability standpoint, governments are vulnerable to the phenomenon of co-
optation, whereby oil revenues are used not only to grow and develop military capabilities 
but also to prevent these capabilities from counteracting their power and authority 
through payoffs, bribes, and financial incentives (Basedau and Lay, 2009, p. 761).  
The paradigmatic deficiencies of the rentier concept in state governance create a complex 
and potentially vulnerable dynamic for the development of future industries and national 
capabilities. For example, Moore (2002) observes that in international development, state 
structure “conforms to sectoral needs or dominant revenue needs” whereby “social forces 
and business forces are expected to follow suit” (p. 36). In oil-based economies, the state 
serves as the central “locus of wealth creation”, and as a result, the private sector is 
compartmentalised and packaged into those enterprises and capabilities that magnify the 
capacity for generating national wealth (Moore, 2002, p. 36). 
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The developmental constraints underlying the rentier arrangement have significant 
impacts in nations that are heavily dependent on a limited revenue stream such as oil 
rents. Basedau and Lay (2009) observe that because the oil revenues fulfil government 
funding objectives, there is no need for taxation. As a result, citizens may be less likely 
to protest government activities, even if such investments and commitments are viewed 
as unjust, unethical, or inappropriate (Snyder and Bhavnani, 2005; Basedau and Lay, 
2009). Despite such perceived stability and constant income, Springborg (2013) describes 
rents as consumables, or finance-only returns, that are “unable to be accumulated into 
fixed capital” and therefore designed to perpetuate the underlying state and status of the 
domestic population (p. 304). 
2.2.3 Authoritarian Rule and Governance  
Underscoring authoritarian systems, Singh and Dunn (2015) observe a predisposition to 
subjugation that is spawned from socio-cultural biases and value constructs (p. 564). This 
form of national dominion undermines the pursuit of less authoritarian standards and 
practices and perpetuates the stereotypical role of power dynamics in social, economic, 
and political relationships (Singh and Dunn, 2015). Whilst an increase in domestic 
diversity is predicted to limit the strength and position of the authoritarian regime, in 
nations like the GCC where expatriates are prevented from attaining meaningful status 
within the authoritarian society, the homogenisation of socio-cultural values restricts 
uprising and resistance to government authority (Singh and Dunn, 2015). Regional 
conformity also perpetuates the standard of authoritarian rule, and Soest (2015) observes 
that government partnerships and strategic alliances not only extend the status and 
influence of authoritarian values, but also create stronger institutions on which these 
values can be disseminated and enforced. 
Perceived similarity across national regimes represents an important catalyst for 
preventing changes and mitigating social uprising (Soest, 2015). As observed during the 
recent patterns of civil unrest during the Arab Spring, Soest (2015) acknowledges the 
strategic positioning of GCC governments against the rebellion, uniting leadership in 
solidarity and power against the destabilising objectives of the rebelling factions. 
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Coalition building, as occurred during the Kuwaiti crisis in the late 1990s, has created a 
form of strategic alliance between states throughout the GCC that is predicated on the 
persistence and sustainability of the rentier agenda (Yom, 2011). In GCC nations, Kuru 
(2014) observes that “oil and gas rents have led to a vicious circle of conflicts and 
authoritarianism”, creating a barrier to democratisation and hindering the development of 
private enterprise and industry innovation (p. 423). 
The cognitive and psychological constructs of national authoritarianism are an important 
representation of those factors that define and influence industry domains and network 
patterns (Soest, 2015). From patterns of subjugation, government support, and regime-
following agenda setting to resistance, collaboration, and solidarity, the preservation of 
an authoritarian standard within resource dependent nations is ultimately contingent on 
the perpetuation of patterns and consistencies throughout the majority population of 
subjects (Soest, 2015). 
Once oil and gas resources have “saturated the national political economy”, Yom (2011) 
predicts that regimes are likely to struggle to consolidate power and will ultimately be 
faced with a need to develop and sustain alliances with previously marginalised social 
groups to perpetuate the status quo and maintain elite status (p. 222). This form of survival 
politics is indicative of state building strategies that, although vulnerable to the loss of 
resource stability and fluctuation of international markets, can build platforms on which 
future developmental and innovation investments can be based (Yom, 2011). 
2.3 Economic Diversification and the Banking Industry 
2.3.1 Definition of Banking 
The banking system consists of the Central Bank, which supervises the commercial 
banking sector, and the commercial banks, which, along with specified financial 
organisations, are occupied with transactional activities. Within a short time, the 
globalisation of the capital market and the rapid technological progress in 
telecommunication and information technology have changed the landscape of banking 
and the further credit space. In the modern banking environment, the commercial banks 
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are the largest financial institutions, having incorporated into their activities numerous 
new services, mediatory and not. The expansion of banking activities into new areas 
creates a need for a definition to cover this extended scope of action of new banking 
institutions (Saunders, 2004). 
According to banking legislation in most countries, a bank is defined as an organisation 
whose current business is to receive deposits of the public and to grant loans. For most 
banking businesses, commercial lending complements lending and borrowing which are 
currently the main activities. Business, consumer, mortgage, and international loans are 
the basic revenue of commercial banks and finance the operating costs of the institution, 
and the deposits of the public. The balance between the acceptance of deposits and the 
granting of loans is the characteristic that differentiates banks from other credit mediation 
organisations. As a way of attracting deposits, banks use public capital, which usually 
does not have the expertise and resources required to properly evaluation bank 
management. This is an additional reason for imposing restrictive rules on banks 
(Saunders and Cornett, 2003). 
The empirical definition overlooks one very important function of banks: the creation of 
money. The loans granted have only partial coverage in cash and cash equivalents and 
consequently, their value is a multiple of the value of deposits. By maintaining a ratio of 
cash and equivalent reserves to deposits, or alternatively expressed, by maintaining a 
liquidity ratio less than one, the commercial banks add new money to the economy. Apart 
from the above major banking operation, there is a range of modern banking activities 
not included in the empirical definition. However, since banks are continually adding new 
services to the range of their activities, there is no commonly accepted theoretical 
definition that encompasses all banking operations (Saunders, 2004). 
2.3.2 Banking Functions: Importance of Banking Mediation 
Banks are dependent on the services sector, and like any business, their main goal is profit 
maximisation. Their role and profit maximisation behaviour have special importance for 
the economy. Developments in the financial sector have a strong impact on the 
commercial sectors of the economy which is the reason that solvency is an essential 
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characteristic of banks. Creditworthiness not only attracts deposits but also ensures the 
smooth functioning of the economy.  
Traditional Role 
The earliest theories attribute the existence of banks to their exclusive ability to transform 
primary debt, which is preferred by borrowers, to secondary debts, credit tools that 
lenders prefer and possess. The coupling or matching of money demand with supply is a 
service that has high production costs and takes time to be realised. This increased cost 
of using the banking network is divided into several economic units, and is viewed as the 
most rational way of coupling the need for cash with the offer of capital funds or money 
resources (Saunders and Cornett, 2003). 
Additionally, banking institutions can manage collective portfolios in which the 
evaluation risk is much smaller than for an individual portfolio due to the diversity of 
holdings. According to the first banking theories, the provision for solvency, or 
creditworthiness, and the cheaper mediation services were the reasons for the existence 
of banks. An equally important function of banks is that they provide a transmission 
channel for monetary influences. Through commercial banks, the monetary policy 
pursued by the Central Bank is spread throughout the economic system. However, 
because banks do not have exclusivity in these services, it was questionable whether the 
role of banks is based only on these theoretical pursuits.  
The Evolution of the Role and Functioning of Banks  
During the years between 1984 and 1997, the number of commercial banks decreased 
significantly from 14,500 to around 9,800 banks. This change forced researchers to 
discuss disintermediation and to stress that the importance of the traditional role of banks 
is declining in the face of new economic developments. Through intense international 
competition in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, the oversized banking 
system was forced to re-evaluate both its size and its economic role. Meanwhile, the 
development of technology in the banking sector brought new impetus and opportunities 
for innovation. Services such as automatic teller machines (ATMs), on-line banking, and 
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the proliferation of credit cards created new markets for the banking sector (Saunders and 
Cornett, 2003). 
With the development of these new activities, the traditional role of banks changed, 
creating a need for modern theories to explain the necessity of credit intermediation. The 
banks improve the total results of competitive capital markets by issuing a secondary 
credit tool called deposits. To a greater extent than do the primary bonds, deposits protect 
against the risks associated with the inability of households to know ex ante, with absolute 
certainty, the future allocation of their expenditure. The security of liquidity is the 
essential function of mediatory organisations, which offer lenders low pay credit tools 
that protect lenders not only from unexpected disruptions of the temporal allocation of 
consumption, but also from the uncertain cost lenders undertake by contributing directly 
to borrowers. A common lender does not know the investment plans of businesses 
because the cost of data collection is disproportionately large compared to the expected 
revenue from the portfolio. Monitoring costs are borne by banking organisations that, 
because of their size, exploit economies of scale to reduce monitoring costs per loan unit 
for the benefit of creditors and debtors. The raison d’etre of the banking system, but also 
the most important banking service, is providing the safest and lowest cost allocation of 
the available savings for the various economic uses (Saunders, 2004). 
Business Operations and Poles of Modern Banking  
The complexity of modern banking services and their distinctive role in the economic 
environment has led banks to become highly specialised. The diversification of products 
that every financial institution offers, depending on the area of specialisation, requires the 
application of different strategies. The range of banking services is large and extends from 
retail banking to securitisation and stock market transactions. Commercial banks serve 
many individuals and small businesses and must perform many tasks daily, such as 
issuing consumer loans and credit cards. In small and medium enterprises, the practice 
that is followed is more direct and is based on developing relationships of trust. In 
investment banking, the services are focused on a narrower, but more specific, clientele. 
Financial institutions and large corporations require highly specialised financial products. 
Consulting services, long-term investment loans, and financing international trade 
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transactions are the main business areas of investment banking. Banking institutions offer 
intermediation services such as being guarantors in possible mergers, minimising any risk 
associated with the financial condition of the parties involved (Belmond, 2010). 
The banks manage their capital through stock trading to maximise their profits, and at the 
same time, the banks offer these services to institutional investors. Through managing the 
portfolio of their creditworthy customers, banking institutions cover the complete needs 
of large institutions and private individuals for investment and management. In addition, 
specialised institutions, such as central banks of countries, supervise the wider banking 
system and conduct the monetary policy for each individual state or any union of states. 
2.3.3 The Global Environment  
Although international banking has been practiced for several centuries, in recent decades 
the technological development of transport and the rapid growth of international trade in 
goods and services have fuelled its rapid growth. Consequently, the largest banking 
houses are competing against each other to attract deposits and loans in this new and 
appealing environment. The banking services in this global environment, along with 
increased profitability and the opportunities for growth that they offer, are creating 
intense competition among banking institutions. Starting at the end of the twentieth 
century, banks have had to modify the strategies to be robust and capable of coping with 
new challenges (Saunders, 2004). 
Positive Perspectives on International Expansion  
The development of trade on a global scale and ease of access to all kinds of information 
and economic data has encouraged companies in the banking industry to do business 
internationally. Following their geographic expansion, financial institutions disconnect 
their future success from the course of a single economy. Often the proceeds of a bank 
that operates locally or nationally become tied to the state of the domestic economy, 
impeding the administration from devising expansion strategies and restricting further 
growth (Belmond, 2010). Through international expansion, banks can increase their sizes 
and exploit economies of scale. By crossing national boundaries, the average operating 
costs of financial institutions are reduced since there are opportunities for better use of 
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assets. The expanded global market allows a commercial bank to find cheaper and readily 
available sources of cash funds. This is an extremely useful feature of international 
activity because through these sources, banks finance their commercial endeavours and 
cover their operating costs without having to pay more for the scarce domestic financial 
resources. By offering services in the international market, banking institutions can attract 
and develop client relationships with multinational companies. By funding multinational 
companies and supporting direct investments abroad, the banks’ profit margins expand, 
and their positions in the global market improve. This perspective cannot be developed 
by institutions that offer their services locally because they are not able to offer their 
products to large groups and reap indirect benefits from the value of international trade 
and investment. In special cases, international expansion can bring favourable tax regimes 
for financial institutions and allow them to avoid intense supervision. In some countries 
outside the EU and the USA, there are tax exemptions and flexible supervisory laws that 
allow companies having their bases there to increase their net profits. Although non-
institutional, this perspective provides a powerful incentive for banking institutions.  
Negative Impact of International Expansion  
Along with the benefits that accrue from international operations, there are some factors 
that adversely affect the overall impact of these activities. Although geographic 
expansion allows banks to better manage their assets by giving them multiple options, the 
cost of monitoring and reporting is significantly larger (Belmond, 2010). The differences 
in the cultures, legal frameworks, and currencies of each country have to be taken into 
account when investing in the global market. The cost of monitoring these parameters is 
added to the conventional costs associated with the monitoring of investment 
opportunities in domestic markets, thus increasing the total operating costs of the bank. 
In addition to the increased cost of monitoring, there are also fixed costs. Fixed costs 
incurred by an organisation that operates in more than one market are very high. The 
larger the size of the firm, the greater the total fixed costs. However, fixed costs do not 
depend only on the size of the bank, but also on local market prices. The prices of 
production factors vary from country to country, making the total costs different. Apart 
from the establishment of branches in a new market, a banking institution may expand 
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geographically by acquiring a percentage of a bank that already exists. This option offers 
important gains without additional expenditures. However, in this case, high levels of 
confidence in the company's management and in the political and economic condition of 
the country are required. A prolonged recession in the country that operates the partner 
bank or an unfortunate administrative strategy can jeopardise the total investment capital 
without the investor having the opportunity to implement his own strategy (Saunders, 
2004). 
2.3.4 An Example: The Banking System of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 
A brief analysis of the banking system of the KSA will be presented. The banking system 
of the KSA, as is the case in most of public governance and public life, is influenced by 
the tradition and the culture of the country which is built on the principles of the Law that 
originates from the Quran. The key authority in the banking system of the KSA is the 
Saudi Arabian Monetary Authority (SAMA), established in 1952, which is the central 
monetary agency (Hertog, 2007). 
Prior to the 1950s, the banking system of the KSA relied on the Saudi Hollandi Bank, 
which was the key financial agent of the KSA and was part of the Netherlands Trading 
Society. After the financial crisis of the 1950s and due of the need of the Kingdom to run 
its own matters without depending on third parties, the SAMA was launched as the key 
financial institution of the KSA. This was supported by the USA and Aramco. SAMA is 
responsible not only for maintaining the reserves and controlling the agents of the 
country’s financial system, but also for controlling all the transactions related to the oil 
industry (Hertog, 2007). This function is critically important and distinguishes SAMA 
from other financial systems because SAMA does not operate as a traditional watchdog, 
but also controls the lucrative oil reserves of the country (Fahad Abdullah Al-Mubarak, 
Public Investor 100, Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute, retrieved 25 October 2015) 
SAMA has been subject to many reforms and today is considered one of the most efficient 
and important financial systems in the Middle East. It has significant autonomy and this 
helps the KSA to have an advanced financial system, thus avoiding any financial troubles 
and supporting the economy of the country. 
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2.3.5 Overall Discussion  
The access to rich and persistent mineral deposits affords developing economies the 
financial resources critical to the developmental process and the stabilisation of economic 
systems and export partnerships (Davis and Tilton, 2002). Davis and Tilton (2002) 
characterise this assessment as the traditional view of development through resource 
exportation and state that the underlying mineral wealth “in the form of deposits that can 
be profitably mined, is part of a country’s stock of capital”. If a country possesses an 
inherently high capital such as rich oil fields, foundation and subsequently output should 
increase significantly. As a result, per capita income should increase over time as well 
(Davis and Tilton, 2002). If dormant, untouched, and under-utilised, these deposits are 
unproductive, thereby reducing the potential for the domestic economy to capitalise on 
the developmental potential of a robust and persistent natural supply of minerals (Davis 
and Tilton, 2002). This exploitative paradigm of extraction and economic advantage not 
only perpetuates the reliance on a limited stream of natural resources but also, as observed 
by Wiig and Kolstad (2012), prevents nations from embracing a diversified platform and 
investing in new industries. 
Focusing on the politics and protectionism of oil-rich nations, Wiig and Kolstad (2012) 
observe that if the “income from existing immobile factors are sufficiently large 
compared to the expected income from new industries, then diversification into new areas 
is not necessarily in the interest of the elite” (p. 201). The reign and persistence of the 
high-income, high-wealth elite class not only lowers the incentives associated with 
industry transformation or re-investment, but also restricts the willingness of these 
regimes to invest in private sector development that could usurp their rents and profits 
(Wiig and Kolstad, 2012). 
Focusing on nations seeking to determine pathways of diversification, Wiig and Kolstad 
(2012) propose that diversifying in those sectors with mobile, dynamic production, such 
as manufacturing or services, has the potential to “induce less elite opposition to 
democratization and improve the chances of a viable democracy”. Alternatively, where 
the targeted sectors of diversification are immobile, as in agriculture, opposition is likely 
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to be magnified as elite leaders resist the loss of their property and long-term financial 
returns (Wiig and Kolstad, 2012). 
2.4 Government Investment and Economic Growth 
The crowding out effect described by Karl (2004) and Frankel (2012) reflects a self-
replicating cycle of developmental defeat. When the government must invest significantly 
in the exploitation of oil and gas resources, the funding and other human and 
technological resources available to other industries is limited (Karl, 2004). Despite the 
high level of volatility in commodity prices for oil and gas, Frankel (2012) observes that 
once the infrastructure has been integrated into the domestic economy, the governmental 
priorities do not reorient or refocus on other areas of opportunity. Instead, dependency 
perpetuates stagnation in other industries and critical manufacturing and agricultural 
sectors suffer, creating additional dependencies on external, imported resources (Frankel, 
2012). Despite the potential for a positive trade balance due to the high outflows of in-
demand oil and gas resources, governments fail to acquire the skills and competitive 
potential necessary to stabilise internal growth and development, creating a perpetual 
state of dependency that can only be overcome through differentiation and diversification 
(Karl, 2004). 
Although more than half of the world’s population lives in democratic nations of some 
sort, Anyanwu and Erhijakpor (2014) observe that “only 11 percent reside in full 
democracies, representing just 15% of all countries in the world, whilst more than 37% 
of the population in these democratic nations live under authoritarian rule”. Underscoring 
the perpetuation of authoritarian regimes is what Singh (2011) characterises as the rule 
of law, or a standard of practice and oversight which inhibits the introduction of 
reformative initiatives based on tradition and the persistent status of the overarching 
regime (p. 218). Relying heavily on the strength of the military and the dominion of legal 
constructs and charters, nations with authoritarian traditions perpetuate the status and 
stability of these regimes through the maintenance of the status quo (Singh, 2011). 
Anyanwu and Erhijakpor (2014) describe a modernisation effect, meaning that oil-rich 
governments are more likely to employ their wealth to prevent the formation of 
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independent social groups, thus inhibiting democratisation, and to invest in protectionist 
positions that “retard certain social changes that tend to produce more accountable 
government” (p. 11).  
2.5 FDI and Private Sector Development 
One of the challenges in oil producing states is that reliance on domestic resources and 
industries affects the willingness of governments to embrace the patronage and financial 
support of foreign corporations (Singh, 2011). Highlighting evidence from Nigeria, Singh 
(2011) observes that, due to the strategic positioning of foreign corporations with direct 
access to rich oil resources, developmental agendas and state objectives have been 
manipulated by firms with limited domestic investment or vision. 
The domain and influence of the elite class in an oil-dependent nation plays a critical role 
in the transformative potential of the lower classes, subjugating their interests in favour 
of sustainable socio-political divisions and governmental authority (Singh, 2011). 
The concept of policy transfer proposes that “pioneering projects and innovative 
regulations in individual countries will spread within the GCC” (Reiche, 2010, p. 2396). 
As the GCC has gradually opened its borders to the international community, Reiche 
(2010) observes that the low taxation levels and the low labour costs have been 
particularly attractive to foreign corporations seeking to maximise their profitability and 
capitalise on international foreign partnerships. However, the result of such international 
expansion has been the positioning of energy-intensive industries within GCC nations 
and, as a result, increases in the environmental and climate change impacts of these 
continued operations and exploitative initiatives (Reiche, 2010). 
2.6 Systemic Risks and Consequences of Resource Constraints for Bank 
Profits 
Focusing on the diversification of industry and energy throughout the GCC, Atalay et al. 
(2016) observe that alternative energy investments serve as capacity indicators for the 
gradual alleviation of domestic dependency on oil and gas resources. Through the 
quantification of these statistical indicators over time, a pattern of domestic investment 
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in future energy resources is developed, highlighting strategic focal points that are being 
implemented throughout these nations to sustain and protect their abundant natural 
resources and diversify their energy economies (Atalay et al., 2016). 
Investing in sustainable technologies in oil exporting nations of the GCC represents a 
strategic advantage which has the potential to significantly enhance the long-term 
developmental outlook for these nations (Reiche, 2010). By acknowledging the peak of 
oil and the terminal nature of the extractive industries, Reiche (2010) posits that GCC 
nations, all of whom are currently highly vulnerable to the effects of climate change, have 
the potential to introduce alternative technologies that can augment and mitigate the 
demand for fossil fuel-based energy sources. From desalinisation plants to solar and wind 
energy, the acknowledgement that alternative and sustainable resources could achieve a 
strategic domestic advantage, on both national and regional scales, should be sufficient 
to motivate and inspire technological uptake in the coming decade (Reiche, 2010). 
2.7 Banking Sector Risk Management and Performance 
2.7.1 Introduction to Bank Sector Risk Management  
Risk concerns the expected values of the results of future events. From a technical point 
of view, the value of those results may be positive or negative. However, generally we 
tend to focus only on any potential harm that may arise from a future event. This risk may 
accrue either from incurring a cost, termed a downside risk, or by failing to attain some 
benefit, which is an upside risk. There are many definitions of risk: 
 The international guide to risk-related definitions is ISO (2009) which 
describes risk as the “effect of uncertainty in objectives”. The effect may 
be positive, negative, or a deviation from the expected. Also, risk is often 
described by an event, a change in circumstances, or a consequence 
 Eugene Rosa (2003) defines risk as “the situation or the event where 
something of human value is at stake, and where the outcome is 
uncertain”, clarifying that if there is no uncertainty, there is no risk. 
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 The first edition of the well-established Australian risk management 
standard, AS/NZS 4390:1999, defines risk as the “chance that something 
will happen that will impact on objectives. It is measured in terms of 
consequence and likelihood.” 
  The quantitative definition is provided by OHSAS (2011) is “Risk is a 
combination of the likelihood of an occurrence of a hazardous event or 
exposure(s) and the severity of injury or ill health that can be caused by 
the event or exposure(s).” 
Mathematically, risk is often simply defined as RISK = (probability of event occurring) 
x (impact from event occurring). In this equation, the term “probability of event 
occurring” is also called likelihood. If any of the variables on the right side of the equation 
approaches zero, then the overall risk approaches zero. 
It is important to make a distinction between risk and uncertainty. Frank Knight (1921) 
establishes the distinction between risk and uncertainty as follows:  
Uncertainty must be taken in a sense radically distinct from the familiar notion of 
risk, from which it has never been properly separated. . . . The essential fact is that 
‘risk’ means in some cases a quantity susceptible of measurement . . . It will 
appear that a measurable uncertainty, or ‘risk’ properly, is so far different from an 
unmeasurable one that it is not in effect an uncertainty at all. We . . . accordingly 
restrict the term ‘uncertainty’ to cases of the non-quantitative type. 
A solution to this ambiguity is proposed by Douglas Hubbard (2009), who defines 
uncertainty as the lack of complete certainty, that is, the existence of more than one 
possibility (p.10). Risk is a state of uncertainty where some of the possibilities involve an 
undesirable outcome. In this sense, Hubbard uses the terms so that one may have 
uncertainty without risk but not risk without uncertainty. We can be uncertain about the 
winner of a contest, but unless we have some personal stake in it, we have no risk. If we 
bet money on the outcome of the contest, then we have a risk. In both cases, there is more 
than one possible outcome. The measure of uncertainty refers only to the probabilities 
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assigned to outcomes, while the measure of risk requires both probabilities for outcomes 
and losses quantified for outcomes. 
For any organisation and its management, the ability to cope with risk is essential. Hence, 
risk management consists of the approaches that firms use to deal with risks they face. 
Indeed, the world today is an unpredictable place and as long as there is some uncertainty 
about the future events that could result in adverse outcomes for individuals, risk must be 
managed. The prevailing definition of risk management is given in the ISO Guide as 
“coordinated activities to direct and control an organization with regard to risk”   (ISO, 
B. and Guide, I.E.C., 2002, p73). Risk management has a variety of origins and is 
practised by a wide range of professionals. One of the earliest applications of risk 
management was used in insurance management functions in the USA. The practice of 
risk management became more widespread and better co-ordinated because the cost of 
insurance became prohibitive in the 1950s and the extent of coverage was limited. 
Therefore, insurance buyers became concerned with risk control. In Europe, the 
combined approach to risk financing and risk control developed in the 1970s, followed 
by the establishment of the concept of the total cost of risk. This led to the realisation that 
there were many risks facing organisations that were not insurable. Risk managers in the 
1980s and 1990s were frequently mid-level executives within the corporate hierarchy on 
Wall Street or Main Street. They managed exposure to risk of all types. This is no longer 
true for market, credit, or operational risk, which are now actively managed on a firmwide 
basis by senior risk professionals reporting to the Board level of many firms. Today risk 
management is an essential component of any corporate business strategy (Greuning, and 
Bratanovic, 2009). 
At this point, it is important to acknowledge that risk management, despite being one of 
the core concepts of modern finance, has always been on the forefront of financial 
management. However, over the past 10 years there has been a growing interest in risk 
management due of the global financial crisis. Indeed, beginning with the financial crisis 
in the USA in 2007-8, mostly caused by factors related to risk management, and then 
spreading to the European crisis that began in 2010, risk management and its ability to 
prevent and deal with upcoming crises has attracted increased attention (Kotz, 2015). 
  
37 
Some of the factors that led to the recent crises included the inability of the banking 
system to cope with the potential risks and their inability to identify some key internal 
factors which led to these crises such as the relaxed underwriting standards allowing 
origination of riskier mortgages to less creditworthy borrowers, along with high levels of 
corruption and greed (Pezzuto, 2013).  
The above example indicates how important it is for financial systems to have sustainable 
methods of risk management. 
It is important to describe the categories of risks that banks may have to face. In the 
banking industry, there are numerous risks affecting profitability. In banking, risk is 
defined as the probability that financial loss will be suffered due to an event that devalues 
assets or causes direct loss. Risk can be financial or non-financial, with each category 
having various subtypes and significances. Financial risk includes the broadest types of 
risk such as credit risk, political risk, and any risk related to external events (Achou, 2008; 
Ghosh, 2012; Cleary and Malleret, 2007). Systemic risk in banking is the probability of 
a sudden disruptive event occurring that would impede profitable banking (Kaufman and 
Scott, 2003; Mishkin, 1991). Such an event has been described metaphorically as a chain 
reaction of interconnected dominos collapsing and has been empirically expressed by 
covariance (Kaufman and Scott, 2003; Lumby and Jones, 1999; Kaufman, 1994). Such a 
chain reaction may occur when large financial organisations consistently default on 
payments. This reaction inadvertently propagates, with the resultant withdrawal and 
transfer of deposits, causing liquidity problems and, in some cases, insolvency (Kaufman 
and Scott, 2003). Financial institutions that suffer insolvency are often excessively 
leveraged (Kaufman and Scott, 2003; Rochet and Tirole, 1996).  
Currently, the KSA and other Gulf nations rely on the fact that banks hold a much larger 
than normal reserve and government assurance of all deposits (Essayyad and Madani, 
2003; Thomsen and Goton, 2012). As is discussed in subsequent sections, the style of 
governance and reliance on fossil fuels as the primary source of income has left the 
region’s economy and the banking sector quite concentrated and excessively risk averse 
(Essayyad and Madani, 2003; report 2012; Niblock and Malik, 2007; Rodriguez, 2006). 
At present several political economic (PE) factors, including the interplay among the 
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fluctuating value of fossil fuels, government spending, governance style, the state of the 
economy, and a diverse society with divergent demands is of particular importance in the 
risk it imposes on banks (Niblock and Malik, 2007; Crystal, 1990; Auty, 2001a). As is 
evidenced below, the heavy dependence on oil puts banks in the Gulf region at risk of 
common shock, or a mutual financial struggle. Countries with specialised industries are 
at high risk for common shock disruption, an effect which banks manage by ensuring 
high capital, government assurance of deposits, and risk related premiums on deposit 
insurance (Kaufman and Scott, 2003). However, overreliance on government assurance 
and insurance contributes to managers opting for profitable but high risk investments, 




2.7.2 The Effects on Bank Risk Management on Bank Performance 
The global financial crisis has proven that risk management practices are not always 
effective. However, this does not imply that there was no indication of what would 
happen. For example, in 2005, the Governor of the Reserve Bank of India, Raghuram 
Rajan, warned of just what happened (Lahart, 2009). The fact that Rajan and many 
others issued advance warnings is evidence that the bank sector’s risk management 
practices and tools worked and that they identified the potential risks. However, there 
was a need to understand that risk management is not a decision-making function, but a 
set of practices and tools for the decision-making process. Hence, there was evidence of 
what would happen, but the decision makers did not take the appropriate initiatives to 
prevent this crisis (Koller, 2012). Indeed, it seems that there was sound knowledge of 
what would happen, but culture and lack of transparency are some of the key reasons 
that led to the financial crisis (Patterson et al., 2011). 
It is understood that a well-organised risk management system can help organisations 
avoid many problems, including bankruptcy and being exposed to stakeholders. Some 
examples include the cases of Enron, Daiwa Bank, WorldCom, Parmalat, Lehman 
  
39 
Brothers, and many others where despite warnings, the organisations did not take the 
appropriate action and went bankrupt. This emphasises the importance of complying 
with the appropriate regulations, such as the Basel regulations, and taking appropriate 
measures to cope with the risks associated with an uncertain environment (Bhole, 
2006). 
A large portion of ensuring the fair performance of banks and avoiding the case of fraud 
or wrongdoing is complying with regulations. For example, Basel II rules force banks to 
prove that they are trustworthy by implementing stricter criteria in the calculation of 
risk-weighted assets and a stricter definition of equity. The new Basel rules associated 
with the weighting of assets calculates operational risks and introduces three alternative 
methods for calculating both credit and operational risks. Moreover, the introduction of 
Pillars II and III reinforces the supervisory processes and market discipline. Despite the 
difficulties in implementing Basel II due to lack of infrastructure in their own 
organisations, banking institutions had to adopt the rules to maintain their status and 
market share and to ensure their place in the new sophisticated banking environment. 
These difficulties stemmed from activating markets and from central banks’ limited 
experience in regulatory issues. Basel III makes special provisions for the second pillar 
as it addresses firm-wide governance and risk management, thus capturing the risk of 
off-balance sheet exposures and securitisation activities. Basel III also addresses the 
management of risk concentrations, and provides incentives for banks to better manage 
risks and returns over the long term; use sound compensation and valuation practices; 
and prompts banks to stress testing and accounting. These measures create a very strict 
framework for the operation of the banking system, making the system capable of 
dealing with the risks to avoid a future collapse. The aims are to have a financial system 
that will be much more reliable than in the past and to improve the system’s 
performance. 
 
2.7.3 Categories of Banking Risks 
These multiple sources of risk raise issues of definition. Quantitative risk management 
has become a major banking operation, and general perceptions are useless. The different 
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types of risks must be identified and designated carefully, and such definitions provide a 
first basis for measuring risk and for implementing risk management. The definitions of 
various types of risks have become more accurate. This process has been helped 
considerably by new rules and regulations which have identified the basic principles and 
rules applicable to various risks. A consideration of these definitions is the starting point 
of risk management (Bessis, 1998). 
Credit Risk  
Credit risk is the risk that customers will fail to fulfil their obligations to repay debt. This 
is called customer default and can result in total or partial loss of the amount loaned by 
the Contractor to the counterparty, the borrower. Credit risk is also the risk of a reduction 
in the credit standing of the counterparty. Such deterioration does not imply default, but 
it means that the probability of default increases. Financial markets assess the 
creditworthiness of companies and manage risk through higher interest rates on issues of 
corporate debt, either through a reduction in the value of their shares, or through an 
evaluation of the companies` valuation, which is an assessment of the quality of the debt 
issues. Credit risk is significant since the default of a small number of important 
customers can cause large losses, which may lead to bankruptcy or insolvency. This is 
observed through classical processes in banks. Restrictive systems put a limit on the 
amount of lending to customers in a single industry and to customers in a single country. 
Ultimately, there are differentiated rules of risk between the counterparties. The size of 
the commitment is not sufficient for the measurement of risk. Risk has two dimensions: 
the size of the risk, or the quantity that can be lost, and the quality of the risk, which is 
the probability of default (Finch, 2009).  
The quality of risk is often estimated through evaluations. These assessments are internal 
to the lending bank, or external when derived from rating agencies. The measurement of 
quality of risk may lead to the quantification of the probability of customers to default, 
plus the probability of any compensation in the case of default bankruptcy. The 
probability of default is obviously difficult to calculate. Historical data on defaults by 
rating scales or by company are available but cannot be applied to any given customer. 
The size of compensation is also unknown. The loss or default depends on the every-time 
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warranty, either by third party guarantors or by any mortgage that has been defined as 
compensation in the event of bankruptcy and liquidation of securities. In summary, the 
credit risk, the oldest of all bank risks, is actually the result of multidimensional risks. It 
sounds paradoxical that the most commonly known of all risks still remains difficult to 
assess. Finally, the overall credit risk in the transactions of a portfolio, in loans, or in 
market tools is difficult to assess. If the defaults of all customers occur at the same time, 
for example, because they belong to the same company or group, the risk is greater than 
if these defaults are independent. All banks are protected from risk through portfolio 
diversification, which makes these concurrent defaults very unlikely. However, the 
quantitative measurement of the effect of diversification remains a challenge (Brigham 
and Ehrhardt, 2013). 
Market Risk 
Market risk is the risk of unfavourable deviations of the market value, or the mark-to-
market value, of the negotiating portfolio during the required period for the liquidation of 
the transactions. Market risk exists for each time period. The earnings for the market 
portfolio are the revenues minus the losses arising from transactions. Any reduction in 
value will bring a market loss for the corresponding period equivalent to the difference 
between the nominal value, the mark-to-market value, in the beginning and at the end. 
The holding period of financial instruments is not suitable to measure market risk, when 
at any time, it may be decided to liquidate the tools or to hedge them for future changes 
in value. There is also a risk that the market value may change during the minimum 
required period for the liquidation of transactions. This is the reason the market risk is 
limited to the period of liquidation. Beyond this period, the risk has a different form. It is 
the risk of an inability to monitor the market portfolio. If the control of risk is insufficient, 
the values in the market can deviate in any size up to that of the liquidation or hedging. 
Meanwhile, the possible deviations can far exceed any deviation that could occur within 
a short period of liquidation. This risk is more an operational risk than a genuine market 
risk. Even if the liquidation period is very short, the deviations may be important in 
volatile markets. Also, if the market tools are not easy to liquefy, they are difficult to sell 
without great discounts. When the liquidation period is longer, there are real and greater 
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deviations in values. Generally, the liquidation period varies with the type of financial 
instrument. It may be as short as one day for foreign exchange, and much longer for 
derivatives.  
In any case, the regulator provides rules to set the period of liquidation. Obviously, there 
is a wide variety of possible deviations in the values between any two dates, as market 
movements are rapid. Determining the possible negative deviation requires rules to 
identify the maximum possible deviation. These rules serve to establish the maximum 
deviation over a given threshold, say 5%, of all possible market movements in the 
specified period (Brigham and Ehrhardt, 2013). 
Interest Rate Risk 
Interest rate risk is the risk of lower profits due to changes in interest rates. Most accounts 
on bank balance sheets show returns and costs, which are adjusted in accordance with the 
interest rates. Since interest rates are unstable, so are profits. Every lender or borrower is 
subject to interest rate risk. The lender who is getting paid in a floating interest rate 
situation faces the risk that yields may decline due to a reduction in interest rates. The 
borrower who pays a floating rate of interest has higher costs when interest rates rise. 
Both sides are risky since they cause returns or debts adjusted to market rates. However, 
this also provides opportunities for profits.  
In addition, a main role of financial institutions is the transformation of capital from one 
form to another, such as from deposits or liabilities to loans or assets. The mismatching 
of maturities between assets and liabilities leads to interest rate risk.  
Exchange Rate Risk 
Currency risk is a risk caused by changes in exchange rates. Deviations in earnings are 
caused by the adjustment of odds and fees on exchange rates or by the changes in the 
values of assets and liabilities denominated in foreign currencies. Currency risk is a 
classical field of international finance and is an element of market risk. 
For market transactions, exchange rates are a subset of the market parameters, the 
fluctuations in which are counted together with other market parameters. There is also an 
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additional currency risk for all banking or market transactions made in foreign currencies, 
because profits must be translated into a monetary basis. A traditional way to approach 
the foreign exchange risk is to manage risk on a currency-by-currency basis for the 
banking portfolio. 
Liquidity Risk 
Liquidity risk is the risk of the inability to find sufficient cash reserves to cover the 
liabilities of the bank, for example, the replacement of existing funds as they mature or 
are withdrawn to satisfy customer needs for further lending. Liquidity risk is considered 
a large risk. It is often determined in two different ways: extreme illiquidity, the safety 
cushion provided by the portfolio of the liquid assets, and the ability to fund with a 
"normal" cost. Extreme non-liquidity leads to bankruptcy (Gefang et al., 2011).  
The liquidity risk is an unwanted risk. However, such extreme conditions are often the 
result of other risks. For example, significant losses due to the default of a major customer 
could cause liquidity issues and doubts about the future of the organisation. These are 
sufficient to cause massive withdrawals of funds or the closing of credit lines from other 
institutions that are trying to protect themselves from possible default. These two events 
can cause a major liquidity crisis, which is likely to result in bankruptcy. Another 
common definition of liquidity risk is when short-term asset values are not sufficient to 
match current liabilities or unexpected outflows (Brigham and Ehrhardt, 2013). 
However, liquidity is the safety net that helps in difficult situations. Finally, the liquidity 
risk entails problems in raising funds. In this case, the liquidity risk is related to the ability 
to find funds at a reasonable cost. One such capability is the result of two factors: market 
liquidity, which varies temporally, and bank liquidity. Both factors interact to determine 
the conditions of funding (Nobili, 2008). The cost of liquidity can be increased due to the 
transitory liquidity shortages in the market. The market liquidity has an effect on the cost 
of funds for all players. Market liquidity indicators include the volume of transactions; 
the level of interest rates and their changes; and the difficulties encountered in finding 
counterparty. The ease of access to foreign funds also depends on the characteristics of 
the organisation: the organisation`s capital requirements and the stability of those over 
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time; the design of debt in time; the credit standing of the bank; and all the characteristics 
that shape market perceptions of the bank, its evaluation, and the politics of its financing. 
If the perception of its credit status is worsened, the funding will be more expensive. If 
finding of funds becomes suddenly significant or experiences unexpected fluctuations, 
the market perception can be negative (McConnell et al., 2011).  
Liquidity risk is a normal result of specific transactions. These create a maturity gap 
between assets and liabilities. Often banks collect short-term sources of funding and lend 
for long intervals. Given this difference in maturities, there is always a liquidity risk and 
a liquidity cost. Liquidity cost can be defined as any cost caused by the blocking of 
liquidity for the time horizon of the loan. The status of liquidity of a bank is captured by 
the time limits or the projected uses and the sources of funds. These define the timeframe 
of the gap between the uses and the sources of funds. The size of these gaps and their 
stability over time provide a comprehensive picture of the liquidity situation. The aim of 
debt management is to manage these future liquidity gaps within acceptable limits, given 
the market perception of the bank (Gefang et al., 2011). 
Operational Risk 
The question is whether the risk of direct or indirect loss arises from problematic internal 
processes and systems, human behaviour, or external factors. Operational risk refers to 
losses that may arise due to inadequate systems and internal controls, human errors, 
failure of management, and any potential difficulties among the key targets of corporate 
governance, including shareholders, managers, or representatives of employees. Such 
problems can arise from failure to take preventive action. An important type of 
operational risk concerns the technological risk, which is the risk of damage to or 
insufficiency of information technology systems (Kobayashi, 2012). This means that 
there is a need to protect these systems from intrinsic difficulties or outside interference. 
Other aspects of operational risk can arise from external factors, such as fires, 
earthquakes, or other natural disasters. The above definition is open to many adaptations 
and different factors may be emphasised in different places depending on the 
particularities of each bank. However, the above definition is assumed to be satisfactory 
at the industry level (Kobayashi, 2012). 
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The Basel Committee includes legal risk in the definition of operational risk. The latter 
arises from frequent changes in the legal framework governing the operation of banks, 
affecting their profitability. For example, a court order relating to a particular bank may 
have wider implications for the settlement of important banking issues in the entire 
banking system. The incorrect legal advice or incorrect legal documentation that includes 
evidence and supporting materials, may lead to loss of value. In addition, banks should 
carefully investigate the legal risk when developing new financial products, introducing 
new types of transactions, or operating internationally. The supervisory framework for 
banking activities varies widely among countries and may be susceptible to different 
interpretations. Foreign banks’ poor understanding of the supervisory framework of the 
banking system in the host country can lead to the imposition of costly sanctions 
(McConnell et al., 2011). 
Country Risk 
Country risk is defined as the probability that the country will fail to generate enough 
foreign exchange to service its external cash loans. Moreover, a kind of credit risk is due 
to the circumstances prevailing in one country and not in the individual firm that borrows 
from a financial institution. The US and European banks faced this problem in loans given 
in the 1970s to less developed countries in Eastern Europe and South America. In the 
early 1980s, these countries faced problems and many were forced to seek restructuring 
of their debt, as was the case for Mexico and Brazil.  
2.7.4 Practical Implementations for Banking Risks  
As Culp (2001) claims, risk management is primarily designed to protect banks from 
damage and is related to risk reduction efforts. The key to the concept of risk management 
is the identification and handling of risks. The main objective is to maximise value, 
minimise losses, and remove potential threats to make banks sustainable. Risk 
management must be a continuous process in accordance with the strategy followed by 
each bank. Efficient risk management will create an appropriate framework for the future 
activity of the organisation and will improve the decision-making process and the 
programming capability, thus reducing volatility and uncertainty in important business 
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operations and improving the overall operational efficiency. According to Erich (2008), 
credit institutions play a very important role in the management of financial risks. A key 
concern of banking institutions is risks that comprise hazards. These can be recognised, 
evaluated, measured, and easily adjusted. Banks should take protective measures to limit 
risks. For example, there should be special attention paid to the terms of loans so banks 
are not exposed to levels of risk with which they cannot cope that would jeopardise their 
overall profitability and viability (Hoffman, 2002).  
Certainly, effective risk management is required together with the supervision of 
authorities in the forms of necessary laws, rules, and procedures. This ensures the 
reliability of banks and increases their ability to deal with the negative effects of 
exogenous factors. Authorities supervise and control each department in banks and pass 
laws and presidential decrees to control the liquidity, solvency levels, capital adequacy, 
risk, and corporate governance efficiency (Cummins and Embrechts, 2006). For the 
banking sector to establish an effective operational risk management framework and 
practices, banking institutions should pay special attention to their leadership. It should 
be understood by the governments at all levels of the hierarchy that effective management 
of operational risk will bring additional value to banks, so it is necessary to design an 
appropriate management framework that is part of the general corporate governance of 
the bank (Currie, 2004). The aim of upper management is to bring greater benefits back 
to the banks through its products and services. To do this, the banks need to reduce the 
levels of risk inherent in all their banking products and services. Through the development 
of an effective operational risk management framework, the specific risks can be 
minimised, thereby reducing the costs that the banking system incurs. Moreover, banks 
can regulate the capital they need to cover the risks. In the future, this process can lead to 
better operational efficiency, reduced costs, better customer service, and other important 
benefits (Hoffman, 2002).  
2.7.5 Operational Risk in the Banking Sector  
Operational risk in the banking system is different from the categories of credit risk or 
market risk. Operational risk exists from the moment the bank uses employees and 
systems for its internal processes that are managed and subject to external influences. 
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While operational risks have caused considerable economic losses, related harmful events 
have been attributed to credit and market risks (Balestra, 2000). For example, there have 
been transactions that fraudulently produced a market risk caused by an operational risk. 
An operational risk is intrinsically linked to the credit institution, with all its processes 
and the business of the bank profile. It is related to the organisational culture that pervades 
the bank and includes a series of specific methods applied in the daily operation of the 
bank. While market and credit risks are based on relative incomes, this is not true for an 
operational risk. That is, higher operational risk does not lead to low-income levels (Al 
Ariss, 2014).  
Most operational risks lie in the internal environment of the bank. This indicates a lack 
of information and data for creating an effective operational risk management database. 
The losses of banks that are attributable to operational risk are not necessarily transferred 
to other banks. Due to the acceptance of credit and market risks, it is easier to measure 
and control the conditions that determine them as existing exposures which can be 
managed through variation (Balestra, 2000). However, this is not the case for operational 
risk in which the interaction of risk factors is not clear, which may lead to potential loss. 
Operational risks are rarely high which causes some concern about the stability of 
banking institutions. In addition, operational risk is the result of a loss while the credit 
and market risks are causes of damage. There is confusion between operational risks and 
credit and market risks. In many cases, an event may incur various types of risks (Culp, 
2001). However, the bank administration should pay attention to understanding the causes 
and results of risk to ensure effective management and effective actions (HSBC Global 
Research, 2014). In the case of such events, as shown above, the operational risk is 
measured in credit risk and augment, which results in incorrect data that can lead to 
management making bad decisions. In such a case, managers may consider a redesign of 
the lending process. However, recording an operational risk can increase credit risk as the 
damage can easily be reported. This can lead to the financial capital being customised to 
ensure adequate coverage (HSBC Global Research, 2014).  
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2.7.6 Supervisory Bodies – Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
In the last twenty years, the international financial system has operated in a much more 
volatile environment that significantly impedes the supervisory work of the national 
authorities. The liberalisation of capital and financial markets, coupled with the intense 
competition between banks, exerts pressure on the profitability of the industry. Banking 
groups, in their efforts to maintain high levels of profitability and improve their position 
in the global market, increase their exposure to risk. Banks offer special services to the 
economic system and guaranteeing the smooth functioning of the banking system is a 
prerequisite for overall economic stability (Treacy and Carey, 2000). For this reason, the 
supervision of the banking system is very important, and the establishment of uniform 
rules is recommended by institutional authorities, such as the European Union, and by 
non-institutional authorities, such as the Basel Committee. These recommendations are 
followed by the incorporation of the standards by each country, with the aim of having 
the whole global banking system governed by common rules. The efforts for supervision 
are continuously adjusted to current financial conditions (Slovik, 2012). 
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Basel I  
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision was established in December 1974 by the 
governors of the central banks of the G-10 countries in response to the collapse of the 
Bankhaus Herstatt bank in Germany and the Franklin National Bank in the USA. The 
Committee is an organisation without legal definition that acts under the framework of 
the Bank for International Settlements. Its beginnings coincide with the abolition of the 
system of fixed exchange rates of Bretton Woods and the beginning of the formation of 
a global monetary system characterised by volatile exchange rates and basic 
macroeconomic features. In this framework, banking activities are particularly vulnerable 
to risks and therefore, banks should be provided with the required capital. The main 
objective of the Basel Committee is to establish rules for the prudent supervision of 
capital adequacy of banks. The standards set forth by the Committee are not binding on 
the countries or banks in countries that are recipients of the proposals. However, efforts 
are made for their implementation to achieve uniform treatment of banking risks 
(McConnell et al., 2011). 
Basel II 
The new proposals (1999-2001) of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision are a 
continuation of the Initial Advisory Text revised framework for capital adequacy of credit 
institutions. The new proposals are based on three interdependent pillars that contribute 
to the security and stability of the financial system.  
The first pillar is the minimum capital requirements for coverage of the undertaken risks. 
The second pillar the supervisory review procedures for capital adequacy of credit 
institutions. Finally, the third pillar concerns the increasing requirements that markets 
may impose on banks regarding their capital adequacy through rules that mandate 





It is generally accepted that the implementation of the regulatory framework of banking 
supervision for the Capital Adequacy contributed to the decline in bankruptcies of banks 
and ensured the stability of the banking system worldwide. The Initial Accord (1988) 
succeeded, through typical rules, in addressing the majority of risk which comes in the 
form of credit risk. The criticism against the Initial Accord focused mainly on its inability 
to follow the developments of international banking. Banking institutions were 
undertaking risks on a global scale, causing the indicators measuring these risks to be 
inadequate. Furthermore, the discrete values with which the requirements are weighted 
are not accurate and do not capture the time interval of the requirements. Finally, the 
minimum value of the solvency ratio (8%) is generally applicable and allows banks to 
conduct supervisory arbitrage. For example, loans are weighted with the same coefficient 
whether they are given to small or large companies. The revision of the Initial Accord 
gave the banking institutions the option to weight their requirements using internal 
models. However, in practice, these models do not lead to qualitative conclusions due to 
imperfections that arise in the use of individual parameters. The evaluation systems are 
complex and can only be implemented by a few large banks, creating a problem under 
the conditions of international competition between banks. However, the most important 
consequence of the New Accord is that it creates a problem of macroeconomic character. 
Capital and provisions are accumulated during the growth cycle of expansion lending and 
earnings growth to cover the risks of loan write-offs and reduced profits during the 
descent phase. The capital supervision, however, tends to bind the banking institutions 
during the descent.  
Approaching the solvency ratio limit because of the economic climate, banks are forced 
to reduce lending and increase their capital at very high cost. The whole process works 
against efforts of the economy to recover because the capital that is necessary for 
investments costs more. 
The international community has placed emphasis on the need for domestic markets to 
be strengthened so they are less vulnerable to financial crises. The implementation of the 
three pillars of the New Accord is critical to the safety and solvency of the banking 
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system. At the same time, however, supervision must be exercised with the utmost 
flexibility so that the rules reflect the constantly changing conditions. 
Basel III new rules are not only an improvement of the previews accords but also a more 
decisive step to avoiding global crises. Basel III demands more capital in quality and 
quantity, introduces buffers for countercyclical capital conservation, and demands capital 
loss absorption at the point of non-viability. Extra focus is given to risk coverage and 
liquidity to reduce leverage. Furthermore, risk management and supervision is expanded 
to off-balance sheet exposures and securitisation activities to facilitate managing risk 
concentrations, thus providing incentives to banks to better manage risk and returns over 
the long term. Basel III strengthens market discipline by demanding more enhanced 
disclosures of the details of the components of regulatory capital. One of the main reasons 
the economic and financial crisis became so severe is that the banking sectors of many 
countries had built up excessive on-and off-balance sheet leverage which was 
accompanied by a gradual erosion of the level and quality of their capital bases. At the 
same time, many banks were holding insufficient liquidity buffers. Therefore, the banking 
system was not able to absorb the resulting systemic trading and credit losses nor could 
it cope with the reintermediation of large off-balance sheet exposures that had built up in 
the shadow banking system.  
The crisis was further amplified by a procyclical deleveraging process and by the 
interconnectedness of systemic institutions through an array of complex transactions. 
During the most severe portion of the crisis, the market lost confidence in the solvency 
and liquidity of many banking institutions. The weaknesses in the banking sector were 
rapidly transmitted to the rest of the financial system and the real economy, resulting in 
a massive contraction of liquidity and credit availability. Ultimately, the public sector had 
to step in with unprecedented injections of liquidity, capital support, and guarantees, 
exposing taxpayers to large losses (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision reforms, 
2011). 
The effect on banks, financial systems, and economies at the epicentre of the crisis was 
immediate. However, the crisis also spread to a wider circle of countries worldwide. For 
these countries, the transmission channels were less direct and were caused by a severe 
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contraction in global liquidity, cross-border credit availability, and demand for exports. 
Given the scope and speed with which the recent and previous crises have been 
transmitted around the globe, as well as the unpredictable nature of future crises, it is 
critical that all countries raise the resilience of their banking sectors to both internal and 
external shocks (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision reforms, 2011). 
Basel III is a comprehensive set of reform measures to strengthen the regulation, 
supervision, and risk management of the banking sector. These measures have the 
following objectives: 
 Improve the banking sector's ability to absorb shocks arising from 
financial and economic stress, whatever the source  
 Improve risk management and governance (Basel III, 2011) 
 Strengthen banks' transparency and disclosures  
The reforms target the following: 
 Bank-level, or microprudential, regulation, which will help raise the 
resilience of individual banking institutions to periods of stress  
 Macroprudential, system wide risks that can build up across the banking 
sector as well as the procyclical amplification of these risks over time 
These two approaches to supervision are complementary because greater resilience at the 
individual bank level reduces the risk of system wide shock (Basel III, 2011). 
2.8 Corporate Governance, Institutional Accountability, and Performance 
2.8.1 Corporate Governance 
Since the mid-1990s, Corporate Governance (CG) has been an important topic of 
academic research as well as for policymakers on both the national and international level 
and in both developed and developing countries. Various economic scandals and crises, 
like the accounting scandals of Enron, Parmalat, and WorldCom, have provided strong 
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incentives for greater emphasis on the compliance of business organisations with 
corporate governance systems. Consequently, corporate governance methods have been 
developed to reduce the chances of violations by ensuring quality financial reporting to 
maintain firms’ good reputations and creditability (García-Meca and Sanchez-Ballesta, 
2009).  
The recognition of the need for corporate governance resulted from a comment in Adam 
Smith’s Wealth of Nations (1776). Since the 1980s, when the term first appeared in the 
international literature, many studies with different approaches to this complex subject 
have been published. In some papers, the culture and the management theories focus more 
on the effects of corporate governance on the efficiency of enterprises, or the structure of 
the capital and the organisation based on statistical analysis and numerical data. However, 
the fact is that corporate governance remains an ambiguous concept, despite attempts at 
definitions by various scholars, which indicates the lack of a common acceptable 
conceptual framework (La Porta et al., 2000). 
For the purposes of this research, corporate governance is understood as the need for 
governance to ensure the success of companies with emphasis on the role of boards of 
directors that are ultimately responsible for the organisations’ decisions and performance. 
This approach recognises that if corporations want to remain competitive in a rapidly 
changing world, they must innovate and create new opportunities. Chi-Kun Ho (2005) 
defines governance as the structures and the procedures between boards, stakeholders, 
and executive managers, which includes the exercise of strong stewardship and leadership 
in establishing targets, evaluating performance, and becoming oriented on innovation 
(Leblanc, 2004). Ahmed and Najam (2005) state that "Corporate governance can be 
regarded as a decision making and integrative management frame work of fair do’s and 
don’ts within which the organization achieves its goals and objectives while maintaining 
its relations with different actors, forces and environments." Corporate governance can 
thus be defined as a set of effective rules and mechanisms through which a business 
organisation is directed and monitored to maximise its long-term value as well as to 
protect and satisfy the expectations of its employees, shareholders, creditors, and 
financial markets (Shahid, 2009).  
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Corporate governance covers a wide range of issues concerning enterprises yet can also 
be divided into outsider and insider systems. Outsider systems are used in UK and US 
companies. The main feature of these systems is the fact that equity ownership is widely 
dispersed and managed by institutional investors whose primary interest is the 
maximisation of their financial investment. The insider model of corporate governance is 
usually followed in OECD countries and “it is characterized by large concentrated share 
ownership, cross-shareholdings, and long-term committed shareholders” (Tan and Wang, 
2010). The insider model concerns small-sized firms that are characterised by less wealth 
institutionalism and more family interests.  
Examples of definitions of “Corporate Governance” are listed below: 
Solomon J., 2004.  “The system of corporate governance presiding in any 
country is determined by a wide array of internal factors, 
including corporate ownership structure, the state of the 







“Corporate governance includes the laws and procedures 
through which the state, civilians and social groups promote 
their opinions and interests, solve their differences and fulfil 
their obligations.” 




for the 21st Century.  
“Corporate governance is about ‘the whole set of legal, 
cultural and institutional arrangements that determine what 
public corporations can do, who controls them, how that 
control is exercised and how the risks and return from the 
activities they undertake are allocated’.”  
Monks and Minow, 
1995. Corporate 
Governance.  
“Corporate governance is the relationship among various 
participants (chief executive officer, management, 
shareholders, employees) in determining the direction and 
performance of corporations.”  
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Shleifer and Vishny, 
1997.  
“Corporate governance deals with the way suppliers of 





“Corporate governance is about how suppliers of capital get 
managers to return profits, make sure managers do not misuse 
the capital by investing in bad projects, and how shareholders 
and creditors monitor managers.”  
International Chamber 
of Commerce.  
“Corporate governance is the relationship between corporate 
managers, directors and the providers of equity, people and 
institutions who save and invest their capital to earn a return. 
It ensures that the board of directors is accountable for the 
pursuit of corporate objectives and that the corporation itself 
conforms to the law and regulations.”  
 
Source: Solomon (2004) 
 
Various empirical researchers indicate that corporate governance plays a significant role 
in reinforcing transparency and accountability as well as in determining business 
relationships through a properly established legal and regulatory framework. Through the 
adoption of constructive corporate governance methods, business organisations can 
acquire strong competitive advantages resulting in long-term sustainability. Because any 
possible economic irregularity is prevented and business ethics and integrity are 
encouraged, the level of investors’ and clients’ trust is heightened. Furthermore, firms 
that adhere to strong corporate governance mechanisms can offer corporate security and 
confidentiality and, because of their good reputation, they are considered more attractive 
to potential foreign investors and can establish a more competitive position in the global 
business environment. Finally, good corporate governance can ensure the creation and 
development of a smoothly-operating, flexible, and fair internal business environment 
that is characterised by reduced conflicts of interest, stronger willingness for job creation, 
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higher employee morale, and increased commitment of employees (Ahmed and Najam, 
2005). 
2.8.2 Corporate Governance Principles  
Corporate governance is the benchmark of all worldwide efforts to ensure the smooth and 
efficient operation of businesses. The compilation of corporate governance methods is 
attributed to the OECD, which published these principles in 1999 after much discussion 
with various governments, international organisations, and the private sector. Within the 
next few years, the rapid evolution in the financial and business world created the need 
for the redaction of new governance principles that would consider new data and 
contemporary concerns, and thus could respond to the needs of business. In 2003, the 
OECD published the revised principles of corporate governance (Common, 2008).  
The purpose of the governance principles is to shape the framework within which 
business efficiency can be improved and balance in the economy can be achieved. 
Corporate governance offers specific guidance to all stakeholders, including legislators, 
executives, and market players. It identifies specific objectives and proposes of 
appropriate measures to achieve efficiency. Indeed, recognising that each country may 
have different economic, social, political, and legal conditions, the OECD gave the 
government authorities a non-binding character, thus facilitating smoother integration in 
the environment of each country. It is worth noting that these principles are not 
exclusively for countries that are members of the OECD, but are available to all countries 
(Rathmell and Schulze, 2000).  
The importance of this principle is that the frame of corporate governance varies 
considerably for each country because of different conditions in each. More specifically, 
this principle contains four distinct points that are presented as proposals. First, it argues 
that the framework should be developed considering its impact on the performance of the 
economy, on the market integrity, and on the incentives created for the different parts of 
the market to promote transparent and efficient markets (Ewers and Malecki, 2010). With 
this proposal, the fact that business entities variously affect the operation and performance 
of the whole economy requires the governance framework adopted to be consistent with 
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the requirements and market demands. Corporate governance should prevent conflict and 
promote transparency. Secondly, the various laws and regulations should be established 
after discussions between all interested parties, including states, businesses, and 
stakeholders, to ensure transparency and common acceptance, considering the costs and 
benefits of each case and protecting the rights of all parties (Common, 2008).  
This proposal highlights the need for a clear description of responsibilities of each 
authority to avoid conflicts between them, the costs associated with these problems, and 
the possibility that some cases may not fall under the jurisdiction of any authority. In 
other words, the various authorities should work together to overcome conflicts of 
interest, should be composed of highly qualified people, and should have the funds 
necessary to effectively carry out their work (HSBC Global Research, 2014).  
The second proposal claims that certain rights accompany share ownership, such as 
voting at meetings and electing directors. These rights are usually provided by law and 
have similar protection. The proposals of this authority are related to those rights of all 
shareholders recognised by law in countries that are members of the OECD. The clear 
formulation of these rights is intended to provide notification to shareholders and to 
eliminate abuse by third parties, such as directors or managers of businesses, for their 
own benefit. Therefore, an effective framework for corporate governance should keep 
shareholders informed about the dates and locations of meetings and keep them up to date 
on the daily issues. In addition, shareholders should have the opportunity to ask questions 
to the Board, introduce topics for discussion, and propose solutions within reasonable 
limits (Culp, 2001). Indeed, it is proposed that the shareholders have the same rights 
whether they are present or absent from meetings. Furthermore, to enable markets under 
corporate control to operate in an efficient and transparent manner, shareholders should 
know their rights and whether they are protected in case of takeovers, mergers, and selling 
of a significant part of the assets of the company. Additionally, it is argued that 
institutional investors should disclose their overall strategies on corporate governance 
procedures and should address conflicts of interest that may affect the efficiency of their 
investments. Finally, the second principle suggests that shareholders, including 
institutional investors, should have the opportunity to consult each other on issues 
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concerning their basic rights as specified in the principle. In other words, since the 
shareholders are usually small and scattered, the possibility of cooperation allows them 
to effectively exercise their roles in the company, preventing cases of unequal treatment 
(Erich, 2008).  
According to the third principle, for the capital market to function properly, investors 
should feel confident in the output of their funds. This means that there should be the 
appropriate legal rights for shareholders, whether they belong to a minority or to another 
country with a different legal framework, to protect them from potential exploitation by 
others in the company, such as the Board of Directors, executives and major shareholders 
(HSBC Global Research, 2014). In fact, this principle is analysed in three separate 
proposals. First, all shareholders should be treated equally. This essentially means that 
they have the same rights and belong to the same class. The acceptance of shareholders 
of those classes that are affected negatively is required. Especially for minority 
shareholders, it is specifically mentioned that there is both the need to protect them from 
major shareholders and a need for prediction of the existence of adequate compensation. 
Moreover, within the framework of equal treatment of shareholders, the vote via 
representatives is promoted, together with voting abroad as well. General meetings should 
follow procedures that permit all shareholders to exercise their rights (Doerig Hans-
Ulrich, 2000). Secondly, it is noted that internal transactions should be prohibited. This 
proposal is directed at those countries that have similar provisions in their legislative 
structures, inducing them to take the necessary steps to ensure this treaty. Finally, the 
third proposal suggests that the board members and senior managers disclose any material 
interests to the Council, either directly or indirectly, or on behalf of third parties who are 
related to any matter that directly affects the business. This ensures the objectivity of the 
staff to their work performed within the company and the chances of encroachment of 
corporate interests are reduced (HSBC Global Research, 2014).  
The fourth principle encourages cooperation between companies in creating value, job 
vacancies and the conservation of financially strong companies. Stakeholders play an 
important role in any business, sometimes by offering their capital, as do investors and 
customers; sometimes working as employees; and sometimes providing credit, as do 
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suppliers and creditors. Hence, since their contributions to the functioning and 
effectiveness of the operation are significant, it is ultimately in the interest of businesses 
to maintain excellent and lasting relationships with them (Erich, 2008). There should also 
be possible compensation in case of infringement. This requires a transparent and 
effective legal framework to protect these rights. Particular for workers, it is suggested 
that their involvement in corporate governance through the development of specific 
mechanisms to improve efficiency works positively for enterprises both directly, through 
increased efficiency, and indirectly, through the readiness of employees to invest their 
skills in the business (Hoffman, 2002). Another proposal that is part of the role of 
stakeholders in corporate governance concerns the need for early and regular access to 
adequate and reliable information on governance processes, which is a prerequisite for 
them to fulfil their obligations. Moreover, as in the case of shareholders, open 
communication between the stakeholders and the Council allows discussion of their 
concerns about illegal or unethical practices without fear of limiting their rights. In this 
way, it is ensured that these issues are addressed within the business, avoiding the 
possibility of defamation or functional instability. Creditors are important stakeholders in 
businesses because they are those from whom the business borrows money. Therefore, 
the effective enforcement of their rights, combined with a good framework for 
bankruptcies, are two factors favouring the development of better relations between 
creditors and companies. Therefore, creditors should receive special attention in the 
formulation of an effective governance framework (Currie, 2004).  
The fifth principle is important because it promotes transparency, acting as a mechanism 
to control the entire enterprise; it provides shareholders with the necessary information 
to better exercise their rights; it strengthens the credibility of the company to outside 
investors; and it protects the various stakeholders from violation of their rights. It is not 
a coincidence that almost all countries fortify corporate governance legislatively, others 
on an annual basis, and others on a semi-annual or quarterly basis. According to the 
OECD, the disclosure should include substantial information on the trade among related 
businesses; the intended risk factors; the matters relating to employees and other 




It is essential that the disclosure be limited to the above cases, which are important in the 
context of corporate governance and therefore deserve a separate report. Regarding the 
way the disclosure is placed, an accounting procedure is proposed that includes the use 
of financial and non-financial variables. In this way, the reliability of published 
statements is increased and the control of the company is facilitated. At the same time, 
the OECD proposes the conducting of annual audits by independent auditors who will 
objectively assure the Council of the validity of financial statements, thereby enhancing 
the credibility of the statements (Currie, 2004). These external auditors are expected to 
be accountable only to shareholders, undertaking the obligation to the company and not 
to executives, thus demonstrating professionalism when conducting the audit. In addition 
to the information, which can be relatively expensive to obtain, the development of other 
channels of information such as electronic registration is provided, which will give all 
interested users timely, equitable, and inexpensive access to information, enabling even 
further audit procedures (Sbracia, 2003).  
The sixth principle states that the Board is responsible for the design and implementation 
of corporate strategy, for controlling managers, and for resolving conflicts of interest, and 
for keeping the company in balance. Indeed, since the Board’s role is complex, many 
companies precisely define powers and responsibilities. The OECD, in an effort to 
develop a framework for corporate governance, formulates six proposals related to the 
responsibilities of the Board. First, it argues that managers should be fully informed and 
act in accordance with the interests of the company and its shareholders. With this 
proposal, special emphasis on loyalty to the management company is given to all 
shareholders (Tokic, 2015). This proposal complements the previous one, suggesting that 
Council members should not treat shareholders differently. The maintenance of high 
ethical standards makes the Council more credible, improves the image of the entire 
enterprise, and limits potential mismanagement. The principle refers to the basic 
functions performed by the Board. According to the OECD, these functions are vital for 
an effective framework for corporate governance. In addition, the Council should be able 
to exercise objectivity on corporate issues, which can be achieved through the inclusion 
of independent, non-executive directors (Currie, 2004).  
  
61 
2.8.3 Corporate Governance Theories 
Corporate governance can be described as that which facilitates “effective, 
entrepreneurial and prudent management that can deliver the long-term success of the 
company” (The UK Corporate Governance Code - 
http://www.frc.org.uk/corporate/ukcgcode.cfm). In order for corporate governance to be 
successful there are some principles that act as manuals, as indicated above. These 
principles are based on a number of theories, outlined below.  
 
Agency Theory  
In the work of Clarke (2004) Agency Theory is defined as “the relationship 
between the principals, such as shareholders and agents such as the company executives 
and managers”. “According to this theory, the shareholders hire certain people known as 
agents (who can hold many positions like managers, directors, etc.) that act in accordance 
to the best interest of the shareholders themselves”. Even though this is the main purpose 
things don’t always unfold in the desired way, as Padilla (2000) states. It is possible that 
the agent will not make the shareholders’ interests his. The theory focuses on the 
relationships that are masked by the basic structure of the principal and the agents who 
are engaged in a cooperative effort, but have differing goals and differing attitudes toward 
risk (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972). “When an agent pursues risky projects, although they 
may lead to an increased value of the asset, such a move threatens the job security of the 
agent. He is therefore not interested in such projects because they are seen as risky”. 
The agent has an incentive to deviate from the principal’s interests, because the 
agent’s preferences or goals differ from the principal's. It is usually assumed that the 
interest of the principal is to maximize wealth (Denise, 2001). The agent, on the other 
hand, is interested in a variety of issues such as career goals and increased salary, (Jensen 
and Meckling, 1976). Given this conflict of interests, the agent, if left alone, will pursue 
his own interests to the detriment of the principal’s. A basic factor in the survival and 
success of the corporate form of organization is the control and monitoring of agency 
problems (Fama and Jensen, 1983). One would expect some countermeasures are meant 
to have been deployed; for Jensen and Meckling (1976) these countermeasures come in 
the form of country laws, contracts (bonds), incentives and monitoring. Contracts are used 
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as a mechanism to resolve ex-ante problems caused by the nonalignment of the interests 
of shareholders and their appointed agents. These contracts specify relationship between 
shareholders as principals and managers as agents; between shareholders (principals) and 
directors (agents); between directors (principals) and managers (agents) The contracts can 






Figure 1. The agency model 
Source: Jensen M.C. and Meckling W. (1976) “Theory Of The Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs 





For Block (1993), the Stewardship Theory can be described as the exact opposite 
of Agency Theory. In short, “Stewardship is... the willingness to be accountable for the 
well-being of the larger organization by operating in service rather than in control of those 
around us”.  A view that is also supported by Armstrong (1997). In this theory, stewards 
are company executives and managers working for the shareholders – those who protect 
and increase profit for the shareholders. Many researchers (Donaldson & Davis, 1991; 
Armstrong 1997; Block, 1993) note that, unlike agency theory, stewardship theory 
stresses not individualism, but rather the role of management as stewards, integrating 
their goals into the organization. “The stewardship perspective suggests that stewards are 
satisfied and motivated when organizational success is attained” (Block, 1993). 
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Being a successful theory it can have a major impact on the costs of the 
shareholders for monitoring and controlling. How can this happen? According to 
Donaldson and Davis (1991) it is because as a theory it promotes the autonomy that 
stewards can gain through trust, highlighted in Figure 2 (see below). The bigger the trust, 
the more autonomy can be achieved which in turn can maximize the return of the 
shareholders. Even if it wasn’t for the autonomy gained through trust, it would be the 
thought of advancing in the business world. To be more precise executives and directors, 
in order to protect their reputations as decision makers in organizations, would be inclined 
to operate the firm in such a way in order to maximize financial performance as well as 
the shareholders’ profits. Keeping this in mind it is understandable why someone would 
associate the firm’s performance with their individual performance (Famas, 1980 and 
Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). 
 
 
Figure 2. The Stewardship Model 
Source: Armstrong, JL. (1997), “Stewardship and public service”, Ottawa, Discussion 
Paper for the Public Service Commission of Canada, Ottawa. 
 
Stakeholder Theory 
Stakeholder Theory can be defined as “any group or individual who can affect or 
is affected by the achievement of the organization’s objectives” (Abdullah and Valentine, 
2009). According to the stakeholder theory, managers are not working for the 
shareholders, but rather they serve and nurture a network of relationships. To Donaldson 
and Preston, (1995), those included are somehow connected to the firm itself, such as the 
customers, the investors and many more, as it can be seen in Figure 3.  
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“On the other end, Sundaram & Inkpen (2004) contend that stakeholder theory attempts 
to address the group of stakeholders deserving and requiring management’s attention. 
Whilst, Donaldson & Preston (1995) claimed that all groups participate in a business to 
obtain benefits. Nevertheless, Clarkson (1995) suggested that the firm is a system, where 
there are stakeholders and the purpose of the organization is to create wealth for its 
stakeholders” (Abdullah and Valentine, 2009:48). 
Freeman (1984) contends that the network of relationships with many groups can 
affect the decision making processes as the stakeholder theory is concerned with the 
nature of these relationships in terms of both processes and outcomes for the firm and its 
stakeholders. Donaldson & Preston (1995) argued that this theory focuses on managerial 
decision making, but the interests of all stakeholders have intrinsic value, and no sets of 
interests is assumed to dominate the others. 
 
Figure 3. The stakeholders model 
Source: Donaldson, T. and Preston, L.E. (1995) “The Stakeholder Theory of the Corporation: Concepts, 
Evidence and Implications”. Academy of Management Review, Vol. 20, No. 1, pp. 65-91. 
 
Transaction Cost Theory  
Transaction Cost Theory was first initiated by Cyert and March (1963) and later 
theoretically described and explored by Williamson (1996). This theory attempts to view 
the firm as an organization comprising of people with different views and objectives. 
“The underlying assumption of transaction theory is that firms have become so large they 
in effect substitute for the market in determining the allocation of resources. In other 
words, the organization and structure of a firm can determine price and production” 
(Williamson, 1996). The unit of analysis in transaction cost theory is the transaction. 
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Therefore, the combination of people with the transaction, suggests that transaction cost 
theory managers are opportunists and arrange firms’ transactions to their interests. 
2.8.4 Corporate governance in the banking sector  
Corporate governance is the cornerstone of the organization with respect to the 
effective internal control systems in modern business. It is the key element in the success 
of companies, functioning as the mechanism through which to overcome conflicts of 
interest. Modern businesses have to be oriented not only to maximize profit but also to 
social interest. An effective corporate governance system demands the existence of 
integrated rules and internal mechanisms (Jensen, 1996). According to Jesover and 
Kirkpatrick (2005), the transparency of management and social responsibility are two of 
the most essential subjects leading companies today. Corporate governance balances the 
economic, social and environmental operational activities. It provides a series of rules to 
be followed, so that a company is not only administrated with consistency and 
transparency, but also for it to showcase this to its prospective investors. A sequence of 
unfavourable events during the last 15 years in the international business community 
(including the financial institutions) rekindled interest in the best practices of corporate 
governance.  The best practice focused on and around the field of adequacy and 
transparency of financial results, that are announced by companies and the effectiveness 
of their operational structure (Jesover and Kirkpatrick, 2005).  
As a result, a considerably large number of codes and laws were first issued in 
countries with developed economies.  Here, the meaning of corporate governance (the 
most acceptable definition was given by O.E.C.D.), as well as the description or the 
redefinition of rules/guidelines of its implementation and the Management’s and the 
Board of Directors’ responsibilities range of authority was determined. There, 
developments regarding the rules of corporate governance implementation were also 
incorporated (Jensen and Murphy, 1990). Under consideration of the Basel Committee 
(the international forum that assures Bank system stability), with its new framework for 
International Convergence of Capital Measures and Capital Standards, the need for banks, 
and especially Boards of Directors and Management and Internal Audit Units, to take 
measures is essential in order to establish a sound system of Corporate Governance 
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(Leblanc, 2004). Typically, in the preface of the OECD text which publicized the 
proposals for the principles that should concern corporate governance, the whole exercise 
is part of the effort to help governments improve existing legal, institutional and 
regulatory frameworks and to provide guidance on exchanges, investors, businesses and 
other interested parties involved in the process of developing a sound corporate 
governance system, following the best practices available (La Porta et al., 2002). The aim 
is to determine international roles and clarify the rights and obligations of the various 
actors involved in the governance of a company, and further incorporate them into the 
operation of those mechanisms that are used for monitoring and control, a fact that 
enables the efficient use of available resources. It is important to note that in the Basel 
Committee on the implementation of sound corporate governance practices, these 
substantially contribute to the acquisition and maintenance of public confidence, which 
is considered critical for banks to function and the economy in general (Roe, 2003).  
An increasing number of companies worldwide are progressing in their use of 
fundamental values to govern their operation at management level and training codes of 
ethics for employees (Code of Conduct). These actions are dictated either by a certain 
regulatory environment, including what happens to companies whose shares are traded 
on the New York Stock Exchange or are found under adoption of international best 
practices (Shleifer, A. and R. Vishny, 1997). The globalization and liberalization of 
markets and a number of adverse developments in the international financial community, 
particularly the last 15 years have caused concern and anxiety for both the efficiency and 
transparency of the information provided by the companies for their financial size and for 
the effectiveness of their operating structure. It is essentially a matter of credibility when 
it comes to companies which use practices of corporate governance. An important factor, 
in particular, is the degree of adoption and implementation of the appropriate mechanisms 
for monitoring and control of an undertaking, whilst efficiently using the available 
resources (Shleifer and Wolfenson, 2014). Unsurprisingly, consideration is growing 
primarily in economically developed countries such as in the USA. Other counties have 
been working on the matter of corporate governance after the OECD initiative (1999) for 
creating a record of the authorities, that is, the values that should govern the relations 
concerning companies’ management with shareholders and other co-operators. There are, 
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however, substantial differences in dealing with the problem for each country. Most 
corporate governance codes are limited to recommendations - proposals and their 
submissive nature (voluntary rules). On the other hand, particularly in the USA, most 
companies have chosen to institutionalize mandatory rules. Although one could argue 
that the latter approach facilitates the work of the internal auditors, it is not certain that 
the introduction of such practices would avoid the repeat of Enron-type events in the 
future (Jensen, 1996).  
 
It is evident that the problem of corporate governance consists, in essence, of the 
design and operation of the appropriate control environment in a company so that its 
interests receive priority in order for the company to avoid any conflicts of interest, with 
a view to meeting the expectations of shareholders, customers, suppliers and employees. 
To this end, the main role of the management of an enterprise plays a major role in order 
for the manager to integrate the operation of appropriate internal controls into an 
appropriate control system (Jensen, 1996). A key component of this is the Internal Control 
Unit which has an essential function in the improvement of corporate governance 
structures and the achievement of desired objectives. Given the intense competition faced 
by enterprises, it should be noted that the true application-sharing of best practice 
corporate governance use of a multiplication of internal controls (internal controls) is 
secure and has positive results. In particular, when it comes to banks, the concept of 
internal control, namely the establishment of control mechanisms or procedures for 
carrying out their work practice, is applied worldwide since the start of their operation 
(Jesove and Kirkpatrick, 2005). Today, the necessity of the internal control system of 
company development and the role and importance of Internal Audit Units is recognized 
by international organizations texts (V.I.S.-European Commission, etc.). The 
implementation of the proposed framework of ICS principles ensures a reasonable 
assurance, in order for organizations to achieve established targets. Even rationale, given 
by the International Institute Auditors, are positively evaluated in terms of efficiency and 
effectiveness for the viability of an organization (Tricker, 2005).  
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The special interest of corporate governance concerning banks is focused on the 
fact that, as opposed to the other or non-listed companies, banks are subject to a strict 
supervisory regime. This is because they receive deposits of public and funding agencies, 
while also providing investment services. Therefore, it is not surprising that banks make 
efforts to implement the corporate governance rules proposed by international 
organizations, including prudential rules. World War II made currency risks being faced 
by banks virtually insignificant, while the fluctuations of interest rates in international 
currencies were, mostly, moderate, and price competition was irrelevant, since central 
banks applied strict regulations concerning the fixing of lending and deposit rates. In 
general, the new Basel II framework dictates the need for measures by banks to form a 
robust corporate governance system and, in particular, to apply sophisticated risk 
measurement and management methods. All stakeholders, Management-Internal 
Inspectors and those who are using other audit functions, are required to develop 
responsibilities for different aspects of the systems, and ideally there should be yearly 
evaluations (Weir et al., 2002).  
As King and Levine (1993) correctly pointed out, banks act as financial 
intermediaries, a role extremely important to the economic development of a country, 
whether developed or developing. Banks have a special role in countries with immature 
stock markets where they not only act as the primary source of raising capital for 
businesses and households but they are also a common place for people to deposit their 
savings (Blommestein & Spencer 1993, Tandelilin et al 2007). Keeping these two 
functions in mind, it is concluded that the primary duty and concern of every government 
is the implementation of regulatory rules and legislation, to protect both depositors’ 
funds, as well as to maintain the public confidence in the reliability of the banking system.  
It is clear that “the bankruptcy of a bank, can cause significant public costs and 
cause broader macroeconomic implications” (Bhattacharya,et al, 1998). As a result, the 
importance of corporate governance in the banking sector of each country, as well as the 
significance of a viable approach throughout, is central to the management of corporate 
governance in the banking sector. Specifically, a "narrow" approach to corporate 
governance in the banking sector treats its structure as a mechanism through which 
shareholders ensure that the managers will act and manage the business, having as their 
  
69 
main concern the benefit of shareholders and other stakeholders (Shleifer & Vishny, 
1997).  
For Macey and O'Hara (2001), a broader view of corporate governance must be 
adopted, especially in the case of banking institutions. “The reasons behind this claim are 
mainly the particular forms of banking activities, forms that corporate governance should 
take into consideration in order to promote both shareholders’ and depositors’ interests” 
(Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2005).  
According to the most recent document outlining corporate governance, published by 
the Basel Committee II in July of 2005, “corporate governance includes the way in which 
a business or even a foundation managed (run) by the board of directors and senior 
executives and that affects the way that the bank”: 
 Defines the business objectives (including shareholders’ expected performance of 
invested capital) 
  Specifies the procedures and the way that banking services are made/offered 
  Responsibly fulfils their obligations to their shareholders, while taking into 
consideration the interests of other stakeholders 
 Aligns activities and overall behavior with the expectation that banks will operate 
in a safe and a proper manner and in accordance with applicable laws and 
regulations  
 Protects depositors’ interests 
 
Despite this, banks are not like other companies. “Even if we consider this broad 
concept of universal bank or if we narrow the approach down to commercial banking, the 
fact is that banks are not like other firms” (Ogbechie & Koufopoulos 2008). The very 
nature of its business lies in receiving deposits, making loans and processing information, 
and its central role in any economy, as the basis for the payments system, makes them 
different in many aspects. The academic literature has been prolific in attempts to explain 
the existence of financial intermediaries, i.e., what it is that banks do that cannot be 
replicated in the capital markets through direct contracting between investors and firms 
(Gorton and Winton, 2002). According to researchers, including Fama (1985), what 
makes banks different from other companies is that they simultaneously:  
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1. Provide access to the payments system, and  
2. Have access to financial information of customers, which they directly control  
According to many researchers (Fama, 1985, Freixas & Rochet, 1997, Macey & Hara, 
2001), banks have two additional functions: 
1. To transform assets (assets transformation)  
2. To manage investment risk (risk management).  
The above two functions point to the particularity of banks and justify the reasons why 
banks, unlike other businesses, operate on a specific legislation and regulations context. 
2.9 Corporate Governance and Financial Performance: Empirical 
International Studies  
The evaluation of corporate governance systems and their correlation with financial 
performance has long been a topic of academic research. One of the first studies was 
conducted by Goergen (1999), who examines the relationship a corporate governance, 
financial performance, and ownership structures in UK and German companies. 
Goergen’s study shows that the dispersion of business risk and, consequently, the firm’s 
performance was not necessarily determined by the ownership system. Additionally, 
financial performance was strongly connected to corporate governance, but could also be 
influenced by other factors, including the expansion of domestic financial markets into 
the global business environment.  
Leuz, Nanda, and Wysocki (2013) gathered accounting information from over 8,000 
companies in 31 countries between 1990 and 1999 and compared corporate earnings 
management among countries. The study concludes that earnings management and, 
consequently corporate governance, was negatively associated with legal enforcement 
and investors’ protection. The authors find that earnings management is significantly 
developed in countries where legal protection is weak. In the case of lack of strong 
protection, company insiders can acquire greater private control benefits, which offered 
stronger incentives to cover up firms’ performance (Leuz et al., 2013).  
La Porta et al. (1999) claim that a potential investor tends to invest more in a firm that 
operates in a stable and strong legal environment, resulting in greater financial 
  
71 
performance. According to Mitton’s (2001) study of East Asian companies, “better price 
performance is associated with firms that have indicators of higher disclosure quality, 
higher outside ownership concentration and they are focused rather than diversified.”  
Weir, Laing, and McKnight (2002) contend that there is a possible link between financial 
performance and corporate governance mechanisms, both internal and external. Based on 
evidence from 311 UK companies between 1994 and 1996, this research suggests that the 
adoption of identical corporate governance methods would lead to different results in 
each firm. The complicated relationship between corporate governance and financial 
performance could become simpler if corporate governance systems were adjusted to 
each company’s specific needs.  
Despite such studies suggesting a positive relationship between corporate governance and 
financial performance, Gruszczynski (2005) investigates listed companies in Poland and 
claims that corporate governance relates to financial performance only to a limited extent. 
More specifically, it has been found that corporate governance mechanisms might not 
influence company performance. Studies by Singh and Davidson (2003), Young (2003), 
and Kyereboah-Coleman (2007), suggest that corporate governance and firm financial 
performance are not interrelated. In addition, Doidge, Andrew, and Rene (2007), argue 
that the application of corporate governance mechanisms is negatively related to weak 
legal systems. Based on Klapper and Love (2004), those countries that were not 
characterised by efficacious legal systems had greater need for productive corporate 
governance regulations, which will eventually result in stronger financial performance. 
Lastly, according to Omran, Bolbol, and Fatheldin (2008), concerning Arab equity 
markets, ownership structure does not influence the financial performance of companies. 
Therefore, following or ignoring corporate governance methods does not necessarily play 
an important role in the determination of financial performance. 
2.9.1 The UK and US Models of Corporate Governance 
The UK and the USA are considered the originators and developers of principles of 
corporate governance. Due to numerous financial and accounting scandals, these 
countries have further emphasised the formation and establishment of corporate 
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governance codes through which to promote and encourage voluntary improvements to 
prevent any potential economic failure.  
The Model of the UK 
Corporate governance in the UK was developed by special committees set up to study the 
issue and define its parameters. The most famous of these is the Committee Cadbury, 
which drafted a report in 1992 on the "Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance", 
better known as the Cadbury Report or the Code of Best Practices. This Code, and its 
subsequent amendments, referred to the mechanisms of governance which should be 
adopted by businesses according to the principles of corporate governance. The 
recommendations of the Code, despite their non-binding nature, were accepted by a large 
portion of the business world and significantly shaped the model of corporate governance 
throughout the UK. The Cadbury Report has been followed by various other codes of best 
practice that can be briefly described by Figure 4 below: 
 
 
Figure 4. The UK corporate governance codes  




The most recently issued UK corporate governance code, formerly the Combined Code, 
was published in May 2010 and developed based on the Cadbury Report. The corporate 
governance code establishes the main principles of leadership, board effectiveness, 
accountability, and remuneration, as well relations with shareholders. The new code 
analysed and upgraded these principles, aiming to provide a framework for the adoption 
of corporate governance regulations. The Code “sets out standards of governance. 
Companies are required either to follow the Code or explain how else they are acting to 
promote good governance” (Chartered Accountants Ireland, 2012).  
One point on which the model of the UK is different from others is in the form of the 
Board. Specifically, the establishment of two independent sub-committees instead of a 
double, two-tiered board is proposed. In this system, the two tiers deal separately with 
issues of control such as audit committees, and the reward and compensation of the 
directors, respectively. This duality is not supported by the Commission Cadbury, but has 
been adopted by a significant portion of English businesses, although the results of 
investigations have not reached a clear conclusion as to its effectiveness. In addition, 
shareholding is dispersed (diffuse ownership), which is favoured by the existence of well-
developed capital markets, as in the USA (Weir et al., 2002). Indeed, large fund 
management companies, such as pension funds, hold a significant amount of capital, 
while the power of institutional investors is significant and growing. Moreover, banks do 
not play an important role in corporate governance, although participation in the capital 
market is not prohibited by law, and creditors' rights enjoy strong legal protection. The 
model of the UK strongly resembles the model of the USA. In the literature, these two 
models are often considered together and referred to as the “Anglo-Saxon system” 
(Leblanc, 2004).  
The Model of the US  
The first corporate governance code in the USA appeared in 1970 and, in January 1978, 
a report entitled The Role and Composition of the Board of Directors of the Large 
Publicly Owned Corporation was issued by the Business Roundtable. This report is a 
guideline for the minimisation of corporate criminal behaviour, as well as the 
strengthening US firms’ corporate capacities. In addition, several corporate regulations 
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have been developed by the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) and the National Association of Securities Dealers Automated 
Quotations (NASDAQ).  
As Leblanc (2004) notes, the model of the USA belongs to those models that are market 
oriented. This means that the control of managers provided in the context of corporate 
governance is carried out both by boards, with several independent directors, and by the 
external market share through the threat of takeovers. The Board in US companies, which 
is the key element of the whole control system, is composed mostly of outside 
independent directors. Their role is purely supervisory, as they are required to staff the 
audit committees defined by the capital market. Through these committees, the control of 
internal directors is ensured. These directors are responsible for monitoring the managers. 
Meanwhile, companies in the USA are also exposed to the possibility of redemption, as 
there are specific provisions which favour this form of concentration of capital (Laing 
and Weir, 1999). Some authors are in favour of acquisitions as a means of intimidation 
of the administration, while others believe it is a poor incentive that does not bring about 
desired results. Unlike the Board, which focuses on the structure of corporate governance, 
the survey results regarding duality are contradictory (Leblanc, 2004).  
The USA is dominated by diffuse ownership, with capital being concentrated particularly 
in the hands of institutional investors such as insurance funds and agencies. Generally, 
banks do not develop close, long-term relationships with businesses and usually have no 
connection with the administration. Even in cases of acquisitions using borrowed funds 
(Leveraged Buyouts (LBOs)), which have been particularly popular in the USA, banks 
only undertake the role of supervisor shareholder temporarily. Several authors attribute 
the low participation of banks in corporate governance to the legislative framework of the 
country, which is not favourable to creditors. More specifically, there is less legal 
protection of creditors' rights in the USA than in other countries such as Germany and 
Japan, mainly because of the favourable treatment of businesses in bankruptcy cases. 
Instead, the rights of all shareholders, especially those of minority shareholders, enjoy 
strong legal protection (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997).  
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It is worth mentioning that one of the most important corporate governance measures in 
the USA is the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX, S-O, or the Act), passed and published in July 
2002 by the American Congress. This act proposes and describes numerous corporate 
governance provisions to eliminate and prevent possible accounting or management 
corruptions (Zhang, 2007). More specifically, SOX imposes various requirements on 
listed companies in the following areas (Copeland, Weston, and Shastri, 2005): 
 Auditor independence  
 Certification of financial reporting  
 Insider trading  
 Enhanced disclosure  
 Standards regarding professional responsibility  
 Fraud accountability  
 Conflicts of interest  
 Penalties  
SOX signals a historically significant shift in the philosophy of the American securities 
laws toward a federalised and more prescriptive approach to corporate governance and 
financial performance.  
A brief comparison of the UK and US corporate governance codes indicates that, even 
though they present various similarities, they are also characterised by significant 
differences. Specifically, while the UK government has introduced voluntary corporate 
governance mechanisms by adopting the “comply or explain” approach, the relevant US 
codes have been more statutory and legislative. In addition, the pattern of ownership and 
control of the UK and US markets that has been determined through the corporate 
governance systems is profoundly diverse. In the USA, shareholders’ roles are quite 
constrained, while in the UK, “shareholders are clearly in the driving seat, with boards as 
contractual agents of the general meeting”. Finally, separating the roles of the Chairman 
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and the CEO of the Board of Directors has proven to be a divergent area of the above 
corporate governance codes since it has been shown that, in contrast with US businesses, 
the vast majority of the UK companies have preferred the dual leadership structure. 
2.9.2 Corporate Governance Mechanisms in Europe, Asia, Africa, and 
Australia 
Heightened interest in the development of corporate governance codes is also evident in 
other nations, including those in the European Union, Asia, Africa, and Australia.  
In April 1998, the OECD Business Sector Advisory Group on Corporate Governance was 
formed and published a report entitled “Corporate Governance: Improving 
Competitiveness and Access to Capital in Global Markets”, better known as the Millstein 
Report. This report, which presents a private-sector viewpoint, contends that “while 
government provides the structure for governance, corporate governance happens inside 
the corporation and depends on investors, boards and managements”. Further, corporate 
governance mechanisms are more efficient if greater attention is given to the principles 
of fairness, transparency, accountability, and responsibility (Holly, n.d.). 
The core principles have expanded into the five OECD Principles of Corporate 
Governance, issued in May 1999. These principles provide an institutional framework for 
the adoption of good corporate governance practices (Holly, n.d.). The five areas covered 
include:  
 The responsibilities of the Board of Directors  
 The shareholders’ rights  
 The shareholders’ equitable treatment  
 The role of stakeholders  
 Accurate and timely disclosure and transparency  
The OECD Principles of Corporate Governance have contributed to the creation of two 
additional corporate governance codes entitled the “Statement on Global Corporate 
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Governance Principles” and the “Euro Shareholders Corporate Governance Guidelines 
2000”. 
The Model of Germany  
Germany has one of the best-known models of relationship-oriented systems. In 
Germany, the principles of corporate governance are achieved not through the Board of 
Directors and acquisitions, but through the control exercised by the banks as major 
creditors and by major shareholders, with which firms maintain almost permanent 
relationships. More specifically, German law provides for the existence of two-tiered 
boards with managerial and supervisory parts. The Supervisory Board is appointed for 
some time and includes only internal staff. The Supervisory Board is composed of half 
representatives of workers and half representatives of shareholders, while the function is 
the same as for the independent external directors in US companies (Learmount, 2002).  
Unlike in the USA, where the independent directors constitute a strong control 
mechanism, the Supervisory Board in Germany does not have significant power. In 
general, the German Board is a weak control mechanism because it lacks features that 
make it a worthwhile board. It is small, holds frequent meetings involving an intense flow 
of information, and lacks conflicting interests. Furthermore, there is no significant 
external control market and the capital market cannot be characterised as highly 
developed, a fact that is partly responsible for low competitiveness (Roe, 2003). The 
absence of effective control mechanisms has meant that some companies have turned to 
concentrated ownership to address the agency problem. Consequently, the capital of 
German companies is held both by large investors, usually the dominant family, as well 
as by major creditors, such as the banks. Relationships developed between the company 
and its owners are strong and long lasting, making it very difficult to change ownership 
in any way, for example through acquisitions (Laing and Weir, 1999).  
The concentrated ownership, particularly the holding of shares by banks, distinguishes 
the model of Germany from others worldwide. Elements such as the strong protection of 
creditors as opposed to the legal protection of shareholders, which is not as strong, the 
lack of regulations to exclude the involvement of banks in equity, and the developed 
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banking system, all help to ensure that banks play a key role in the system of government. 
There are some who believe that the system of Germany is better than that of the USA 
because the concentrated ownership allows better control and reduces agency costs (Roe, 
2003). Of course, there is a contrary view, arguing that this situation brings the 
entrenchment of the directors, since they are at no risk of losing their positions as are 
those in the USA. Regardless of conflicting views as to the effectiveness of this model, 
the fact remains that the conditions in Germany have favoured the development of a 
governance model which is fully compatible with the way that German businesses 
operate, yet clearly different from that of the UK and the USA (Roe, 2003).  
The Model of Japan  
Corporate governance in Japan began to develop following the Second World War, along 
with many important changes in every aspect of the social, economic, and political life of 
the country. The distinctive feature of the unique Japanese corporate governance model 
is the existence of lifelong employment relationships: people work in the same firm for 
their entire working lives. This situation, which began as an attempt by administration to 
raise the morale of the workers after widespread layoffs following the end of the war, has 
created a climate of ethical commitment to the businesses of the country and operates as 
an incentive for the workers themselves (Jesover and Kirkpatrick, 2005). The relationship 
between this worker loyalty and corporate governance results in workers later becoming 
members of Boards of Directors, a right granted to them in recognition of their 
contribution to the company. Therefore, the Board becomes a body without real power. 
The inadequacy of the Board as a control mechanism leads to the control by senior 
management from other institutions such as banks, affiliated companies, lenders, former 
executives, suppliers, or large shareholders (Hutchinson and Gul, 2004).  
As in the case of Germany, takeovers are very rare and this happens not because of a non-
developed capital market, but because of the close and long-term relationships between 
business entities. In terms of the degree of concentration of capital, Japan is somewhere 
in the middle between the widespread ownership in the USA and the concentrated 
ownership in Germany. First, the banks, which often fill the role of large shareholders, 
have the right to participate in the capital of the companies and are actively occupied with 
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their administration. Second, the capital market allows the participation of many small 
investors in equity (Laing and Weir, 1999).  
The Model of France  
In the literature, references to corporate governance in France are rare. This suggests that 
corporate governance is not well developed, at least not in comparison to those countries 
listed above. According to the data available, France takes the following unique approach. 
France allows shareholders to choose their own form of board, single-tiered or two-tiered. 
The first case refers to a consolidated board that holds all the powers, while the second 
has power in two separate boards, managerial and supervisory. This option is not provided 
by the legal framework in any of the other countries examined (Ingley and Van der Walt, 
2004). Apart from this feature, which is clearly important in terms of corporate 
governance, France has made some important strides. The Board of Directors does not 
have homogeneity, and is sometimes composed of large shareholders. Takeovers are rare, 
with executives losing their position only in cases of privatisation, and capital is usually 
owned by powerful families and financial organisations. Therefore, the image which is 
created is that of a country that does not give special attention to the issue of corporate 
governance for reasons that may have to do with the philosophy of French companies and 
the temperament of the French themselves (Jensen, 1996).  
2.10 Summary 
The KSA and Qatar are countries that operate in a high-risk region. They depend 
primarily on oil, especially the KSA. Both countries are trying to improve their 
performance through establishing a safe financial market with limited risks. Risk 
management is an important element of this goal and can be accomplished through good 
corporate governance. In current business markets, the corporate governance landscape 
is continually evolving. The significant role of corporate governance lies in its critical 
contribution to the maintenance of companies’ internal integrity and proper functioning. 
Through the adoption of good corporate governance mechanisms, the competitiveness 
and efficiency of companies’ activities can be increased and any potential business risk 
can be minimised. Furthermore, in addition to preventing or discouraging financial and 
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accounting malpractice, effective corporate governance regulations undoubtedly protect 
the financial interests of firms’ managers, owners, employees, and investors. 
This research fills a gap in the knowledge base about factors affecting the banking sector 
in the gulf, that existing literature have not covered. Stevens.P. 2008 and Hesse .H. 2016 
have both addressed this topic; They both address it from the geopolitics of institutional 
governance and macro-economic regulations perspectives respectively. This narrows the 
focus of their research and leaves too many factors out of consideration. Auty R.M. 
(2001), like this research, takes a more holistic approach to the oil-dependency problem 
in the GCC, insisting on a full scale business, social and cultural change. However, Auty 
.R.M (2001) undertakes no qualitative analysis at all, unlike this research. This research 
is also more focused on KSA’s banking system and how it can be reformed to play its 
part in diversifying the economy. It draws comparisons with Qatar as well to highlight 
the failures and successes of this quest for economic transformation.  
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Chapter 3: Saudi Arabia and Qatar 
3.1 Introduction 
The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) is ruled by a monarch who is both the head of 
government and of the Royal Forces. Religious scholars and the monarchy share a close 
relationship. All aspects of the economic and political life of the kingdom are controlled 
by the royal family who are advised by local religious leaders; a symbiotic relationship 
has been accepted by both parties. It has been suggested by a number of institutes that the 
succession of power – which is passed from brother to brother and not father to son (due 
to their age differences) – is the primary political risk within the kingdom.  
Government spending and the oil sector are the principle driving forces behind the KSA’s 
open economy. Efforts to diversify the economy have been undertaken and the 
construction of solar plants capable of producing 41-GW of power has been planned to 
be completed by 2032. Sectors other than the manufacturing sector have also seen much 
progress in terms of diversification. Since the kingdom joined the World Trade 
Organization (WTO), airlines, telecoms, banking, and financial services have all 
witnessed substantial expansions. Agriculture has been promoted through food security 
programmes and, like other Gulf Corporation Council (GCC) countries, the KSA has 
announced many mega infrastructure programmes that are due to be launched soon. 
(World Trade Organisation; 2017).   
Regarding the KSA’s dependency on oil, Ehteshami and Wright (2007) have noted that 
despite the middle-class of Saudi Arabia emerging as a result of an economically stratified 
nation “it is questionable to what extent it will press for substantive change so long as 
many of its members view their own positions as contingent upon the maintenance of the 
status quo” (p. 914). 
Qatar, bordered by Iran, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE, is amongst the six 
independent Gulf States located in the southern Arabian Gulf. Qatar has technically been 
independent from Bahrain since the middle of the 19th century. However, it was only after 
1971 that Qatar became a fully independent sovereign state following the British 
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withdrawal and the disengagement with the UAE. Though Qatar is a pure monarchy, it is 
showing signs of the emergence of a limited democratic process. Initially through the 
discovery of oil, and later through heavy investment in liquefied natural gas (LNG), Qatar 
has undergone a rapid transformation. Qatar’s 2010 population (according to the 2010 
census) of 1.7 million was nearly double what it was 5 years beforehand. 
Rathmell and Schulze (2000) have used Qatar as an example to highlight the manner in 
which a political reform may be undertaken for reasons other than economic necessity. 
Qatar has produced a self-image of an increasingly open and participatory state following 
Emir Hamad’s coup in 1995. These political alterations were not enforced upon the 
inhabitants of Qatar due to economic necessity, rather they were selected for reasons 
related to domestic dynastic politics and foreign policy. Rathmell and Schulze (2000) 
mention, however, that: “however much political reforms may be trumpeted, they will 
have little structural effect on the political system unless they are combined with reforms 
of state finances”. 
Project Qatar is amongst the most significant exhibitions highlighting the latest service 
and product requirements of Qatar’s fast-growing construction sector. Project Qatar 
advertises the similarities between the Qatari ICT market and that of the neighbouring 
UAE. Qatar’s domestic market is expanding and this, along with the cost of business 
increasing in the UAE, highlights a clear opportunity for Qatar to distinguish its business 
appeal. 
These factors, together, have led to the latest Global Financial Centre Index (GFCI 15), 
which is published by the Z/Yen Group in London, to rank Qatar as the top financial 
centre in the Middle East (Sambridge, 2014). Qatar’s rank of 26, though 2 places below 
the previous year, is still 3 positions ahead of 29th positioned Dubai. Doing Business 
(2012) noted that Qatar made dealing with construction permits more time and cost 
consuming, but it made it easier for a population to get credit and start a business. 
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3.2 Socio-Political Outlook and Consequences of Oil Dependency 
The under-educated, under-resourced, and under-employed youth of Saudi Arabia rose in 
the Arab Spring. This has been viewed as a prelude to a vastly more radical change in the 
social, political, and economic dynamics of the KSA. Al-Rasheed (2011) has noted that 
despite the ineffective attempts of the Saudi government to quell the uprising, the divided 
vocal masses that arose from a sectarian agenda built on bi-partisanship offered the 
troubled leadership a strategic opportunity to undermine any developing political 
mobilisation. A zealous Wahhabi mentality, along with the conscious division between 
Sunni and Shia groups, has led to the political and economic marginalisation of Shias, as 
well as having “renewed the loyalty of the Sunni majority” (Al-Rasheed, 2011). 
Debates and conflicts demanding a constitutional monarchy perpetuated the Arab Spring. 
The Saudi government responded by banning organised protests and delivering swift 
repercussions for activists, undermining this platform and limiting is influence to public 
debates and small-scale petitions (Al-Rasheed, 2011). The kingdom’s dependence on 
petroleum gives rise to many different social structures. Petroleum produces huge capital 
but necessitates massive technological resources to be exploited. Oil companies wish to 
socio-politically dominate countries with vast oil resources. 
This is significant in its influence on the entrepreneur class. The domestic elite form 
relationships with foreign companies and technological advantages benefit entrepreneurs 
wishing to become independently powerful economically. These entrepreneurs, in an 
effort to become powerful, form allegiances with the USA or foreign capitals, such as 
Middle East merchants (Al-Mualla, 2010). Resultantly, the nouveau riche, a new 
primarily oil-dependent wealthy social class, develop. The wealth arises from 
entrepreneurial efforts and a chain of privileged connections with the USA, making it a 
creation promoted by no-holds-barred rent seeking (Greiner, 2004). 
The dependence on oil export, the driving force of the Saudi economy, has also moulded 
the professional and middle classes in the KSA. Saudi’s labour market consists of three 
categories of jobs: oil-related, private sector, and public sector. The professional and 
middle classes’ standards of living are related to their relative fortunes resulting from the 
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oil industry. During periods of economic boom, such as during the 1980s, educated 
citizens, who otherwise had little prospects of wealth, were offered high-paying jobs. The 
number of jobs available subsequently shrank as the number of educated people grew, 
leading to social tensions, especially in more urbanised areas (Kropski, 2012). 
Relatively few people work in the oil sector, meaning that those who do are usually fairly 
skilful. Other sectors in the kingdom are currently shrinking and this causes the oil sector 
to be viewed as an aristocratic divide, separating those who work within it and those who 
do not. This wedge is further defined by the skill and education levels of the employees. 
The poorer rural population experiences a certain magnetism from the cities due to oil 
exports giving rise to many novel opportunities. 
The high migration levels seen in the kingdom are also attributable to the oil industry and 
the migration is further promoted by the labour market which highlights the possibility 
that anybody has the potential to become rich through the country’s oil reserves (Dawoud, 
2007). The profile of the population has changed, accordingly, in a dramatic manner. 
Countries with a large reliance on oil exports tend to have more foreign residents than 
native inhabitants. Saudi Arabia holds 17 million residents, 98% of whom are situated in 
the manufacturing sector, whilst less than 2% work in the oil industry (Al-Iriani, 2005). 
Immigrants tend to be paid less than natives and so this extensive migration exacerbates 
the already present inequality issues. The oil industry creates an illusion that suggests that 
some people become rich with little effort. The reality of the matter is, however, that most 
employees work lifelong and amass little wealth; this work can be categorised as being 
of either low or high productivity (Adelman, 2004). 
Regarding Qatar’s socio-political situation, EC Harris Research (2012) has made the 
observation that Qatar’s bid to host the 2022 FIFA World Cup reflects a wider economic 
strategy that understands the limited nature of hydrocarbon reserves and the need for 
alternative economic plans. The government of Qatar has delineated the framework for 
delivering long-term outcomes as a part of the ‘Qatar National Vision’ programme. Qatar 
aims to become a technologically and economically advances society by 2030, being able 
to maintain high living standards for subsequent generations. This signifies its desire to 
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move from being a hydrocarbon economy to a knowledge one, through social, human, 
economic, and environmental development. 
Qatar has managed to devise ambitious political, economic, and social targets through 
their National Development Strategy. The targets include increased provision to provide 
more holistic healthcare and education opportunities, as well as more efficient 
government services. The intention is to reach the goals through not only the government 
and private sectors, but also through civil society by increasing the level of national pride 
in the country. 
As suggested by recent publications, the 2022 FIFA World Cup has given rise to lucrative 
construction opportunities for real estate developers. Analysts from Deloitte (2013) have 
mentioned that successful bidders need to consider the strategic aims of Qatar’s 2022 
World Cup programme, including: innovation, sustainability, health and safety, and 
quality, with a general theme of legacy encompassing proceedings. Ehteshami and Wright 
(2007) have noted that underlying the Qatari elite’s transitional aims is a generational 
shift that catalyses investment in industry and infrastructure developments that is in direct 
conflict with the rentier standard’s status quo. 
Atalay et al. (2016) suggest that measuring the capacity of renewable energy installed, 
along with its output, is essential in assessing future patterns of gas and oil dependence; 
they deem this to be an essential indicator of the GCC nations’ transformative energy 
agendas. Qatar is currently ranked as being the 2nd highest adopter of renewable energy 
in the GCC (UAE is the 1st) due to its installing capacity being greater than 41.2 MW. 
Despite Saudi Arabia’s recent investment in renewable energy, the kingdom’s productive 
capacity per capita, along with the output intensity of these resources, means that it is 
currently lagging significantly behind other GCC countries (Atalay et al., 2016). 
3.3 Industry Development and Private Sector Challenges 
According to Atalay et al. (2016), “Saudi Arabia currently lack mass-scale joint-ventures 
which would enable the utilization of renewable energy resources” (p. 210). Saudi 
Aramco and Solar Frontier’s (Japan) investment alliance of 2012 has not yet brought to 
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fruition its energy-oriented outputs (Atalay et al., 2016). Khaled Juffali Co. and French 
Soitec, in 2015, signed a “memorandum of understanding to create a joint venture which 
will be responsible for the marketing and selling of concentrator photovoltaic systems 
(CPV) in Saudi Arabia” (Atalay et al., 2016, p. 210). 
The kingdom will encounter a succession of critical trials in the next 10 to 15 years 
regarding its demographic and fiscal outlook. The energy market will experience 
increased levels of competition and the much of the young Saudi population will have 
reached working age. The economy is, therefore, in a state of transition. If current trends 
continue, the kingdom will encounter economic decline in the years to come due to the 
relative little that has been done to shift the economy from being an oil-dependent one to 
a more sustainable one. Arouri and Rault (2012) have claimed that it is essential for the 
Saudi government to pre-empt the challenges and freeze public spending whilst 
intervening to affect change within the labour market and intervening in household 
incomes. The latter intervention would, however, increase fiscal strain and create 
unemployment. 
There are, however, other possible scenarios for the future of Saudi Arabia. One 
possibility is that of the kingdom being able to sustainably maintain its economy through 
productivity-led transformations that significantly reform business regulations and the 
labour market (Arouri, 2011). An economy such as the one described would prerequire 
fiscal management. Successful political reforms that effect such a change could bring 
about a new cycle of wealth for the kingdom. Saudi Arabia’s GDP could double if the 
country invests in renewable energy as the economy, now no longer dependent on oil, 
could be fuelled by private sector investments. This would also lead to the creation of 
approximately 6 million jobs, providing work opportunities for the many natives in the 
labour market (Cipollini et al., 2009). 
Transition, though difficult, is essential for the economy of the KSA to undergo reform. 
If Saudi Arabia wished to compete economically on a global scale, the reigns on the 
economy would need to be slackened as it transitions away from being government-led 
to being market-based. The Saudi government has been accelerating efforts towards this 
change over the past few months (Arouri, 2012). 
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There currently exists two major obstacles in Saudi Arabia’s struggle for reform. The 
first, an external obstacle, is regarding the global oil industry, the KSA’s economy’s 
current life-blood. A 2.3% deficit was seen in Saudi Arabia in 2014 (Ajmi, 2013). Fiscal 
deficits were predicted by the IMF. The second challenge, an internal one, is regarding 
the current population demographics in the kingdom and the projected workforce in 
future years. The current youth number more than 6 million and they are expected to be 
of working age in 2030. The changing demographics will lead to a larger population 
within the future Saudi Arabian labour market. New jobs would, therefore, need to be 
created and one potential source is the renewable energy industry. A growing elderly 
population would also desire adequate finance and health systems (IMF, 2015). 
The current workforce in Saudi Arabia is divided between low-paid foreign labourers 
working in the private sector and high-paid employees working in the oil industry. The 
aforementioned two challenges pose significant risk to the economic development of the 
kingdom. Limiting the influx of foreign workers and freezing public expenditures alone 
have proven insufficient in maintaining Saudi’s living standards. There exists, therefore, 
a strong need to develop new labour sectors, renewable energy being an example 
(Cipollini et al., 2009). 
If the example of the expanding renewable energy sector came to fruition, then Saudi’s 
non-oil sector would alter the dominance of the public sector and would require 
continuous investments and productivity growth. This would then lead to a substantial 
growth of the renewable energy sector. A major obstacle, however, is that such 
development would require 4 trillion dollars of investment, an amount 3 to 4 times larger 
that of the 2003 investment to facilitate the growth of the oil industry. 
Saudi Arabia’s non-oil industry is currently relatively small and has a lot of potential for 
growth. Though it started from a low initial point, the non-oil industry in Saudi Arabia 
proportionately outperformed the overall economy in 2013. The non-oil industry has 
witnessed an annual 10% growth, a number representing much faster growth than that 
experienced by the country’s GDP and the rest of the economy, the latter of which has 
shown annual growth rate of 2.5%. There are a range of fast-growing sectors, including 
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hospitality, tourism, health, and finance, but the fastest growing sector is seemingly the 
manufacturing sector (IMF, 2015). 
Tackling the renewable energy sector alone is not feasible for the government, instead 
they need financial contributions and risk-sharing from private sector companies. The 
government also needs to halt its dependence on foreign labourers and, instead, train the 
local workforce. The renewable energy industry will also be open to international 
investment if the CEOs and leaders throughout the country aim to make the necessary 
transformations (Friedrich et al., 2014). This process would allow for the required 
investments to flow in to spark a boom in the country’s economy. The economy would 
also benefit from the resultant increase in healthy competition, leading to accelerated 
modernisation. 
If successful, these changes will be embraced by the Saudi population who would be 
looking for novel opportunities and higher pay rates. The renewable energy industry 
would create opportunities for individuals and business, leading to a change in the overall 
economy of the country (Adelman, 2004). The economy, having risen, would allow for 
the new Saudi generation to work in a rising, highly productive industry. An additional 
benefit of this is that it would improve the relationship of the population and the 
government. Renewable resources can, potentially, amass great wealth for Saudi Arabia 
in the future, positively affecting the whole kingdom (Adelman, 2004). 
The Energy City in Qatar has similar renewable energy objectives forming its theoretical 
blueprints. The Energy City “invites multinational natural gas and oil companies to set 
up their headquarters there in order to become the next major energy hub and centre for 
regional operations and global hydrocarbon development” (Reiche, 2010, p. 2402). 
Contrasting the objectives underlying Masdar City, a low-carbon project, this energy-
centric investment aims to create a sustainable blueprint for future development by 
developing and subsequently implementing a host of green capabilities and technologies 
geared towards lowering dependency on carbon-based fuels. The project aims to design 
innovative renewable energy technologies to reduce the effects of anthropogenic 
activities worldwide (Reiche, 2010; Energy City, 2016). 
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3.4 Educational Systems and Renewable Energy Investment  
Atalay et al. (2016) have noted that although the fields of renewable energy technology 
development and deployment have receive investment at King Abdulla University of 
Science and Technology (KAUST), large-scale projects to harness renewable energy 
have not yet been carried out across the nation’s energy architecture. The KSA’s 
renewable energy vision has undergone a drastic change from its initial state. The 
kingdom’s first self-defined goal is to produce 9.5 GW of energy and although no timeline 
has been overtly mentioned, it is set to aim for producing this by 2030. The figure of 9.5 
GW reflects conservative estimates regarding energy consumption nationwide. 
In the initial phase of the project, in May 2016, the government of Saudi Arabia stated 
that this target was to be achieved prior to 2023. They also delineated the programme 
further and undertook a U-turn with their new plans on becoming a substantial market in 
the international renewable energy sector and, perhaps, the largest one in the Middle East 
and North Africa region with its plans for renewable sources’ installations. To meet the 
kingdom’s aim to deploy power plants by 2023, an average capacity of 1.6 GW needs to 
be built annually (IMF, 2015). 
Though seemingly ambitious, Saudi Arabia’s increasing energy demands mean that the 
target only accounts for 5% of its total energy usage. Saudi Arabia has only managed to 
install 25 MW of renewable energy capacity since 2015, making the 9.5 GW target seem 
bold. The 5% target pales in comparison to other countries. Germany, for example, whilst 
enjoying less solar irradiation than Saudi Arabia, is aiming to have renewable energy 
account for 32% of its total energy consumption by 2016. 6.4% of this is produced 
through photovoltaics. Dubai’s targets are also much higher than Saudi’s, with a target of 
7% of its national output to be through renewable resources by 2020 and 25% by 2030. 
Therefore, the KSA is lagging behind other nations in its renewable energy pursuits and 
it would need to expend large amounts of effort if it wishes to be a competitive player in 
the international renewable energy market (IMF, 2015). 
The KSA intends to localise the manufacturing of its sources of renewable energy, leading 
to heightened interest in sustainability and the production of renewable energy 
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components in areas of high local demand. Saudi Arabia also possesses legal framework 
ensuring regulations are met in the deployment of renewable energy. This framework 
promotes the liberalisation of the fuel market as a means through which energy is 
distributed. The raised tariffs on electricity in 2016 represent the first step in the country’s 
plan to lower its electricity and fuel consumption (Ajmi et al., 2013). 
Qatar is also heading towards developing its renewable energy industry. Atalay et al. 
(2016) have observed that Qatar is moulding an environment for research, through the 
development of its Education City, that is heavily geared towards research and 
development (R&D) in sustainable and renewable energy technologies and sources. 
Qatari institutions and a growing platform of universities (e.g. Texas A&M University, 
Carnegie Mellon University, and Georgetown University) have developed alliances that 
reflect the commitment of policymakers in Qatar to effect change in its energy 
consumption patterns; the alliances also add to the nation’s wealth of knowledge 
regarding the building and maintenance of new markets and industries within the sector 
(Atalay et al., 2016). The legislative framework of Qatar has aimed to tackle this system 
of subsidisation primarily through the Al Dhameen advance certification programme of 
the Qatar Development Bank. However, the market is shifting and moneylenders in Qatar 
are beginning to be more willing to loan money for these purposes. 
The heightened intensity within the market is the principle fuel of this national effort. 
Banks are also aiming to facilitate corporate loaning through the aid of small 
organisations. Moneylenders have, therefore, begun welcoming measures to 
accommodate SME, such as providing dedicated items and branches and having 
effectively organised SME groups. These moneylenders are expecting this industry to 
improve its current economic standing in the years ahead (Hammoudeh and Choi, 2007). 
Additionally, loans to organisations are an area of concern for Qatar and its banks, as they 
have been receiving a lesser share of local credit than individual loaning. According to 
information from the QCB, the figures in 2010 showed that 19.3% of nationwide loaning 




The ultra-competitive market is encouraging moneylenders to target the retail sector with 
increased vigour in an effort to boost the SMEs. The loan specialists hope to satisfy their 
clients’ requests by searching for new information regarding their requirements. The 
renewable energy industry is not the sole recipient of investments, however, it is a 
segment of the economy that can potentially serve as a priority target for Qatar. The 
current defining characteristic of business development is innovation, as is being 
increasingly understood across the sector (Khalifa et al., 2014b). 
Budgetary foundations are, at present, striving with large efforts to operate in accordance 
with government plans. The QCB regulates banks operating in the domestic market, 
including the five major banks in Qatar. Once authorised by the QFC, the banks are 
subject to the framework and models set out through precedent-based law and enforced 
by the QFC Regulatory Authority (Loh, 2013). Banks working alongside the QFC are 
unable to partake in retail finance and banking, however, a small number of banks 
operating under the purview of the QCB have interests obliging them to work alongside 
both regulators (e.g. QIB’s 49% responsibility for investment). A third control-wielding 
organisation, namely the Qatar Financial Markets Authority (QFMA), also needs to be 
appreciated by the banks. Banks intending on partaking in financier exercises in the Qatar 
Stock Exchange, a prerequisite for qualification post-2010, need to initially obtain a 
permit of authorisation from the QFMA, with an eventual aim of doing so (Loh, 2013). 
Qatar has attempted to transition towards have a more united regulatory system, one in 
which the QCB holds the most sway. The QCB has been highlighted as the major body 
regulating suppliers of financial administration (e.g. Islamic budgetary administration 
organisations, banks, trade houses, and firms that have received authorisation from the 
QFMA and QFC) in Qatar through Law 13 of 2012 (Loh, 2013). Although the QFC 
organisations remain directly under the control of the QFC Regulatory Authority and the 
QFMA is left intact, the QCB’s new position as a superseding regulatory body has largely 
been understood as a step towards developing a unified regulatory body (Morales et al., 
2011). 
The QCB aims to refine and develop the efficient management of an administrative 
system and, simultaneously, the financial sector awaits the possibility of a shift towards 
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operating under a single regulatory body. The QCB stated its intentions in 2014 to 
develop a Sharia-compliant regulatory body. These advancements reflect the consumer 
protection and macro prudential aims being zealously pursued. The potential risks of such 
a shift include interest margins and low income broadening becoming vulnerable to the 
money-related approach of the US. Research suggests, however, a bright future for 
sectors in Qatar (Tokic, 2015). 
3.5 Government Subsidies, Private Sector Investment, and Commercial 
Banking 
The KSA’s traditionally conservative, religiously-minded government framework 
contains within it a Shura Council, a “stable, reform-oriented, technocratic forum 
which… serves as the ideal sounding board for the testing of future reform plans” 
(Ehteshami and Wright, 2007, p. 928). 2012 was the year in which the government of 
Saudi Arabia first made public its ambitious energy project through which it intends to 
install solar plants capable of producing 41 GW, wind plants capable of producing 9 GW, 
and other renewable sources capable of producing 4 GW of power by 2032. 
A whitepaper from 2013 for the installation of renewable resource plants contained 
details of the plan but these were never actualised. King Abdullah’s death in 2015 
significantly overshadowed the topic. A sequence of dissonances and conflicting claims 
have led to the stagnation of the Saudi Arabian programme, including the involvement of 
the private sector. Though the scope of the project includes a range of sectors, its 
economic actions have been led by the Saudi Industrial Development Fund, which is 
empowered by the King; he did not, however, devise a comprehensive plan regarding its 
implementation (Ajmi et al., 2013). 
The successor to the throne, King Salman, made the announcement in May 2016 that the 
government would be reshuffled with the aid of the private sector in a move towards 
achieving the desired goals of the 2030 vision. After over 15 years of service, Ali Al-
Naimi, the oil minister, was relieved of his position, leading to a swift decline in oil prices. 
The minister was eventually replaced by Khalid Al-Falih, the current chairman of Saudi 
Aramco, who went on to take on the role of minister of energy and mineral resources 
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whilst manifesting the oil industry. Khalid Al-Falih’s position as chairman is amongst the 
most significant positions affecting the build up to the 2030 vision. 
The indications of reorganisation hint at the possibility of a number of drastic changes in 
the KSA’s energy industry. The aim of the changes are understood as tackling the need 
for top-down governance that is centralised but aided by the private sector to realise the 
2030 vision. Al-Falih’s role as minister means that he is in control of the energy portfolio 
and, therefore, in charge of Saudi’s renewable energy development project (IMF, 2016). 
K.A. CARE may cease being a standalone organisation as further reshuffling takes place 
under the new energy ministry. The new initiatives of King Salman will differ from the 
old ones and absorb them. Saudi Aramco, after becoming a private energy company and 
with the help of SEC, would actively aid the deployment of renewable energy (IMF, 
2016). Additional details regarding the energy project are yet to be revealed, along with 
details regarding the new policy. The 2030 vision is broad in its scope and the renewable 
energy project entails an unprecedented change in the country’s workings. There remains, 
however, heavy scepticism as the KSA has previously announced a sequence of ambitious 
goals that were never realised (IMF, 2016). 
In an effort to restore confidence in its future energy industry and strengthen the private 
sector, the KSA needs to firmly pass through a sequence of concrete stages leading 
towards its announced goals. Though there exist a number of positive indications of 
change and substantial pressure from inside the government, the risks associated with the 
change remain present. Risks include those related to issues of prioritisation and the 
political dissent of stakeholders. Upon excluding such obstacles and Dubai’s bids for 
solar energy, the KSA can announced its new vision for renewable energy by 2030 and 
progress towards it without any further hindrances (Al-Rodhan, 2005). 
Qatar’s companies and corporations are provided official financial services through the 
Qatar Financial Centre (QFC). Qatar’s technological think-tanks are catered to by the 
Qatar Science and Technology Park (QSTP) who also provide support for start-ups that 
aim to contribute to scientific progress and training (Murad, 2010). Qatar has also 
developed an three ne free zones in which 100% possession by overseas agents is 
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possible. These new zones are the: Industrial field, Industrial City (MIC), and New Doha 
International Airport. The QFC resides amongst the free zones and its business ethics and 
regulatory practices meet high international standards; the QFC is unbiased and 
independent of Qatari sway. It operated in accordance with international requirements 
and aims to attract global and local economic investments (Kropski et al., 2012). 
Firms aiming to commercialise and strengthen applied sciences are supported by the 
QTSP, which sits in Qatar’s Education City in Doha. The QTSP also aids states with their 
technological requirements, whilst offering a tax and import tariff free environment for 
the trades of goods and offerings. The QTSP also offers unrestricted capital, the 
unrestricted repatriation of gains, and lenient immigration laws related to the hiring of 
foreign employees (Murad, 2010). 
Commercial processes are overseen by the QFC Regulatory Authority that supervises and 
authorises business pursuits involving the QFC (Murad, 2010). Qatar has formed a 
parallel process for organisations involving economic services that is based on English 
normal legislation (Flood, 2013). This creates an all-encompassing atmosphere for 
commercial and civil issues, allowing the QFC to verify immigration, tax, monetary 
regulations, and legal guidelines regarding employment. This process has a number of 
advantages over the free zone procedures within the environment, because it allows for 
international organisations to penetrate the local market (Kropski et al., 2012). 
Qatar has a vast range of infrastructure programmes that are defined by its growing 
population and large stores of hydrocarbons that permit Qatar to compete internationally 
with its banking sector and experience fast growth rates. Seeing this, lenders become 
emboldened and this subsequently leads to increased market investment and the 
development of new services and products. Several regulatory alterations have 
simultaneously hinted at the arrival of further developments (Corey et al., 2016). 
The Qatar Central Bank (QCB) has been supervising over 15 other banks since 2015, 
indicating steady growth. According to central bank data, 7 of these banks own over 180 
branches and are national institutions; they are deemed conventional lenders. Banks 
control much of Qatar’s assets and infrastructure and they work with foreign banks to 
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greatly influence the local economy. Although their numbers are based on massive global 
institutions, regional players are also present (IMF, 2016). 
Both traditional and foreign moneylenders have been facing increased levels of 
competition over the past decade due to the rise of Sharia-compliant moneylenders and 
the low requirement levels of the QCB to work under it. 20 additional institutions operate 
under a completely different environment and a distinct regulatory office, except for QI 
invest, which possesses a Sharia-compliant office of its own (Diebold and Yilmaz, 2009). 
A few local moneylenders have significant roles within the banks, even though the nature 
of the market is a varied one. 
Over 80% of the sector’s assets are held by its five largest banks. The Qatar National 
Bank (QNB) is half owned by the Qatar Investment Authority arm of the government, 
whilst the Commercial Bank of Qatar is in possession of 10% of the market and assets 
worth many US billions. Islamic banks also hold economically significant roles; the 
country’s next two most popular banks are Sharia compliant. The Qatar Islamic Bank and 
the Doha bank, both founded in 1980, hold 10% and 7% respectively of the nation’s 
banking assets; Masraf, a young bank, holds 8% (Emerson, 2016). 
In terms of moneylending activity, these banks vie with a number of financial institutions 
registered by the QCB. There exist significant differences between the market approach 
of these banks and that of other larger banks. One such difference is that these banks are 
able to lend to retail customers in an effort to increase profit margins. Loan charges have 
recently been offered to retail customers and financial institutions have urged to focus on 
small enterprises that are not limited by the usual banking restrictions. These institutions 
charge higher interest rates than banks and are able to quickly secure business – in certain 
cases, within a week (Diebold and Yilmaz, 2009). 
The World Bank mentions that Qatar’s population is below 2 million. Thus, the target 
population for banks consists of relatively few paid nationals and expatriates. The 
moneylenders within Qatar are active and the country’s top five banks have extended 
their influence beyond Qatar’s borders. The QNB began expanding in 2013 by purchasing 
a 70% stake in Turkish banks and currently operates internationally, in countries 
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including Syria, Yemen, and Lebanon. The QIB currently owns QIB Sudan and almost 
the entirety of the Arab Finance House of Lebanon (Emerson, 2016). 
Engle et al. (2012) mention that the quick-expanding Sharia financial industry may 
undergo further expansion as it grows as an alternative to capitalism amidst the banking 
and credit crises. The Sharia financial system comprises US $300 billion and is expanding 
by 15% each year. The Islamic system forbids interest and the levying of fees, but it 
promotes joint ownership and profit-sharing. The recent international economic disasters 
highlight the need for drastic structural reform of the financial system worldwide. Islamic 
banking offers a beneficial alternative that reduces the risks associated with banking. 
These banks do not purchase shares, rather they invest in assets, protecting them from 
many of the risks faced by European and American banks (Fatough, 2007). 
Two significant ways in which Islamic banking differs from capitalism are that it 
prohibits interest-based loans – usury is explicitly forbidden in Islam – and it prevents 
speculation. The Islamic system shares both profits and risks with the client, unlike 
market capitalism. Ijara, a Shariah-compliant banking product often used in the property 
market, involves leasing and eventually purchasing a property without ever mortgaging 
it. Musharaka’s bank also offers products through which the client and bank share both 
loss and profit. The number of Islamic banks have grown over the past thirty years to 
reach 300 banks in 75 countries. These banks have amassed US $300 billion in assets and 
are growing at a rate of 15% annually (Emerson, 2016). 
3.6 Oil and Gas Volatility and the Banking Sector  
The KSA’s banking sector is seemingly able to withstand shocks; its commercial banks 
are thought to be well capitalised and are currently profitable. Current indicators suggest 
that the capital adequacy ratio is 17.8%, a high figure, and that the kingdom’s corporate 
balance sheets are show a firm standing. Regulation imposed by the SAME (Monetary 
Agency of Saudi Arabia) regarding the banking sector have been reinforced recently as 
the country has fostered Basel III and liquidity standards. These actions, in concert with 
the country’s financial system, can boost the KSA’s economy (Al Ariss, 2014). Oil prices 
have, however, affected NPLs in the kingdom and have led to subsequent fiscal 
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constraints, reduced credit extension, and a reduced rate of GDP growth of the non-oil 
private sector. 
This has led to a resultant decline in equity prices and the banking sector has leveraged 
together with the banks’ riskiness. Although emerging markets are usually smaller than 
the markets of more advanced economies, low equity prices can still produce significantly 
negative effects on the economy (Common, 2008). Eventually the average borrowers’ 
creditworthiness decline and conditions for liquidity become more stringent. The rise in 
the USA’s domestic interest rates has led to a constricting of the country’s monetary 
policy; borrowing costs have risen and increased the pressure on ensuring that the quality 
of assets meets a certain standard. Oil prices are known to invariably affect deposits, with 
low prices reducing deposit inflows and income; private sector companies are affected 
the most (Novotny, 2009). 
Real oil prices and the non-oil private sector’s true GDP are considered in 
macroeconomic studies. The IMF claim that until 2011, real oil prices have maintained 
an average of 17% year to year, though they declined in 2001 and 2009. The GDP of the 
non-private sector rose from 4% to nearly 20% in 2004; it remained over 10% in 2008. 
The KSA’s growth performance dropped to below 6% in 2014, though it managed to 
deliver impressive stock returns due to its solid oil performance. Between 2003 and 2005, 
a real equity price growth of 75% was maintained, after which there was a sudden decline 
in 2006, and again in 2014. The same time period witnessed ten-year bond yields 
declining to 2.5% and a drop of 17 basis points annually throughout those years (IMF, 
2015). 
The KSA’s bank level is tied to the total loans’ share. IMF analysis has demonstrated real 
deposit and real credit growth. 2009 witnessed an increased rate of decline, resulting in a 
steep drop in oil prices. Credit growth broadly reflects the alterations in equity and oil 
prices. Therefore, the deposit was steadier, averaging 10% from 2012 to 2014 and, 14% 
from year to year in real terms in 2008. Thus, there exists a risk of solvency in the KSA 
and the kingdom’s NPL ratio is logit-transformed. Real and financial factors effects on 
one another are significant due to the changing oil industry in the KSA. Research has 
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shown that NPL ratios change with declines in GDP and the real growth rates of the price 
of oil (Al Ariss, 2014). 
Qatar has recently been experiencing steady growth. The country’s GDP rose by 5.9% in 
2012, upon the completion of large gas sector investments. A rise of 6.5% was seen in 
2013 and another rise of 6.2% was estimated to have occurred in 2016. The rising trend 
is expected to continue into the future and annual revenues are predicted to rise by 5-6%; 
in 2016, the rise is expected to be 7.8%. Sequential GDP rises influence the constitution 
of the public investment programme – that is worth US $182 billion – aiming to host the 
2022 FIFA World Cup (Emerson, 2016). 
The recent decline in oil prices has been of particular concern, however, and the effects 
of this are currently being seen in ongoing revisions of the budget. It is thought that this 
will continue until late 2016. Regardless, it is thought that the high level of funds gathered 
from hydrocarbon exports are not vulnerable at times of high economic growth. Qatar is 
currently directing its attention towards developing extraneous segments of its economy 
by drawing in international investment unrelated to hydrocarbons; these investments still 
account for approximately 50% of the GDP (Corey et al., 2016). With the 2022 FIFA 
World Cup plan in motion, non-hydrocarbon areas of the economy are predicted to 
contribute to greater proportions of the GDP. In 2016, this proportion is expected to rise 
to 57.2%. The transport, construction, and manufacturing sectors are the areas of the 
economy, other that the hydrocarbon sector, that are currently enjoying the highest levels 
of growth (Engle et al., 2012). 
Qatar’s production and export of hydrocarbons have helped it attain the highest per capita 
GDP in the world, along with the lowest inflation rate (3.1% in 2013) and the lowest level 
(only 0.5% in 2012). Qatar dominates the international LNG economy and it this sectors 
impressive performance has helped maintain a sequence of sizeable fiscal surpluses, 
along with surpluses in the country’s current accounting. In addition to the country’s high 
current accounting surplus, it is predicted to receive a boost in the budgetary surplus of 
4.7% on the GDP to 2.6% of GDP in 2016, due to large-scale investments in the country’s 
infrastructure in the build-up to the 2022 FIFA World Cup. 
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Despite such investments, the government will endeavour to uphold an expansionary 
fiscal policy in the following years as investments in the hydrocarbon and infrastructure 
segments are required. Qataris also enjoy the lowest tax rates, with small rates of taxes 
corresponding to depreciation and exemptions. The “National Development Strategy 
2011-2016” was announced in March 2011 as being the medium-term blueprint for the 
pursuit of the “National Vision – Qatar 2030”. The National Development Strategy 
mentioned that the World Economic Forum considered Qatar to be the most economically 
competitive Arab country and the 17th most economically competitive country 
worldwide. 
Qatar’s Sovereign Wealth Fund is amongst the largest in the world and its revenue from 
the sale of hydrocarbons is massive. In March 2015, Qatar was ranked 9th globally by the 
Sovereign Wealth Funds Institute, with a total global investment amount of US $256 
billion. Qatar also surpasses the Catarina Funds of Abu Dhabi, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait, 
which respectively occupy positions 2, 3, and 6 in the rankings. The fund controls and 
supervises the Qatar Investment Authority and primarily conducts long-term international 
investments. These have been made in a range of countries (e.g. Switzerland, Singapore, 
USA, Korea, and Malaysia), with the most successful investments being made in the 
fields of petrochemicals, energy, mines, oil companies, banks, hotels, roads, transport, 
media, communications, fashion, and financial institutions (Emerson, 2016). 
As previously mentioned, the energy sector, especially the sales of hydrocarbons, forms 
the driving force of Qatar’s economy. Sales of hydrocarbons make up 50% of Qatar’s 
GDP, 70% of its budget revenues, and 85% of the value of its exports. There are an 
estimated 25 billion barrels of proven oil reserves, enough to maintain current production 
levels for another 57 years. In 2014, an average of 1.966 million barrels of oil were 
produced each day. Qatar arranged within its budget plans an investment of $3.4 billion 
annually from 2015 to 2017. Field forecasts predict that the proportion of the economy 
occupied by the hydrocarbon sector is due to rise from 0.8% in 2015 to 1.8% in 2016 and 
1.9% in 2017 (Corey et al., 2016). 
Qatar has the third highest proven natural gas reserves, surpassed only by Russia and Iran, 
which are thought to have more than 13% of the world’s reserves (an estimated 25.1 
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trillion barrels). Additionally, the country is the fourth largest gas producer in the 
followed, surpassed only by Russia, Iran, and the USA; Qatar is the largest exporter, 
however, of liquefied natural gas (LNG). South Pars, the world’s largest gas field, is 
situated in the Persian Gulf between Qatar and Iran; it is shared by both countries. 6,000 
square kilometres out of a total of 9,700 are located in the North Dome. Qatar supplies 
Oman and the UAE with gas from this field. A new offshore gas field has also been 
discovered for the first time in 42 years and after four years of research; the gas field is 
estimated at 2,5 TCF. Qatar has permitted foreign investments in gas fields, becoming 
the world’s first LNG exporter in 2007. LNG is produced through advanced gas-to-liquids 
(GTL) technology that converts the z / g wet fuel and maintains high levels of efficiency 
(Diebold and Yilmaz, 2009). 
Qatar’s successful 2022 FIFA World Cup bid should speed up the realisation of its 
massive infrastructure projects, such as its metro and highway connection with 
neighbouring Bahrain. The 2022 FIFA World Cup is estimated to be bringing about US 
$60 billion worth of construction projects. 9 new football stadiums meeting ecological 
standards and costing an estimated US $4 billion will be built (Corey et al., 2016). The 
hospitality sector is also expecting a massive boost in investment, with the goal of 
constructing 80,000 new beds by 2022. 
Qatar has to meet both the needs that arise from organising the games and the needs of 
the nation’s infrastructure that have arisen from the rapid population growth and 
industrialisation of the country. The transport sector, especially the production of new 
motorways, will be given particular importance. It is thought that the total cost of the 
construction projects is US $20 billion, including the construction of the Doha and Lusail 
expressways, the Doha Bay link, and the Dukhaan motorway. The Qatari government is 
also aiming to build a new port and a new international airport (Emerson, 2016). 
Qatar’s government is also aiming to invest largely in education and health, alongside its 
infrastructure investments. However, the notable drop in global oil prices has made the 
government tentative in its control of the national expenditure. Therefore, budget 
calculations for some of the public construction projects have been revised and shrunk, 
whilst new projects, such as the building of four of the 2022 FIFA World Cup’s first 
  
101 
midnight football stadiums have either been abandoned or limited to using estimated costs 
(IMF, 2016). Resultantly, concerns have arisen regarding the viability and long-term 
profitability of a sequence of resident foreign contractor companies. 
3.7 Forecasts and the Mitigation of Risk in Banking  
The KSA, with an average output of above 2.5 million barrels per day in 2011, ranks fifth 
amongst the world’s largest producers of oil. Saudi living requirements are excessive, 
with 2012 figures from the IMF showing per capita earnings reaching US $43,000 or US 
$29,000 PPP. Gas and oil account for more than 30% of the country’s GDP, but the 
kingdom has witnessed an enormous money diversification, with a huge monetary sector 
– a sector that initiated with offshore banking units and developed to include investment 
banks – and an expanding trade sector. The KSA has also seen boosts to its tourism 
industry and has begun hosting various sporting events. In the years preceding the world 
recession, Saudi Arabia underwent a huge increase economic development. The kingdom 
expended much effort to develop high-rise buildings that were far from city centres; the 
growth was predominantly concentrated in the centre of the KSA (Novotny, 2009). 
Saudi’s growth in GDP was rapid in the 1970s but more unpredictable in the following 
two decades, correlating with the international price of oil. In the 2000s, oil prices reached 
new heights and, between 2003 and 2008, Saudi Arabia’s GDP rose by an average of 7%. 
The subsequent global recessing and sharp fall in oil prices and house prices meant that 
Saudi’s GDP fell by 8% in 2009. 2010 saw an rise in GDP of 1.3% and 2011 saw a rise 
of 4.2%. Inflation has generally been limited, however, due to 2004 to 2008 witnessing 
rapidly rising oil revenues, a construction boom, high commodity costs, and weakening 
US dollar, there was huge pressure for inflation to rise. In 2008, inflation reached 12.3%, 
but it dropped to 1.6% and then 0.9% in 2009 and 2010 respectively, after commodity 
costs dropped, demand weakened, and the property bubble burst. Although the KSA 
underwent large developments of its import sector, there was a rising trade surplus 
between 2005 and 2008 and a declining present account surplus, which dropped in 2009 
to US $7.8 billion as oil costs plummeted. The higher oil prices of 2011 and 2012 meant 
that there was an excess of over US $50 billion (Al Ariss, 2014). 
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The KSA aims to produce an attractive atmosphere to draw in capital and new talent. A 
decent communication system is amongst the prerequisites for a strong industrial and 
financial environment. A productive financial environment also requires coordinated 
infrastructure, as well as all the essential utilities to be available (Novotny, 2009). The 
kingdom’s exchange zones allow for the efficient running of services and relatively easy 
registration. Saudi Arabia’s liberating of property ownership is amongst the factors 
thought to be promoting its surging property market and producing an attractive social 
environment with novel developments in the latter half of this past century (Greiner, 
2004). Remaining consistent with the regulations of world financial institutions, the 
KSA’s industry showed premonitory signs through the union of some of its bureaucratic 
approaches, including the registering, licensing, and filing of companies. Legislation has 
also improved the credit score expertise procedure (Al Ariss, 2014). 
Economic analysts from Oxford University have predicted future growth in Saudi 
Arabia’s non-oil financial sector. This contrasts with the country’s slow-rising oil output 
and lacklustre future growth projections. The analysts expected non-oil GDP to rise by 
4%, 5.3%, and 5.8% in 2013, 2014, and 2015 respectively. It is thought that this 
acceleration in growth will increase due to the growing investment in the non-oil domestic 








Saudi Arabia ranked 26th in terms of its global industry rating in 2014, a drop of four 
positions from the previous year. Universal trades asserted in 2013 that the KSA made 
the paying of taxes simpler by introducing an option to submit and pay online for social 
security contributions. The digitalising of the KSA’s courts and the new computerised 
filing process have simplified Saudi Arabia’s contracts. 
Qatar’s market is characterised by growing exposure overseas and increasing challenges 
regarding the financial soundness of its renewable energy data. The country’s system of 
banking remains efficient and stable and the banks have strong capital adequacy rations 
that are strongly supported by the country’s rulers. Qatar’s banks have received high 
levels of accreditation (A+, A2, and AA3) from the world’s largest credit rating agencies. 
Government support for the sector is significant and the boards of directors of the 
domestic moneylending institutions contain wealthy government officials. Governmental 
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bodies maintain the bulk ownership of most of the banks (Corey et al., 2016). 
Governmental support for the banking sector was made evident following the 2008 
financial crisis. In the aftermath of the crisis, the Qatari government guaranteed the Qatari 
bank deposits, used the QIA to maintain the bank’s capitals, and bought out problematic 
real estate portfolios. Qatar was ranked as having the most efficient banking system 
amongst the GCC countries due to its 2013 revenues of 20%. Qatar’s banks are wider 
than those in other GCC countries due to the low cost of their funding, and their profitable 
corporate and retail segments (Emerson, 2016). 
Qatar’s banks managed to remain profitable throughout the global financial crisis and this 
progress was maintained throughout 2014. In 2015, Qatar’s five largest banks witnessed 
a year to year growth of 12% in their total assets. The country is the largest lender of 
money within the GCC, boosting this sector’s asset growth to make it the highest amongst 
the GCC countries. The assets of the sector amount to over US $270 billion and Qatar’s 
local industry profits are ranked 2nd in the region. 
The Qatari government’s plans remain the most significant factor influencing the 
country’s banking activity; infrastructure projects and hydrocarbon sales have been the 
cause of rising opportunities in the private sector (Emerson, 2016). The nation’s 
infrastructure revolves predominantly around its 2030 vision and it is thought that this 
vision will maintain high levels of performance in the coming years. Qatar has put in 
place a number of plans for development in the build up to the 2022 FIFA World Cup, 
including accelerating activity on its infrastructure projects between 2016 and 2018. 
Amongst these plans are new football stadiums, the Doha metro project, and the Doha 
port, a massive project due for completion in 2030 (Corey et al., 2016). 
Qatar’s lending environment is developing in accordance with the relative needs and sizes 
of the individual companies that are borrowing. The country’s moneylenders offer low-
risk loans with easy returns, drawing borrowers with massive corporate opportunities in 
Qatar’s rapidly growing economy. There is, however, a scarcity of data regarding small 
firm lending. One report by researchers in 2013 claimed that Qatar is lending small SMEs 
the required money (Emerson, 2016). Currently, financial institutions in the country work 
in accordance with two separate protocols. Domestic sector banks operate under the 
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control and licensing of the central bank, being subject to the standards and rules of the 
common law. QFC banks do not offer retail financial or retail banking, even though they 
are under the QCB’s jurisdiction (Gallo and Velucci, 2009). Qatar’s banks need to also 
consider the QFMA’s regulations; banks wishing to involve themselves in brokerage 
activities, for example, need to get a license from the QFMA before doing so (Corey et 
al., 2016). 
The newly changed regulatory system of Qatar positions the QCB as the predominant 
authority for all of Qatar’s investment companies and financial service institutions. QFC 
companies are under the direct control of the QFC Regulatory Authority, whilst the 
QCB’s role as the overall supervisor is seen as a move towards the creation of a unified 
regulatory body (Engle et al., 2012). The country has also developed novel regulatory 
framework to coordinate a strategic reinforcement of the financial sector. There are six 
primary aims to be achieved: (1) expand the macro-prudential oversight; (2) develop 
micro-prudential framework; (3) promote cooperation; (4) strengthen the financial 
market; (5) promote human capital; and (6) enhance the current regulations (Corey et al., 
2016). 
3.8 Market Environment and Investment Opportunities  
Sharia law is the highest form of regulation in all GCC countries. However, foreign 
investment is also regulated by legal guidelines – which are based predominantly around 
European models – found in laws passed by the various legislating authorities (Siddiqi 
and Anadon, 2011). These countries have adopted legal and judicial procedures to 
supervise and control industry disputes outside of the Sharia courts. All six countries have 
distinctly independent judicial practises. Bahrain and Kuwait maintain clear distinctions 
between the executive and legislative branches of the government. This is also seen in 
Qatar, UAE, and Oman, but in these countries, the legislative branches are purely 
consultative (Novotny, 2009). Four of the GCC countries have funding regulations that 
protect international traders and restrict their entry and operations. Regional buyers 
benefit the countries but there remain some vestiges of discrimination. The re-emergence 
of Sharia-compliant finance means that Sharia law is producing novel effects in the 
  
106 
market, with interest-based transactions being the predominant obstacle to tackle 
(Bzikova et al., 2013). 
Schiliro (2013), states that the GCC countries should promote a positive industry 
atmosphere for the development and progress of the financial sector, with ongoing 
international exchange, capital actions, and minimal personal-sector routine restrictions. 
He also claims that the UAE’s total funding regime remains restrictive and that to achieve 
the regulatory approach he deems most suitable, the UAE would focus primarily on 
upgrading and its legal guidelines regarding funding and customer security; he feels that 
this would amend the issues relating to the entry into the industrial sector and other land-
related problems, promoting more efficient and effective entry into finance (Siddiqi and 
Anadon, 2011). 
Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE maintain the world’s least convoluted tax frameworks, 
securing them the top three spots in the overall tax rankings globally. (IMF, 2015). 
Over the last four years, international investors have been especially interested in the 
GCC countries from the Middle East. Qatar and the UAE have provided real access points 
for corporations from overseas, increasing awareness and attracting international 
business. The Middle East houses 177 million barrels, 44% of international stores of 
crude oil. Three quarters of the region is found in the Forbes list of top 15 richest nations 
and they show a solid GDP growth of 3% annually. Elsewhere, the USA’s economy is 
stagnant, China’s is slowing, and Europe’s is currently recessing. The Middle East seems 
an idyllic haven for many. Western business and media constantly scans for investment 
opportunities and is currently drawn towards the Middle East due to its great industry 
boards, its promising financial signs, and its high-priced subculture (Al Ariss, 2014). 
Bureaucracy and burdensome trade practises often make business in the West more 
difficult than in the immature economies of the Middle East. Local legislation in the 
Middle East needs to include strong agreements and cooperation between its countries. 
Currently, entry routes into the banking sector, as well as funding opportunities, are much 
less clear than in mature economies; the bargaining zeal of buyers is evident throughout. 
The judicial systems differs greatly from Western systems. Often, SMEs do not do have 
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adequate entry into knowledge, firms, resources, and consultants that would allow them 
to understand and mitigate potential risks. Lucrative investments can often burden an 
institution with a huge host of obligations (Kropski et al., 2012). 
3.8.1 Investment Environment in the Gulf  
In all the GCC states, Sharia (Islamic) law constitutes the prime law. However, most 
of the laws relevant to foreign investment are contained in legislation enacted by the 
legislative authority. Most of this legislation is based on the European models, often 
French, patterned after the Egyptian legislation. Sharia principles are generally applied 
only in matters affecting the personal status of Muslims such as family matters, 
succession, property, and to some extent, torts and criminal law. The GCC states 
introduced judicial and legal systems to deal with business disputes outside the Sharia 
court system. In commercial matters, one way or another, interest is normally 
recognized, although with limitations. While all six countries have separate, 
substantially independent judicial systems, Kuwait and Bahrain have a clear 
distinction between the legislative and executive branches of the government. The 
distinction is observed in the UAE, Qatar and Oman, but the legislatures’ role appears 
to be primarily consultative. Four out of the six GCC countries have an investment law 
which contains provisions to protect international investors, but also restrictions to 
their entry and operation. Regional investors from the GCC region benefit from 
preferential treatment, but discrimination is still applied. Moreover, with the re-
emergence of Islamic finance, Sharia law is having a new impact. The main difficulty 
arises in the classification of interest charged on funds in Shariah. While some Islamic 
jurists and scholars consider all types of interest as usury which is prohibited in 
Shariah, others consider simple interest acceptable and only compounded interest to 
be prohibited.  
Schiliro, (2013) in his study for the UAE, maybe the most successful GCC state in putting 
together a favorable business environment for growth and private sector development 
with minimal restrictions on private-sector activities, international trade and capital 
movements, claims that the overall investment regime remains restrictive. According to 
his study, regulatory system’s improvements should focus on issuing strong consumer 
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protection laws, issuing investment laws, solving the problem of the access to commercial 
land and other land-related issues, making a more efficient and easy access to finance. 
 
Figure 5. 
Source: K.Mellahi, C, Guermat, G. Frynas, and H- Al Bortamani, Motives for Foreign Direct Investment 
in Gulf Cooperation Countries. 
 
Another issue to consider is the creation of Free Trade Zones. Free Trade Zones are 
separate and distinct regions for companies to trade with special conditions, such as 
allowing 100% foreign ownership. The Free Trade Zones (FTZs) of the UAE are a 
veritable opportunity for the country to showcase its development and special area 
approach. The UAE in the last 15 years has witnessed a quantum increase in industrial 
development and one of the most significant and remarkable achievements are the 
success of Free Zones. The UAE Free Zones have been among the strong pillars of the 
country’s economic performance attracting much foreign investments, creating 
thousands of jobs, and facilitating the needed transfer of technology into the country. 
Together, the Free Zones account for more than half of the country’s non-oil exports 
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and underpin the UAE’s ranking as the third most important re-export center in the 
world. According to PKF (2009) analysts, the Free Zones help in keeping the engine 
of economic diversification rolling by attracting foreign investment in the private 
sector, which is central to the region’s overall plan aimed at reducing its economic 
dependence on oil, while creating employment for its nationals. Moreover, the Free 
Zones could prove to be the mechanism not only for a new impetus to diversification, 
but also for changing the very face of economic activity in this region. 
A “TRADE and EXPORT Middle East” article (May 2014) summarizes the key 
incentives offered by various Free Zones of the UAE, which includes:  
 100% foreign ownership  
  0% corporate tax for a fixed period (generally a 15 – 50-year tax holiday 
depending on the free zone)  
 Free zone companies can hold a UAE bank account to conduct routine 
operational transactions  
  No import or export duties  
  Full repatriation of capital and profits  
  No withholding tax  
  Quick approval procedures  
  No current requirement to hire UAE nationals; and  
 Flexible regime in terms of sponsorship and obtaining UAE residence visas.  
  Extended leases  
  Abundant and inexpensive energy  
 
An independent Free Zone Authority (FZA) governs each Free Zone, and is the agency 
responsible for issuing FTZ operating licenses and assisting companies with establishing 
their business in the FTZ.  The exception is Dubai International Financial Centre (which 
has its own civil and commercial laws and its own court system).  Most other UAE 
Federal Laws apply in the free zones, including the UAE Labor Law (although the free 
zone authority may also have employment regulations which supplement this legislation, 
e.g. the Dubai Technology and Media Free Zone Employment Regulations), and other 
UAE Federal Laws. There are specific regulations in place in each free zone which enable 
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free zone entities to be formed and regulated. The courts in the Emirate in which the free 
zone is situated are likely to have jurisdiction over disputes arising in relation to 
companies that operate within that free zone.  
Qatar like the UAE’s free zone practice has established the Qatar Financial Centre 
(QFC) and the Qatar Science and Technology Park (QSTP), while three new free zones 
(New Doha International Airport, Mesaieed Industrial City (MIC) and the Industrial 
Area) are planned. The QFC caters to professional and financial services companies 
and firms, and QSTP to technology companies or start-ups that contribute to 
technology development and training. The Qatar Financial Centre (QFC) is one of the 
designated Free Zones in which 100% foreign ownership is possible. The QFC’s 
commercial and regulatory environment and systems conform to international best 
practices and are separate from, and independent of, the host Qatari systems. QFC 
operates to international standards to attract international and domestic financial 
services institutions and professional service providers that support them (accountants, 
lawyers, etc). The Qatar Financial Centre Authority (QFCA) is responsible for 
commercial strategy and the regulator, the Qatar Financial Centre Regulatory 
Authority (QFCRA), authorizes and supervises businesses conducting activities from 
the QFC.  
The Qatar Science and Technology Park (QSTP) which is located within Qatar 
Foundation’s Education City in Doha, supports companies seeking to develop and 
commercialize technologies, and assists technology start-ups and incubators. No taxes 
or import duties on goods and services, unrestricted repatriation of profits; unrestricted 
capital; and relaxed immigration laws for the hiring of non-Qatari employees are 
among the key features of the QSTP business environment. 
Flood (2013) in his article points out that Qatar has created a parallel system for 
financial services companies based on English common law. It is an “all-
encompassing environment” for civil and commercial matters that allows the QFC to 
determine tax, immigration and employment laws and financial regulations. This 
system, offers advantages over the “free zones” operated elsewhere in the region 
because it permits international companies to tap into the domestic market.  
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The Bahrain Logistics Zone was set up to be a multi-modal customs free logistics park, 
benefiting from the Kingdom of Bahrain’s progressive business environment and legal 
framework with a mission to leverage Khalifa Bin Salman Port (KBSP) and enhance 
the volume of export and re-export cargo throughput. In Bahrain, a foreign investor 
can retain 100% ownership and benefit from the region’s lowest taxes in addition to 
freely repatriating capital, profits and dividends, meaning there is no such thing as a 
‘free zone’, unlike elsewhere in the region. In effect, the whole of the Bahrain has free 
zone status as being reported by Aparna Shivpuri Arya (2012).  
The Kuwait Free Trade Zone (KFTZ), located strategically in Shuwaikh Port, provides 
access to the emerging markets in northern Iran, Iraq, Turkey, the Commonwealth of 
Independent States or the CIS. Shuwaikh port, home of the KFTZ, is owned and 
operated by the Kuwait Ports Authority (KPA). During the past few years, KPA has 
engaged in massive renovation and modernization of its management and operation 
systems resulting in considerable increase in both efficiency and productivity. The 
privatization of the cargo and container handling activities and computerization of the 
tariff, financial and administrative systems have made KFTZ a modern port facility. 
Among the advantages of investing in KFTZ are:  
 Exemption for taxation on all corporate and personal forms of income.  
  Capital and profits are freely transferable outside the KFTZ and not subject to 
any exchange control.  
  100% foreign ownership  
  Policy of promotion of Free Trade.  
 The KFTZ is quite close to the international airport, a major city – and close to 
the Iranian border. The management being in private hands would ensure all 
professional support for the industries. In addition, it has ample supply of energy 
and water, state of-the-art communication systems and excellent transportation 
systems by sea, land and air. (Kuwait Information, 2014) 
Ruhs (2012) reports that the GCC countries have admitted very large numbers of what 
are meant to be strictly temporary migrant workers since the dramatic increase in oil 
prices and revenues in 1973-74 and 1979. Migrants now constitute large majorities of 
the workforce in almost all GCC countries (ranging from just over 50 percent in Saudi 
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Arabia to 95 percent in Qatar), especially in the private sector where relatively few 
citizens work. The private sectors of Kuwait, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates 
(UAE) are effectively 100% staffed by migrant workers. In other GCC countries, the 
share of nationals in total private sector employment is higher but still less than 50% 
(Oman 48%, Saudi Arabia 46%, Bahrain 30%). Although doing all kinds of work 
including many ‘high-end’ jobs in e.g. the oil industry, the majority of temporary 
migrants in GCC countries are employed in medium and low-skilled jobs in sectors 
such as construction, wholesale and retail and domestic services.  
The GCC countries, as labor-importing, resource-rich economies, share a number of 
structural similarities and common features regarding the working labor. Baldwin-
Edwards (2011) describe a) low total participation and employment rates of nationals, 
b) extreme segmentation of the labor market – especially public/private and 
national/immigrant worker, c) rising unemployment rates, (especially of women and 
the young), d) employment dominated by services and construction, e) female 
employment almost exclusively in services, notably housekeeping for migrant women, 
education and social services for native women, f) the importance of the kafala, or 
sponsorship system, for a flexible stock of ‘temporary’ foreign labor, which in reality 
is more permanent. These migrations differ from the migrant population in other 
regions of the world, however they are similar in structure to other Gulf countries.  
According to the Kafala system, a foreigner is not allowed to work in the GCC 
countries without local sponsorship (khafeel). Once the employment relationship is 
broken, foreign workers become illegal residents, and must immediately leave the 
country. In this sponsorship system if the employee wants to change his/her job he/she 
needs the permission from the present employer. Unless, and until, permission is 
granted, jobs cannot be changed. Transfer of sponsorship is allowed in restricted 
categories only such as domestic workers. Except in Kuwait and the UAE, all other 
countries need the permission of the employer to leave the country. Even if the 
employee has his/her passport he/she needs permission of the employer in order to 
travel abroad. Employers frequently withhold wages for months and confiscate 
passports as “security” to keep workers from quitting. The combination of “recruiting 
fees” and abusive work environment constitute “forced labor” in this region.  
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In 2013, the Migration Policy Institute reports that the UAE had the fifth-largest 
international migrant stock in the world with 7.8 million migrants (out of a total 
population of 9.2 million), according to United Nations (UN) estimates. Over the past 
several years, the UAE government has substantively reformed its laws to address the 
concerns of those who condemn the Kafala system for exposing migrant workers, 
especially domestic workers, to abusive practices. Recent measures have ranged from 
outlawing employer confiscation of workers' passports, to allowing workers to transfer 
employer sponsorship and introducing wage protection measures. Furthermore, the 
Kafala system poses many domestic challenges for UAE policymakers, from 25 
effectively controlling the costs of the program (maintain its national infrastructure 
and services, e.g. police security and subsidized programs) to, more generally, 
ensuring economic opportunities for its own nationals.  
The Economist Intelligence Unit (2009) reported the rapidly expanding young 
population of the GCC states and its great potential to support further economic 
growth. Although this generation is being increasingly well-educated and IT-literate, 
with a greater proportion of female workers, the Gulf economies are remaining heavily 
dependent on expatriate labor not only for the recent past but also for the foreseeable 
future.  
According to PwC analysts the Gulf’s workforce will expand rapidly over the next 
decade, unlike some of the E7 economies. The United Nations estimates the potential 
workforce will grow by around a third by 2025. To keep these extra people busy, 10 
million net new jobs will need to be created.  
The creation of new jobs is both an opportunity and a challenge for the future. It 
provides the Gulf with a golden opportunity to push through reforms and further 
encourage the growth of the non-hydrocarbon private sector. By doing so, the GCC 
will create the jobs of the future that it needs, and diversify away from oil based 
production.  
These changes will have national, regional and international business implications. 
The GCC economies could enhance their role as a hub between the West and the East. 
Building on an already sound banking system, the Gulf economies could become the 
international center of Islamic finance. The Gulf could also act as a staging post to 
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investment flows between the E7 and other emerging economies. Expanding these 
roles will help provide the necessary opportunities for the many millions of young 
university graduates that the region will produce between now and 2025. (PwC, 2013)  
The build-up of skills in the region, both GCC nationals and expatriates, creates a huge 
opportunity. Education reforms will remain a focus of government policy, with 
increasing attention paid to pre-secondary education and to English-language skills, 
without which nationals will not be able to take full advantage of the increasing 
number of foreign private universities and colleges in the Gulf.  
Although education reforms have been under way for around three decades in some 
Gulf countries, private-sector employers generally prefer to recruit expatriates. Issues 
of cost, productivity, work ethic and the balance between worker and employer rights 
all contribute to this preference for expatriates.  
The continuously rapid expansion of the workforce and the balance between locals and 
expatriates, middle/top managers raise concerns both sides (Ariss, 2014). While 
expatriates are coming to the region in order to boost their careers and take advantage 
of the wealth and the lifestyle, locals tend to perceive skilled expatriates as a threat to 
their career progression as, it is felt, they withhold job knowledge and expertise from 
their local counterparts. The feeling of being stereotyped by expatriates for the 
numerous privileges that locals hold compared with expatriates, as a result of 
nationalization policies and culture, along with the feeling of locals being a minority 
in their own countries, seem to threaten the already very competitive working 
environment that both locals and expatriates face. 
3.8.2 The attractiveness of the Gulf countries in general 
During the first oil boom of 1973–78, the oil-rich states of the Persian Gulf failed to take 
steps for the eventuality that their oil would run out. Investments were made but, overall, 
oil revenue was spent to provide jobs, housing, education, and income to citizens. The 
second oil boom, since 1998, is a second opportunity for the Gulf States to prepare for 
their inevitable post-oil future. Globalization and the repositioning of the Gulf States in 
the global order, capital flows, and patterns of trade; specific challenges facing carbon-
rich and resource-rich economic development; diversification, educational and human 
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capital development into post-oil political economies; and the future of regional security 
structures in the post-Arab Spring environment have come under examination. Ewers and 
Malecki (2010) presented the positive and negative features of the business environment 
in the Gulf's oil-rich economies. Positive features were identified almost entirely based 
on capital, energy and infrastructure, including: strong financial incentives for foreign 
investors, strategic location, high quality physical infrastructure, low energy costs, an 
abundance of free zones, and rising educational levels in the domestic population. 
Problems concerning the quality of labor and restrictions on hiring are perceived as key 
problems. Other issues, such as tax rates and corruption, rank more highly. Inefficient 
government bureaucracies, political instability, access to financing were also among the 
negative features of the business environment in the Gulf countries. Various international 
institutions, private institutions, and policy analysts have examined conditions in the Gulf 
States, and their conclusions are much the same. According to Sick (1998) a simple glance 
at the list of the structural problems would suggest a set of fairly common fiscal and 
public policy correctives: stimulation of an energetic private sector capable of generating 
jobs; privatization of many state-owned businesses; reevaluation of the extraordinarily 
generous entitlements that were adopted in the 1980s; curbing population growth; gradual 
reduction of subsidies on goods and services; introduction of taxes or user fees; improved 
education and training of citizens to make them more competitive in the private sector 
job market; removal of the many legal and financial benefits that skewed the labor market 
in favor of foreign workers; and political reforms that would permit a greater sense of 
public participation in the political process and, most importantly, a measure of 
accountability by ruling elites. Various combinations of these and other remedies began 
to be proposed by regional and international observers almost as soon as the nature of the 
problems became clear. Common (2008) in his analysis reveals the Gulf region’s public 
administration to be highly resistant to international reform trends. Although the relative 
size and scope of the public sector in the Gulf region could provide a potential impetus 
to administrative reform, this reform has been slow and limited. According to Common 
(2008) the Gulf States have focused on economic and labor market policies to stimulate 
the private sector and reduce dependence on public sector employment for nationals 
rather than reform administrative systems. Also, the powerful elite face relatively few 
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incentives to reform and also the political change is bound by strong institutions 
supported by culture and tradition, where ruling families continue to dominate political 
life. As a consequence, exhortations from the international community, such as the World 
Bank or the United Nations, to improve public governance appear to falter or are quietly 
ignored. A different approach is introduced by Dargin (2013), who argues that the 
pressures of economic development and industrial diversification are steadily eroding the 
comparative advantage that the Gulf countries enjoyed for much of the late twentieth 
century and early twenty-first century which allowed them to support domestic industries 
with extremely low-cost associated natural gas. As a result, the investment logic that 
guided energy intensive industries to the region will have to concomitantly evolve, 
especially considering that due to the stresses of the Arab Spring, demographic growth, 
economic diversification, and pan-Gulf cooperation and integration, the Gulf countries 
will have to guarantee a sustainable economic model for their citizens. 
 
MENA-OECD Investment Programme analysts (2011) identified the main obstacles to 
foreign investment as listed below, 
 foreign ownership limitations 
 sectorial restrictions to national treatment  
 discretionary procedures, delays and opacity of decision-making process for 
investment approval, licensing or registration as the main obstacles to foreign 
investment  
 lack of transparency and insufficient dissemination of information  
 sponsorship requirements in some countries where a local intermediary is 
required to operate or facilitate the investment project 
 obstacles for obtaining visas and work permits and restrictive quotas, as a 
corollary of nationalization policies of the workforce, as well as challenges to 
develop higher skilled personnel 
According to MENA-OECD’s findings the decision to invest in GCC countries 
relies on investment laws and barriers to foreign investments. The private sector perceives 
the restrictions to foreign ownership and approval requirements as key obstacles. 
Additional concerns of investors can be raised regarding the access to economic / 
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investment zones, as well as of compliance with international transparency obligations. 
The Economic Agreement between the GCC States (Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Kuwait, 
Oman, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates), as adopted by the GCC Supreme Council 
in 31st December 2001, represents a new style of GCC joint work as it does not only call 
for cooperation and coordination among Member States, but goes beyond that to 
expressly provide for the economic integration among Member States through the 
adoption of specific programs and workable mechanisms focusing on the development of 
common policies covering trade, investment, banking and finance, transportation and 
telecommunications. Gulf Co-operation Council’s (GCC) main aim was promoting 
security and stability in the region. 
Economic integration has been limited so far, to a customs union in 2003, and the plans 
to establish a common market and to achieve monetary union and a single currency by 
2010 have been postponed indefinitely following the UAE’s withdrawal from the project. 
PwC’s Middle East Region, Senior Partner Hani Ashkar in his interview, points out two 
fundamental things that the GCC does well in order to diversify the economies in areas 
outside of oil production and create a solid platform for sustained future growth. First, 
it’s a place as a center of Finance in the region. Dubai has already set out its stall to 
become the global center of Islamic Finance, and according to his opinion this element 
of Finance alone is a fast-growing sector. PwC expects that Global Islamic Finance assets 
will more than double from $1.2 trillion in the next four years. Secondly, the region’s 
airlines have been very successful in anticipating and capitalizing on both investment and 
physical flows over the last 10 years, and their strategic placement of hubs and routes has 
fuelled massive growth, putting them truly on the global stage. (PwC, 2013)  
 
International Monetary Fund reports high growth for the GCC economies. The 
combination of historically high oil prices, expanded oil production, expansionary fiscal 
policies, and low interest rates are supporting buoyant economic activity. Fiscal and 
external surpluses are large, inflation is moderate, and prospects for growth remain 
positive. Risks to the GCC stemming from exposure to Europe crisis are limited, but the 
impact via oil demand and prices could be substantial, depending on the exports 
determined in the 10th Annual Meeting of Ministers of Finance and Central Bank 
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Governors. The economies remain dependent on hydrocarbon extraction, and rising 
government spending has raised breakeven oil prices, implying heightened 
vulnerabilities. 
3.8.3 An overview of KSA and Qatar 
The KSA and the Gulf are leading global exporters of oil and derived products, and they 
belong to the Gulf Corporate Council (GCC) which aims to strengthen development 
within the region. Whilst currency exchange is currently pegged to the dollar in both 
countries, the GCC recently proposed plans to create a single currency within the region, 
a proposal which is currently on hold. The ongoing currency setup contributes to the 
convoluted PE of the region (Carli 2012, Khan 2008, Li and Jin 2012). Within the region 
and the KSA in particular, the royal family, respected elders and religious leaders control 
politics and the economy (Thomsen and Goton 2012, Crystal 1990, Niblock and Malik 
2007). Although much effort has been made to diversify into sectors such as banking, 
transport and telecommunications, countries in the Gulf are still heavily reliant upon oil . 
In addition, a growing gap in living standards due to major developments in certain parts 
of the country, neglect of older parts of cities and poor access to mortgage funds, have 
contributed to social instability that poses a risk for political instability (Saleh 1998, Saleh 
2001, Niblock and Malik 2007). In 2003, the number of non-performing loans in Qatar 
were initially higher than the KSA. However, the latest data in 2008 shows that whilst 
both countries have reduced defaults, Qatar has done so to a much greater extent. 
Furthermore, private sector credit growth and investment income at banks was shown to 
be much higher in Qatar than the KSA and the region at large (Al-Hassan et al. 2010). 
Further research is required to see whether the KSA has improved performance relative 
to its neighbours.  
  
A number of government institutions such as the Saudi Arabia Monetary Fund 
(SAMA), Saudi Arabia Basic Industries Corporation (SABIC) and Saudi Arabia General 
Investment Authority, to name but a few, are centrally controlled centres of excellence 
which apparently operate at high efficiency and in the interest of the Kingdoms’ progress 
(Niblock and Malik 2007). These institutions are reported to be working tirelessly to 
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strengthen and broaden the economy with global success. This success created by state-
led institutions, coupled with the expanding private sectors, may suggest movement away 
from oil dependance. This in turn may reduce the risk posed by oil to banks. The financial 
authority of the KSA, SAMA, which is overseen by a board of directors is globally 
recognised for its capacity to manage financial difficulties, primarily through liquidity 
boosting, guarantees and overseeing management (report 2012, Budd et al. 2013). There 
is the tendency for banks in the Gulf to be over reliant on government guarantees, without 
having risk management strategies and early warning systems in place to better manage 





According to the International Financial Centre Index (GFCI 15), published through the 
London-based Z/Yen group, Qatar has managed to secure its title as the Middle East’s 
most attractive financial environment. Qatar’s global ranking was 26, two places lower 
than the previous year, but remaining ahead of 29th ranked Dubai, which moved down 4 
places from the previous year. Several Gulf financial players have made leaps in the 
previous 12 months’ rankings. Riyadh, for example, moved up 16 places to reach a rank 
of 31, which Bahrain jumped to 40th, and Abu Dhabi rose 12 places to 10th (Murad, 2010). 
The Qatari government has established firm long-term goals for the nation. Through its 
2030 vision, the country hopes to develop into an economically advanced society able to 
maintain its own development and high living standards for years to come. These changes 
would ideally transform Qatar from being a country with a hydrocarbon economy to being 
one with a “potential economy”, through the four pillars of: environmental, social, fiscal, 
and human progress (Almutaz et al., 2012). 
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Qatar’s nationwide approach to development has helped it plan on producing an 
imaginative, formidable, prescient future with an improved business environment and 
with citizens who understand their desires for their nation (Kropski et al., 2012).              
Simultaneously, Qatar intends to provide improved healthcare and educational systems, 
as well as effective government services. Qatar is aiming to deliver these plans and 
achieve its governmental and personal sector aims, whilst improving the satisfaction of 
its citizens (Arouri and Rault, 2012). The build-up to the 2022 FIFA World Cup has led 
to increased opportunities for estate developers in Qatar. Successful bidders have been 
endorsed by analysts and these bidders need to appreciate Qatar’s aims for its 2022 
programme, including: innovation, sustainability, health and safety, and quality, with a 
general theme of legacy encompassing proceedings (Corey et al., 2016). 
Qatar’s relative success shows the possibilities of what can also be achieved by KSA if it 










Chapter 4: Research Methodology 
4.1 Introduction 
Throughout the fields of financial and institutional academia, the scope and diversity of 
the methodological techniques and approaches used has resulted in a lack of 
epistemological and ontological consistency. Instead, problem-centred, case-oriented, 
phenomenological research typifies the patterns of empiricism, resulting in a diversified 
network of techniques and methods. From predictive market analysis via quantitative 
modelling to internal evaluations and feedback from focus group participants, the range 
of methods available complicates the selection and application of a single paradigm. Over 
the course of this chapter, the foundations of empiricism are tested, evaluated, and 
compared to justify the use of a singular, effective model for comparing the institutional 
outcomes in the KSA and Qatar. The following sections describe a mixed methods 
approach that allows for the comparison and in-depth analysis of empirical findings from 
both nations that are directly linked to the primary aim and core objectives of this study. 
4.2 Research Paradigm 
According to Tashakkori and Teddlie (2010), Jonker and Pennink (2011), Punch (2014), 
Bryman (2015), and Creswell (2015), a research paradigm is an orientation of beliefs and 
knowledge towards the specific, targeted realisation of empirical objectives. Creswell 
(2015) characterises this as “worldview”, or a belief system composed of types and 
dimensions of evidence, namely epistemology, and the overarching architecture of 
reality, or ontology (p. 16). The research paradigm is a key determinant of methodological 
choices and techniques. Johnson and Christensen (2012) further observe that by default, 
research paradigms are held in concert by a “community of researchers”, relying on 
shared assumptions, concepts, and values to systematise and structure the underlying 
approach to empiricism (p. 31). Providing models, establishing rules, and directing focal 
points, the research paradigm is an important determinant of methodological 
appropriateness and congruence (Johnson and Christensen, 2012). The following sections 
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discuss three well-known paradigms that are considered for the current study including 
the positivist, the constructivist, and the mixed methods approaches.  
4.2.1 The Positivist Paradigm 
An historically scientific approach to the evaluation of problems and patterns in the fields 
of natural science, the positivist paradigm is “based on the belief that scientific action 
produces concepts that are useful”, systematising data collection and findings to inform 
and influence future rules and theory (Jonker and Pennink, 2011, p. 29). Widely applied 
to the banking industry, the positivist worldview engenders empirical techniques with 
replicability and structural reliability that can be used to extend or amend theoretical 
underpinnings (Collis and Hussey, 2014; Babbie, 2016). Due to the rigidity and structured 
domain of the positivist philosophy, the methods and approach to data collection and 
analysis are governed by an overarching body of knowledge and epistemological domains 
(Tashakkori and Teddlie, 2010; Jonker and Pennink, 2011). It is through the replication 
and structured application of these varied, yet interconnected techniques to a variety of 
empirical problems that the scope and field of knowledge and relationships is 
systematically expanded (Babbie, 2016). 
Within the positivist doctrine, determinism, or the identification and assessment of rules 
in the natural sciences, predicts that “knowledge effects external realities, and as a result, 
the laws of the universe can be known” (Morcol, 2001, p. 382). In addition, Wildemuth 
(1993) observes a standard of objectivity, whereby reality “transcends the individual’s 
perspective, expressing the observable, statistical regularities of behaviour” (p. 540). 
Patterns, predictable relationships, risks, and outcomes can be not only forecast and 
measured in relation to human activities, but also replicated and re-evaluated temporally 
to further define, legitimise, and construct known patterns and social structures 
(Tashakkori and Teddlie, 2010). Positivism consists of four epistemological and 
methodological guidelines that dominate the foundations and characteristics of empirical 
research approaches (Morcol, 2001, p. 383): 
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 Objectivism: The epistemological belief that there is a tangible reality and 
that observations have temporal and contextual independence from the 
observer. 
 Fact-Value Distinction: Assumes that because an objective reality exists 
and it is reflected in our minds, facts which pertain to it can be 
distinguished from the emotional states of the mind. 
 Rational Analysis: Analysis is a potentially rational process, free from 
values and the institutionalised expression of those values. 
 Quantification: Assumes that quantification is a value per se and that 
quantitative answers are by definition better than qualitative ones. 
The applicability of these guidelines is predicated on the selection of the research 
problem, the clarity of the research questions, explicit theoretical emphasis, and an a 
priori specification of the underlying constructs (Dube and Pare, 2003). It is only through 
the transparency of the methodological rigour that positivist research achieves its 
specificity of purpose and evidence-oriented validity (Dube and Pare, 2003). In recent 
banking applications, including Kollmann et al. (2013) and Gogas et al. (2014), such 
rigour and structure translates into problem-specific architecture for evaluating the effects 
of corporate governance on bank performance and fiscal stability. Inherently tied to 
econometric, purely quantitative principles, the forecasting model introduced by Gogas 
et al. (2014) systematically compares the influence of a structured range of financial 
indicators temporally to predict the patterns and movements of institutional credit ratings 
under governance commitments. The study by Kollmann et al. (2013) focuses on a 
broader, macroeconomic relationship between banks and government investments, 
highlighting the interconnectivity of economic growth (GDP) and internal financial 
indicators such as Capital to Asset Ratio, Property Prices, and Bond Rate. Each study is 
indicative of how the positivist paradigm is applicable to complex, multivariate problems 




Despite the robust, widely applied commitment to the positivist belief system throughout 
centuries of social research, Crook and Garrett (2005) describe this position as “curious” 
and “remarkably misleading” (p. 207). By definition, a paradigm is expected to establish 
a “set of beliefs, procedures, and working practices” that can be applied and replicated in 
relation to a given problem. The emergence of variability and inconsistent patterns in 
paradigmatic models not only demands replacement, but also revises the dominant views 
and perspectives that serve as governance measures for the enduring standard (Crook and 
Garrett, 2005, p. 207). Because of asymmetric information and researcher-planned 
investigation, the positivist paradigm is often viewed as an effort to force “uncertain facts 
to comport with values and beliefs, whereby preconceptions shape the types of 
information used in decision making” (Morcol, 2001, p. 384). Further, Godfrey and Hill 
(1995) contest that elements that are “purely theoretical” cannot be verified and therefore 
“have no meaning” (p. 523). Due to variations in behaviour, inconsistencies in values, 
and widespread pressures throughout a diverse global community, the objectives of 
positivist research must be defined and the scope of research controlled to systematically 
address specific, model-oriented problems (Crook and Garrett, 2005). 
For the current study, the positivist paradigm offers several important advantages that can 
be used to critically compare the banking industry performance phenomena in the KSA 
and Qatar. Systematising the extrapolation of feedback and experience from managers in 
the Middle East, Da Cruz and Marques (2012) employ a purely quantitative survey, 
drawing distinctions between managerial strategies and value systems. Likert-based 
scalar instruments, as described by Bryman (2012), offer an opportunity to critically 
evaluate the perspectives and beliefs of individuals without subjecting the research to the 
subjectivity or opinionated position of each respondent. Given the purpose of this 
research, focusing on the experiences and agendas of managers in the banking industry is 
an essential predictor of how banks will respond to increasingly risky and high-pressure 
markets in the future. In addition, as objectified by the Da Cruz and Marques (2012) and 
Bryman (2012) approaches to quantitative surveying, the structure can be used as an 
advantage when comparing the values and perspectives of individuals across clearly 
defined groups such as banks in the KSA and Qatar. 
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4.2.2 The Constructivist Paradigm 
The problem with research in modern enterprise is that complex socio-economic systems 
do not conform to a single model or archetype (Dessler, 1999; Jonker and Pennink, 2011). 
Instead, a broad range of socio-cultural, network, and strategic effects have resulted in 
evolving and dynamic environments that are transitory in nature and characteristics 
(Dessler, 1999). Constructivists, therefore, “hold assumptions that individuals seek 
understanding of the world in which they live and work . . . developing subjective 
meanings of their experiences—meanings directed toward certain objects or things” 
(Creswell, 2014, p. 8). Efforts to selectively quantify and pattern the behaviours, 
strengths, and weaknesses of individuals throughout a banking environment according to 
a common rule like the theory of planned behaviour (Ajzen, 2011) or the expectancy 
theory of motivation (Isaac et al., 2001) not only avoids the potential for unpredictability 
but also narrows the scope of empiricism to a very selective and targeted research focus. 
Constructivism offers an alternative dynamic which builds on the variability of social 
experiences and functions, avoiding the compartmentalisation of positivism in a specific 
theory or domain. 
As the constructivist paradigm embraces the social construction of knowledge and 
patterns, the evidential domain is inherently qualitative and inductive (Creswell, 2014). 
Research is therefore based on the pursuit of “intelligibility”, whereby observations, 
experiences, and interpretations provide researchers with a range of perspectives and 
examples that can be used to construct new theories and new knowledge (Dessler, 1999, 
p. 128). By default, constructivist research is compelled to “assume that reality is 
subjective and socially constructed”, allowing researchers to base their interpretations 
and analyses of phenomenological evidence on what they observe, what they infer, and 
what they understand (Wildemuth, 1993, p. 450). Characterised by Creswell (2014) as a 
“participatory world view”, the constructivist paradigm transfers researchers from an 
externalised research domain that includes facts, figures, and data collection, to an 
internal position in the scope and dynamics of the problem (p. 9). In this way, patterns 
and observations are unique to the research domain itself, generating meaningful 
outcomes that are derived from the perceived significance suggested by the research. 
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In the banking industry, the constructivist paradigm is typically adopted where social 
dynamics, perspectives, and beliefs need to be tested. Breitstein and Dini (2011), for 
example, undertake empirical analysis of the pre-2007 financial crisis industry to 
demonstrate how varying social inputs constructed a crisis and contributed to the 
contagion effect of excessive risk taking. From a less general, targeted methodological 
approach, Lichtenstein and Williamson (2006) employ constructivism to interpret the 
experiences and preferences of online banking consumers, assessing factors that motivate 
and support engagement with advanced technology. Distinctive from the positivist 
approach, each of these studies uses an interpretive lens that is focused on the root causes 
and effects of a given problem, avoiding the structured and narrow spectrum of 
quantitative data and performance-based models in favour of the perspectives, values, 
and beliefs of the actors engaged in the problem or process. 
For the current study, the constructivist paradigm is viewed as a means of interpretation, 
whereby specific beliefs, experiences, and values of the banking industries in the KSA 
and Qatar can be captured and evaluated. Through the distribution of an open-ended 
questionnaire, bank managers can provide insights into why specific risk mitigation 
programmes and platforms are being adopted and what outlying risks and vulnerabilities 
might affect the performance of these banks in the future (Bryman, 2012). Yet, because 
such evidence is inherently subjective and individually oriented, the findings of a purely 
constructivist approach to this study would be vulnerable to scrutiny and criticism due to 
their situational and experiential specificity (Creswell, 2009). In addition, by failing to 
address the performance-level domain, assumptions regarding the relationships among 
risk management, market changes, and institutional performance would likely fail to 
address many of the forces and catalysts underlying this evolving phenomenon. 
4.2.3 The Mixed Methods Solution 
To evolve beyond the structural limitations of both a singular, general interpretation or a 
multiple, specific interpretation of problems and phenomena, the “pragmatic” philosophy 
of mixed methods research diversifies the empirical approach to include both quantitative 
and qualitative approaches (Creswell, 2014, p. 16). This form of “what works” adaptation 
of methodological constructs is driven by the core problem or research focal point and is 
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constructed of theoretical underpinnings and structural justifications that bridge the gap 
between inconsistency and reliability in empiricism (Creswell, 2014; Watkins and Gioia, 
2015). Wildemuth (1993) describes this as a “post-positivist approach” to social research 
and social problem solving, and contends that mixed methods research “advocates 
methodological pluralism”, integrating both quantitative and qualitative techniques into 
a single, targeted research instrument (p. 451). 
The merits of the mixed methods approach as championed by Creswell and Clark (2012) 
and Watkins and Gioia (2015) is linked to the triangulation of findings, whereby 
diversified and disparate sources of evidence can be compared and analysed in relation 
to the overarching research problem despite their different structures and sources. In a 
recent thesis, Chen (2012) leverages this dynamic research architecture to assess a range 
of “intangibles” in the banking sector, leveraging qualitative internal perspectives of 
banking managers to support quantitative analysis of industry and institutional 
performance characteristics (p. 14). Such efforts are designed to explain the relationships 
among knowledge, understanding, and performance management by identifying a range 
of factors and forces that influence the administration of systems and risk management 
services (Chen, 2012). Similarly, Strang (2012) adopts a behaviourist perspective, 
administering open-ended surveys to bank managers to compare financial performance 
to the risk tolerances and management strategies being adopted by these professionals.  
Prior to the synthesis afforded by the mixed methods design, researchers used more than 
one methodology to satisfy the criterion of triangulation (Galton and Wilcocks, 1983), 
while at the same time not having to be limited to a narrow methodological theory 
(Tashakkori and Teddlie, 2003). Early research by Chesterton (1927) indicates that the 
mixed methods design is not a clear-cut and well-defined research protocol: “The real 
problems associated with rapprochements come when the analysis is proceeding . . . Here 
the real problems of between method triangulation ‘rise in green robes, roaring from the 
green hells of the sea, where fallen skies, and evil hues, and eyeless creatures be” (in 
Galton and Delamont 1986, p. 171). 
The “incommensurability” or “incompatibility” thesis developed during 1970s and 1980s 
signified that epistemologically the quantitative and the qualitative approaches to 
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research are inherently irreconcilable (Symonds and Gorard, 2008). To provide a 
rationale for the use of a multitude of methods in the same research protocol, triangulation 
is described as a method that can allow the researcher to utilise the best aspects of both 
methods while at the same time minimising the disadvantages of both the qualitative and 
quantitative approaches. As Creswell and Plano Clark (2007) describe it, the paradigm 
that was being created adopted as a main tenet that “the use of quantitative and qualitative 
approaches in combination provides a better understanding of research problems than 
either approach alone” (p. 5), since according to Tashakkori and Creswell (2007), “one 
cannot separate methods from the larger process of research of which it is a part” (p. 304).   
The mixed methods design has since been viewed as a solution to the incommensurability 
thesis, and it came to be known as the third methodological movement (Tashakkori and 
Teddlie, 2003) to the quantitative and qualitative protocols. With respect to the theoretical 
basis of the mixed methods design, several theoreticians aimed to develop a discrete 
context in which to embed it in a manner that grounded the methodology and highlighted 
its distinctiveness (Tashakkori and Teddlie, 2003). Greene (2005) argues that the mixed 
methods design is an inclusive approach that welcomes “all legitimate methodological 
traditions” (p. 207), and theoreticians such as Tashakkori and Teddlie (2003) and Jonson 
and Onwuegbuzie (2004) select pragmatism, or “the philosophy of free choice” 
(Symonds and Gorard, 2008, p. 3), as the ideal candidate to fill this void. Fortified with 
the acceptance of pragmatism, the mixed methods design has been discussed as being the 
third paradigm that reconciles apparently incompatible methodologies and approaches 
(Jonson, Onwuegbuzie, and Turner, 2007).  
Jonson, Onwuegbuzie, and Turner (2007), attempt to provide a formal definition of mixed 
methods through the consolidation of the viewpoints of thirty-one experts.  
Mixed methods research is the type of research in which a researcher or team of 
researchers combines elements of qualitative and quantitative research 
approaches (e.g., use of qualitative and quantitative viewpoints, data collection, 
analysis, inference techniques) for the broad purpose of breadth and depth of 
understanding and corroboration. (Jonson et al., 2007, p. 118)  
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A similar definition has been offered by Creswell and Plano Clark (2007):  
Mixed methods is a research design with philosophical assumptions as well as 
methods of inquiry. As a methodology, it involves philosophical assumptions that 
guide the direction of the collection and analysis of data and the mixture of 
qualitative and quantitative approaches in many phases in the research process. 
As a method, it focuses on collecting, analyzing, and mixing both quantitative and 
qualitative data in a single study or series of studies. (p. 5)  
The above two definitions emphasise that the mixed methods design approach uses 
qualitative and quantitative protocols in methodological and epistemological terms. 
A related term to mixed methods research is mixed analysis. Onwuegbuzie and Combs 
(2010) define mixed analysis in as much of an all-encompassing manner as possible. 
Their definition takes into consideration the different approaches adopted in 20 years of 
significant research from a diverse range of fields including business, education, 
psychology, nursing, and linguistics. In their analysis, Onwuegbuzie and Combs (2010) 
isolate thirteen main decisions that researchers must make in various stages of mixed 
methods research.  
Onwuegbuzie and Combs (2010) utilise those decision criteria to provide the following 
definition:  
Mixed analysis involves the use of both quantitative and qualitative analytical 
techniques within the same framework, which is guided either a priori, a 
posteriori, or iteratively, representing analytical decisions that occur both prior to 
the study and during the study.  
Mixed analysis might be based on one of the existing mixed methods research paradigms 
such as pragmatism or transformative-emancipatory so that it can meet several rationales 
or purposes, including triangulation, complementarity, development, initiation, and 
expansion.  
Mixed analyses involve the analysis of quantitative data, qualitative data, or both. These 
can occur either concurrently or sequentially in two phases, in which case either phase 
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can be completed first. Findings from the initial analysis phase inform the subsequent 
phase. More than two phases can also be used iteratively. The analysis approaches may 
not interact until the data interpretation stage yields a basic parallel mixed analysis, 
although more complex forms of parallel mixed analysis can be used, in which interaction 
takes place in a limited way before the data interpretation phase. Mixed analysis can be 
design based, whereby it is directly linked to the mixed methods design, for example, 
sequential mixed analysis techniques used for sequential mixed methods designs. 
Alternatively, mixed analysis can be phase based, in which case the mixed analysis takes 
place in one or more phases such as data transformation. In mixed analyses, either the 
qualitative or quantitative analysis strands may be given priority or they may have equal 
priority because of a priori decisions determined at the research conceptualisation phase 
or decisions made during the study, including a posteriori or iterative decisions. Mixed 
analysis can be used in case-oriented, variable-oriented, and process or experience 
oriented analyses. Mixed analysis is guided by an attempt to analyse data in a way that 
yields at least one of five types of generalisations: external statistical generalisations, 
internal statistical generalisations, analytical generalisations, case-to-case transfer, and 
naturalistic generalisation. In its most integrated form, mixed analysis may involve some 
form of cross-over analysis, wherein one or more analysis types associated with one 
tradition, such as qualitative analysis, are used to analyse data associated with a different 
tradition, such as quantitative data (Onwuegbuzie and Combs, 2010).  
Of the thirteen criteria mentioned, the ones that appeared most often were the rationale 
or the purpose for carrying out a mixed method design analysis, the number of data types 
to be incorporated in the analysis, the sequence of time of the different components of the 
mixed methods analysis, the comparative importance assigned to each analytical 
component, and the number of the phases of analysis. 
The concept of “mixed methods” is used by many researchers in social science research, 
whereupon “the researcher mixes or combines quantitative and qualitative research 
techniques, methods, approaches, concepts, or language into a single study” (Jonson and 
Onwuegbuzie 2004, p. 17). Symonds and Gorard (2008) argue that the mixed method 
approach has as its roots a philosophical approach more than an empirical approach.  
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According to Johnson and Onwuegbuzie (2004), the mixed methods design approach has 
specific advantages and disadvantages. Some advantages are that  
words, pictures, and narrative can be used to add meaning to numbers; numbers 
can be used to add precision to words, pictures, and narrative; can provide 
quantitative and qualitative research strengths; can answer a broader and more 
complete range of research questions because the researcher is not confined to a 
single method or approach. (Johnson and Onwuegbuzie, 2004, p. 20)  
Additionally, the mixed methods approach allows the use of the complementarity 
principle: “A researcher can use the strengths of an additional method to overcome the 
weaknesses in another method by using both in a research study” (Johnson and 
Onwuegbuzie, 2004, p. 20). The mixed methods approach can involve the principle of 
triangulation because it “can provide stronger evidence for a conclusion through 
convergence and corroboration of findings” (Johnson and Onwuegbuzie, 2004, p. 20). 
Furthermore, the mixed methods approach provides a deeper or multi-tiered insight into 
reality, revealing things that a single method approach may not be able to detect; it 
provides a justification for increasing the degree to which the results of the research are 
generalisable; and the combination of the quantitative and qualitative approaches 
provides a more thorough snapshot of reality that is needed for the purposes of generating 
and enriching theoretical perspectives and practical research applications (Johnson and 
Onwuegbuzie, 2004). 
The disadvantages of a mixed method approach include the fact that a research team may 
be required as “it can be difficult for a single researcher to carry out both qualitative and 
quantitative research, especially if two or more approaches are expected to be used 
concurrently” (Johnson and Onwuegbuzie, 2004, p. 20). Additionally, the researcher 
needs to study many different and diverse methodologies as well as understand how these 
disparate approaches can be used together. Further, there are some theoreticians who 
argue that this mixing of methodologies is never warranted and qualitative and 
quantitative methods should resume their discrete roles in research. There are also many 
ongoing debates on issues such as how qualitative results are interpreted, or what the 
exact nature of the combination of the qualitative and quantitative paradigms should be. 
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Finally, the mixed method approach usually requires significant time and money 
(Johnson and Onwuegbuzie, 2004). 
Through the comparison of the quantitative, qualitative, and mixed methods paradigms, 
it is determined that the mixed methods approach allows the current study to capture 
evidence related to institutional performance in each of these markets, and then to 
compare the performance outlooks with the perspectives, values, and experiences of 
managers directly responsible for the realisation of these performance goals. In 
developing a mixed methods approach, Watkins and Gioia (2015) describe a convergent 
parallel design that involves the collection of both quantitative and qualitative data 
separately, and then the triangulation of the results within a single, focused analytical 
process (p. 77). Ultimately, it is the paired realisation of performance goals and 
managerial objectives that will make these institutions successful. Therefore, it is prudent 
to capture evidence regarding both axes of this problem, rather than attempting to 
dissociate one from the other. The remaining sections of this chapter describe the 
architecture and approach used to capture the empirical evidence and the sources of 
evidence that originate through the multidimensional application of the mixed methods 
research technique. 
4.3 Research Approach 
The research approach for this study is adapted from the mixed methods guidelines 
outlined in Creswell and Clark (2012), Punch (2014), and Watkins and Gioia (2015). 
Specifically, the process involves first identifying the sources of information for 
collecting and analysing the empirical data. Data for the underlying financial factors is 
extrapolated from a variety of sources, including the following primary databases: 
 Bank Annual Reports  
 Government Databases  
 Industry Reports  
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Once this data is collected, it is aggregated into a standardised Excel spreadsheet for 
tracking and analysis. The focus of this macro-level, comparative, and systematic analysis 
of institutional performance in the KSA and Qatar is to identify the effects of oil market 
pricing fluctuations on commercial bank performance. Through the systematisation of the 
factor-based analysis and consistency of the regression techniques, this initial empirical 
segment is designed to provide an overview of the threats, risks, and stability effects 
currently confronting institutions in each of these markets. 
The second dimension of this approach is to develop a micro-level assessment of the 
perspectives, values, and experiences of qualified members of the banking industry in 
each of the case study countries. Characteristic of the mixed methods approach to 
participant surveying, this strategy involves the development of a standardised research 
instrument that is multi-component and multi-method in its constructs (Watkins and 
Gioia, 2015). Accordingly, the quantitative survey segment is designed to be 
administered to any members of the banking leadership team that are accessible and 
willing to participate in this process. The qualitative interview targets senior managers 
and corporate officials with experience, knowledge, and authority in institutional 
performance and governance. The mixed methods approach involves the administration 
of these surveys and interviews followed by the collation and statistical comparison of 
these findings to address particularities and key observations in relation to the diversified 
participant groups in both the KSA and Qatar. 
4.4 Research Instrument and Data Collection 
The convergent parallel design of mixed methods research outlined by Watkins and Gioia 
(2015) involves clearly defining the axes of data collection in accordance with the focal 
points of the core research problem. For the current study, the research problem involves 
several distinctive factors including the performance of banks in the KSA and Qatar in 
periods of varying performance levels in the oil and gas industry; the growth and 
development strategies implemented at these financial institutions; and the risk 
management and positioning agenda being deployed to combat uncertainty. Whilst the 
first of these focal points mandates an inherently quantitative, case-specific analysis of 
  
134 
explicit performance data, the second of these two areas is directly concerned with the 
perspectives, beliefs, and experiences of the managers used by these financial institutions. 
There are three primary segments of the empirical research process that are designed and 
oriented towards the capture and analysis of evidence directly related to this core research 
problem and agenda. 
The initial, quantitative data segment focuses on secondary evidence readily available 
from annual reports associated with bank performance and business development. 
Serving as the primary dependent variable for evaluating the impacts of changes in the 
oil and gas industry, these reports are extrapolated from institutions in both the KSA and 
Qatar, yielding a comparative model that can be analysed and compared on a factor-by-
factor basis. The core independent variables are based on national reports, including data 
on oil productivity and industry growth; oil and gas as a percentage of GDP; and 
government spending on the oil and gas industry. Gibertthorpe and Panyrakis (2015) 
observe a distribution of oil and gas operations at micro, meso, and macro levels in 
developing economies, highlighting the role of supply chain development and industry 
growth in affecting the domestic economy. For the current research, a similar analysis of 
these market constructs is assimilated into this initial quantitative research segment, 
allowing for the data analysis to be extrapolated in direct reference to domestic impacts 
on the micro and macro levels. 
Bank specific figures such as ROA, non-performing loans, and issue of credit between 
the years 2007 and 2013 are obtained from the Bank Scope data base and SAMA as these 
sources are likely to be the most reliable (Niblock and Malik, 2007; Al-Hassan et al., 
2010). For the same period, country specific data such as the oil price, GDP, inflation, 
commodity index, fiscal spending, and budget sources are obtained from the IMF and 
World Bank. Data on lending activity is also obtained from data held by banks, as this 
will be a useful indicator of whether current lending activity correlates with the external 
factors of interest. Data is collated in SPSS and multiple regression analysis is used to 
test the strength of the relationship between commercial bank profitability and external 
factors. The strength of the dependant variable ROA against multiple predictor variables, 
including fiscal spend and old price, is tested. Overall R values and beta’s show the 
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strength of the relationship, with adjusted R2 being reported (Burns and Burns, 2008). As 
relationships are expected between many of the independent variables, multicollinearity 
is assessed prior to multiple regression analysis. In SPSS, the adjusted R square, ANOVA, 
and list of coefficients are used to interpret data (Burns and Burns, 2008). Data are 
obtained from similar sources in both Saudi Arabia and Qatar, although data from banks 
for analysis of lending activity will be sourced separately from banks in each country. 
Other researchers correlating internal or external factors to bank profit or risk have used 
ROA as the dependant variable (Athanasoglou et al., 2006; Almazari, 2014). The same 
design is adopted here. The strength of the relationship between the dependant variable, 
ROA, and other variables, and between ROA and the multiple external independent 
variables, are compared for the two countries. This information is invaluable for better 
understanding of the current dependence on fiscal spend and oil, and may reveal changes 
in trends over the time period considered, enabling better bank management strategies. 
Furthermore, the empirical data generated from assessing the two countries will prove 
useful in understanding how each country’s strategy is promoting diversification and risk 
reduction. It is of interest to understand how the divergent PE of each country impinges 
on the data obtained (Carli, 2012; Crystal, 1990). 
The second segment of this research is designed to capture important and relevant 
evidence regarding the experiences, values, and perspectives of bank managers in the 
KSA and Qatar. This structured survey is designed to be administered via e-mail, 
telephone, or in person to members of these financial institutions with decision-making 
powers and strategic responsibilities. As the first, key component of the mixed methods 
surveying model, the quantitative survey segment involves the use of a Likert scale to 
extrapolate feedback in relation to a variety of structured, targeted prompts (Bryman, 
2012; Punch, 2014). This survey includes several critical components, each of which is 
used in the analytical process to enable the modelling and analysis of key patterns, 
industry dynamics, and business agendas. The following is an overview of the five 





Section 1: Demographic Characteristics and Patterns  
The participants are asked to provide background information regarding their individual 
backgrounds and experience in the banking industry; their responses generate grouping 
and classification variables. This section includes information about gender, age, 
educational level, position in the company, length of employment in commercial banking, 
and length of employment at the current organisation, as well as the average loan default 
percentage at the current organisation. The variables in this section are rated using 
categorical scales, such as “male/female” and “secondary education/some 
college/master's/bachelor's/PhD+”. 
Section 2: Strategy Analysis  
This series of 15 structured prompts is designed to critically assess the current strategies 
underlying bank industry positioning in relation to oil and gas resources and international 
development in each nation. Examples of the items in this section include “The banking 
industry is stable and diversified” (item 1); “We invest a high percentage of our funds in 
private sector enterprises” (item 4); “We anticipate that the oil and gas market will recover 
in price and volume” (item 9); “There is an inadequate population of skilled entrepreneurs 
in our national population” (item 13); and “Banks are essential to the domestic economy 
and therefore must be protected during periods of financial duress and decline” (item 14). 
The items are rated on a Likert five-point scale, where 1=strongly agree, 2=agree, 
3=neither agree nor disagree, 4=disagree, and 5=strongly disagree. 
Section 3: Performance Analysis   
This series of 20 structured prompts considers the pressures and influences of industry 
transitions, assessing the impact of external forces on the attainment of performance 
objectives and priorities. A standard Likert method is used for this analysis as well. 
Examples of the items used in the performance analysis section include “Global pressures 
on the oil and gas market have destabilised performance domestically” (item 1); “When 
oil prices decline, we are less likely to lend money to private enterprises” (item 8); 
“Citizens are more likely to withhold savings and investments when oil prices fluctuate 
or decline” (item 9); “The increase in lending rates is a positive step towards industry 
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maturity (item 12); and “Our banks should invest more heavily in business development 
and growth to increase industry performance” (item 18). 
Section 4: Government Role and Agenda Analysis 
This survey segment includes 10 prompts related to the domestic government’s role in 
financial stability and the oil and gas industry. Likert scales are used for items 1, 4, and 
5, while most scales used are categorical. Examples of the items used include “Our 
government has a long-term vision that does not rely on oil and gas for development (item 
1); “The primary industry on which lending and development should focus is 
manufacturing, services, technology, agriculture, or others” (item 2); “Government 
investment in oil and gas is a necessary and sustainable commitment” (item 4); 
“Government analysts would rank the current threat level in oil and gas as high/risky, 
medium/uncertain, average/competitive, evolving/manageable, or low/ideal” (item 9); 
and “Is the government investment in oil and gas based on the self-preservation, national 
growth/development, industry protection, or other factors” (item 10). 
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Section 5: Future Growth Analysis   
Focusing on the strategic direction of these organisations, this final section includes two 
different lists of 10 factors affecting strategic direction and performance outcomes. A 
Likert scale is used to assess either the degree of importance (strategy) or the degree of 
impact (performance), where 1=“very important/impactful” and 5=“not 
important/impactful at all”. Examples of the items related to forming and implementing 
the firm’s ongoing banking strategy include “price performance of the oil and gas 
industry” (item 1); “diversification of industries” (item 4); and “citizen expectations and 
national demands” (item 7). Examples of the items representing the impact of specific 
factors on organisational performance include “demand for loans and innovative 
financing products” (item 2); “managerial strategy making and positioning” (item 6); and 
“foreign investment and development” (item 10). 
The quantitative segment of this process is strategic and selective in its administration 
and is designed to target feedback and experiences from those individuals directly 
responsible for institutional management such as VPs, Executives, CEOs, and CFOs. The 
interviews include 7 questions, listed in Appendix C. The qualitative survey architecture 
is based on an open-ended, prompt-response format (Merriam, 2015). Strategically, these 
questions are thematically structured to create a cognitive progression from the state of 
the industry, through the challenges and limitations encountered in the industry, and 
finally to the future of the banking industry. As the results are designed to be captured 
verbatim, the sections are designed in multi-part segments that allow the respondents to 
provide fully comprehensive interpretation and feedback to the prompts and their 
relevance to the specific institution or domestic banking industry. 
4.5 Research Participants and Data Collection 
To examine the differences between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) and Qatar, 
employees and managers, a total of six-hundred (N=600) participants, took part in the 
present research. Of these, half (N=300) are respondents from the KSA, and half are 
Qatari participants (N=300).  
  
139 
4.6 Data Analysis 
The analysis of empirical data related to this multidimensional, multisegment 
investigation involves a variety of analytical tools and assessment measures, many of 
which are paradigm-specific and data-oriented. The financial performance data, for 
example, is collected and selectively aggregated into a standard form spreadsheet so that 
time series patterns can be compared for correlation, multicollinearity, and statistically 
significant relationships (Singh, 2007). The Pearson’s Correlation analysis is used to 
identify the degree of similarity between dependent and independent variables, 
manifesting a construct of reliability and validity that can be used to further explain 
relationships during the analytical process (Gravetter and Wallnau, 2008). 
Multicollinearity is a vulnerability in linear economic models, which Neelman (2014) 
suggests can lead to an invalidation of the empirical findings, particularly if the two 
variables have a near or perfect longitudinal relationship (Brooks, 2002). Finally, 
statistical significance is evaluated using the IBM SPSS 20 module in a factor-based 
linear regression analysis (Singh, 2007). 
4.7 Ethical Concerns 
Limitations and Challenges 
This study focuses on the perspectives of managers in institutions that are innately tied to 
their regional and domestic markets. As a result, there is less incentive for these managers 
to decry the status of developmental processes and pursue additional revenue streams 
without the full support of the national market and financial network. Whilst this research 
endeavours to make distinctions between individuals, grouping their perspectives, values, 
and priorities according to a range of independent variables that are demographic and 
experience-derived, the inability of this study to overcome the effects and influences of 
national culture on individual perspectives may inherently limit the accuracy and 
reliability of the empirical findings. Further, due to the construct domain of regionalised 
institutional management, geographic similarities among the participant responses have 
not only skewed this data, but also perpetuated a division of values and priorities that is 
national in its architecture and influence. 
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The administration of these surveys and interviews requires that protective and fiercely 
competitive institutions agree to allow their managers to participate in this process. 
Regardless of the focus or objectives associated with this study, the potential threat of 
this research to the proprietary and institutional systems is considered a hindrance to the 
support and engagement in this process. Whilst a much larger sample population of both 
employees and managers was initially sought, over the course of the sampling process, 
resistance to participation and a lack of institutional permission created barriers to the 
administration process. As a result, the purposive sampling technique (Bryman, 2012) 
was designed to limit resistance and encourage participation, narrowing the scope and 
breadth of the survey to experienced managers who entered into the process openly and 
objectively. 
4.8 Summary 
This chapter outlines the foundations of the mixed methods approach that is employed in 
the comparative assessment of banking risks and performance vulnerabilities in the KSA 
and Qatar. By focusing on both quantitative and qualitative sources of evidence, this 
research approach creates a diversified platform of multidimensional findings that are 
both comparable and directly relevant to the objectives of this study. Over the subsequent 
chapter, these results are presented and critically assessed to identify the spectrum of 
forces operating within and outside of this industry. Through adherence to this rigid and 
strategic methodological approach, the goal is to glean insights and new evidence 
regarding the perils and risks of resource dependency, the developmental constraints 





Chapter 5: Research findings 
5.1 Introduction 
This mixed methods investigation was undertaken to compare the experiences, 
perspectives, performance, and values of the banking industry in the Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia (KSA) and Qatar. This chapter synthesises the findings from the 
operationalisation of the quantitative and qualitative protocols, providing a comparative 
analysis of the situation as reported by 300 KSA participants and 300 Qatar participants. 
Simultaneously, the chapter examines the thematic elements in an effort to identify those 
factors supporting transformative and diversified outcomes in Qatar and the hurdles and 
limitations that must be overcome in KSA to match or exceed such transformative 
performance. Over the following sections, a comprehensive review of this empirical 
evidence will address the diversity of challenges and risks facing the banking industry as 
each of these nations navigates its own unique stage in the developmental process. 
Ultimately, these findings present a contrast between dependency and abundance, 
focusing on the transitional imperative that is required to overcome the constraints of a 
narrow industrial paradigm and opportunistic governmental enterprise. 
5.2 Statistical and Econometric Analysis of Banking Performance and the Oil 
Market in the KSA and Qatar 
In this section, the results for the quantitative and the qualitative research are presented 
at length. Specifically, descriptive results for the sample characteristics and for all main 
items of the research are reported through the use of frequency tables. Presentation of 
these results is followed by the testing of the research hypotheses through the use of 
advanced statistics. Finally, a complete analysis of the interviews is presented.  
5.2.1: Demographic Characteristics and Patterns 
A full demonstration of the demographic characteristics and patterns of the survey data 
can be found in Appendix C. The total sample was comprised of N=600 participants, of 
which 50% were from Qatar (N=300) and 50% were from the KSA (N=300). The 
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majority was comprised of females for both the KSA (83%, N=249) and Qatar (81%, 
N=243) samples. Most participants in both ethnic groups belonged to the age range of 35 
to 54 years old (KSA 74%, Qatar 72%). Fifteen per cent (15%) were in the age range of 
25 to 34 years old, and 8-10% were over 54 years old (Table 1). 
With respect to the samples’ educational level, the participants were mostly holders of 
degrees at the bachelor’s (KSA 50%, Qatar 48%) and at the master’s (KSA 41%, Qatar 
43%) levels. Four to five per cent (4-5%) of the participants were holders of PhD degrees 
(Table 2).  
As to position or status, most participants in both groups were tellers/associates (KSA 
67%, Qatar 72%). Ten to eleven per cent (10-11%) were regional managers, 9-12% were 
floor supervisors, and 6-8% were department or branch managers (Table 3).  
Regarding the participants’ length of employment in commercial banking, about one in 
two of the whole sample had been employed in such a position for 4 to 6 years (KSA 
49%, Qatar 51%); many had been employed in commercial banking for 1 to 3 years (KSA 
25%, Qatar 27%). Twelve to thirteen per cent (12-13%) of the sample had 7 to 9 years of 
experience in commercial banking (Table 4). 
Almost one in two participants had been employed at their current organisation for 4 to 6 
years (KSA 45%, Qatar 48%), and one in four had worked at the current company for 1 
to 3 years (KSA 25%, Qatar 27%). Fifteen to eighteen per cent (15-18%) had worked in 
the current organisation for 7 years or more, while 10-12% had worked at the current 
organisation for less than a year (Table 5). 
For most participants, the average loan default percentage at the current organisation was 
in a range of 1-12% (KSA 84%, Qatar 85%). Specifically, at the current organisation, 22-
24% had a mean loan default of 1-4%, 32-33% had a mean loan default of 5-8%, and 28-
30% had an average loan default of 9-12% (Table 6). 
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5.2.2: Strategy Analysis 
The Strategy Analysis (Section 2), which comprised the first fifteen items of the 
questionnaire, yielded the following results. (A full illustration of the results of the 
strategy analysis section of the survey can be found in Appendix C.)  
In item 1, “The banking industry is stable and diversified”, overall the majority of the 
sample disagreed, while about one in four agreed. Specifically, 65% (N=195) of KSA 
participants disagreed, and 57% (N=171) of Qatari participants disagreed (Table 7). 
In item 2, “Current interest rates are competitive and in demand”, overall the majority 
agreed, while about one in three disagreed. Specifically, 66% (N=198) of KSA 
participants agreed, and 63% (N=189) of Qatari participants agreed. Twenty-five per cent 
(25%) of KSA participants and 31% of Qatari participants disagreed (Table 8). 
In item 3, “Central bank interventions have improved our lending strategies”, overall the 
vast majority agreed. Respectively, 84% (N=252) and 85% (N=255) of KSA and Qatari 
participants agreed, and only 5% and 1% of KSA and Qatari participants disagreed (Table 
9). 
In item 4, “We invest a high percentage of our funds in private sector enterprises”, overall 
the majority agreed, while about one in four disagreed. Specifically, 73% (N=219) of 
KSA participants agreed, and 75% (N=225) of Qatari participants agreed. Twenty-four 
per cent (24%) of all participants disagreed (Table 10). 
In item 5, “Most deposits are tied to oil and gas rents”, the majority of the sample agreed, 
but many also disagreed. Respectively, 50% (N=150) and 60% (N=180) of KSA and 
Qatari participants agreed, but 46% and 30% of KSA and Qatar participants disagreed 
(Table 11). 
In item 6, “Our vision is global, and this requires diversification”, most KSA participants 




In item 7, “Our default rates are anticipated and appropriate”, the majority of the sample 
disagreed, but many also agreed. Respectively, 50% (N=150) and 53% (N=158) of KSA 
and Qatar participants disagreed, but 41% (N=123) and 39% (N=117) of KSA and Qatar 
participants agreed (Table 13). 
In item 8, “The financial instruments we use are market sensitive and vulnerable to risks”, 
overall the majority agreed (58-59%), and 28-30% disagreed. Specifically, 58% (N=174) 
of KSA participants agreed, and 59% (N=177) of Qatari participants agreed (Table 14). 
In item 9, “We anticipate that the oil and gas market will recover in price and volume”, 
overall the majority disagreed (51-53%), but many also agreed (42-44%) (Table 15). 
In item 10, “Most citizens do not plan financially for long-term market shocks”, overall 
the majority agreed (61%), while about one in three disagreed (31-36%) (Table 16). 
In item 11, “Government subsidies allow us to loan more freely to the private sector”, 
overall the vast majority agreed (75-76%). Only 7% of KSA participants and 5% of Qatar 
participants disagreed (Table 17). 
In item 12, “Investments in research and development create liabilities and additional 
risks”, the vast majority disagreed (70-72%). Only 14% of KSA participants and 11% of 
Qatari participants agreed (Table 18). 
In item 13, “There is an inadequate population of skilled entrepreneurs in our national 
population”, overall the majority agreed. Specifically, 61% of KSA participants agreed, 
and 58% of Qatar participants disagreed. A large proportion of both KSA and Qatar 
participants remained neutral (19-24%) (Table 19). 
In item 14, “Banks are essential to the domestic economy and therefore must be protected 
during periods of financial duress and decline”, overall the majority agreed (72-75%). 
Eight per cent (8%) of all participants disagreed. Seventeen per cent (17%) of KSA 
participants and 20% of Qatari participants remained neutral (Table 20). 
In item 15, “The financial market is mature and competitive”, both subgroups agreed, but 
while for KSA participants the majority was marginal (52%), for Qatari participants the 
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rate of agreement was higher at 71%. A large proportion of the sample remained neutral 
(25-35%), while 13% of KSA participants and 4% of Qatar participants disagreed (Table 
21). 
Given that the items of the Strategy Analysis (Section 2) were answered on a 5-point 
Likert scale, the below table (Table 1) provides the means and standard deviations for 
these items in order of agreement. Number 1 signifies strong agreement, while number 5 
indicates strong disagreement. 
 
Table 1. 





3. Central bank interventions have improved our lending strategies. 1.97 .675 
11. Government subsidies allow us to loan more freely to the private 
sector. 
2.21 .728 
14. Banks are essential to the domestic economy and therefore must 
be protected during periods of financial duress and decline. 
2.22 .802 
15. The financial market is mature and competitive. 2.33 .838 
4. We invest a high percentage of our funds in private sector 
enterprises. 
2.41 1.031 
2. Current interest rates are competitive and in demand. 2.57 1.220 
8. The financial instruments we use are market sensitive and 
vulnerable to risks. 
2.68 1.166 
10. Most citizens do not plan financially for long-term market shocks. 2.72 1.248 
6. Our vision is global. and this requires diversification. 2.78 1.286 
5. Most deposits are tied to oil and gas rents. 2.85 1.229 
13. There is an inadequate population of skilled entrepreneurs in our 
national population. 
2.98 1.158 
7. Our default rates are anticipated and appropriate. 3.15 1.253 
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9. We anticipate that the oil and gas market will recover in price and 
volume. 
3.17 1.222 
1. The banking industry is stable and diversified. 3.42 1.061 




5.2.3: Performance Analysis 
The Performance Analysis (Section 3) yielded the following results. (Full results tables 
are listed in Appendix C.)  
In item 1, “Global pressures on the oil and gas market have destabilised performance 
domestically”, overall the majority agreed, but more KSA participants agreed (67%) than 
did Qatari participants (52%). Sixteen per cent (16%) of KSA participants and 26% of 
Qatari participants disagreed (Table 22). 
In item 2, “The variability of commodity pricing creates highly impactful risks for our 
nation”, most participants agreed, namely 62% of KSA participants and 48% of Qatari 
participants. A large proportion of the sample remained neutral (27-29%), and 11% of 
KSA participants and 23% of Qatari participants disagreed (Table 23). 
In item 3, “Even if we diversified our industries, we would need decades to allow them 
to mature”, most KSA participants agreed (60%), but most Qatari participants disagreed 
(59%). About one in five participants remained neutral (20-22%) (Table 24). 
In item 4, “Strategic partnerships and FDI allow rapid exchange of knowledge and 
technology and should be supported”, overall the majority agreed (61-65%). Specifically, 
one in four KSA participants (24%) and one in five Qatari participants (20%) remained 
neutral, and 15% of both groups disagreed (Table 25). 
In item 5, “Our bank is vulnerable to systemic risks”, a large proportion of the sample 
agreed: 52% of Qatari participants and 43% of KSA participants. One in three participants 
from Qatar (32%) and even more KSA participants (39%) remained neutral. Fifteen per 
cent (15%) of Qatari participants and 18% of KSA participants disagreed (Table 26). 
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In item 6, “Without government support, our bank would likely be exposed to 
performance shocks”, overall the majority agreed (61-65%). Many participants remained 
neutral (22-25%), and 13-14% of the sample disagreed (Table 27). 
In item 7, “Liquidity levels are at an all-time low”, overall the majority agreed (59-61%), 
and some participants remained neutral (17-22%). Additionally, 22% of KSA participants 
and 18% of Qatari participants disagreed (Table 28). 
In item 8, “When oil prices decline, we are less likely to lend money to private 
enterprises”, many Qatari participants agreed (46%), and the majority of KSA 
participants agreed (63%). Many KSA participants (26%) and Qatar (30%) assumed a 
neutral stance, and 11% of KSA participants and 24% of Qatari participants disagreed 
(Table 29). 
In item 9, “Citizens are more likely to withhold savings and investments when oil prices 
fluctuate or decline”, overall the majority agreed (59-61%); 19-22% remained neutral; 
and 17-22% disagreed (Table 30).  
In item 10, “Investing in diversification offers a layer of stability that we desperately need 
at this time”, overall the majority agreed (58-62%); 22-28% remained neutral; and 14-
16% disagreed (Table 31). 
In item 11, “Intra-bank loans create a dangerous cycle of risk and vulnerability”, overall 
the majority agreed (59-60%); 18-20% remained neutral; and 21-22% disagreed (Table 
32). 
In item 12, “The increase in lending rates is a positive step towards industry maturity”, 
overall the majority agreed (58-60%); 18-22% remained neutral; and 20-22% disagreed 
(Table 33). 
In item 13, “Most of our internal investment strategies are based on oil and gas 
exploitation”, a marginal majority of KSA participants agreed (53%), and 45% of Qatari 
participants agreed. Fourteen per cent (14%) of KSA participants and 29% of Qatari 
participants disagreed, while 26-33% remained neutral (Table 34). 
  
148 
In item 14, “Countries have national industries and products: Ours should remain oil and 
gas”, most participants disagreed (53%); 27% remained neutral; and 20% agreed (Table 
35). 
In item 15, “The gap between the citizen and expatriate population in our nation is 
worrying”, the overwhelming majority of the sample disagreed (80-81%). Overall, 40-
42% of the sample expressed strong disagreement. Only 9% of KSA participants and 5% 
of Qatari participants agreed with the statement (Table 36). 
In item 16, “New companies are a liability; we would prefer to invest in tested models”, 
a marginal majority of the sample disagreed (52-54%); 27-29% of the sample remained 
neutral; and 17-21% agreed (Table 37). 
In item 17, “Most small businesses are likely to fail if given enough time”, approximately 
one in two participants remained neutral (48-54%); 26-35% agreed; and 17-20% 
disagreed (Table 38). 
In item 18, “Our banks should invest more heavily in business development and growth 
to increase industry performance”, the majority agreed (56-58%); 19-24% remained 
neutral; and 20-23% disagreed (Table 39). 
In item 19, “Without sufficient oil and gas liquidity, we cannot fund additional 
development”, most KSA participants agreed (58%), while most Qatari participants 
disagreed (53%). Many participants remained neutral (21-26%) (Table 40). 
Finally, in item 20, “The domestic financial markets are unstable and high risk”, many 
KSA and Qatar participants remained neutral (46-47%). Approximately one in three KSA 
participants (34%) and one in four Qatari participants (28%) agreed, while 20-25% 
disagreed (Table 41). 
For the above items, which were answered on a Likert scale, the following table (Table 











6. Without government support, our bank would likely be 
exposed to performance shocks. 
2.42 .967 
10. Investing in diversification offers a layer of stability that 
we desperately need at this time. 
2.42 .977 
4. Strategic partnerships and FDI allow rapid exchange of 
knowledge and technology and should be supported. 
2.43 1.018 
1. Global pressures on the oil and gas market have destabilised 
performance domestically. 
2.52 1.064 
7. Liquidity levels are at an all-time low. 2.53 1.087 
9. Citizens are more likely to withhold savings and 
investments when oil prices fluctuate or decline. 
2.53 1.005 
11. Intra-bank loans create a dangerous cycle of risk and 
vulnerability. 
2.53 1.059 
2. The variability of commodity pricing creates highly 
impactful risks for our nation. 
2.57 .968 
8. When oil prices decline. we are less likely to lend money to 
private enterprises. 
2.58 .973 
12. The increase in lending rates is a positive step towards 
industry maturity. 
2.58 1.028 
5. Our bank is vulnerable to systemic risks. 2.61 .958 
18. Our banks should invest more heavily in business 
development and growth to increase industry performance. 
2.62 1.052 
13. Most of our internal investment strategies are based on oil 
and gas exploitation. 
2.70 1.020 





20. The domestic financial markets are unstable and high risk. 2.86 .937 
19. Without sufficient oil and gas liquidity. we cannot fund 
additional development. 
2.97 1.103 
3. Even if we diversified our industries, we would need 
decades to allow them to mature. 
2.98 1.148 
14. Countries have national industries and products: Ours 
should remain oil and gas. 
3.39 .990 
16. New companies are a liability; we would prefer to invest 
in tested models. 
3.40 1.006 
15. The gap between the citizen and expatriate population in 
our nation is worrying. 
4.13 .935 
 
5.2.4: Government Role and Agenda Analysis 
The Government Role and Agenda Analysis (Section 4) yielded the following results. 
(Tables of findings are presented in Appendix C.)  
In item 1, “Our government has a long-term vision that does not rely on oil and gas for 
development”, the majority of Qatari participants agreed (57%); on the contrary, most 
KSA participants disagreed (53%). One in four participants remained neutral (24-26%) 
(Table 42). 
In item 2, most KSA participants indicated that the primary industry upon which lending 
and development should focus is manufacturing (62%); for Qatari participants, the 
majority responded that the focus of lending and development should be services (58%). 
Some participants selected technology (12-14%) as an industry to focus on (Table 43). 
In item 3, most KSA participants answered that the primary result of a government bailout 
in their nation is investment in business development (60%). For Qatar participants, bank 
stability was the main effect (59%). Some participants from both groups indicated that a 
need for more bailouts in the future (8-12%) and market uncertainty (7-12%) are the 
primary results of a government bailout (Table 44). 
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In item 4, “Government investment in oil and gas is a necessary and sustainable 
commitment”, the large majority of KSA participants agreed (77%), while most Qatari 
participants disagreed (66%). Almost one in two KSA participants expressed strong 
agreement (45%). Sixteen per cent (16%) of KSA participants and 20% of Qatari 
participants remained neutral (Table 45). 
In item 5, overall the majority replied that the government’s role in stabilising the 
domestic economy is very important (63-67%). The vast majority replied that the 
government’s role in stabilising the domestic economy is at least important (87%) (Table 
46). 
In item 6, overall the vast majority replied that dependence on a single export makes their 
country look weak and uncertain (86-87%). Some felt that such dependence makes the 
country look committed and resourceful (10-11%) (Table 47). 
In item 7, almost one in two participants from Qatar replied that the primary factor 
restricting the number of national citizens in private sector employment is market 
uncertainty (49%). For 51% of KSA participants, deficient financing was the main factor. 
Lack of education was the most important factor for 17-19% of the sample, while 10-
14% felt that lack of government funding is a main restrictive factor (Table 48). 
In item 8, many KSA participants replied that the primary sector which national citizens 
would most like to work in is oil and gas (43%); additionally, 28% replied that the most 
desirable sector is construction. Of the Qatari participants, 35% replied that the service 
sector is the main sector of choice among national citizens; 25% selected the construction 
sector; and 20% selected academia (Table 49). 
In item 9, the majority of KSA participants answered that government analysts would 
rank the current threat level in oil and gas as high/risky (68%), and approximately one in 
four replied that the threat level is medium/uncertain (24%). The majority of Qatari 
participants replied that the current oil/gas threat level ranks as medium/uncertain (55%); 
approximately one in four (26%) replied that government analysts would rank it as 
high/risky (Table 50). 
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In item 10, most KSA participants answered that government investment in oil and gas is 
based on national growth/development (56%). One in two Qatari participants (50%) 
replied that future opportunities and change are the reason behind government investment 
in oil/gas. Ten to eleven per cent (10-11%) felt that self-preservation was the reason, and 
12-13% felt national security was the reason (Table 51). 
5.2.5: Future Growth Analysis 
The final section, the Future Growth Analysis (Section 5), was comprised of two parts: 
items concerning how ten factors influence the formation and implementation of the 
firm’s ongoing banking strategy and items concerning how ten factors impact on 
organisational performance. The results are presented below.  
With regard to the forming and implementing of the firm’s ongoing banking strategy, the 
following results were found. (Full results tables are listed in Appendix C.)  
“Price performance of the oil and gas industry” was deemed very important by KSA 
participants (56%) and important by Qatari participants (56%). Overall, the vast majority 
of the sample found price performance of the oil/gas industry to be at least important (76-
79%) (Table 52). 
 “Government subsidies and investments” were deemed very important by Qatari 
participants (46%) and important by KSA participants (54%). Overall, the vast majority 
of the sample found government subsidies and investments to be at least important (79-
80%). Nineteen to twenty per cent (19-20%) of the sample found government subsidies 
and investments to be somewhat important (Table 53). 
“Education system improvements and specialisation” were seen as very important (49%) 
and important (33%) by Qatari participants, but only as somewhat important (54%) and 
important (33%) by KSA participants. Overall, the vast majority of Qatari participants 
found the improvement and the specialisation of the education system to be at least 
important (82%); the KSA participants assigned the same level of importance by a 
marginal majority of 52% (Table 54). 
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“Diversification of industries” was deemed by most participants (68-70%) to be at least 
important. Overall, one in four participants found it to be somewhat important (23-26%) 
(Table 55). 
“Strategic vision or agenda for national change” was viewed as at least important by the 
majority of the sample (74% of KSA participants and 62% of Qatar participants). A 
proportion of both subgroups found this factor somewhat important (22-34%) (Table 56). 
“Industry rules and regulations” were seen as very important by one in two KSA 
participants (50%) and as important by most Qatari participants (53%). Overall, 75-82% 
of the sample saw industry rules and regulations as important for the firm’s ongoing 
banking strategy. Eighteen to twenty-five per cent (18-25%) of the sample felt that 
industry rules and regulations are somewhat important as part of the firm’s ongoing 
banking strategy (Table 57). 
“Citizen expectations and national demands” were seen as very important by many Qatari 
participants (44%) and as important by one in two KSA participants (49%). In all, 70-
76% of the sample found citizen expectations and national demands to be at least 
important for the forming and the implementing of the firm’s ongoing banking strategy. 
Twenty to twenty-five per cent (20-25%) of the sample replied that citizen expectations 
and national demands are somewhat important (Table 58). 
“Intra-bank partnerships and support” were deemed by both subgroups (68-69%) to be at 
least important. A large number of participants found it to be somewhat important (26-
28%) (Table 59). 
“Foreign interests and investments” were seen as very important (42%) by many Qatari 
participants and as important by many KSA participants (45%). Overall, 65-72% deemed 
foreign interests and investments as at least important (Table 60). 
Finally, “defaults and risks in bank performance” were very important for most 
participants (51-54%) and, overall, the vast majority found bank performance defaults 
and risks to be at least important (84-89%) for forming and implementing the firm’s 
ongoing banking strategy (Table 61). 
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For the ten items regarding the importance of the above factors for forming and 
implementing the firm’s ongoing banking strategy, Table 3 presents the relevant means 
and standard deviations in order of magnitude (where 1=very important, and 5=not 
important at all).  
 
Table 3. 
Means and standard deviations for Future Growth Analysis items on forming and 





Defaults and risks in bank performance 1.62 .752 
Price performance of the oil and gas industry 1.84 .763 
Industry rules and regulations 1.86 .745 
Government subsidies and investments 1.86 .756 
Citizen expectations and national demands 1.99 .855 
Education system improvements and specialisation 2.01 .855 
Foreign interests and investments 2.06 .888 
Strategic vision or agenda for national change 2.19 .763 
Intra-bank partnerships and support 2.20 .760 
Diversification of industries 2.24 .807 
 
With regard to the ten factors that impact organisational performance, the following 
results were found.  
“Oil and gas industry prices” were seen as very impactful by many KSA participants 
(41%) and as impactful by many Qatari participants (45%). Overall, 67-71% found 
oil/gas industry prices to be impactful, and 24-29% found the factor to be somewhat 
impactful (Appendix C. Table 62). 
“Demand for loans and innovative financing products” was seen as at least impactful to 
organisational performance by 70% of Qatari participants; for KSA participants, the 
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corresponding percentage was 43%. Many more KSA participants saw demand for loans 
and innovative financial products as somewhat impactful (45%) than did Qatari 
participants (26%) (Table 63). 
“Start-up investment and capital requirements” was seen as at least impactful by 63-71% 
of the sample overall. Many Qatari participants found it to be very impactful (40%), and 
24-33% of the overall sample felt that start-up investment and capital requirements are 
somewhat impactful to organisational performance (Table 64). 
“Liquidity guidelines and standards” were viewed as very impactful (50-54%) by the 
majority of the overall sample, and the vast majority found it to be at least impactful (78-
83%). Fourteen to nineteen per cent (14-19%) of the sample replied that liquidity 
guidelines and standards are somewhat impactful (Table 65). 
“Auditing and governance oversight” was seen as very impactful by the majority of the 
overall sample (51%). Overall, 79-80% viewed the factor as at least impactful. Nineteen 
per cent (19%) of the sample felt that auditing and governance oversight are somewhat 
impactful (Table 66). 
“Managerial strategy making and positioning” was deemed as at least impactful by 66-
70% of the sample. A proportion of both subgroups saw managerial strategising and 
positioning as somewhat impactful (22-27%) (Table 67).  
“Infrastructure and system” were seen as very impactful to organisational performance 
by many Qatari participants (44%) and as impactful by many KSA participants (45%). In 
all, 60-76% of the sample agreed that infrastructure and system are at least impactful to 
organisational performance. Twenty-one per cent (21%) of Qatari participants and 35% 
of KSA participants felt that infrastructure and system are somewhat impactful (Table 
68). 
“Domestic competitive forces” were deemed to be at least impactful by 70% of the overall 
sample. A large proportion of participants found domestic competitive forces to be 
somewhat impactful (28-29%) (Table 69). 
  
156 
“International competitive forces” were deemed to be at least impactful to organisational 
performance by 68-72% of the sample. A large proportion of participants found 
international competitive forces to be somewhat impactful (27-30%) (Table 70). 
Finally, “foreign investment and development” were seen as very impactful by many 
Qatari participants (43%) and as impactful by many KSA participants (44%). Overall, 
68-74% of the sample replied that foreign investment and development is at least 
impactful to organisational performance. Twenty-one per cent (21%) of Qatari 
participants and 28% of KSA participants felt that foreign investment and development 
are somewhat impactful (Table 71). 
For the above ten items relating to factors that impact on the participants’ organisational 
performance, Table 4 presents the relevant means and standard deviations in order of 
magnitude (where 1=very impactful, and 5=not impactful at all). 
Table 4. 
Means and standard deviations for Future Growth Analysis items on impact on 





Liquidity guidelines and standards 1.71 .848 
Auditing and governance oversight 1.71 .823 
Foreign investment and development 2.00 .873 
Oil and gas industry prices 2.04 .872 
Domestic competitive forces 2.07 .766 
Infrastructure and system 2.07 .870 
International competitive forces 2.08 .762 
Start-up investment and capital requirements 2.09 .865 
Managerial strategising and positioning 2.23 .848 




5.3 Reliability Analysis and Dimensions 
For the items belonging to the Strategy Analysis (Section 2) and the Performance 
Analysis (Section 3), Cronbach’s alpha reliability analyses were performed. The rationale 
for this action is twofold. First, providing summaries of multiple items or questions as 
single dimensions, wherever possible, helps to provide a clear overview of the results and 
renders the hypothesis testing more coherent. Second, this approach was selected because 
these two sections are comprised of Likert scale items, as opposed to the Government 
Role and Agenda Analysis (Section 4); they are not lists of different topics either, as is 
the case with Future Growth Analysis (Section 5), but groups of items that explore a 
cohesive topic. 
Table 5 presents the results of the reliability analysis, along with the means for the 
resulting dimensions that were calculated through the use of the “compute” command in 
the statistical software SPSS. Both groups of items had a high and acceptable level of 
reliability. The means for the Strategy Analysis (Section 2) and Performance Analysis 
(Section 3) dimensions were 2,75 and 2,78, approximating the middle value 3 (“neither 




Cronbach’s reliability of items and mean of calculated dimensions for the Strategy 
Analysis (Section 2) and Performance Analysis (Section 3).  
 Cronbach's Alpha N of Items Mean 
Section 2: Strategy Analysis .874 15 2.75 
Section 3: Performance Analysis .941 20 2.78 
 
5.4 Research Hypotheses  
For the testing of the research hypotheses, a series of independent samples t-tests and 
analysis of variance (ANOVA) tests were performed, with the main items of the 
questionnaire as dependent variables, and ethnicity and the sample characteristics as 
independent variables. The choice of test (t-test or ANOVA) depended on the number of 
category responses of the independent variable. For variables like ethnicity (Qatar/KSA) 
and gender (male/female), independent samples t-tests were used. For other variables 
with more than two category responses, the ANOVA test was operationalised. The items 
belonging to Sections 2 and 3 are included as part of the singular dimensions that were 
presented in the previous table. 
For the first research hypothesis H1, “There is a significant difference between the 
responses of the participants from Qatar and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia”, the 
independent samples t-tests revealed multiple statistically significant differences (Table 
6).  
 Table 6. 
Significant independent samples t-tests for ethnicity (H1).  
  t-test means 
  t df p KSA Qatar 





1. Our government has a long-term vision not reliant on oil and gas for 
development. 
9.197 597.565 .000 3.34 2.56 
2. The primary industry upon which lending and development should focus is: -13.952 598 .000 – – 
3. The primary result of a government bailout in our nation is: 13.751 598 .000 – – 
4. Government investment in oil/gas is a necessary and sustainable commitment. -23.936 597.99 .000 1.85 3.67 
7. The primary factor restricting national citizens in private sector employment is: 8.199 598 .000 – – 
8. The primary sector which national citizens would like to work in is: -4.111 598 .000 – – 
9. Government analysts would rank the current threat level in oil/gas as follows: -9.630 588.68 .000 – – 






Price performance of the oil and gas industry -6.472 598 .000 1.65 2.04 
Government subsidies and investments 3.600 598 .000 1.97 1.75 
Education system improvements and specialisation 9.522 597.16 .000 2.32 1.70 
Industry rules and regulations -5.916 598 .000 1.68 2.03 
Citizen expectations and national demands 4.361 598 .000 2.14 1.84 
Foreign interests and investments 3.910 598 .000 2.20 1.92 
Section 5b. Impact 
on organisational 
performance 
Oil and gas industry prices -3.114 598 .002 1.93 2.15 
Demand for loans and innovative financing products 8.267 597.62 .000 2.55 1.95 
Start-up investment and capital requirements 4.159 598 .000 2.23 1.94 
Infrastructure and system 7.027 595.67 .000 2.31 1.83 
Foreign investment and development 3.398 598 .001 2.12 1.88 
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As can be seen in the table above, nationality had a statistically significant effect on the 
performance analysis dimension (t=-2,672, df=589,1, p=,008), and KSA participants had 
a higher degree of agreement to the statements (2,7) than did Qatari participants (2,9). 
Nationality also had a statistically significant effect on eight items from the Government 
Role and Agenda Analysis (Section 4), on six out of the ten Future Growth Analysis items 
on forming and implementing the firm’s ongoing banking strategy (Section 5a), and on 
five out of the ten Future Growth Analysis items on the impact on organisational 
performance (Section 5b). 
Therefore, the first research hypothesis H1 is accepted, and the null hypothesis H0 is 
rejected: There was a significant difference between the responses of the participants 
from Qatar and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.  
For the testing of the second hypothesis H2, “The characteristics of the sample influence 
their responses to the questionnaire”, the ANOVA tests and the independent samples t-
tests revealed a multitude of statistically significant differences. Results are presented in 
Tables 7-13. 
As can be seen in Table 7 below, gender had a statistically significant effect on the 
performance analysis dimension (t=3.426, df=598, p=,001). Females had a higher degree 
of agreement to the statements (2,7) than did males (2,9). Gender also had a statistically 




Significant independent samples t-tests for gender (H2).  
  t-test means 
  t df p male female 
Section 3. Dimension: Performance Analysis 3.426 598 .001 2.94 2.70 
Section 4.  
Government Role and 
Agenda Analysis 
8. The primary sector which national 
citizens would like to work in is: 
-2.663 161.66 .009 – – 





Intra-bank partnerships and support 3.053 163.81 .003 2.39 2.15 





Significant ANOVA tests for age range (H2).  
  ANOVA 
  F df p 
Section 3. Dimension: Performance Analysis 2.908 4 .021 
Section 4. Government Role and 
Agenda Analysis 
1. Our government has a long-term vision not reliant on oil/gas for development. 2.605 4 .035 
7. The primary factor restricting national citizens in private sector employment is: 5.889 4 .000 
9. Government analysts would rank the current threat level in oil/gas as: 13.528 4 .000 
10. The government investment in oil and gas is based on the following objective: 4.468 4 .001 
Section 5a. Forming and 
implementing the firm’s ongoing 
banking strategy 
Price performance of the oil and gas industry 2.703 4 .030 
Government subsidies and investments 5.048 4 .001 
Education system improvements and specialisation 5.338 4 .000 
Diversification of industries 2.744 4 .028 
Intra-bank partnerships and support 4.968 4 .001 
Defaults and risks in bank performance 4.729 4 .001 
Section 5b. 
Impact on organisational  
Performance 
Demand for loans and innovative financing products 5.764 4 .000 
Start-up investment and capital requirements 4.614 4 .001 
Managerial strategising and positioning 7.296 4 .000 




As Table 8 above indicates, age range had a statistically significant effect on the 
performance analysis dimension (F=2,908, df=4, p=,021). Age range also had a 
statistically significant effect on items 1, 7, 9, and 10 from the Government Role 
and Agenda Analysis (Section 4). In Sections 5a and 5b, there were six and five 
items, respectively, which had responses influenced by age range. 
The educational level of the participants had a statistically significant effect on the 
performance analysis dimension (F=2,58, df=4, p=,037). Educational level also 
had a statistically significant effect on items 1, 3, 5, 8, and 10 of the Government 
and Agenda Analysis (Section 4). In Sections 5a and 5b, there were six and five 
items, respectively, which had responses influenced by educational level (Table 
9). 
The participants’ position (Table 10) had a statistically significant effect on the 
performance analysis dimension (F=3,27, df=4, p=,011). Participant’s position 
also had a statistically significant effect on items 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, and 10 in the 
Government and Agenda Analysis (Section 4). In Sections 5a and 5b, there were 





Significant ANOVA tests for educational level (H2).  
  ANOVA 
  F df p 
Section 3. Dimension: Performance Analysis 2.575 4 .037 
Section 4. Government Role and 
Agenda Analysis 
1. Our government has a long-term vision not reliant on oil/gas for development. 4.512 4 .001 
3. The primary result of a government bailout in our nation is: 12.710 4 .000 
5. The government’s role in stabilising the domestic economy is: 3.974 4 .003 
8. The primary sector which national citizens would like to work in is: 3.023 4 .017 
10. The government investment in oil and gas is based on the following objective: 7.606 4 .000 
Section 5a. Forming and 
implementing the firm’s ongoing 
banking strategy 
Price performance of the oil and gas industry 2.851 4 .023 
Diversification of industries 8.292 4 .000 
Strategic vision or agenda for national change 11.545 4 .000 
Industry rules and regulations 4.188 4 .002 
Citizen expectations and national demands 5.411 4 .000 
Intra-bank partnerships and support 2.489 4 .042 
Section 5b. 
Impact on organisational  
performance 
Oil and gas industry prices 4.975 4 .001 
Demand for loans and innovative financing products 5.285 4 .000 
Start-up investment and capital requirements 2.570 4 .037 
Auditing and governance oversight 4.450 4 .001 
Infrastructure and system 2.687 4 .031 
Domestic competitive forces 2.412 4 .048 





Significant ANOVA tests for position (H2).  
  ANOVA 
  F df p 
Section 3. Dimension: Performance Analysis 3.272 4 .011 
Section 4. Government Role and 
Agenda Analysis 
2. The primary industry upon which lending and development should focus is: 3.728 4 .005 
3. The primary result of a government bailout in our nation is: 6.585 4 .000 
4. Government investment in oil/gas is a necessary and sustainable commitment. 4.593 4 .001 
5. The government’s role in stabilising the domestic economy is: 3.415 4 .009 
7. The primary factor restricting national citizens in private sector employment is: 2.592 4 .036 
8. The primary sector which national citizens would like to work in is: 6.363 4 .000 
10. The government investment in oil and gas is based on the following objective: 3.997 4 .003 
Section 5a. Forming and 
implementing the firm’s ongoing 
banking strategy 
Price performance of the oil and gas industry 2.783 4 .026 
Education system improvements and specialisation 3.019 4 .018 
Diversification of industries 12.292 4 .000 
Citizen expectations and national demands 3.297 4 .011 
Intra-bank partnerships and support 7.717 4 .000 
Foreign interests and investments 2.469 4 .044 
Defaults and risks in bank performance 3.933 4 .004 
Section 5b. 
Impact on organisational  
performance 
Auditing and governance oversight 3.765 4 .005 
Infrastructure and system 4.779 4 .001 
International competitive forces 3.234 4 .012 
Foreign investment and development 2.522 4 .040 
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Participants’ years of employment in the sector (Table 11) had a statistically 
significant effect on the dimensions of strategy analysis (F=12.05, df=4, p≤.0005) 
and performance analysis (F=4.63, df=4, p=.001). This factor also had a 
significant effect on items 5, 8, 9, and 10 in the Government Role and Agenda 
Analysis (Section 4). In Sections 5a and 5b, there were two and five items, 
respectively, which had responses influenced by years of employment in the 
sector. 
Years of employment in the current organisation (Table 12) had a statistically 
significant effect on the dimensions of strategy analysis (F=11.42, df=4, p≤.0005) 
and performance analysis (F=4.21, df=4, p=.002). This factor also had a 
significant effect on items 1, 5, 9, and 10 of the Government Role and Agenda 
Analysis (Section 4). In Sections 5a and 5b, there were three and six items, 
respectively, which had responses influenced by years of employment in the 
sector. 
Finally, the average loan default percentage at the current organisation (Table 13) 
had a statistically significant effect on the strategy analysis dimension (F=4.67, 
df=4, p=.001). This factor also had a significant effect on items 2, 3, 5, and 9 of 
the Government Role and Agenda Analysis (Section 4). In Sections 5a and 5b, 
there were nine and seven items, respectively, which had responses influenced by 
the average loan default percentage at the current organisation. 
(Tables 11, 12, and 13 can be found in the pages that follow.)  
As a result of the multitude of statistically significant relationships that were 
found, research hypothesis H2 is accepted, and the null hypothesis is rejected. The 
characteristics of the sample, including gender, age range, educational level, 
position in the company, years of work in the sector and in the current 
organisation, and the average loan default percentage at the current organisation, 
all influenced participants’ responses to the questionnaire and composed a 




Significant ANOVA tests for years of employment in sector (H2).  
  ANOVA 
  F df p 
Section 2. Dimension: Strategy Analysis 12.054 4 .000 
Section 3. Dimension: Performance Analysis 4.628 4 .001 
Section 4. Government Role and 
Agenda Analysis 
5. The government’s role in stabilising the domestic economy is: 5.260 4 .000 
8. The primary sector which national citizens would like to work in is: 3.701 4 .005 
9. Government analysts would rank the current threat level in oil/gas as: 3.485 4 .008 
10. The government investment in oil and gas is based on the following objective: 4.499 4 .001 
Section 5a. Forming and 
implementing the firm’s ongoing 
banking strategy 
Government subsidies and investments 3.352 4 .010 





Impact on organisational  
performance 
Oil and gas industry prices 2.890 4 .022 
Start-up investment and capital requirements 11.807 4 .000 
Auditing and governance oversight 7.288 4 .000 
Domestic competitive forces 3.017 4 .018 





Significant ANOVA tests for years of employment in current organisation (H2).  
  ANOVA 
  F df p 
Section 2. Dimension: Strategy Analysis 11.416 4 .000 
Section 3. Dimension: Performance Analysis 4.209 4 .002 
Section 4. Government Role and 
Agenda Analysis 
1. Our government has a long-term vision not reliant on oil/gas for development. 3.652 4 .006 
5. The government’s role in stabilising the domestic economy is: 2.732 4 .028 
9. Government analysts would rank the current threat level in oil/gas as: 3.142 4 .014 
10. The government investment in oil and gas is based on the following objective: 3.744 4 .005 
Section 5a. Forming and 
implementing the firm’s ongoing 
banking strategy 
Price performance of the oil and gas industry 4.548 4 .001 
Diversification of industries 2.907 4 .021 
Intra-bank partnerships and support 3.062 4 .016 
Section 5b. 
Impact on organisational  
performance 
Oil and gas industry prices 2.959 4 .019 
Demand for loans and innovative financing products 4.395 4 .002 
Start-up investment and capital requirements 14.408 4 .000 
Auditing and governance oversight 5.224 4 .000 
Domestic competitive forces 2.434 4 .046 







Significant ANOVA tests for average loan default percentage at the current organisation (H2).  
  ANOVA 
  F df p 
Section 2. Dimension: Strategy Analysis 4.674 4 .001 
Section 4. Government Role and 
Agenda Analysis 
2. The primary industry upon which lending and development should focus is: 2.734 4 .028 
3. The primary result of a government bailout in our nation is: 3.279 4 .011 
5. The government’s role in stabilising the domestic economy is: 3.958 4 .004 
9. Government analysts would rank the current threat level in oil/gas as: 3.252 4 .012 
Section 5a. Forming and 
implementing the firm’s ongoing 
banking strategy 
Price performance of the oil and gas industry 2.747 4 .028 
Government subsidies and investments 2.969 4 .019 
Education system improvements and specialisation 3.630 4 .006 
Diversification of industries 3.788 4 .005 
Industry rules and regulations 2.501 4 .042 
Citizen expectations and national demands 2.968 4 .019 
Intra-bank partnerships and support 3.174 4 .013 
Foreign interests and investments 10.574 4 .000 
Defaults and risks in bank performance 3.995 4 .003 
Section 5b. 
Impact on organisational  
performance 
Demand for loans and innovative financing products 6.568 4 .000 
Start-up investment and capital requirements 3.354 4 .010 
Liquidity guidelines and standards 3.101 4 .015 
Auditing and governance oversight 2.448 4 .045 
Managerial strategising and positioning 2.544 4 .039 
Domestic competitive forces 3.627 4 .006 
Foreign investment and development 2.602 4 .035 
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5.5 Qualitative Analysis of Interview Results 
In this section, a presentation of the responses of the interviewees is carried out. 
Interviewees included 15 participants from the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) and 15 
participants from Qatar. They were encouraged to provide short and to-the-point 
responses.  
Question 1. 
What were the impacts of the recent pricing decline in the oil and gas market on 
your bank’s financial performance? On your development objectives? On your 
strategy? 
The major themes that emerged from this question included concerns from nine KSA 
participants (60%) about income reduction and downsizing (“For KSA the impact has 
been a dramatic change on our income. I think that the reduced prices on oil has created 
a lot of damages”, “major impact prices have gone down by far”, and “there are some 
thoughts for cost reductions or even downsizing if this is necessary”). 
Ten participants from Qatar (67%) argued either that the impact is not significant (“there 
is a minor impact”), because “the Qatari economy doesn’t rely only on oil”, or that there 
is some impact, but it is not debilitating: “Qatar is a country which focuses on other 
sectors such as tourism, business, finance, etc. The recent decline in oil and gas markets 
surely is a bad thing for us, but still we do not depend so much on oil as it happens with 
other gulf countries”. 
Question 2. 
What initiatives have been taken to diversify the industries and economic outputs in 
your national economy? Are these sufficient? Are they effective? 
The major themes that emerged from this question were as follows.  
A large majority of the KSA interviewees (12/15, 80%) agreed that the Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia is an oil-based economy and as such, little has been done by way of diversifying 
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the industries (“our economy relies mostly on oil, and there is a lack of industry 
diversification”; “it is something that hurts the economy”; “KSA is a pretty fragment 
market. It focuses on oil, and . . . there are several concerns about this, since the country 
and its finance system is not able to diversify and invest into new sectors”).  
In contrast, many Qatari participants argued that the economy of Qatar is more diversified 
and that it attracts and handles major sports and tourist events (“Qatar is a diverse 
economy. An example is the preparation for the World Cup 2022 and the investments in 
the tourist industry.”; “Qatar has already turned to diversity. Our financial institutions 
are funding many new projects, for example, on sports and tourism. They are quite 
effective, and the outcome is to rely less and less on oil.”).  
Question 3. 
What constitutes a world-class bank, and how can you evolve your current platform 
and programme to achieve this objective? 
Overall, the sample agreed (18/30, 60%) that a world-class bank needs to be able to 
function daily at a global level (“World class bank means to operate globally”; “A world 
class bank is a bank which operates in a global base. For this reason, our Qatari banks 
are looking to the global markets”). Additionally, many participants noted that a world-
class bank needs to be able to manage and overcome crises, both local (14/30, 47%, e.g. 
“A world class bank needs to not be affected from local crises”) and international (11/30, 
37%, e.g. “It must also be able to adapt to international economic change”).  
To evolve their current platform, some participants (10/30, 33%) stated that there is a 
need for expanding outward and establishing international business collaborations and 
co-operations (“Therefore, we need to expand abroad. In order to achieve this, there is a 
need to work with partners outside”).  
Question 4. 
What are the primary risks facing your bank right now, and how do you predict 
that your organisation will address these risks in the future? 
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For the KSA sample, the major thematic element that came up was that of a crisis (“For 
KSA banks the major risk is that as a country we are in a deep crisis”). The perceived 
risks were of “low price oils” (13/15, 87%), of “corruption” (8/15, 53%), of the 
establishment of “an authoritarian regime” (7/15, 47%), and of terrorists (“It seems that 
we get isolated while many others are accusing our country for supporting terrorism”) 
(6/15, 40%). One particularly pessimistic participant from KSA stated, “I am not sure for 
our role, but I think that we have to work on this and stop being the scapegoat. The bank 
depends a lot on state intervention, so there is so much to do”. 
For about half of the interviewees from Qatar (7/15, 47%), the primary risk facing their 
bank at the present time was overexposure to construction loans (“there has been too 
much reckless reliance on loaning”, “our companies have been overexposed to 
construction loans”). Some Qatar interviewees (4/15 or 27%) argued that an economic 
recession may have exacerbated this risk (“but it seems that a minor recession may have 
a big effect on this”, “Qatar has many risks, such as . . . the global recession”). Some 
mention was also made to the threat of potential terrorist attacks (“Qatar has many risks, 
such as terrorism”) (2/15, 13%). 
However, in a response that addressed questions 1 and 2, as well as the upcoming question 
6, one Qatar interviewee stated that the Qatari economy is robust and not overridden by 
uncertainty (“However, we have developed a strong economy which relies on free market 
rules, and I think that this is a pretty reliable economy diversified on many sectors, hence 
the risk is also subject of a wider spread which reduces uncertainty”).  
Question 5. 
Are government interventions in banking effective? What other solutions might be 
employed to overcome such central actions? 
The main themes that were discussed in response to this question were the following:  
Some KSA interviewees (5/15, 33%) pointed out that the government is less effective 
with its banking interventions (“I am not convinced that the government’s efforts have 
been successful”, “there are problems with the government’s approach”; “KSA is a 
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country where the state has a key role in everything. In our case the royal family has a 
strong role in the finance system, and it intervenes on frequent times. For me, a solution 
would be to have less intervention and more transparency.”). 
In contrast, many Qatar interviewees (8/15, 53%) felt that overall their government is 
effective in its use of banking interventions (“in Qatar the government is effective”; “the 
state’s banking interventions are successful”; “It is understood that Qatar wants to 
promote a new business model for the Gulf, one which will rely on free market enterprise 
and less on government intervention. Of course, it is understood that we live in a state 
where there is a high level of state intervention while the royal family exercises a strong 
influence. However, we have to work hard so to convince the central government about 
the effectiveness of the private sector and there we can operate without state 
intervention.”).  
Among the KSA and Qatar interviewees overall, many (8/30, 27%) noted that the 
economy of the two countries is mixed.  
Question 6. 
What are the internal effects of instability in the oil and gas industry? The external 
effects? 
The major theme to develop for KSA participants (7/15 or 47%) was that oil and gas 
instability promoted problems (“Overall, our countries – the Gulf countries – rely a lot 
on oil and gas. During the past 10 years, there are many efforts, especially in Qatar and 
UAE, so not to get so much dependence on oil. The internal effects are stronger in KSA 
than in other countries”). These problems include social unrest (“There is a major 
unrest”, “social tension is obvious”), turmoil (“may affect the country’s stability”), and 
even radical groups may become involved (“it may be subject to exploitation from 
extremists”). 
In the external effects of instability in the oil and gas industry, a number of KSA 
interviewees (4/15, 27%) mentioned the danger that foreign countries and worldwide 
suppliers could start to prefer other antagonistic products over their own (“many countries 
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and suppliers may prefer substitute products”, “in a global economic environment, 
whoever gains a competitive advantage is likely to be selected for business. And 
instability will ruin their chances”; “The external effects are seen . . . on international 
trade”). One participant noted that the external effects of instability in the oil and gas 
industry have repercussions for the country’s society (“The external effects are seen on 
the society”).  
For the Qatari sample, the overall state of affairs was explicitly considered by many (8/15, 
53%) as stable (“In Qatar things are more stable”, “instability has not been a major issue 
of concern”), and no further themes emerged.  
Question 7. 
What focal points and investment strategies will your bank be employing in the short 
to medium term to increase funding and liquidity? The long term? 
The thematic elements that surfaced from this question were largely common to both 
ethnic groups. A number of interviewees (8/30, 27%) answered that in the short term, the 
bank’s plan is to utilise start-ups in order to bring in immediate profits (e.g., “In the short 
term we must look for start-ups that can bring immediate profit”, “by using start-ups we 
can produce revenue quickly”).  
One Qatari participant noted that for Qatar, which “is a strong economy”, in the short 
term “we look to fund some ongoing projects, such as to fund the World Cup 2022”.  
For the long term, a number of participants (14/30, 47%), primarily from Qatar (N=10) 
but also from KSA (N=4), argued that their organisations are likely to invest in industries 
other than the oil industry (“there is a need to invest not in oil but in other industries”, 
“we will probably diversify our investments away from the oil/gas industry”). One Qatari 
participant replied that international ventures have been funded for the long term (“when 
it comes for a long term, we have funded some ventures abroad, for example, in Turkey 
and other countries where we expect a high ROE”).  
One KSA participant offered the solution of retaining the bank’s position through 
deinvesting or selecting opportunities with lesser risk. This participant suggested that 
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KSA invests in defence and construction: “For a KSA bank the key strategy is to retain 
the position, and this can be made from deinvesting or going only into low-risk 
opportunities. In the long term, we can invest in defence and construction so to come back 
into a positive rate of development”. 
Finally, some KSA participants (4/15, 27%) noted that change of this type is not very 
easy in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia since “there are many barriers”. In the Qatar 
sample, some interviewees (3/15, 20%) mentioned that the prospects for increasing 
funding and liquidity are promising (“the bank’s outlook for future funding and liquidity 










Chapter 6: Discussion and Analysis of Findings 
Analysis from the qualitative questionnaire research: 
The present sample comprises 600 participants, 50% from Qatar and 50% from the 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA). The sample contains mainly female respondents (81%) 
who are 35-54 years old (72%) and holders of bachelor’s (48%) and master’s (42%) 
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degrees. Most participants were tellers/associates (69%); 11% were regional managers; 
11% were floor supervisors; 7% were department/branch managers; and 3% were 
executives. Fifty per cent (50%) of all participants had been employed in commercial 
banking for 4 to 6 years, and 26% had 1 to 3 years’ experience in commercial banking. 
Additionally, 13% had been employed in commercial banking for 7 to 9 years. Forty-six 
per cent (46%) of all participants had been employed at their current organisation for 4 to 
6 years, and 26% had worked at their current company for 1 to 3 years. The average loan 
default percentage at the current organisation varied: 22% to 25% had a mean of 14%, 
32% to 33% had a mean loan default of 5-8%, and 28% to 30% had a mean loan default 
percentage at the current organisation of 9-12%. 
In Section 2: Strategy Analysis, the majority of both the KSA and Qatar participants 
agreed that central bank interventions have improved their lending strategies (85%), and 
that government subsidies allow them to loan more freely to the private sector (76%). 
They agreed that banks are essential to the domestic economy and therefore must be 
protected during periods of financial duress and decline (74%); that they invest a high 
percentage of their funds in private sector enterprises (74%); and that current interest rates 
are competitive and in demand (64%). They also agreed that most citizens do not plan 
financially for long-term market shocks (61%); and that the financial instruments they 
use are market sensitive and vulnerable to risks (59%). They further agreed that most 
deposits are tied to oil and gas rents (55%), and that the financial market is mature and 
competitive (61%). For this last item, the majority agreement of Qatari participants was 
higher (71%) than the corresponding agreement of participants from the KSA (52%). 
The sample disagreed with the statements that investments in research and development 
create liabilities and additional risks (71%); that the banking industry is stable and 
diversified (61%); that the oil and gas market will recover in price and volume (53%); 
and that their default rates are anticipated and appropriate (52%).  
Two points on which the two groups differed were the questionnaire items “Our vision is 
global, and this requires diversification”, where 73% of Qatari participants agreed, but 
60% of KSA participants disagreed; and “there is an inadequate population of skilled 
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entrepreneurs in our national population”, where KSA participants agreed (61%) but 
Qatari participants disagreed (58%). 
In Section 3: Performance Analysis, the majority of the Qatar and KSA participants 
agreed that strategic partnerships and FDI allow rapid exchange of knowledge and 
technology and should be supported (63%); and that without government support, their 
bank would likely be exposed to performance shocks (63%). The majority agreed that 
global pressures on the oil and gas market have destabilised performance domestically 
(60%), through agreement was stronger among the KSA participants (67%) than the 
Qatari participants (52%). The majority also agreed that liquidity levels are at an all-time 
low (60%); that citizens are more likely to withhold savings and investments when oil 
prices fluctuate or decline (60%); and that investing in diversification offers a layer of 
stability that they desperately need at this time (60%). They further agreed that intra-bank 
loans create a dangerous cycle of risk and vulnerability (60%), with 22% disagreeing; and 
that the increase in lending rates is a positive step towards industry maturity (59%),with 
21% disagreeing. They agreed as well that their banks should invest more heavily in 
business development and growth to increase industry performance (57%), with 22% 
disagreeing; that the variability of commodity pricing creates highly impactful risks for 
their nation (55%), 62% of KSA participants and 48% of Qatari participants; and that 
when oil prices decline, they are less likely to lend money to private enterprises (55%), 
with more KSA participants agreeing (63%) than Qatari participants (46%). Additionally, 
many participants agreed that most of their internal investment strategies are based on oil 
and gas exploitation (49%), while 29% of Qatari participants and 14% of the KSA 
participants disagreed. Finally, many agreed that their bank is vulnerable to systemic risks 
(48%), although Qatari participants thought so by a marginal majority (52%), while 43% 
of the KSA participants agreed.  
Contrarily, the large majority disagreed that the gap between the citizen and expatriate 
population in their nation is worrying (81%), noting that 41% of the complete sample 
expressed strong disagreement. The majority disagreed with the statement that “countries 
have national industries and products: Ours should remain oil and gas” (53%), while 20% 
agreed. Furthermore, the majority disagreed that new companies are a liability and that 
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they would prefer to invest in tested models (53%), with 18% agreeing to this statement. 
A neutral stance was assumed by many participants on the items “Most small businesses 
are likely to fail if given enough time” (51%) and “the domestic financial markets are 
unstable and high-risk” (47%).  
The KSA and Qatar groups differed in their reaction to two statements. Most KSA 
participants agreed (60%) that even if they diversified their industries, they would need 
decades to allow them to mature, but 59% of Qatari participants disagreed. Furthermore, 
the majority of the KSA participants agreed (58%) that without sufficient oil and gas 
liquidity, they cannot fund additional development; however, most Qatari participants 
disagreed (53%).  
In Section 4: Government Role and Agenda Analysis, the KSA and Qatari participants 
had different views on the statement that the government’s long-term vision does not rely 
on oil and gas for development. The majority of Qatari participants agreed (57%); 
however, a marginal majority of the KSA participants disagreed (53%). For the KSA 
participants, the primary industry on which lending and development should focus is 
manufacturing (62%), while for Qatari participants it is the services industry (58%). 
Moreover, 13% of the total sample highlighted technology as an industry on which to 
focus. 
For most of the KSA participants (60%), the primary result of a government bailout in 
their nation was investment in business development; for the Qatari participants, it was 
bank stability (59%). The large majority of participants from the KSA agreed, with 45% 
expressing strong agreement, that government investment in oil and gas is a necessary 
and sustainable commitment (77%); however, the reverse was true for most Qatari 
participants who disagreed (66%). Both the KSA and Qatari participants agreed (87%) 
that dependence on a single export makes their country look weak and uncertain, as well 
as that that the government’s role in stabilising the domestic economy is very important 
(65%). Overall, 87% found the government’s role to be at least important. 
Many Qatari participants found the primary factor restricting the number of national 
citizens in private sector employment to be market uncertainty (49%). For many KSA 
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nationals, on the other hand, deficient financing was the main factor restricting the 
number of national citizens in private sector employment (51%). Many KSA participants 
stated that the primary sector in which national citizens would like to work is oil and gas 
(43%) or construction (28%). For many Qatari participants, the primary desirable sector 
for citizens to work was the service sector (35%), the construction sector (25%),  
or an academic career (20%). For most KSA participants, government analysts were 
thought to classify the current threat level in oil and gas as high/risky (68%), and 24% 
thought that the threat level would be classified as medium/uncertain (24%). Most Qatari 
participants replied that the threat level would be deemed to be medium/uncertain (55%), 
or high/risky (26%). Finally, most of the KSA participants felt that government 
investment in oil and gas is based on national growth/development (56%), while 50% of 
Qatari participants found future opportunities and change to be the basis for government 
investment in oil and gas.  
In Section 5: Future Growth Analysis, the ten factors involved in forming and 
implementing the firm’s ongoing banking strategy were reported as follows: Government 
subsidies and investments were deemed very important by Qatari participants (46%) and 
important by participants from the KSA (54%). In all, a large majority (80%) found 
government subsidies and investments to be at least important in forming and 
implementing the firm’s ongoing banking strategy. Most participants from each group 
agreed that the diversification of industries was at least important for forming and 
implementing the firm’s ongoing banking strategy (69%); that the strategic vision/agenda 
for national change was at least important (68%); that industry rules and regulations are 
important (78%) and very important for the KSA participants (50%); that citizen 
expectations and national demands are important and very important for 44% of Qatari 
participants for forming and implementing the firm’s ongoing banking strategy (73%). 
Both ethnic groups also agreed that intra-bank partnerships and support (69%) and 
foreign interest and investments (68%) are at least important to forming and 
implementing the firm’s ongoing banking strategy. Finally, the majority found defaults 
and risks in bank performance to be very important (53%), and overall, 87% replied that 
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bank performance defaults and risks are at least important in forming and implementing 
the firm’s ongoing banking strategy. 
Some differences were observed in the responses of the KSA and Qatari participants to 
two items. While both groups agreed that the improvement and specialisation of the 
education system are important, Qatari participants thought so by a large majority of 82%, 
but KSA participants only marginally agreed with a majority of 52%. Furthermore, the 
two groups largely agreed that the price performance of the oil and gas industry is 
important (78%); however, this was more pronounced for the KSA participants (“very 
important” for 56%) than for Qatari participants (“important” for 56%).  
As to the ten factors that impact their organisational performance, the following were 
found. Liquidity guidelines and standards were considered to be very impactful (52%) 
and, overall, 81% of the KSA and Qatari participants replied that they are at least 
impactful on organisational performance. Auditing and governance oversight was found 
to be very impactful by 51% of the sample and at least impactful by 80%. Domestic 
competitive forces were viewed as at least impactful by 70%, while many felt that found 
domestic competitive forces are somewhat impactful (29%). International competitive 
forces were seen as at least impactful on organisational performance by 70%, and many 
found the international competitive forces to be somewhat impactful (29%). Managerial 
strategy making and positioning was seen as at least impactful by 68% of the sample, 
while 25% found managerial strategising and positioning to be somewhat impactful. 
For the remaining five items, some differences between the KSA and Qatari participants 
were observed. Although both groups agreed that oil and gas industry prices are at least 
impactful on their organisational performance (69%), it should be noted that a large 
proportion of the KSA participants found the industry prices of oil and gas to be very 
impactful (41%). The demand for loans and innovative financing products was deemed 
to be at least impactful on organisational performance by most Qatari participants (70%), 
but only by 43% of the KSA participants, many of who viewed the demand for loans and 
innovative financial products as somewhat impactful (45%). While 67% of the entire 
sample viewed start-up investment and capital requirements as at least impactful on their 
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organisational performance, it is interesting to note that 40% of Qatari participants 
deemed start-up investment and capital requirements to be very impactful. 
Furthermore, while, overall, 68% of the sample viewed infrastructure and system as at 
least impactful on organisational performance, many participants from Qatar found them 
to be very impactful (44%). Finally, while foreign investment and development were 
deemed to be at least impactful by both groups (71%), many Qatari participants found 
them particularly impactful on their organisational performance (43%). 
In order to calculate unifying dimensions for groups of related items, two Cronbach’s 
reliability analyses were carried out, one for the fifteen items of the Strategy Analysis 
(Section 2), and one for the twenty items of the Performance Analysis (Section 3). Results 
showed that the internal consistency of the two scales was quite high and acceptable at 
a=,87 and a=,94, respectively.  
 The first research hypothesis examined whether “there is a significant difference 
between the responses of the participants from Qatar and the Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia” (H1). The independent sample t-tests that were performed showed multiple 
statistically significant effects. There were extensive statistically significant differences 
to the performance analysis dimension, where the KSA participants had a higher degree 
of agreement than the Qatari participants; most items relating to the “government role 
and agenda analysis” (8/10), to “forming and implementing the firm’s ongoing banking 
strategy” (6/10 items) and to “impact on organisational performance” (5/10) were 
significantly differentiated according to whether the respondent was from Qatar or the 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Hypothesis H1 was therefore accepted, and there was indeed 
a significant difference between the responses of the participants from Qatar and those 
from the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.  
The second hypothesis tested whether “the characteristics of the sample influence their 
responses to the questionnaire” (H2). Results showed that there were multiple 
statistically significant differences, composing a complex view for an important role of 
the sample characteristics in their responses to the questionnaire. Gender, age range, work 
position, years of employment in the sector, years of employment in the current 
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organisation, and average loan default percentage at the current organisation had 
numerous significant relationships to the Performance Analysis (Section 2), to the 
Strategy Analysis (Section 3), to the Government Role and Agenda Analysis (Section 4), 
to the forming and implementing of the firm’s ongoing banking strategy (Section 5a), and 
to the impact on the organisational performance (Section 5b). Because of the multitude 
of statistically significant differences, the second hypothesis was also accepted, and the 
characteristics of the sample were found to exert significant influences on the responses 
of the sample to the main survey items. 
The interviews of 15 KSA and 15 Qatari participants yielded the results and main themes 
which follow: When asked about the impact of the recent pricing decline in the oil/gas 
market on their bank’s financial performance, development objectives, and strategy, 60% 
of the KSA participants voiced major concerns, such as income reduction and 
downsizing. For Qatari participants, 67% felt that this pricing decline was not particularly 
impactful on their country because the Qatari economy does not rely heavily on oil. 
In the second question, interviewees were asked to discuss any initiatives taken to 
diversify the industries and economic outputs in the national economy, as well as their 
degree of effectiveness. Eighty per cent (80%) of the KSA interviewees stated that the 
economy of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is based on oil, and this means diversification 
cannot take place easily. The Qatari interviewees replied that the economy of Qatar is 
diversified and that it is active in investments in worldwide sports events and tourist 
activities.  
For the third question, the participants were asked to discuss what constitutes a world-
class bank, as well as how their current platform can be developed and programmed to 
achieve the objective of a world-class bank. Sixty per cent (60%) of both ethnic groups 
agreed that a world-class bank must be capable of functioning at a global level of quality, 
and many in the sample emphasised that a world-class bank must be capable of managing 
and overcoming local (47%) and international (37%) crises. An outward business 
expansion through establishing international business collaborations and co-operations 
was proposed by 33% of the participants in order to evolve their current platform.  
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For the fourth interview question, participants were called upon to list the primary risks 
facing their bank at the present time and to predict how their organisation will address 
these risks in the future. For participants from the KSA, the major theme was that of a 
crisis, appearing through low oil prices, corruption,  the establishment of an authoritarian 
regime, or terrorists. Many Qatari interviewees remarked that the primary risk facing their 
bank at the present time is overexposure to construction loans (47%), and for 27%, an 
economic recession may have exacerbated that effect.  
For the fifth question, the researcher asked the interviewees to comment on the 
effectiveness of government interventions in banking and to consider what other solutions 
might be employed to overcome such actions. For Qatari participants, the major theme to 
emerge was that their government is effective in its use of banking interventions (53%). 
For the KSA participants, however, the reverse was true, and 33% felt that the KSA 
government is not particularly effective in its interventions in banking. Twenty-seven per 
cent (27%) of all interviewees pointed out that Qatar and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 
have mixed economies.  
In the sixth question, the interviewees discussed the internal and external effects of 
instability on the oil and gas industry. For the KSA participants, the major theme that 
developed (47%) for the internal effect was that this instability promoted problems, such 
as social unrest, instability, and even the involvement of extremist groups. Twenty-seven 
per cent (27%) of the KSA participants felt that the external effects of instability on the 
oil and gas industry carry the risk that other countries and foreign suppliers may prefer 
other antagonistic products to their own. For Qatari participants, 53% deemed the overall 
state of affairs to be stable and not an issue for major concern.  
In the final interview question, participants were asked to discuss the focal points and 
investment strategies that their bank would be employing to increase funding and 
liquidity in the short- to the long-term. The main themes to surface were, to a large degree, 
common to both groups. For the short-term, 27% of interviewees believed that that the 
bank’s plan is to find and utilise start-ups to produce immediate profit. One Qatari 
interviewee pointed out that for the strong Qatari economy, they look to invest in and 
fund projects like the World Cup 2022. 
  
184 
For the long-term, 47% of interviewees, mainly from Qatar, but also from the KSA, stated 
that the organisation is likely to invest in industries other than the oil industry. One Qatari 
participant signified that, for the long-term, their bank has been funding particular 
international ventures. For the KSA, one participant proposed that the bank needs to retain 
its position through either de-investing or focusing on low-risk opportunities and 
suggested that the KSA invest in defence and construction.  
Finally, 27% of the KSA nationals brought attention to the fact that increasing funding 
and liquidity is not easy for the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia because of existing barriers. 
For the Qatari sample, 20% noted that there are promising prospects for an increase in 
funding and liquidity in both the immediate and the long-term future.  
Qatar has launched a number of projects simultaneously. The new airport is almost 
complete, and a brand-new port is currently under construction. New highways have been 
laid, complemented by the construction of a rail network to connect the country with its 
neighbours. Three metro lines are also underway, and eight stadiums are in the design 
phase. Additionally, hospitals and schools are being constructed.  
The KSA is a country which prefers many managers, mostly because it has a long 
tradition as a country which operates in the lucrative oil industry. On the other hand, it 
has a major weakness, namely, its autocratic regime and the lack of alternatives for 
development, such as the financial market, as it operates with other Gulf countries. For 
example, the UAE and Qatar are aiming at cultural openness and toleration to make the 
two Emirates a more hospitable environment for themselves and their employees. Dubai 
and Abu Dhabi were the first two Emirates to begin investing in infrastructure and to 
initiate policies for economic diversification. Expo 2020 is now the main reference for 
business opportunities. With two new cities under planning, real estate has started picking 
up. Logistic centres have developed win fast pace. The tourist industry is still showing 
increasing numbers. Additionally, many companies have established their regional 
headquarters in the UAE.  
The Gulf is, in accordance with the findings of this study, a region with high investment 
attractiveness and the KSA can have a share in this. The potential market is significant 
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and growing fast. The reasons for this growth, as perceived by the participants of the 
survey, are as follows:  
1. Large budget surpluses from the oil and gas sector  
2. The constantly high oil and gas prices in the global market  
3. Internal competition among the GCC countries for political power  
4. Internal competition among the GCC countries to become economic hubs of the region  
5. The need for the GCC countries to diversify economies  
Although the attractiveness of investment is a common, nevertheless there is a clear 
ambivalence in the sustainability of this attractiveness. For example, Qatar has EXPO and 
FIFA’s World Cup coming up, which will improve its economy and financial systems, 
while the KSA seems to be stuck in the middle.  
Regarding the relationship between external factors and the profitability and performance 
of commercial banks in the KSA and Qatar, from market variability to commodity prices 
to supply chain uncertainty, the effects of a single stream income on the KSA banks and 
financial systems is an important predictor of future stability and sustainable growth. 
Qatar has constructed a viable finance system which interacts with the rest of the world, 
while the KSA still has a financial system that merely tries to cope with the external 
world. Furthermore, in the politics of the KSA, often there are speculations of terrorist 
links, is a setback for maximising the profitability and the performance from the 
commercial banks in the KSA. This means that the banks and, therefore, both the 
economy and the political system of the KSA are vulnerable to external factors, including 
the price of oil and political changes. We must not forget that many countries have 
experienced the “Arab Spring”. In an authoritarian state, it will not be surprising to see 
similar unrest, especially if oil prices fall. By contrast, as Qatar’s banks are more liberal 
and open, they depend less on the political climate or on oil and hence on systematic 
shocks created by those factors.  
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As a final point, Qatar is a nation whose socio-cultural factors tend to change. There are 
now more rights and the influx of foreigners helps the country to lean towards an open 
society and therefore an open economy. By contrast, the KSA lags behind. It will certainly 
need to move on and open up its economy in order to reduce potential bank risks. Being 
isolated and cut off from the rest of the globalised economy is not good at this period of 
time. 
Despite strategic objectives and prudent business practices, the dynamics and pressures 
within the socio-cultural framework of the KSA continue to play a role in corporate 
governance, corporate structure, and corporate investment. In addition, expectations 
imposed on government agencies have perpetuated the conditions for a resource-
dependent standard that has affected the performance and growth of the banking industry. 
This research seeks to evaluate the role which these forces play in exposing commercial 
banks to market risks and network vulnerabilities. Hence the KSA will need a series of 
reforms in all levels of its political and social life. 
6.1 Summary 
The Gulf is often referred to in studies as a unified region, however, the differences 
between its countries are significant. Qatar and the KSA virtually monopolised the 
debriefing sessions despite the fact that many of the participants are active in more than 
one country in the Gulf. It has been apparent that the interviewees were intuitively basing 
their responses on Qatar and the KSA. The KSA remains the largest market in the region, 
but its unique cultural and religious status makes it intimidating to many managers.  
At this juncture, Qatar appears to be the most promising country for the investment and 
expansion of many companies. The 2030 Country Vision has put in motion a detailed 
strategic plan to diversify the country’s income source and to change the economy from 
oil-based to knowledge-based. The main focus is on health services, education, sports, 
and applied science. The country has aspirations to become a centre of culture, tradition, 
convention tourism, and a hub for education and health services. To achieve this goal, a 
significant number of expatriates have landed in the country to support the construction 
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of mega infrastructure and to staff the companies which promote the government’s 
initiatives.  
Interview respondents have also reaffirmed the role government has to play and the very 





Chapter 7:Limitations, Recommendations and Conclusions 
7.1 Limitations 
As discussed in the methodology section (Chapter 3), the mixed methods design protocol 
is characterised by a number of important advantages over the solitary use of either the 
qualitative or the quantitative approach. It does, however, have a number of potential 
disadvantages and points of concern. Such difficulties may include the resource-intensive 
nature of mixed methods, where these mixed methodologies often require large sums of 
money and a lot of time to undertake. They may also include the likely need for a team 
of researchers rather than one researcher. Additionally, there is the deep, cross-
methodological and cross-discipline knowledge that the researcher needs to familiarise 
himself or herself with. And finally, there is the constant tackling of current issues and 
problems, including the interpretation of ambiguous results (Johnson and Onwuegbuzie, 
2004). 
 
The gulf region is a place of constant upheaval, it is rife with sectarian violence, 
ideological rivalries and diplomatic standoffs that greatly discourage FDI into the region 
and non-oil sectors of GCC economies.  
A quick snapshot of current events show a diplomatic blockade of Qatar by KSA, UAE, 
Egypt and Bahrain. It is estimated, $30 billion has flowed out of the Qatari banking 
system, in the first two months of this embargo alone (Moody’s, 2017). Proxy war rages 
in Yemen between KSA and Iran-backed militants (UNICEF. 2018). KSA is embroiled 
in a royal succession struggle; Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman is holding fellow 
members of the Saudi royal family under house arrest in his anti-corruption drive to 
modernise the Saudi economy. (House.K.E.;2017) 
These events not only make co-operation difficult between the GCC economies, it acts as 
shocks to be banking system and creates an environment of uncertainty that is hard to 
account for. This study does not account for such unanticipated events, thus, limited in 




Generally speaking, the main objective of risk management is to protect the banks from 
damage having to do with risk reduction. The key point of the concept of risk management 
is to identify and handle risks. The main objective is to add maximum value to minimise 
losses and to remove potential threats. If the banking system of the Gulf countries is to 
be safe, risk management must a continuous process that accords with the strategy 
followed by each bank. . Through the effectiveness of risk management, the appropriate 
framework for any future activity of the organisation can be created together with the 
improvement in the decision-making process, the possibility of programming to reduce 
the volatility, and the attention of the uncertainty in important business operations. This 
will improve the operational efficiency of the banks.  
A credit institution plays an important role in managing financial risks. Risk is a key 
concern of the bank as there could be risks that can be identified, assessed, measured, and 
easily adjusted. The bank should therefore take protective measures in the various 
processes in order to predict specific contexts and risk limits. For example, special 
attention should be paid to the terms of the loans so that these are not exposed to levels 
of risk that cannot be handled and do not jeopardise the overall profitability and viability. 
Effective risk management definitely requires the supervision of the authorities, together 
with the laws, rules, and procedures necessary to ensure the reliability of banks and 
increase their ability to deal with the negative effects of exogenous factors. The economic 
growth, together with the increased number of losses due to operational risk in financial 
institutions, led the Basel Committee (2003) to issue a text that defines the basic 
operational risk management practices for the banks. This text is considered to be a step 
in the formulation of detailed rules for the corporate governance of all the main types of 
risks. 
The practices mentioned by the Basel Committee are essentially standards which have 
been proven necessary to manage operational risk and allow institutions to develop 
approaches that fit their organisational needs. The Board of Directors must be informed 
about the operational risks that occur in the bank in order to approve and verify the 
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problems at regular intervals under his management. This framework should formulate 
rules for the recognition, measurement, control, and management of operational risks. 
The Board should establish an independent internal control system, consisting of well-
trained staff, in order to ensure that the operational risk management policies are 
implemented effectively and that the bank has the necessary capital for these to be 
implemented. It should also carry out periodic checks to ensure the success of the existing 
framework. The senior executives of the banking institution should be responsible and 
play an active role in properly implementing the operational risk management framework. 
Moreover, the application should be consistent with all levels of the hierarchy and 
everyone should know his or her duties concerning operational risk management. The top 
management and the bank's Governing Council are responsible for creating methods and 
procedures for operational risk management products, activities, and systems of the bank. 
The bank is required to identify and assess operational risks posed by products, processes, 
activities, and systems. Also,  in designing new products, processes, and systems, or 
before they have been implemented, the banks must be  able to assess the operational risk 
they pose. Procedures should also be established through which the level of operational 
risk occurrence can be checked. The procedures should include the following:  
a. Regular reporting to the Board and senior management, which 
must be clear concerning the level and trend of operational risks.  
b. Determination of withholding funds to cover the amount of 
operational risk. 
The management of the banking institutions should pay particular attention to the proper 
implementation of an appropriate strategy as well as to the processes and mechanisms 
that need to be applied to all of their activities for the management of operational risk. In 
order to avoid or minimise the occurrence of operational risk, they also have to make the 
necessary checks on the proper application of measures. When it comes to Renewable 
Energy, from a geopolitical and geo-economic point of view, the network is important 
for the countries surrounding the North Sea. In order to establish a basis for the 
development of a large European energy network interface, it is important for the 
Netherlands and Belgium to provide access to the North Sea through a series of offshore 
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parks. Compared to the conventional geopolitics of energy, renewables have similarities 
and differences. Renewable energy sources are more decentralised and thus trigger more 
local players when compared to centrally controlled conventional energy. In terms of 
countries, the Gulf countries and some European countries, such as Germany, appear to 
have invested heavily in renewable energy and to have an eye on the future geopolitical 
map. Countries such as Saudi Arabia, which had a major role in the geopolitics of 
conventional energy, appear to have a strong position in renewable energy and the critical 
materials that support them.  
The privatisation of companies in the energy sector in Saudi Arabia is important. The 
country’s government shows particular interest in the privatisation of energy sector 
companies and in the issues of energy efficiency and renewable energy.  Energy issues 
can develop into an area of cooperation with institutions and organisations of the other 
GCC countries.  
The Middle East, North Africa, Algeria, Iraq, and Iran and the oil-producing Gulf 
Cooperation are the regions which will feel the greatest pressure about oil prices in 2017. 
As IMF estimates, the budget of Saudi Arabia requires $98.3 per barrel, while Bahrain 
and Oman ask for $89.8 and $96.8, respectively. However, the GCC countries are 
considered able to withstand the storm of low prices on account of their low debt and 
large foreign exchange in stock. Therefore, it is estimated that they can disregard the 
moves of their competitors through predictions. The main player is Saudi Arabia; many 
analysts point out that the KSA may not be as stable as it was recently believed.  Internal 
problems may occur because of cuts in the Saudi budget, and those problems may change 
the country’s local geopolitical scene and permit the return of the country’s traditional 
enemy, Iran. Algeria and Iraq may also face significant problems. 
 
7.3 Conclusions 
Lately, and for justifiable reasons, the Gulf region has attracted the attention of the 
media and researchers. Although proven oil and gas reserves have been known to exist 
in the region for decades, circumstances have never been better than they are now for 
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economic and political change. Oil and gas prices have been high for quite a long time, 
allowing for a budget surplus in all countries and confidence in the economic future.  
A new generation of inspired leaders, most notably in Qatar and the UAE, has risen to 
power. These leaders are willing to try to change their countries and diversify their 
economies. At the same time. Within this historical framework, a large number of 
lucrative and high profile investment opportunities have emerged. On the one hand,  
business people have identified the main obstacles, such as restrictive immigration 
laws, inefficient public authorities, a poor or unclear legal framework, and high 
competition. On the other hand, they foresee long lasting economic prosperity, the 
willingness of the governments to continue the reforms, and the potential for highly 
profitable business. It can therefore be concluded that the Gulf area is a highly 
attractive investment destination. Mega infrastructure projects will not only fuel the 
economy but also create a foundation for the establishment and growth of other 
industries, including the logistics and the aviation industries. It is certain that time and 
further studies will prove whether the inherited problems of the Gulf economic 
environment will be mitigated or whether GCC countries will have lost another chance 
to create diversified and sustainable growth. This thesis has moved ahead with an 
analysis of the cases of the KSA and Qatar as two examples of GCC countries. On this 
basis, the author has undertaken the related research, which is both qualitative and 
quantitative.  
Qatar, it appears has taken greater strides in modernising its economy; Its banking 
system is not only robust but interacts internally with the global system and expanding 
into new markets. Tourism, international events and infrastructure developments have 
meant that Qatar is better insulated from oil price shocks than KSA. Both countries 
are diversifying but Qatar is further ahead in the process and can be a blueprint for 
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 Appendix A: Quantitative Survey Summary 









    Male Female         
1 Gender           
  18-24 25-34 35-44 45-54 55+   
2 Age        
  Secondary Some College Master's Bachelor's PhD+   








Regional Manager Executive   
 4 Position or Status        





       





       
    Less than 1% 1-4% 5-8% 9-12% 12%+   
7 
Average Loan 
Default Percentage at 
Current Organisation 








Please evaluate each of 
the following prompts. 
Select the best fit level of 
agreement from the scale 
to the right. 











The banking industry 
is stable and 
diversified. 
        
2 
Current interest rates 
are competitive and in 
demand. 




improved our lending 
strategies. 
        
4 
We invest a high 
percentage of our 
funds in private sector 
enterprises. 
        
5 
Most deposits are tied 
to oil and gas rents. 
        
6 
Our vision is global, 
and this requires 
diversification. 
         
7 
Our default rates are 
anticipated and 
appropriate. 
         
8 
The financial 
instruments we use 
are market sensitive 
and vulnerable to 
risks. 
         
9 
We anticipate that the 
oil and gas market 
will recover in price 
and volume. 
         
10 
Most citizens do not 
plan financially for 
long-term market 
shocks. 
         
11 
Government 
subsidies allow us to 
loan more freely to 
the private sector. 









         
13 
There is an 
inadequate population 
of skilled 
entrepreneurs in our 
national population. 
         
14 
Banks are essential to 
the domestic 
economy and 
therefore must be 
protected during 
periods of financial 
duress and decline. 
         
15 
The financial market 
is mature and 
competitive. 








Please evaluate each of 
the following prompts. 
Select the best fit level of 
agreement from the scale 
to the right. 







1 2 3 4 5   
1 
Global pressures on 




           
2 
The variability of 
commodity pricing 
creates highly 
impactful risks for 
our nation. 
           
3 
Even if we diversified 
our industries, we 
would need decades 
to allow them to 
mature. 









should be supported. 
         
5 
Our bank is 
vulnerable to 
systemic risks. 
         
6 
Without government 
support, our bank 
would likely be 
exposed to 
performance shocks. 
         
7 
Liquidity levels are at 
an all-time low. 
         
8 
When oil prices 
decline, we are less 
likely to lend money 
to private enterprises. 
         
9 
Citizens are more 
likely to withhold 
savings and 
investments when oil 
prices fluctuate or 
decline. 




a layer of stability 
that we desperately 
need at this time. 
         
11 
Intra-bank loans 
create a dangerous 
cycle of risk and 
vulnerability. 
         
12 
The increase in 
lending rates is a 
positive step towards 
industry maturity. 




Most of our internal 
investment strategies 
are based on oil and 
gas exploitation. 




and products: Ours 
should remain oil and 
gas. 
         
15 
The gap between the 
citizen and expatriate 
population in our 
nation is worrying. 
        
16 
New companies are a 
liability; we would 
prefer to invest in 
tested models. 
         
17 
Most small 
businesses are likely 
to fail if given enough 
time. 
         
18 
Our banks should 
invest more heavily in 
business development 
and growth to 
increase industry 
performance. 
         
19 
Without sufficient oil 




         
20 
The domestic 
financial markets are 
unstable and high 
risk. 







 Please evaluate each of the following prompts. Select the best fit level of agreement from each of the various scales. 
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Our government has a 
long-term vision that 
does not rely on oil 
and gas for 
development 
         
    Manufacturing Agriculture Pharmaceuticals Technology Services   
2 
The primary industry 
upon which lending 
and development 
should focus is: 
       
    Bank Stability 
A need for 
more bailouts 










The primary result of 
a government bailout 
in our nation is: 
       









investment in oil and 
gas is a necessary and 
sustainable 
commitment. 
        













role in stabilising the 
domestic economy is: 
           
















Our dependence on a 
single export makes 
our country look: 
          














The primary factor 
restricting the number 
of national citizens in 
private sector 
employment is: 
       
    Oil and Gas Academia Services Pharmaceuticals Finance Construction 
8 
The primary sector 
which national 
citizens would like to 
work in is: 
      







Low/ Ideal   
9 
Government analysts 
would rank the 
current threat level in 
oil and gas as 
follows: 
          
















investment in oil and 
gas is based on the 
following objective: 
        








Please evaluate each of 
the following 10 factors, 
focusing on their degree 
of importance in forming 













firm's ongoing banking 
strategy 
1 
Price performance of 
the oil and gas 
industry 














         
5 
Strategic vision or 
agenda for national 
change 
         
6 
Industry rules and 
regulations 
         
7 
Citizen expectations 
and national demands 





         
9 
Foreign interests and 
investments 
          
10 
Defaults and risks in 
bank performance 
          
Please evaluate each of 
the following 10 factors, 
focusing on their degree 
of impact on your 
organisational 
performance 









Oil and gas industry 
prices 
          
2 
Demand for loans and 
innovative financing 
products 




































          
Figure 1: Quantitative Survey Summary 
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Appendix B: Qualitative Survey Questions 
Question 1: What were the impacts of the recent pricing decline in the oil and gas market 
on your bank’s financial performance? On your development objectives? On your 
strategy? 
Question 2: What initiatives have been taken to diversify the industries and economic 
outputs in your national economy? Are these sufficient? Are they effective? 
Question 3: What constitutes a world-class bank, and how can you evolve your current 
platform and programme to achieve this objective? 
Question 4: What are the primary risks facing your bank right now, and how do you 
predict that your organisation will address these risks in the future? 
Question 5: Are government interventions in banking effective? What other solutions 
might be employed to overcome such central actions? 
Question 6: What are the internal effects of instability in the oil and gas industry? The 
external effects? 
Question 7: What focal points and investment strategies will your bank be employing in 
the short to medium term to increase funding and liquidity? The long term?  
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Appendix C: Survey Findings  
Demographic Characteristics and Patterns 
Table 1. 
Age ranges of KSA and Qatari participants 
 KSA Qatar 
 Frequency percentage frequency percentage 
18-24 9 3% 9 3% 
25-34 45 15% 45 15% 
35-44 105 35% 96 32% 
45-54 117 39% 120 40% 
55+ 24 8% 30 10% 
total 300 100% 300 100% 
 
Table 2. 
Educational level of KSA and Qatari participants 
 KSA Qatar 
 frequency percentage frequency percentage 
secondary 3 1% 3 1% 
some college 9 3% 12 4% 
bachelor’s 150 50% 144 48% 
master’s 123 41% 129 43% 
PhD+ 15 5% 12 4% 






Position or status of KSA and Qatari participants 
 KSA Qatar 
 frequency percentage frequency percentage 
teller/associate 201 67% 216 72% 
floor supervisor 36 12% 27 9% 
department/branch manager 24 8% 18 6% 
regional manager 30 10% 33 11% 
Executive 9 3% 6 2% 
Total 300 100% 300 100% 
 
Table 4. 
Length of employment in commercial banking of KSA and Qatari participants 
 KSA Qatar 
 frequency percentage frequency percentage 
less than 1 year 24 8% 21 7% 
1-3 years 75 25% 81 27% 
4-6 years 147 49% 153 51% 
7-9 years 39 13% 36 12% 
10+ years 15 5% 9 3% 





Length of employment at the current organisation of KSA and Qatari participants 
 KSA Qatar 
 frequency percentage frequency percentage 
less than 1 year 36 12% 30 10% 
1-3 years 75 25% 81 27% 
4-6 years 135 45% 144 48% 
7-9 years 36 12% 33 11% 
10+ years 18 6% 12 4% 
total 300 100% 300 100% 
 
Table 6. 
Average loan default percentage at the current organisation of KSA and Qatari 
participants 
 KSA Qatar 
 frequency percentage frequency percentage 
less than 1% 18 6% 15 5% 
1-4% 66 22% 72 24% 
5-8% 96 32% 99 33% 
9-12% 90 30% 84 28% 
12%+ 30 10% 30 10% 






The banking industry is stable and diversified 
 KSA Qatar 
 frequency percentage frequency percentage 
strongly agree 15 5% 9 3% 
Agree 60 20% 69 23% 
neither agree nor disagree 30 10% 51 17% 
Disagree 153 51% 150 50% 
strongly disagree 42 14% 21 7% 
Total 300 100% 300 100% 
 
Table 8. 
Current interest rates are competitive and in demand  
 KSA Qatar 
 frequency percentage frequency percentage 
strongly agree 45 15% 51 17% 
Agree 153 51% 138 46% 
neither agree nor disagree 27 9% 18 6% 
Disagree 60 20% 54 18% 
strongly disagree 15 5% 39 13% 
Total 300 100% 300 100% 
 
Table 9. 
Central bank interventions have improved our lending strategies 
 KSA Qatar 
 frequency percentage frequency percentage 
strongly agree 72 24% 54 18% 
Agree 180 60% 201 67% 
neither agree nor disagree 33 11% 42 14% 
Disagree 15 5% 3 1% 
strongly disagree 0 0% 0 0% 





We invest a high percentage of our funds in private sector enterprises  
 KSA Qatar 
 frequency percentage frequency percentage 
strongly agree 27 9% 45 15% 
Agree 192 64% 180 60% 
neither agree nor disagree 9 3% 3 1% 
Disagree 69 23% 60 20% 
strongly disagree 3 1% 12 4% 
Total 300 100% 300 100% 
 
Table 11. 
Most deposits are tied to oil and gas rents 
 KSA Qatar 
 frequency percentage frequency percentage 
strongly agree 27 9% 27 9% 
Agree 123 41% 153 51% 
neither agree nor disagree 12 4% 30 10% 
Disagree 105 35% 57 19% 
strongly disagree 33 11% 33 11% 
Total 300 100% 300 100% 
 
Table 12. 
Our vision is global, and this requires diversification 
 KSA Qatar 
 frequency percentage frequency percentage 
strongly agree 36 12% 63 21% 
Agree 69 23% 156 52% 
neither agree nor disagree 15 5% 24 8% 
Disagree 135 45% 48 16% 
strongly disagree 45 15% 9 3% 





Our default rates are anticipated and appropriate 
 KSA Qatar 
 frequency percentage frequency percentage 
strongly agree 33 11% 24 8% 
Agree 90 30% 93 31% 
neither agree nor disagree 27 9% 24 8% 
Disagree 105 35% 126 42% 
strongly disagree 45 15% 33 11% 
Total 300 100% 300 100% 
 
Table 14. 
The financial instruments we use are market sensitive and vulnerable to risks 
 KSA Qatar 
 frequency percentage frequency percentage 
strongly agree 42 14% 24 8% 
Agree 132 44% 153 51% 
neither agree nor disagree 42 14% 33 11% 
Disagree 60 20% 63 21% 
strongly disagree 24 8% 27 9% 
Total 300 100% 300 100% 
 
Table 15. 
We anticipate that the oil and gas market will recover in price and volume 
 KSA Qatar 
 frequency percentage frequency percentage 
strongly agree 12 4% 21 7% 
Agree 120 40% 105 35% 
neither agree nor disagree 15 5% 15 5% 
Disagree 117 39% 114 38% 
strongly disagree 36 12% 45 15% 




Most citizens do not plan financially for long-term market shocks 
 KSA Qatar 
 frequency percentage frequency percentage 
strongly agree 27 9% 45 15% 
Agree 156 52% 138 46% 
neither agree nor disagree 24 8% 9 3% 
Disagree 63 21% 72 24% 
strongly disagree 30 10% 36 12% 
Total 300 100% 300 100% 
 
Table 17. 
Government subsidies allow us to loan more freely to the private sector 
 KSA Qatar 
 frequency percentage frequency percentage 
strongly agree 36 12% 24 8% 
Agree 192 64% 201 67% 
neither agree nor disagree 51 17% 60 20% 
Disagree 18 6% 12 4% 
strongly disagree 3 1% 3 1% 
Total 300 100% 300 100% 
 
Table 18. 
Investments in research and development create liabilities and additional risks 
 KSA Qatar 
 frequency percentage frequency percentage 
strongly agree 6 2% 9 3% 
Agree 36 12% 24 8% 
neither agree nor disagree 42 14% 57 19% 
Disagree 153 51% 159 53% 
strongly disagree 63 21% 51 17% 





There is an inadequate population of skilled entrepreneurs in our national population 
 KSA Qatar 
 frequency percentage frequency percentage 
strongly agree 39 13% 21 7% 
Agree 144 48% 33 11% 
neither agree nor disagree 57 19% 72 24% 
Disagree 45 15% 138 46% 
strongly disagree 15 5% 36 12% 
Total 300 100% 300 100% 
 
Table 20. 
Banks are essential to the domestic economy and therefore must be protected during 
periods of financial duress and decline 
 KSA Qatar 
 frequency percentage frequency percentage 
strongly agree 33 11% 48 16% 
Agree 192 64% 168 56% 
neither agree nor disagree 51 17% 60 20% 
Disagree 21 7% 21 7% 
strongly disagree 3 1% 3 1% 
Total 300 100% 300 100% 
 
Table 21. 
The financial market is mature and competitive 
 KSA Qatar 
 frequency percentage frequency percentage 
strongly agree 24 8% 63 21% 
Agree 132 44% 150 50% 
neither agree nor disagree 105 35% 75 25% 
Disagree 36 12% 12 4% 
strongly disagree 3 1% 0 0% 






Global pressures on the oil and gas market have destabilised performance domestically 
 KSA Qatar 
 frequency percentage frequency percentage 
strongly agree 54 18% 30 10% 
Agree 147 49% 126 42% 
neither agree nor disagree 51 17% 66 22% 
Disagree 42 14% 57 19% 
strongly disagree 6 2% 21 7% 
Total 300 100% 300 100% 
 
Table 23. 
The variability of commodity pricing creates highly impactful risks for our nation 
 KSA Qatar 
 frequency percentage frequency percentage 
strongly agree 30 10% 27 9% 
Agree 156 52% 117 39% 
neither agree nor disagree 81 27% 87 29% 
Disagree 27 9% 51 17% 
strongly disagree 6 2% 18 6% 
Total 300 100% 300 100% 
 
Table 24. 
Even if we diversified our industries, we would need decades to allow them to mature 
 KSA Qatar 
 frequency percentage frequency percentage 
strongly agree 33 11% 18 6% 
Agree 147 49% 45 15% 
neither agree nor disagree 66 22% 60 20% 
Disagree 42 14% 135 45% 
strongly disagree 12 4% 42 14% 





Strategic partnerships and FDI allow rapid exchange of knowledge and technology and 
should be supported 
 KSA Qatar 
 frequency percentage frequency percentage 
strongly agree 42 14% 45 15% 
Agree 141 47% 150 50% 
neither agree nor disagree 72 24% 60 20% 
Disagree 33 11% 27 9% 
strongly disagree 12 4% 18 6% 
Total 300 100% 300 100% 
 
Table 26. 
Our bank is vulnerable to systemic risks 
 KSA Qatar 
 frequency percentage frequency percentage 
strongly agree 30 10% 33 11% 
Agree 99 33% 126 42% 
neither agree nor disagree 117 39% 96 32% 
Disagree 39 13% 39 13% 
strongly disagree 15 5% 6 2% 
Total 300 100% 300 100% 
 
Table 27. 
Without government support, our bank would likely be exposed to performance shocks 
 KSA Qatar 
 frequency percentage frequency percentage 
strongly agree 42 14% 36 12% 
Agree 153 51% 147 49% 
neither agree nor disagree 66 22% 75 25% 
Disagree 24 8% 33 11% 
strongly disagree 15 5% 9 3% 





Liquidity levels are at an all-time low 
 KSA Qatar 
 frequency percentage frequency percentage 
strongly agree 36 12% 48 16% 
Agree 147 49% 129 43% 
neither agree nor disagree 51 17% 66 22% 
Disagree 48 16% 39 13% 
strongly disagree 18 6% 18 6% 
Total 300 100% 300 100% 
 
Table 29. 
When oil prices decline, we are less likely to lend money to private enterprises 
 KSA Qatar 
 frequency percentage frequency percentage 
strongly agree 33 11% 24 8% 
Agree 156 52% 114 38% 
neither agree nor disagree 78 26% 90 30% 
Disagree 24 8% 57 19% 
strongly disagree 9 3% 15 5% 
Total 300 100% 300 100% 
 
Table 30. 
Citizens are more likely to withhold savings and investments when oil prices fluctuate or 
decline 
 KSA Qatar 
 frequency percentage frequency percentage 
strongly agree 33 11% 30 10% 
Agree 150 50% 147 49% 
neither agree nor disagree 66 22% 57 19% 
Disagree 42 14% 51 17% 
strongly disagree 9 3% 15 5% 





Investing in diversification offers a layer of stability that we desperately need at this time 
 KSA Qatar 
 frequency percentage frequency percentage 
strongly agree 51 17% 42 14% 
Agree 135 45% 132 44% 
neither agree nor disagree 66 22% 84 28% 
Disagree 36 12% 39 13% 
strongly disagree 12 4% 3 1% 
Total 300 100% 300 100% 
 
Table 32. 
Intra-bank loans create a dangerous cycle of risk and vulnerability 
 KSA Qatar 
 frequency percentage frequency percentage 
strongly agree 36 12% 42 14% 
Agree 144 48% 135 45% 
neither agree nor disagree 54 18% 60 20% 
Disagree 54 18% 48 16% 
strongly disagree 12 4% 15 5% 
Total 300 100% 300 100% 
 
Table 33. 
The increase in lending rates is a positive step towards industry maturity 
 KSA Qatar 
 frequency percentage frequency percentage 
strongly agree 30 10% 27 9% 
Agree 150 50% 147 49% 
neither agree nor disagree 54 18% 66 22% 
Disagree 51 17% 45 15% 
strongly disagree 15 5% 15 5% 





Most of our internal investment strategies are based on oil and gas exploitation 
 KSA Qatar 
 frequency percentage frequency percentage 
strongly agree 30 10% 18 6% 
Agree 129 43% 117 39% 
neither agree nor disagree 99 33% 78 26% 
Disagree 33 11% 60 20% 
strongly disagree 9 3% 27 9% 
Total 300 100% 300 100% 
 
Table 35. 
Countries have national industries and products: Ours should remain oil and gas 
 KSA Qatar 
 frequency percentage frequency percentage 
strongly agree 9 3% 12 4% 
Agree 51 17% 48 16% 
neither agree nor disagree 81 27% 81 27% 
Disagree 123 41% 135 45% 
strongly disagree 36 12% 24 8% 
Total 300 100% 300 100% 
 
Table 36. 
The gap between the citizen and expatriate population in our nation is worrying 
 KSA Qatar 
 frequency percentage frequency percentage 
strongly agree 6 2% 3 1% 
Agree 21 7% 12 4% 
neither agree nor disagree 33 11% 42 14% 
Disagree 120 40% 117 39% 
strongly disagree 120 40% 126 42% 





New companies are a liability; we would prefer to invest in tested models 
 KSA Qatar 
 frequency percentage frequency percentage 
strongly agree 18 6% 9 3% 
Agree 33 11% 54 18% 
neither agree nor disagree 87 29% 81 27% 
Disagree 132 44% 123 41% 
strongly disagree 30 10% 33 11% 
Total 300 100% 300 100% 
 
Table 38. 
Most small businesses are likely to fail if given enough time 
 KSA Qatar 
 frequency percentage frequency percentage 
strongly agree 21 7% 33 11% 
Agree 57 19% 72 24% 
neither agree nor disagree 162 54% 144 48% 
Disagree 57 19% 42 14% 
strongly disagree 3 1% 9 3% 
Total 300 100% 300 100% 
 
Table 39. 
Our banks should invest more heavily in business development and growth to increase 
industry performance 
 KSA Qatar 
 frequency percentage frequency percentage 
strongly agree 21 7% 33 11% 
Agree 153 51% 135 45% 
neither agree nor disagree 57 19% 72 24% 
Disagree 51 17% 39 13% 
strongly disagree 18 6% 21 7% 





Without sufficient oil and gas liquidity, we cannot fund additional development 
 KSA Qatar 
 frequency percentage frequency percentage 
strongly agree 27 9% 18 6% 
Agree 147 49% 45 15% 
neither agree nor disagree 63 21% 78 26% 
Disagree 48 16% 129 43% 
strongly disagree 15 5% 30 10% 
Total 300 100% 300 100% 
 
Table 41. 
The domestic financial markets are unstable and high risk 
 KSA Qatar 
 frequency percentage frequency percentage 
strongly agree 33 11% 18 6% 
Agree 69 23% 66 22% 
neither agree nor disagree 138 46% 141 47% 
Disagree 51 17% 63 21% 
strongly disagree 9 3% 12 4% 




Government Role and Agenda Analysis 
Table 42. 
Our government has a long-term vision that does not rely on oil and gas for development 
 KSA Qatar 
 frequency percentage frequency percentage 
strongly agree 21 7% 33 11% 
Agree 42 14% 138 46% 
neither agree nor disagree 78 26% 72 24% 
Disagree 132 44% 42 14% 
strongly disagree 27 9% 15 5% 
Total 300 100% 300 100% 
 
Table 43. 
The primary industry upon which lending and development should focus is: 
 KSA Qatar 
 frequency percentage frequency percentage 
Manufacturing 186 62% 42 14% 
Agriculture 9 3% 18 6% 
Pharmaceuticals 18 6% 24 8% 
Technology 36 12% 42 14% 
Services 51 17% 174 58% 





The primary result of a government bailout in our nation is: 
 KSA Qatar 
 frequency percentage frequency percentage 
bank stability 57 19% 177 59% 
a need for more bailouts in the future 24 8% 36 12% 
market uncertainty 21 7% 36 12% 
increased competition 18 6% 0 0% 
investment in business development  180 60% 51 17% 
Total 300 100% 300 100% 
 
Table 45. 
Government investment in oil and gas is a necessary and sustainable commitment 
 KSA Qatar 
 frequency percentage frequency percentage 
strongly agree 135 45% 3 1% 
Agree 96 32% 39 13% 
neither agree nor disagree 48 16% 60 20% 
Disagree 21 7% 150 50% 
strongly disagree 0 0% 48 16% 
Total 300 100% 300 100% 
 
Table 46. 
The government’s role in stabilising the domestic economy is: 
 KSA Qatar 
 frequency percentage frequency percentage 
very important 201 67% 189 63% 
Important 60 20% 72 24% 
somewhat important 27 9% 33 11% 
not very important 12 4% 6 2% 
not important at all 0 0% 0 0% 





Our dependence on a single export makes our country look: 
 KSA Qatar 
 frequency percentage frequency percentage 
strong and strategic 3 1% 6 2% 
committed and resourceful 33 11% 30 10% 
weak and uncertain 261 87% 258 86% 
competitive and opportunistic 3 1% 6 2% 
innovative and creative 0 0% 0 0% 
Total 300 100% 300 100% 
 
Table 48. 
The primary factor restricting the number of national citizens in private sector 
employment is: 
 KSA Qatar 
 frequency percentage frequency percentage 
inadequate pay/benefits 9 3% 12 4% 
lack of education 57 19% 51 17% 
market uncertainty 48 16% 147 49% 
lack of government investment 30 10% 42 14% 
not-respected 3 1% 3 1% 
deficient financing  153 51% 45 15% 




The primary sector which national citizens would like to work in is: 
 KSA Qatar 
 frequency percentage frequency percentage 
oil and gas 129 43% 15 5% 
academia 27 9% 60 20% 
services 30 10% 105 35% 
pharmaceuticals 9 3% 15 5% 
finance 21 7% 30 10% 
construction  84 28% 75 25% 
total 300 100% 300 100% 
 
Table 50. 
Government analysts would rank the current threat level in oil and gas as follows: 
 KSA Qatar 
 frequency percentage frequency percentage 
high/risky 204 68% 78 26% 
medium/uncertain 72 24% 165 55% 
average/competitive 21 7% 45 15% 
evolving/manageable 3 1% 12 4% 
low/ideal 0 0% 0 0% 
Total 300 100% 300 100% 
 
Table 51. 
The government investment in oil and gas is based on the following objective: 
 KSA Qatar 
 frequency percentage frequency percentage 
self-preservation 33 11% 30 10% 
national growth/development 168 56% 72 24% 
industry protection 9 3% 12 4% 
national security 39 13% 36 12% 
future opportunities and change  51 17% 150 50% 




Future Growth Analysis 
Table 52. 
Price performance of the oil and gas industry  
 KSA Qatar 
 frequency percentage frequency percentage 
very important 168 56% 60 20% 
Important 69 23% 168 56% 
somewhat important 63 21% 72 24% 
not very important 0 0% 0 0% 
not important at all 0 0% 0 0% 
Total 300 100% 300 100% 
 
Table 53. 
Government subsidies and investments  
 KSA Qatar 
 frequency percentage frequency percentage 
very important 75 25% 138 46% 
Important 162 54% 102 34% 
somewhat important 60 20% 57 19% 
not very important 3 1% 3 1% 
not important at all 0 0% 0 0% 
Total 300 100% 300 100% 
 
Table 54. 
Education system improvements and specialisation  
 KSA Qatar 
 frequency percentage frequency percentage 
very important 57 19% 147 49% 
Important 99 33% 99 33% 
somewhat important 135 45% 51 17% 
not very important 9 3% 3 1% 
not important at all 0 0% 0 0% 





Diversification of industries 
 KSA Qatar 
 frequency percentage frequency percentage 
very important 39 13% 51 17% 
Important 165 55% 159 53% 
somewhat important 78 26% 69 23% 
not very important 15 5% 18 6% 
not important at all 3 1% 3 1% 
Total 300 100% 300 100% 
 
Table 56. 
Strategic vision or agenda for national change  
 KSA Qatar 
 frequency percentage frequency percentage 
very important 51 17% 54 18% 
Important 171 57% 132 44% 
somewhat important 66 22% 102 34% 
not very important 12 4% 12 4% 
not important at all 0 0% 0 0% 
Total 300 100% 300 100% 
 
Table 57. 
Industry rules and regulations  
 KSA Qatar 
 frequency percentage frequency percentage 
very important 150 50% 66 22% 
Important 96 32% 159 53% 
somewhat important 54 18% 75 25% 
not very important 0 0% 0 0% 
not important at all 0 0% 0 0% 





Citizen expectations and national demands  
 KSA Qatar 
 frequency percentage frequency percentage 
very important 63 21% 132 44% 
Important 147 49% 96 32% 
somewhat important 75 25% 60 20% 
not very important 15 5% 12 4% 
not important at all 0 0% 0 0% 
Total 300 100% 300 100% 
 
Table 59. 
Intra-bank partnerships and support  
 KSA Qatar 
 frequency percentage frequency percentage 
very important 54 18% 45 15% 
Important 153 51% 159 53% 
somewhat important 78 26% 84 28% 
not very important 15 5% 12 4% 
not important at all 0 0% 0 0% 
Total 300 100% 300 100% 
 
Table 60. 
Foreign interests and investments  
 KSA Qatar 
 frequency percentage frequency percentage 
very important 60 20% 126 42% 
Important 135 45% 90 30% 
somewhat important 90 30% 66 22% 
not very important 15 5% 18 6% 
not important at all 0 0% 0 0% 





Defaults and risks in bank performance  
 KSA Qatar 
 frequency percentage frequency percentage 
very important 162 54% 153 51% 
Important 105 35% 99 33% 
somewhat important 30 10% 42 14% 
not very important 3 1% 6 2% 
not important at all 0 0% 0 0% 
Total 300 100% 300 100% 
 
Table 62. 
Oil and gas industry prices  
 KSA Qatar 
 frequency percentage frequency percentage 
very impactful 123 41% 66 22% 
Impactful 90 30% 135 45% 
somewhat impactful 72 24% 87 29% 
not very impactful 15 5% 12 4% 
not impactful at all 0 0% 0 0% 
Total 300 100% 300 100% 
 
Table 63. 
Demand for loans and innovative financing products  
 KSA Qatar 
 frequency percentage frequency percentage 
very impactful 42 14% 117 39% 
Impactful 87 29% 93 31% 
somewhat impactful 135 45% 78 26% 
not very impactful 36 12% 12 4% 
not impactful at all 0 0% 0 0% 





Start-up investment and capital requirements  
 KSA Qatar 
 frequency percentage frequency percentage 
very impactful 54 18% 120 40% 
Impactful 135 45% 93 31% 
somewhat impactful 99 33% 72 24% 
not very impactful 12 4% 15 5% 
not impactful at all 0 0% 0 0% 
Total 300 100% 300 100% 
 
Table 65. 
Liquidity guidelines and standards  
 KSA Qatar 
 frequency percentage frequency percentage 
very impactful 162 54% 150 50% 
Impactful 87 29% 84 28% 
somewhat impactful 42 14% 57 19% 
not very impactful 9 3% 9 3% 
not impactful at all 0 0% 0 0% 
Total 300 100% 300 100% 
 
Table 66. 
Auditing and governance oversight  
 KSA Qatar 
 frequency percentage frequency percentage 
very impactful 153 51% 153 51% 
Impactful 87 29% 84 28% 
somewhat impactful 57 19% 57 19% 
not very impactful 3 1% 6 2% 
not impactful at all 0 0% 0 0% 







Managerial strategy making and positioning  
 KSA Qatar 
 frequency percentage frequency percentage 
very impactful 54 18% 51 17% 
Impactful 156 52% 147 49% 
somewhat impactful 66 22% 81 27% 
not very impactful 21 7% 18 6% 
not impactful at all 3 1% 3 1% 
Total 300 100% 300 100% 
 
Table 68. 
Infrastructure and system  
 KSA Qatar 
 frequency percentage frequency percentage 
very impactful 45 15% 132 44% 
Impactful 135 45% 96 32% 
somewhat impactful 105 35% 63 21% 
not very impactful 12 4% 9 3% 
not impactful at all 3 1% 0 0% 
Total 300 100% 300 100% 
 
Table 69. 
Domestic competitive forces  
 KSA Qatar 
 frequency percentage frequency percentage 
very impactful 72 24% 75 25% 
Impactful 138 46% 135 45% 
somewhat impactful 87 29% 84 28% 
not very impactful 3 1% 6 2% 
not impactful at all 0 0% 0 0% 





International competitive forces  
 KSA Qatar 
 frequency percentage frequency percentage 
very impactful 75 25% 69 23% 
Impactful 141 47% 135 45% 
somewhat impactful 81 27% 90 30% 
not very impactful 3 1% 6 2% 
not impactful at all 0 0% 0 0% 
Total 300 100% 300 100% 
 
Table 71. 
Foreign investment and development  
 KSA Qatar 
 frequency percentage frequency percentage 
very impactful 72 24% 129 43% 
Impactful 132 44% 93 31% 
somewhat impactful 84 28% 63 21% 
not very impactful 12 4% 15 5% 
not impactful at all 0 0% 0 0% 
Total 300 100% 300 100% 
 
Appendix D: Results  
Reliability Analysis and Results 
RELIABILITY 
 /VARIABLES=S2.1 S2.2 S2.3 S2.4 S2.5 S2.6 S2.7 S2.8 S2.9 S2.10 S2.11 S2.12 S2.13 
S2.14 S2.15 




Scale: Section 2: Strategy Analysis 
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Case Processing Summary 
 
N % 
Cases Valid 600 100.0 
Excludeda 0 .0 
Total 600 100.0 
 









 /VARIABLES=S3.1 S3.2 S3.3 S3.4 S3.5 S3.6 S3.7 S3.8 S3.9 S3.10 S3.11 S3.12 S3.13 
S3.14 S3.15 S3.16 S3.17 S3.18 S3.19 S3.20 






Scale: Section 3: Performance Analysis 
Case Processing Summary 
 
N % 
Cases Valid 600 100.0 
Excludeda 0 .0 
Total 600 100.0 
 





Alpha N of Items 
.941 20 
 
COMPUTE Section2StrategyAnalysis=(S2.1 + S2.2 + S2.3 + S2.4 + S2.5 + S2.6 + S2.7 
+ S2.8 + S2.9 + S2.10 + S2.11 + S2.12 + S2.13 + S2.14 + S2.15) / 15. 
EXECUTE. 
COMPUTE Section3PerformanceAnalysis=(S3.1 + S3.2 + S3.3 + S3.4 + S3.5 + S3.6 + 
S3.7 + S3.8 + S3.9 + S3.10 + S3.11 + S3.12 + S3.13 + S3.14 + S3.15 + S3.16 + S3.17 + 








N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
Section2StrategyAnalysis 600 1.13 4.27 2.7470 .64849 
Section3PerformanceAnal
ysis 
600 1.00 4.75 2.7793 .69326 
Valid N (listwise) 600 




T-TEST GROUPS=QatarKSA(1 2) 
 /MISSING=ANALYSIS 
 /VARIABLES=S2.1 S2.2 S2.3 S2.4 S2.5 S2.6 S2.7 S2.8 S2.9 S2.10 S2.11 S2.12 S2.13 S2.14 S2.15 S3.1 S3.2 S3.3 S3.4 
S3.5 S3.6 S3.7 S3.8 S3.9 S3.10 S3.11 S3.12 S3.13 S3.14 S3.15 S3.16 S3.17 S3.18 S3.19 S3.20 S4.1 S4.2 S4.3 S4.4 S4.5 
S4.6 S4.7 S4.8 S4.9 S4.10 S5a.1 S5a.2 S5a.3 S5a.4 S5a.5 S5a.6 S5a.7 S5a.8 S5a.9 S5a.10 S5b.1 S5b.2 S5b.3 S5b.4 S5b.5 













Section 2.  
1. The banking industry is stable and diversified. 
KSA 300 3.49 1.111 .064 
Qatar 300 3.35 1.005 .058 
2. Current interest rates are competitive and in demand. KSA 300 2.49 1.120 .065 
Qatar 300 2.64 1.310 .076 
3. Central bank interventions have improved our lending strategies. KSA 300 1.97 .742 .043 
Qatar 300 1.98 .601 .035 
4. We invest a high percentage of our funds in private sector enterprises. KSA 300 2.43 .974 .056 
Qatar 300 2.38 1.086 .063 
5. Most deposits are tied to oil and gas rents. KSA 300 2.98 1.251 .072 
Qatar 300 2.72 1.194 .069 
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6. Our vision is global. and this requires diversification. KSA 300 3.28 1.299 .075 
Qatar 300 2.28 1.061 .061 
7. Our default rates are anticipated and appropriate. KSA 300 3.13 1.296 .075 
Qatar 300 3.17 1.211 .070 
8. The financial instruments we use are market sensitive and vulnerable to risks. KSA 300 2.64 1.181 .068 
Qatar 300 2.72 1.152 .066 
9. We anticipate that the oil and gas market will recover in price and volume. KSA 300 3.15 1.188 .069 
Qatar 300 3.19 1.257 .073 
10. Most citizens do not plan financially for long-term market shocks. KSA 300 2.71 1.188 .069 
Qatar 300 2.72 1.307 .075 
11. Government subsidies allow us to loan more freely to the private sector. KSA 300 2.20 .763 .044 
Qatar 300 2.23 .692 .040 
12. Investments in research and development create liabilities and additional risks. KSA 300 3.77 .980 .057 
Qatar 300 3.73 .938 .054 
13. There is an inadequate population of skilled entrepreneurs in our national population. KSA 300 2.51 1.055 .061 
Qatar 300 3.45 1.064 .061 
14. Banks are essential to the domestic economy and therefore must be protected during periods of 
financial duress and decline. 
KSA 300 2.23 .774 .045 
Qatar 300 2.21 .830 .048 
15. The financial market is mature and competitive. KSA 300 2.54 .843 .049 
Qatar 300 2.12 .780 .045 
Section 3.  
1. Global pressures on the oil and gas market have destabilised performance domestically. 
KSA 300 2.33 .992 .057 
Qatar 300 2.71 1.100 .064 
2. The variability of commodity pricing creates highly impactful risks for our nation. KSA 300 2.41 .863 .050 
Qatar 300 2.72 1.042 .060 
3. Even if we diversified our industries. we would need decades to allow them to mature. KSA 300 2.51 .997 .058 
Qatar 300 3.46 1.092 .063 
KSA 300 2.44 .995 .057 
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4. Strategic partnerships and FDI allow rapid exchange of knowledge and technology and should be 
supported. 
Qatar 
300 2.41 1.042 .060 
5. Our bank is vulnerable to systemic risks. KSA 300 2.70 .987 .057 
Qatar 300 2.53 .923 .053 
6. Without government support. our bank would likely be exposed to performance shocks. KSA 300 2.39 .991 .057 
Qatar 300 2.44 .943 .054 
7. Liquidity levels are at an all-time low. KSA 300 2.55 1.082 .062 
Qatar 300 2.50 1.093 .063 
8. When oil prices decline. we are less likely to lend money to private enterprises. KSA 300 2.40 .896 .052 
Qatar 300 2.75 1.015 .059 
9. Citizens are more likely to withhold savings and investments when oil prices fluctuate or decline. KSA 300 2.48 .966 .056 
Qatar 300 2.58 1.043 .060 
10. Investing in diversification offers a layer of stability that we desperately need at this time. KSA 300 2.41 1.032 .060 
Qatar 300 2.43 .921 .053 
11. Intra-bank loans create a dangerous cycle of risk and vulnerability. KSA 300 2.54 1.045 .060 
Qatar 300 2.53 1.074 .062 
12. The increase in lending rates is a positive step towards industry maturity. KSA 300 2.57 1.043 .060 
Qatar 300 2.58 1.013 .059 
13. Most of our internal investment strategies are based on oil and gas exploitation. KSA 300 2.54 .923 .053 
Qatar 300 2.87 1.085 .063 
14. Countries have national industries and products: Ours should remain oil and gas. KSA 300 3.42 1.003 .058 
Qatar 300 3.37 .978 .056 
15. The gap between the citizen and expatriate population in our nation is worrying. KSA 300 4.09 .982 .057 
Qatar 300 4.17 .885 .051 
16. New companies are a liability; we would prefer to invest in tested models. KSA 300 3.41 1.013 .058 
Qatar 300 3.39 1.001 .058 
17. Most small businesses are likely to fail if given enough time. KSA 300 2.88 .829 .048 
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Qatar 300 2.74 .936 .054 
18. Our banks should invest more heavily in business development and growth to increase industry 
performance. 
KSA 300 2.64 1.036 .060 
Qatar 300 2.60 1.069 .062 
19. Without sufficient oil and gas liquidity. we cannot fund additional development. KSA 300 2.59 1.022 .059 
Qatar 300 3.36 1.046 .060 
20. The domestic financial markets are unstable and high-risk. KSA 300 2.78 .956 .055 
Qatar 300 2.95 .911 .053 
Section 4.  
1. Our government has a long-term vision that does not rely on oil and gas for development. 
KSA 300 3.34 1.053 .061 
Qatar 300 2.56 1.025 .059 
2. The primary industry upon which lending and development should focus is: KSA 300 2.19 1.632 .094 
Qatar 300 3.96 1.472 .085 
3. The primary result of a government bailout in our nation is: KSA 300 3.80 1.634 .094 
Qatar 300 2.04 1.499 .087 
4. Government investment in oil and gas is a necessary and sustainable commitment. KSA 300 1.85 .933 .054 
Qatar 300 3.67 .930 .054 
5. The government’s role in stabilising the domestic economy is: KSA 300 1.50 .820 .047 
Qatar 300 1.52 .769 .044 
6. Our dependence on a single export makes our country look: KSA 300 2.88 .382 .022 
Qatar 300 2.88 .432 .025 
7. The primary factor restricting the number of national citizens in private sector employment is: KSA 300 4.40 1.758 .101 
Qatar 300 3.36 1.318 .076 
8. The primary sector which national citizens would like to work in is: KSA 300 3.06 2.157 .125 
Qatar 300 3.70 1.618 .093 
9. Government analysts would rank the current threat level in oil and gas as follows: KSA 300 1.41 .666 .038 
Qatar 300 1.97 .756 .044 
10. The government investment in oil and gas is based on the following objective: KSA 300 2.69 1.311 .076 
Qatar 300 3.68 1.518 .088 
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Forming and implementing the firm’s ongoing banking strategy:  
Price performance of the oil and gas industry 
KSA 300 1.65 .806 .047 
Qatar 300 2.04 .663 .038 
Government subsidies and investments KSA 300 1.97 .701 .040 
Qatar 300 1.75 .793 .046 
Education system improvements and specialisation KSA 300 2.32 .812 .047 
Qatar 300 1.70 .782 .045 
Diversification of industries KSA 300 2.26 .784 .045 
Qatar 300 2.21 .830 .048 
Strategic vision or agenda for national change KSA 300 2.13 .731 .042 
Qatar 300 2.24 .790 .046 
Industry rules and regulations KSA 300 1.68 .761 .044 
Qatar 300 2.03 .686 .040 
Citizen expectations and national demands KSA 300 2.14 .802 .046 
Qatar 300 1.84 .881 .051 
Intra-bank partnerships and support KSA 300 2.18 .781 .045 
Qatar 300 2.21 .740 .043 
Foreign interests and investments KSA 300 2.20 .814 .047 
Qatar 300 1.92 .936 .054 
Defaults and risks in bank performance KSA 300 1.58 .711 .041 
Qatar 300 1.67 .789 .046 
Impact on organisational performance:  
Oil and gas industry prices 
KSA 300 1.93 .921 .053 
Qatar 300 2.15 .806 .047 
Demand for loans and innovative financing products KSA 300 2.55 .878 .051 
Qatar 300 1.95 .900 .052 
Start-up investment and capital requirements KSA 300 2.23 .787 .045 
Qatar 300 1.94 .916 .053 
Liquidity guidelines and standards KSA 300 1.66 .829 .048 
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Qatar 300 1.75 .866 .050 
Auditing and governance oversight KSA 300 1.70 .808 .047 
Qatar 300 1.72 .839 .048 
Managerial strategising and positioning KSA 300 2.21 .853 .049 
Qatar 300 2.25 .843 .049 
Infrastructure and system KSA 300 2.31 .810 .047 
Qatar 300 1.83 .862 .050 
Domestic competitive forces KSA 300 2.07 .753 .043 
Qatar 300 2.07 .779 .045 
International competitive forces KSA 300 2.04 .749 .043 
Qatar 300 2.11 .775 .045 
Foreign investment and development KSA 300 2.12 .817 .047 





Independent Samples Test 
 
Levene's Test 
for Equality of 
Variances t-test for Equality of Means 








Interval of the 
Difference 
Lower Upper 
Section 2. 1. The banking industry is 
stable and diversified. 
EVA* 2.009 .157 1.618 598 .106 .140 .087 -.030 .310 
EVNA   1.618 592.149 .106 .140 .087 -.030 .310 
2. Current interest rates are competitive 
and in demand. 
EVA 15.891 .000 -1.508 598 .132 -.150 .100 -.345 .045 
EVNA   -1.508 583.871 .132 -.150 .100 -.345 .045 
3. Central bank interventions have 
improved our lending strategies. 
EVA 6.704 .010 -.181 598 .856 -.010 .055 -.118 .098 
EVNA   -.181 573.078 .856 -.010 .055 -.118 .098 
4. We invest a high percentage of our 
funds in private sector enterprises. 
EVA 1.626 .203 .594 598 .553 .050 .084 -.115 .215 
EVNA   .594 591.018 .553 .050 .084 -.115 .215 
5. Most deposits are tied to oil and gas 
rents. 
EVA 7.373 .007 2.604 598 .009 .260 .100 .064 .456 
EVNA   2.604 596.721 .009 .260 .100 .064 .456 
6. Our vision is global. and this requires 
diversification. 
EVA 44.123 .000 10.328 598 .000 1.000 .097 .810 1.190 
EVNA   10.328 575.050 .000 1.000 .097 .810 1.190 
7. Our default rates are anticipated and 
appropriate. 
EVA 2.651 .104 -.391 598 .696 -.040 .102 -.241 .161 
EVNA   -.391 595.276 .696 -.040 .102 -.241 .161 
8. The financial instruments we use are 
market sensitive and vulnerable to risks. 
EVA .076 .783 -.840 598 .401 -.080 .095 -.267 .107 
EVNA   -.840 597.615 .401 -.080 .095 -.267 .107 
EVA 1.925 .166 -.401 598 .689 -.040 .100 -.236 .156 
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9. We anticipate that the oil and gas 
market will recover in price and volume. 
EVNA   
-.401 596.143 .689 -.040 .100 -.236 .156 
10. Most citizens do not plan financially 
for long-term market shocks. 
EVA 8.370 .004 -.098 598 .922 -.010 .102 -.210 .190 
EVNA   -.098 592.634 .922 -.010 .102 -.210 .190 
11. Government subsidies allow us to 
loan more freely to the private sector. 
EVA .899 .344 -.505 598 .614 -.030 .059 -.147 .087 
EVNA   -.505 592.387 .614 -.030 .059 -.147 .087 
12. Investments in research and 
development create liabilities and 
additional risks. 
EVA .437 .509 .511 598 .610 .040 .078 -.114 .194 
EVNA   
.511 596.865 .610 .040 .078 -.114 .194 
13. There is an inadequate population of 
skilled entrepreneurs in our national 
population. 
EVA .008 .930 -10.867 598 .000 -.940 .087 -1.110 -.770 
EVNA   
-10.867 597.963 .000 -.940 .087 -1.110 -.770 
14. Banks are essential to the domestic 
economy and therefore must be protected 
during periods of financial duress and 
decline. 
EVA 1.709 .192 .305 598 .760 .020 .066 -.109 .149 
EVNA 
  
.305 595.149 .760 .020 .066 -.109 .149 
15. The financial market is mature and 
competitive. 
EVA 11.573 .001 6.336 598 .000 .420 .066 .290 .550 
EVNA   6.336 594.362 .000 .420 .066 .290 .550 
Section 3. 1. Global pressures on the oil 
and gas market have destabilised 
performance domestically. 
EVA 8.367 .004 -4.443 598 .000 -.380 .086 -.548 -.212 
EVNA   
-4.443 591.748 .000 -.380 .086 -.548 -.212 
2. The variability of commodity pricing 
creates highly impactful risks for our 
nation. 
EVA 14.084 .000 -3.970 598 .000 -.310 .078 -.463 -.157 
EVNA   
-3.970 577.943 .000 -.310 .078 -.463 -.157 
3. Even if we diversified our industries. we 
would need decades to allow them to 
mature. 
EVA 3.366 .067 -11.130 598 .000 -.950 .085 -1.118 -.782 
EVNA   
-11.130 593.075 .000 -.950 .085 -1.118 -.782 
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4. Strategic partnerships and FDI allow 
rapid exchange of knowledge and 
technology and should be supported. 
EVA .111 .739 .361 598 .718 .030 .083 -.133 .193 
EVNA   
.361 596.728 .718 .030 .083 -.133 .193 
5. Our bank is vulnerable to systemic 
risks. 
EVA .216 .642 2.179 598 .030 .170 .078 .017 .323 
EVNA   2.179 595.370 .030 .170 .078 .017 .323 
6. Without government support. our bank 
would likely be exposed to performance 
shocks. 
EVA .048 .826 -.633 598 .527 -.050 .079 -.205 .105 
EVNA   
-.633 596.563 .527 -.050 .079 -.205 .105 
7. Liquidity levels are at an all-time low. EVA .000 .984 .563 598 .574 .050 .089 -.124 .224 
EVNA   .563 597.946 .574 .050 .089 -.124 .224 
8. When oil prices decline. we are less 
likely to lend money to private enterprises. 
EVA 8.173 .004 -4.477 598 .000 -.350 .078 -.504 -.196 
EVNA   -4.477 588.874 .000 -.350 .078 -.504 -.196 
9. Citizens are more likely to withhold 
savings and investments when oil prices 
fluctuate or decline. 
EVA 3.190 .075 -1.219 598 .223 -.100 .082 -.261 .061 
EVNA   
-1.219 594.521 .223 -.100 .082 -.261 .061 
10. Investing in diversification offers a 
layer of stability that we desperately need 
at this time. 
EVA 2.494 .115 -.250 598 .802 -.020 .080 -.177 .137 
EVNA   
-.250 590.370 .802 -.020 .080 -.177 .137 
11. Intra-bank loans create a dangerous 
cycle of risk and vulnerability. 
EVA .144 .705 .116 598 .908 .010 .087 -.160 .180 
EVNA   .116 597.560 .908 .010 .087 -.160 .180 
12. The increase in lending rates is a 
positive step towards industry maturity. 
EVA .485 .486 -.119 598 .905 -.010 .084 -.175 .155 
EVNA   -.119 597.492 .905 -.010 .084 -.175 .155 
13. Most of our internal investment 
strategies are based on oil and gas 
exploitation. 
EVA 8.367 .004 -4.013 598 .000 -.330 .082 -.491 -.169 
EVNA   
-4.013 582.960 .000 -.330 .082 -.491 -.169 
EVA .403 .526 .618 598 .537 .050 .081 -.109 .209 
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14. Countries have national industries and 
products: Ours should remain oil and gas. 
EVNA   
.618 597.602 .537 .050 .081 -.109 .209 
15. The gap between the citizen and 
expatriate population in our nation is 
worrying. 
EVA .390 .532 -1.048 598 .295 -.080 .076 -.230 .070 
EVNA   
-1.048 591.634 .295 -.080 .076 -.230 .070 
16. New companies are a liability; we 
would prefer to invest in tested models. 
EVA .150 .698 .243 598 .808 .020 .082 -.141 .181 
EVNA   .243 597.916 .808 .020 .082 -.141 .181 
17. Most small businesses are likely to fail 
if given enough time. 
EVA 8.982 .003 1.939 598 .053 .140 .072 -.002 .282 
EVNA   1.939 589.525 .053 .140 .072 -.002 .282 
18. Our banks should invest more heavily 
in business development and growth to 
increase industry performance. 
EVA .043 .835 .465 598 .642 .040 .086 -.129 .209 
 EVNA   
.465 597.408 .642 .040 .086 -.129 .209 
19. Without sufficient oil and gas liquidity. 
we cannot fund additional development. 
EVA .096 .757 -9.118 598 .000 -.770 .084 -.936 -.604 
EVNA   -9.118 597.691 .000 -.770 .084 -.936 -.604 
20. The domestic financial markets are 
unstable and high risk. 
EVA 3.856 .050 -2.229 598 .026 -.170 .076 -.320 -.020 
EVNA   -2.229 596.605 .026 -.170 .076 -.320 -.020 
Section 4. 1. Our government has a long-
term vision that does not rely on oil and 
gas for development. 
EVA .210 .647 9.197 598 .000 .780 .085 .613 .947 
EVNA   
9.197 597.565 .000 .780 .085 .613 .947 
2. The primary industry upon which 
lending and development should focus is: 
EVA 19.400 .000 -13.952 598 .000 -1.770 .127 -2.019 -1.521 
EVNA   -13.952 591.727 .000 -1.770 .127 -2.019 -1.521 
3. The primary result of a government 
bailout in our nation is: 
EVA 12.595 .000 13.751 598 .000 1.760 .128 1.509 2.011 
EVNA   13.751 593.603 .000 1.760 .128 1.509 2.011 
4. Government investment in oil and gas 
is a necessary and sustainable 
commitment. 
EVA .046 .830 -23.936 598 .000 -1.820 .076 -1.969 -1.671 
EVNA   
-23.936 597.992 .000 -1.820 .076 -1.969 -1.671 
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5. The government’s role in stabilising the 
domestic economy is: 
EVA .172 .679 -.308 598 .758 -.020 .065 -.147 .107 
EVNA   -.308 595.573 .758 -.020 .065 -.147 .107 
6. Our dependence on a single export 
makes our country look: 
EVA .557 .456 .000 598 1.000 .000 .033 -.065 .065 
EVNA   .000 589.403 1.000 .000 .033 -.065 .065 
7. The primary factor restricting the 
number of national citizens in private 
sector employment is: 
EVA 111.372 .000 8.199 598 .000 1.040 .127 .791 1.289 
EVNA   
8.199 554.364 .000 1.040 .127 .791 1.289 
8. The primary sector which national 
citizens would like to work in is: 
EVA 66.996 .000 -4.111 598 .000 -.640 .156 -.946 -.334 
EVNA   -4.111 554.628 .000 -.640 .156 -.946 -.334 
9. Government analysts would rank the 
current threat level in oil and gas as 
follows: 
EVA 1.899 .169 -9.630 598 .000 -.560 .058 -.674 -.446 
EVNA   
-9.630 588.681 .000 -.560 .058 -.674 -.446 
10. The government investment in oil and 
gas is based on the following objective: 
EVA 25.346 .000 -8.547 598 .000 -.990 .116 -1.217 -.763 
EVNA   -8.547 585.602 .000 -.990 .116 -1.217 -.763 
Forming and implementing the firm’s 
ongoing banking strategy: Price 
performance of the oil and gas industry 
EVA 62.132 .000 -6.472 598 .000 -.390 .060 -.508 -.272 
EVNA   
-6.472 576.620 .000 -.390 .060 -.508 -.272 
Government subsidies and investments EVA 31.005 .000 3.600 598 .000 .220 .061 .100 .340 
EVNA   3.600 588.952 .000 .220 .061 .100 .340 
Education system improvements and 
specialisation 
EVA .743 .389 9.522 598 .000 .620 .065 .492 .748 
EVNA   9.522 597.158 .000 .620 .065 .492 .748 
Diversification of industries EVA .239 .625 .759 598 .448 .050 .066 -.079 .179 
EVNA   .759 596.090 .448 .050 .066 -.079 .179 
Strategic vision or agenda for national 
change 
EVA 10.661 .001 -1.769 598 .077 -.110 .062 -.232 .012 
EVNA   -1.769 594.450 .077 -.110 .062 -.232 .012 
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Industry rules and regulations EVA 32.570 .000 -5.916 598 .000 -.350 .059 -.466 -.234 
EVNA   -5.916 591.643 .000 -.350 .059 -.466 -.234 
Citizen expectations and national 
demands 
EVA 9.282 .002 4.361 598 .000 .300 .069 .165 .435 
EVNA   4.361 592.683 .000 .300 .069 .165 .435 
Intra-bank partnerships and support EVA .353 .553 -.483 598 .629 -.030 .062 -.152 .092 
EVNA   -.483 596.294 .629 -.030 .062 -.152 .092 
Foreign interests and investments EVA 7.597 .006 3.910 598 .000 .280 .072 .139 .421 
EVNA   3.910 586.620 .000 .280 .072 .139 .421 
Defaults and risks in bank performance EVA 3.662 .056 -1.467 598 .143 -.090 .061 -.210 .030 
EVNA   -1.467 591.544 .143 -.090 .061 -.210 .030 
Impact their organisational performance: 
Oil and gas industry prices 
EVA 8.840 .003 -3.114 598 .002 -.220 .071 -.359 -.081 
EVNA   -3.114 587.700 .002 -.220 .071 -.359 -.081 
Demand for loans and innovative 
financing products 
EVA .094 .759 8.267 598 .000 .600 .073 .457 .743 
EVNA   8.267 597.615 .000 .600 .073 .457 .743 
Start-up investment and capital 
requirements 
EVA 6.705 .010 4.159 598 .000 .290 .070 .153 .427 
EVNA   4.159 584.690 .000 .290 .070 .153 .427 
Liquidity guidelines and standards EVA 1.145 .285 -1.301 598 .194 -.090 .069 -.226 .046 
EVNA   -1.301 596.841 .194 -.090 .069 -.226 .046 
Auditing and governance oversight EVA .411 .522 -.297 598 .766 -.020 .067 -.152 .112 
EVNA   -.297 597.130 .766 -.020 .067 -.152 .112 
Managerial strategising and positioning EVA .137 .711 -.578 598 .564 -.040 .069 -.176 .096 
EVNA   -.578 597.901 .564 -.040 .069 -.176 .096 
Infrastructure and system EVA 2.488 .115 7.027 598 .000 .480 .068 .346 .614 
EVNA   7.027 595.672 .000 .480 .068 .346 .614 
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Domestic competitive forces EVA .250 .617 .000 598 1.000 .000 .063 -.123 .123 
EVNA   .000 597.302 1.000 .000 .063 -.123 .123 
International competitive forces EVA 1.707 .192 -1.126 598 .261 -.070 .062 -.192 .052 
EVNA   -1.126 597.303 .261 -.070 .062 -.192 .052 
Foreign investment and development EVA 7.645 .006 3.398 598 .001 .240 .071 .101 .379 
EVNA   3.398 591.194 .001 .240 .071 .101 .379 




T-TEST GROUPS=gender(1 2) 
 /MISSING=ANALYSIS 
 /VARIABLES=S2.1 S2.2 S2.3 S2.4 S2.5 S2.6 S2.7 S2.8 S2.9 S2.10 S2.11 S2.12 S2.13 S2.14 S2.15 S3.1 S3.2 S3.3 S3.4 
S3.5 S3.6 S3.7 S3.8 S3.9 S3.10 S3.11 S3.12 S3.13 S3.14 S3.15 S3.16 S3.17 S3.18 S3.19 S3.20 S4.1 S4.2 S4.3 S4.4 S4.5 
S4.6 S4.7 S4.8 S4.9 S4.10 S5a.1 S5a.2 S5a.3 S5a.4 S5a.5 S5a.6 S5a.7 S5a.8 S5a.9 S5a.10 S5b.1 S5b.2 S5b.3 S5b.4 S5b.5 











Section 2. 1. The banking industry is stable and diversified. male 108 3.36 1.115 .107 
female 492 3.43 1.049 .047 
2. Current interest rates are competitive and in demand. male 108 2.97 1.195 .115 
female 492 2.48 1.208 .054 
3. Central bank interventions have improved our lending strategies. male 108 2.14 .676 .065 
female 492 1.94 .670 .030 
4. We invest a high percentage of our funds in private sector enterprises. male 108 2.64 1.036 .100 
female 492 2.35 1.024 .046 
5. Most deposits are tied to oil and gas rents. male 108 3.17 1.242 .119 
female 492 2.78 1.216 .055 
6. Our vision is global. and this requires diversification. male 108 3.03 1.241 .119 
female 492 2.73 1.291 .058 
7. Our default rates are anticipated and appropriate. male 108 3.17 1.219 .117 
  
273 
female 492 3.15 1.262 .057 
8. The financial instruments we use are market sensitive and vulnerable to risks. male 108 3.03 1.018 .098 
female 492 2.60 1.183 .053 
9. We anticipate that the oil and gas market will recover in price and volume. male 108 3.14 1.256 .121 
female 492 3.18 1.216 .055 
10. Most citizens do not plan financially for long-term market shocks. male 108 3.11 1.202 .116 
female 492 2.63 1.242 .056 
11. Government subsidies allow us to loan more freely to the private sector. male 108 2.36 .587 .057 
female 492 2.18 .752 .034 
12. Investments in research and development create liabilities and additional risks. male 108 3.86 1.063 .102 
female 492 3.73 .934 .042 
13. There is an inadequate population of skilled entrepreneurs in our national population. male 108 3.19 1.156 .111 
female 492 2.93 1.155 .052 
14. Banks are essential to the domestic economy and therefore must be protected during periods 
of financial duress and decline. 
male 108 2.47 .767 .074 
female 492 2.16 .799 .036 
15. The financial market is mature and competitive. male 108 2.44 .765 .074 
female 492 2.30 .852 .038 
Section 3. 1. Global pressures on the oil and gas market have destabilised performance 
domestically. 
male 108 2.47 .901 .087 
female 492 2.53 1.097 .049 
2. The variability of commodity pricing creates highly impactful risks for our nation. male 108 2.56 .801 .077 
female 492 2.57 1.002 .045 
3. Even if we diversified our industries. we would need decades to allow them to mature. male 108 2.86 .981 .094 
female 492 3.01 1.180 .053 
4. Strategic partnerships and FDI allow rapid exchange of knowledge and technology and should 
be supported. 
male 108 2.36 .859 .083 
female 492 2.44 1.050 .047 
5. Our bank is vulnerable to systemic risks. male 108 2.58 .799 .077 
female 492 2.62 .990 .045 
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6. Without government support. our bank would likely be exposed to performance shocks. male 108 2.42 .958 .092 
female 492 2.41 .969 .044 
7. Liquidity levels are at an all-time low. male 108 2.50 .962 .093 
female 492 2.53 1.113 .050 
8. When oil prices decline. we are less likely to lend money to private enterprises. male 108 2.50 .767 .074 
female 492 2.59 1.012 .046 
9. Citizens are more likely to withhold savings and investments when oil prices fluctuate or decline. male 108 2.44 .835 .080 
female 492 2.55 1.039 .047 
10. Investing in diversification offers a layer of stability that we desperately need at this time. male 108 2.42 .898 .086 
female 492 2.42 .995 .045 
11. Intra-bank loans create a dangerous cycle of risk and vulnerability. male 108 2.64 .981 .094 
female 492 2.51 1.075 .048 
12. The increase in lending rates is a positive step towards industry maturity. male 108 2.42 .866 .083 
female 492 2.61 1.057 .048 
13. Most of our internal investment strategies are based on oil and gas exploitation. male 108 2.47 .901 .087 
female 492 2.76 1.038 .047 
14. Countries have national industries and products: Ours should remain oil and gas. male 108 3.42 1.042 .100 
female 492 3.39 .979 .044 
15. The gap between the citizen and expatriate population in our nation is worrying. male 108 4.31 .848 .082 
female 492 4.09 .950 .043 
16. New companies are a liability; we would prefer to invest in tested models. male 108 3.42 .987 .095 
female 492 3.40 1.011 .046 
17. Most small businesses are likely to fail if given enough time. male 108 2.58 .866 .083 
female 492 2.86 .884 .040 
18. Our banks should invest more heavily in business development and growth to increase 
industry performance. 
male 108 2.67 1.032 .099 
female 492 2.61 1.057 .048 
19. Without sufficient oil and gas liquidity. we cannot fund additional development. male 108 2.78 1.035 .100 
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female 492 3.02 1.114 .050 
20. The domestic financial markets are unstable and high risk. male 108 2.86 .826 .079 
female 492 2.87 .961 .043 
Section 4. 1. Our government has a long-term vision that does not rely on oil and gas for 
development. 
male 108 2.89 1.026 .099 
female 492 2.96 1.127 .051 
2. The primary industry upon which lending and development should focus is: male 108 3.28 1.701 .164 
female 492 3.03 1.804 .081 
3. The primary result of a government bailout in our nation is: male 108 2.67 1.756 .169 
female 492 2.98 1.803 .081 
4. Government investment in oil and gas is a necessary and sustainable commitment. male 108 2.86 1.211 .117 
female 492 2.74 1.321 .060 
5. The government’s role in stabilising the domestic economy is: male 108 1.56 .801 .077 
female 492 1.50 .793 .036 
6. Our dependence on a single export makes our country look: male 108 2.89 .316 .030 
female 492 2.88 .425 .019 
7. The primary factor restricting the number of national citizens in private sector employment is: male 108 3.72 1.546 .149 
female 492 3.91 1.656 .075 
8. The primary sector which national citizens would like to work in is: male 108 2.94 1.864 .179 
female 492 3.48 1.935 .087 
9. Government analysts would rank the current threat level in oil and gas as follows: male 108 1.64 .538 .052 
female 492 1.70 .806 .036 
10. The government investment in oil and gas is based on the following objective: male 108 3.11 1.475 .142 
female 492 3.20 1.508 .068 
Forming and implementing the firm’s ongoing banking strategy:  
Price performance of the oil and gas industry 
male 108 1.81 .662 .064 
female 492 1.85 .784 .035 
Government subsidies and investments male 108 1.81 .848 .082 
female 492 1.87 .735 .033 
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Education system improvements and specialisation male 108 2.08 .929 .089 
female 492 1.99 .838 .038 
Diversification of industries male 108 2.33 .820 .079 
female 492 2.21 .803 .036 
Strategic vision or agenda for national change male 108 2.31 .742 .071 
female 492 2.16 .765 .035 
Industry rules and regulations male 108 1.86 .859 .083 
female 492 1.85 .718 .032 
Citizen expectations and national demands male 108 1.92 .833 .080 
female 492 2.01 .860 .039 
Intra-bank partnerships and support male 108 2.39 .721 .069 
female 492 2.15 .763 .034 
Foreign interests and investments male 108 2.25 .799 .077 
female 492 2.02 .901 .041 
Defaults and risks in bank performance male 108 1.64 .755 .073 
female 492 1.62 .752 .034 
Impact their organisational performance: Oil and gas industry prices male 108 1.97 .767 .074 
female 492 2.05 .893 .040 
Demand for loans and innovative financing products male 108 2.22 .921 .089 
female 492 2.26 .942 .042 
Start-up investment and capital requirements male 108 2.19 .814 .078 
female 492 2.06 .875 .039 
Liquidity guidelines and standards male 108 1.69 .880 .085 
female 492 1.71 .842 .038 
Auditing and governance oversight male 108 1.67 .854 .082 
female 492 1.72 .816 .037 
Managerial strategising and positioning male 108 2.31 .848 .082 
  
277 
female 492 2.21 .847 .038 
Infrastructure and system male 108 2.03 .932 .090 
female 492 2.08 .856 .039 
Domestic competitive forces male 108 2.17 .690 .066 
female 492 2.05 .780 .035 
International competitive forces male 108 1.97 .603 .058 
female 492 2.10 .791 .036 
Foreign investment and development male 108 1.97 .870 .084 





Independent Samples Test 
 
Levene's Test 
for Equality of 
Variances t-test for Equality of Means 








Interval of the 
Difference 
Lower Upper 
Section 2. 1. The banking industry is 
stable and diversified. 
EVA* 2.375 .124 -.637 598 .525 -.072 .113 -.293 .150 
EVNA   -.613 151.454 .541 -.072 .117 -.303 .160 
2. Current interest rates are competitive 
and in demand. 
EVA .041 .840 3.875 598 .000 .497 .128 .245 .748 
EVNA   3.902 158.621 .000 .497 .127 .245 .748 
3. Central bank interventions have 
improved our lending strategies. 
EVA 1.329 .250 2.804 598 .005 .200 .071 .060 .340 
EVNA   2.787 156.456 .006 .200 .072 .058 .342 
4. We invest a high percentage of our 
funds in private sector enterprises. 
EVA 3.539 .060 2.616 598 .009 .285 .109 .071 .499 
EVNA   2.596 156.176 .010 .285 .110 .068 .502 
5. Most deposits are tied to oil and gas 
rents. 
EVA .259 .611 2.977 598 .003 .386 .130 .131 .641 
EVNA   2.937 155.305 .004 .386 .131 .126 .646 
6. Our vision is global. and this requires 
diversification. 
EVA 2.472 .116 2.218 598 .027 .302 .136 .035 .570 
EVNA   2.274 161.812 .024 .302 .133 .040 .565 
7. Our default rates are anticipated and 
appropriate. 
EVA .113 .737 .153 598 .879 .020 .133 -.241 .282 
EVNA   .156 161.285 .876 .020 .130 -.237 .278 
8. The financial instruments we use are 
market sensitive and vulnerable to risks. 
EVA 5.811 .016 3.454 598 .001 .424 .123 .183 .665 
EVNA   3.802 176.502 .000 .424 .112 .204 .644 
EVA .125 .724 -.292 598 .770 -.038 .130 -.293 .217 
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9. We anticipate that the oil and gas 
market will recover in price and volume. 
EVNA   
-.286 154.076 .775 -.038 .133 -.300 .224 
10. Most citizens do not plan financially for 
long-term market shocks. 
EVA .089 .766 3.682 598 .000 .483 .131 .225 .741 
EVNA   3.759 161.041 .000 .483 .129 .229 .737 
11. Government subsidies allow us to loan 
more freely to the private sector. 
EVA .000 .996 2.312 598 .021 .178 .077 .027 .330 
EVNA   2.704 192.378 .007 .178 .066 .048 .308 
12. Investments in research and 
development create liabilities and 
additional risks. 
EVA 2.098 .148 1.331 598 .184 .136 .102 -.064 .335 
EVNA   
1.225 145.391 .223 .136 .111 -.083 .354 
13. There is an inadequate population of 
skilled entrepreneurs in our national 
population. 
EVA .035 .851 2.131 598 .034 .262 .123 .020 .503 
EVNA   
2.130 157.394 .035 .262 .123 .019 .504 
14. Banks are essential to the domestic 
economy and therefore must be protected 
during periods of financial duress and 
decline. 
EVA 3.264 .071 3.648 598 .000 .308 .084 .142 .473 
EVNA 
  
3.746 162.112 .000 .308 .082 .145 .470 
15. The financial market is mature and 
competitive. 
EVA .633 .426 1.569 598 .117 .140 .089 -.035 .314 
EVNA   1.680 170.367 .095 .140 .083 -.024 .304 
Section 3. 1. Global pressures on the oil 
and gas market have destabilised 
performance domestically. 
EVA 6.556 .011 -.515 598 .607 -.058 .113 -.280 .164 
EVNA   
-.584 183.630 .560 -.058 .100 -.255 .139 
2. The variability of commodity pricing 
creates highly impactful risks for our 
nation. 
EVA 6.228 .013 -.112 598 .911 -.012 .103 -.214 .191 
EVNA   
-.129 188.242 .898 -.012 .089 -.188 .165 
3. Even if we diversified our industries. we 
would need decades to allow them to 
mature. 
EVA 7.317 .007 -1.239 598 .216 -.151 .122 -.390 .088 
EVNA   
-1.395 181.838 .165 -.151 .108 -.365 .063 
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4. Strategic partnerships and FDI allow 
rapid exchange of knowledge and 
technology and should be supported. 
EVA 7.563 .006 -.720 598 .472 -.078 .108 -.290 .135 
EVNA   
-.818 184.391 .414 -.078 .095 -.266 .110 
5. Our bank is vulnerable to systemic 
risks. 
EVA 6.457 .011 -.379 598 .705 -.039 .102 -.239 .162 
EVNA   -.434 186.805 .664 -.039 .089 -.214 .137 
6. Without government support. our bank 
would likely be exposed to performance 
shocks. 
EVA .328 .567 .020 598 .984 .002 .103 -.200 .204 
EVNA   
.020 158.731 .984 .002 .102 -.199 .204 
7. Liquidity levels are at an all-time low. EVA 4.124 .043 -.264 598 .792 -.030 .116 -.257 .197 
EVNA   -.290 175.864 .772 -.030 .105 -.238 .177 
8. When oil prices decline. we are less 
likely to lend money to private enterprises. 
EVA 10.832 .001 -.885 598 .377 -.091 .103 -.294 .112 
EVNA   -1.054 198.024 .293 -.091 .087 -.263 .080 
9. Citizens are more likely to withhold 
savings and investments when oil prices 
fluctuate or decline. 
EVA 8.381 .004 -.977 598 .329 -.104 .107 -.314 .105 
EVNA   
-1.122 187.268 .263 -.104 .093 -.288 .079 
10. Investing in diversification offers a 
layer of stability that we desperately need 
at this time. 
EVA 1.136 .287 -.039 598 .969 -.004 .104 -.208 .200 
EVNA   
-.042 169.757 .967 -.004 .097 -.196 .188 
11. Intra-bank loans create a dangerous 
cycle of risk and vulnerability. 
EVA 1.142 .286 1.127 598 .260 .127 .112 -.094 .348 
EVNA   1.194 168.275 .234 .127 .106 -.083 .336 
12. The increase in lending rates is a 
positive step towards industry maturity. 
EVA 8.229 .004 -1.771 598 .077 -.193 .109 -.407 .021 
EVNA   -2.011 184.204 .046 -.193 .096 -.383 -.004 
13. Most of our internal investment 
strategies are based on oil and gas 
exploitation. 
EVA 1.926 .166 -2.633 598 .009 -.284 .108 -.496 -.072 
EVNA   
-2.881 175.104 .004 -.284 .099 -.478 -.089 
EVA 1.322 .251 .251 598 .802 .026 .105 -.180 .233 
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14. Countries have national industries and 
products: Ours should remain oil and gas. 
EVNA   
.241 151.265 .810 .026 .110 -.190 .243 
15. The gap between the citizen and 
expatriate population in our nation is 
worrying. 
EVA .052 .820 2.161 598 .031 .214 .099 .020 .409 
EVNA   
2.324 171.232 .021 .214 .092 .032 .396 
16. New companies are a liability; we 
would prefer to invest in tested models. 
EVA .029 .865 .190 598 .849 .020 .107 -.190 .230 
EVNA   .193 160.089 .847 .020 .105 -.188 .228 
17. Most small businesses are likely to fail 
if given enough time. 
EVA 1.727 .189 -2.955 598 .003 -.276 .094 -.460 -.093 
EVNA   -2.993 159.668 .003 -.276 .092 -.459 -.094 
18. Our banks should invest more heavily 
in business development and growth to 
increase industry performance. 
EVA .494 .482 .509 598 .611 .057 .112 -.163 .277 
EVNA   
.517 160.134 .606 .057 .110 -.161 .274 
19. Without sufficient oil and gas liquidity. 
we cannot fund additional development. 
EVA .313 .576 -2.058 598 .040 -.241 .117 -.470 -.011 
EVNA   -2.156 165.925 .033 -.241 .112 -.461 -.020 
20. The domestic financial markets are 
unstable and high risk. 
EVA 2.046 .153 -.048 598 .962 -.005 .100 -.200 .191 
EVNA   -.052 176.673 .958 -.005 .090 -.183 .174 
Section 4. 1. Our government has a long-
term vision that does not rely on oil and 
gas for development. 
EVA 1.623 .203 -.632 598 .528 -.075 .118 -.306 .157 
EVNA   
-.671 168.560 .503 -.075 .111 -.294 .145 
2. The primary industry upon which 
lending and development should focus is: 
EVA 4.557 .033 1.303 598 .193 .247 .190 -.126 .620 
EVNA   1.353 164.188 .178 .247 .183 -.114 .608 
3. The primary result of a government 
bailout in our nation is: 
EVA .646 .422 -1.620 598 .106 -.309 .191 -.683 .066 
EVNA   -1.648 160.356 .101 -.309 .188 -.679 .061 
4. Government investment in oil and gas 
is a necessary and sustainable 
commitment. 
EVA 2.883 .090 .891 598 .373 .123 .138 -.148 .395 
EVNA   
.942 167.732 .347 .123 .131 -.135 .382 
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5. The government’s role in stabilising the 
domestic economy is: 
EVA .194 .660 .658 598 .511 .056 .084 -.110 .221 
EVNA   .654 156.445 .514 .056 .085 -.112 .223 
6. Our dependence on a single export 
makes our country look: 
EVA 2.336 .127 .250 598 .802 .011 .043 -.074 .096 
EVNA   .302 202.071 .763 .011 .036 -.060 .082 
7. The primary factor restricting the 
number of national citizens in private 
sector employment is: 
EVA 3.181 .075 -1.106 598 .269 -.192 .174 -.534 .149 
EVNA   
-1.156 165.414 .249 -.192 .166 -.521 .136 
8. The primary sector which national 
citizens would like to work in is: 
EVA 3.555 .060 -2.600 598 .010 -.531 .204 -.932 -.130 
EVNA   -2.663 161.664 .009 -.531 .199 -.925 -.137 
9. Government analysts would rank the 
current threat level in oil and gas as 
follows: 
EVA 19.943 .000 -.767 598 .444 -.062 .081 -.222 .097 
EVNA   
-.986 226.692 .325 -.062 .063 -.187 .062 
10. The government investment in oil and 
gas is based on the following objective: 
EVA 2.455 .118 -.564 598 .573 -.090 .160 -.404 .223 
EVNA   -.573 159.956 .568 -.090 .157 -.401 .221 
Forming and implementing the firm’s 
ongoing banking strategy: Price 
performance of the oil and gas industry 
EVA 8.950 .003 -.593 598 .553 -.048 .081 -.207 .111 
EVNA   
-.660 179.198 .510 -.048 .073 -.192 .096 
Government subsidies and investments EVA 15.744 .000 -.826 598 .409 -.066 .080 -.224 .091 
EVNA   -.754 144.312 .452 -.066 .088 -.240 .108 
Education system improvements and 
specialisation 
EVA 8.466 .004 .984 598 .325 .089 .091 -.089 .268 
EVNA   .922 147.677 .358 .089 .097 -.102 .281 
Diversification of industries EVA .954 .329 1.400 598 .162 .120 .086 -.048 .288 
EVNA   1.381 155.251 .169 .120 .087 -.052 .291 
Strategic vision or agenda for national 
change 
EVA .078 .780 1.817 598 .070 .147 .081 -.012 .306 
EVNA   1.854 160.901 .066 .147 .079 -.010 .304 
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Industry rules and regulations EVA 17.302 .000 .094 598 .925 .007 .079 -.148 .163 
EVNA   .084 141.676 .933 .007 .089 -.168 .183 
Citizen expectations and national 
demands 
EVA .103 .748 -.984 598 .325 -.089 .091 -.268 .089 
EVNA   -1.004 160.978 .317 -.089 .089 -.265 .086 
Intra-bank partnerships and support EVA .133 .716 2.946 598 .003 .236 .080 .079 .394 
EVNA   3.053 163.809 .003 .236 .077 .084 .389 
Foreign interests and investments EVA .939 .333 2.467 598 .014 .232 .094 .047 .416 
EVNA   2.665 172.251 .008 .232 .087 .060 .403 
Defaults and risks in bank performance EVA .291 .590 .212 598 .832 .017 .080 -.140 .174 
EVNA   .211 157.124 .833 .017 .080 -.141 .175 
Impact their organisational performance: 
Oil and gas industry prices 
EVA 10.201 .001 -.892 598 .373 -.083 .093 -.265 .099 
EVNA   -.983 176.771 .327 -.083 .084 -.249 .083 
Demand for loans and innovative 
financing products 
EVA .981 .322 -.340 598 .734 -.034 .100 -.230 .162 
EVNA   -.345 160.010 .731 -.034 .098 -.228 .160 
Start-up investment and capital 
requirements 
EVA .039 .843 1.453 598 .147 .133 .092 -.047 .314 
EVNA   1.522 165.864 .130 .133 .088 -.040 .307 
Liquidity guidelines and standards EVA 1.083 .298 -.143 598 .887 -.013 .090 -.190 .164 
EVNA   -.139 152.914 .890 -.013 .093 -.196 .170 
Auditing and governance oversight EVA .261 .609 -.604 598 .546 -.053 .087 -.225 .119 
EVNA   -.587 152.924 .558 -.053 .090 -.231 .125 
Managerial strategising and positioning EVA 1.007 .316 1.023 598 .307 .092 .090 -.085 .269 
EVNA   1.023 157.423 .308 .092 .090 -.086 .270 
Infrastructure and system EVA 2.521 .113 -.557 598 .578 -.051 .092 -.233 .130 
EVNA   -.527 149.210 .599 -.051 .098 -.244 .141 
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Domestic competitive forces EVA 2.769 .097 1.450 598 .147 .118 .081 -.042 .278 
EVNA   1.568 172.437 .119 .118 .075 -.030 .266 
International competitive forces EVA 25.072 .000 -1.550 598 .122 -.125 .081 -.284 .033 
EVNA   -1.840 196.983 .067 -.125 .068 -.260 .009 
Foreign investment and development EVA .352 .553 -.365 598 .715 -.034 .093 -.216 .148 
EVNA   -.366 158.006 .715 -.034 .092 -.217 .149 
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Square F Sig. 
Section 2. 1. The 
banking industry is 
stable and diversified. 
Between Groups 18.714 4 4.679 4.247 .002 
Within Groups 655.446 595 1.102 
  
Total 674.160 599 
   
2. Current interest 
rates are competitive 
and in demand. 
Between Groups 4.997 4 1.249 .838 .501 
Within Groups 886.468 595 1.490 
  
Total 891.465 599 
   
3. Central bank 
interventions have 
improved our lending 
strategies. 
Between Groups .746 4 .186 .408 .803 




   
4. We invest a high 
percentage of our 
funds in private 
sector enterprises. 
Between Groups 6.004 4 1.501 1.416 .227 




   
5. Most deposits are 
tied to oil and gas 
rents. 
Between Groups 25.889 4 6.472 4.383 .002 
Within Groups 878.611 595 1.477 
  
Total 904.500 599 
   
6. Our vision is 
global. and this 
Between Groups 40.784 4 10.196 6.385 .000 








   
7. Our default rates 
are anticipated and 
appropriate. 
Between Groups 27.046 4 6.761 4.404 .002 
Within Groups 913.454 595 1.535 
  
Total 940.500 599 
   
8. The financial 
instruments we use 
are market sensitive 
and vulnerable to 
risks. 
Between Groups 10.832 4 2.708 2.005 .092 




   
9. We anticipate that 
the oil and gas 
market will recover in 
price and volume. 
Between Groups 38.889 4 9.722 6.760 .000 




   
10. Most citizens do 
not plan financially for 
long-term market 
shocks. 
Between Groups 5.378 4 1.345 .863 .486 




   
11. Government 
subsidies allow us to 
loan more freely to 
the private sector. 
Between Groups 3.296 4 .824 1.562 .183 




   





Between Groups 7.601 4 1.900 2.083 .082 




   
13. There is an 
inadequate 
population of skilled 
entrepreneurs in our 
national population. 
Between Groups 2.684 4 .671 .498 .737 




   
14. Banks are 
essential to the 
Between Groups 3.532 4 .883 1.378 .240 





and therefore must 
be protected during 
periods of financial 
duress and decline. 
Total 
384.960 599 
   
15. The financial 
market is mature and 
competitive. 
Between Groups 6.702 4 1.676 2.408 .048 
Within Groups 413.958 595 .696 
  
Total 420.660 599 
   
Section 3. 1. Global 
pressures on the oil 




Between Groups 7.230 4 1.808 1.604 .172 




   
2. The variability of 
commodity pricing 
creates highly 
impactful risks for our 
nation. 
Between Groups 14.165 4 3.541 3.850 .004 




   
3. Even if we 
diversified our 
industries. we would 
need decades to 
allow them to mature. 
Between Groups 5.833 4 1.458 1.108 .352 




   
4. Strategic 
partnerships and FDI 
allow rapid exchange 
of knowledge and 
technology and 
should be supported. 
Between Groups 5.480 4 1.370 1.325 .259 




   
5. Our bank is 
vulnerable to 
systemic risks. 
Between Groups 11.999 4 3.000 3.317 .011 
Within Groups 538.066 595 .904 
  
Total 550.065 599 
   
6. Without 
government support. 
Between Groups 10.020 4 2.505 2.712 .029 




our bank would likely 




   
7. Liquidity levels are 
at an all-time low. 
Between Groups 14.225 4 3.556 3.052 .017 
Within Groups 693.400 595 1.165 
  
Total 707.625 599 
   
8. When oil prices 
decline. we are less 
likely to lend money 
to private enterprises. 
Between Groups 9.043 4 2.261 2.413 .048 




   
9. Citizens are more 
likely to withhold 
savings and 
investments when oil 
prices fluctuate or 
decline. 
Between Groups 5.973 4 1.493 1.482 .206 




   
10. Investing in 
diversification offers a 
layer of stability that 
we desperately need 
at this time. 
Between Groups 19.462 4 4.865 5.238 .000 




   
11. Intra-bank loans 
create a dangerous 
cycle of risk and 
vulnerability. 
Between Groups 7.966 4 1.991 1.786 .130 




   
12. The increase in 
lending rates is a 
positive step towards 
industry maturity. 
Between Groups 4.278 4 1.070 1.013 .400 




   
13. Most of our 
internal investment 
strategies are based 
on oil and gas 
exploitation. 
Between Groups 9.569 4 2.392 2.321 .056 




   
14. Countries have 
national industries 
Between Groups 17.133 4 4.283 4.469 .001 




and products: Ours 




   
15. The gap between 
the citizen and 
expatriate population 
in our nation is 
worrying. 
Between Groups 8.766 4 2.192 2.532 .039 




   
16. New companies 
are a liability; we 
would prefer to invest 
in tested models. 
Between Groups 12.101 4 3.025 3.031 .017 




   
17. Most small 
businesses are likely 
to fail if given enough 
time. 
Between Groups 1.101 4 .275 .349 .845 
Within Groups 469.239 595 .789 
  
Total 470.340 599 
   
18. Our banks should 
invest more heavily in 
business 
development and 
growth to increase 
industry performance. 
Between Groups 24.787 4 6.197 5.774 .000 




   
19. Without sufficient 
oil and gas liquidity. 
we cannot fund 
additional 
development. 
Between Groups 30.432 4 7.608 6.484 .000 




   
20. The domestic 
financial markets are 
unstable and high 
risk. 
Between Groups 21.249 4 5.312 6.261 .000 




   
Section 4. 1. Our 
government has a 
long-term vision that 
does not rely on oil 
and gas for 
development. 
Between Groups 12.676 4 3.169 2.605 .035 
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2. The primary 




Between Groups 10.259 4 2.565 .802 .524 




   
3. The primary result 
of a government 
bailout in our nation 
is: 
Between Groups 21.428 4 5.357 1.666 .156 




   
4. Government 
investment in oil and 
gas is a necessary 
and sustainable 
commitment. 
Between Groups 10.688 4 2.672 1.582 .177 




   
5. The government’s 
role in stabilising the 
domestic economy is: 
Between Groups 2.845 4 .711 1.128 .342 
Within Groups 375.095 595 .630 
  
Total 377.940 599 
   
6. Our dependence 
on a single export 
makes our country 
look: 
Between Groups 1.036 4 .259 1.567 .181 




   
7. The primary factor 
restricting the number 
of national citizens in 
private sector 
employment is: 
Between Groups 61.137 4 15.284 5.889 .000 




   
8. The primary sector 
which national 
citizens would like to 
work in is: 
Between Groups 13.521 4 3.380 .905 .460 




   
9. Government 
analysts would rank 
the current threat 
level in oil and gas as 
follows: 
Between Groups 29.205 4 7.301 13.528 .000 




   
Between Groups 39.383 4 9.846 4.468 .001 
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10. The government 
investment in oil and 
gas is based on the 
following objective: 









Price performance of 
the oil and gas 
industry 
Between Groups 6.222 4 1.556 2.703 .030 








Between Groups 11.233 4 2.808 5.048 .001 
Within Groups 331.007 595 .556 
  
Total 342.240 599 




Between Groups 15.172 4 3.793 5.338 .000 
Within Groups 422.768 595 .711 
  
Total 437.940 599 
   
Diversification of 
industries 
Between Groups 7.063 4 1.766 2.744 .028 
Within Groups 382.802 595 .643 
  
Total 389.865 599 
   
Strategic vision or 
agenda for national 
change 
Between Groups 5.312 4 1.328 2.302 .057 
Within Groups 343.153 595 .577 
  
Total 348.465 599 
   
Industry rules and 
regulations 
Between Groups 1.260 4 .315 .566 .687 
Within Groups 331.125 595 .557 
  
Total 332.385 599 




Between Groups 2.357 4 .589 .805 .522 
Within Groups 435.583 595 .732 
  
Total 437.940 599 




Between Groups 11.189 4 2.797 4.968 .001 
Within Groups 334.996 595 .563 
  
Total 346.185 599 
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Foreign interests and 
investments 
Between Groups 3.704 4 .926 1.177 .320 
Within Groups 468.136 595 .787 
  
Total 471.840 599 
   
Defaults and risks in 
bank performance 
Between Groups 10.434 4 2.609 4.729 .001 
Within Groups 328.191 595 .552 
  
Total 338.625 599 
   
Impact their 
organisational 
performance: Oil and 
gas industry prices 
Between Groups 6.647 4 1.662 2.205 .067 




   
Demand for loans 
and innovative 
financing products 
Between Groups 19.641 4 4.910 5.764 .000 
Within Groups 506.859 595 .852 
  
Total 526.500 599 




Between Groups 13.499 4 3.375 4.614 .001 
Within Groups 435.166 595 .731 
  
Total 448.665 599 
   
Liquidity guidelines 
and standards 
Between Groups 1.359 4 .340 .471 .757 
Within Groups 429.426 595 .722 
  
Total 430.785 599 
   
Auditing and 
governance oversight 
Between Groups 1.813 4 .453 .668 .614 
Within Groups 403.727 595 .679 
  
Total 405.540 599 




Between Groups 20.118 4 5.029 7.296 .000 
Within Groups 410.142 595 .689 
  
Total 430.260 599 
   
Infrastructure and 
system 
Between Groups 6.736 4 1.684 2.245 .063 
Within Groups 446.324 595 .750 
  
Total 453.060 599 
   
Domestic competitive 
forces 
Between Groups 9.639 4 2.410 4.199 .002 




Total 351.060 599 
   
International 
competitive forces 
Between Groups 1.306 4 .326 .561 .691 
Within Groups 346.319 595 .582 
  
Total 347.625 599 
   
Foreign investment 
and development 
Between Groups 7.128 4 1.782 2.362 .052 
Within Groups 448.872 595 .754 
  
Total 456.000 599 
   
 
 
Post Hoc Tests 
Multiple Comparisons 
















Section 2. 1. The 
banking industry is 
stable and diversified. 
18-24 25-34 -1.033* .322 -2.00 -.06 
35-44 -.978* .313 -1.92 -.03 
45-54 -.867 .313 -1.82 .08 
55+ -1.056* .348 -2.10 -.02 
25-34 18-24 1.033* .322 .06 2.00 
35-44 .056 .122 -.28 .40 
45-54 .166 .123 -.18 .51 
55+ -.022 .195 -.57 .53 
35-44 18-24 .978* .313 .03 1.92 
25-34 -.056 .122 -.40 .28 
45-54 .111 .098 -.16 .38 
55+ -.078 .180 -.58 .43 
45-54 18-24 .867 .313 -.08 1.82 
25-34 -.166 .123 -.51 .18 
35-44 -.111 .098 -.38 .16 
55+ -.188 .181 -.70 .32 
55+ 18-24 1.056* .348 .02 2.10 
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25-34 .022 .195 -.53 .57 
35-44 .078 .180 -.43 .58 
45-54 .188 .181 -.32 .70 
2. Current interest 
rates are competitive 
and in demand. 
18-24 25-34 -.333 .328 -1.32 .65 
35-44 -.204 .316 -1.16 .75 
45-54 -.186 .312 -1.13 .76 
55+ -.444 .352 -1.50 .61 
25-34 18-24 .333 .328 -.65 1.32 
35-44 .129 .155 -.30 .56 
45-54 .148 .147 -.26 .56 
55+ -.111 .220 -.73 .51 
35-44 18-24 .204 .316 -.75 1.16 
25-34 -.129 .155 -.56 .30 
45-54 .018 .117 -.30 .34 
55+ -.240 .202 -.81 .33 
45-54 18-24 .186 .312 -.76 1.13 
25-34 -.148 .147 -.56 .26 
35-44 -.018 .117 -.34 .30 
55+ -.259 .195 -.81 .29 
55+ 18-24 .444 .352 -.61 1.50 
25-34 .111 .220 -.51 .73 
35-44 .240 .202 -.33 .81 
45-54 .259 .195 -.29 .81 
3. Central bank 
interventions have 
improved our lending 
strategies. 
18-24 25-34 -.200 .272 -1.02 .62 
35-44 -.137 .263 -.94 .66 
45-54 -.129 .262 -.92 .67 
55+ -.167 .271 -.99 .65 
25-34 18-24 .200 .272 -.62 1.02 
35-44 .063 .097 -.21 .33 
45-54 .071 .092 -.19 .33 
55+ .033 .116 -.29 .36 
35-44 18-24 .137 .263 -.66 .94 
25-34 -.063 .097 -.33 .21 
45-54 .008 .062 -.16 .18 
55+ -.030 .093 -.29 .23 
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45-54 18-24 .129 .262 -.67 .92 
25-34 -.071 .092 -.33 .19 
35-44 -.008 .062 -.18 .16 
55+ -.038 .088 -.29 .21 
55+ 18-24 .167 .271 -.65 .99 
25-34 -.033 .116 -.36 .29 
35-44 .030 .093 -.23 .29 
45-54 .038 .088 -.21 .29 
4. We invest a high 
percentage of our 
funds in private sector 
enterprises. 
18-24 25-34 -.067 .296 -.95 .82 
35-44 .216 .280 -.63 1.06 
45-54 .082 .279 -.76 .93 
55+ .000 .312 -.93 .93 
25-34 18-24 .067 .296 -.82 .95 
35-44 .283 .138 -.10 .67 
45-54 .149 .134 -.22 .52 
55+ .067 .194 -.48 .61 
35-44 18-24 -.216 .280 -1.06 .63 
25-34 -.283 .138 -.67 .10 
45-54 -.134 .095 -.40 .13 
55+ -.216 .169 -.69 .26 
45-54 18-24 -.082 .279 -.93 .76 
25-34 -.149 .134 -.52 .22 
35-44 .134 .095 -.13 .40 
55+ -.082 .166 -.55 .39 
55+ 18-24 .000 .312 -.93 .93 
25-34 -.067 .194 -.61 .48 
35-44 .216 .169 -.26 .69 
45-54 .082 .166 -.39 .55 
5. Most deposits are 
tied to oil and gas 
rents. 
18-24 25-34 .300 .224 -.36 .96 
35-44 .423 .202 -.18 1.03 
45-54 .713* .195 .13 1.30 
55+ .167 .250 -.57 .90 
25-34 18-24 -.300 .224 -.96 .36 
35-44 .123 .161 -.32 .57 
45-54 .413 .152 -.01 .83 
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55+ -.133 .218 -.75 .48 
35-44 18-24 -.423 .202 -1.03 .18 
25-34 -.123 .161 -.57 .32 
45-54 .290 .118 -.03 .61 
55+ -.256 .195 -.81 .29 
45-54 18-24 -.713* .195 -1.30 -.13 
25-34 -.413 .152 -.83 .01 
35-44 -.290 .118 -.61 .03 
55+ -.546* .188 -1.08 -.02 
55+ 18-24 -.167 .250 -.90 .57 
25-34 .133 .218 -.48 .75 
35-44 .256 .195 -.29 .81 
45-54 .546* .188 .02 1.08 
6. Our vision is global. 
and this requires 
diversification. 
18-24 25-34 -.467 .351 -1.52 .59 
35-44 .162 .338 -.86 1.18 
45-54 .238 .335 -.77 1.25 
55+ -.278 .387 -1.43 .88 
25-34 18-24 .467 .351 -.59 1.52 
35-44 .628* .160 .18 1.07 
45-54 .705* .152 .28 1.13 
55+ .189 .247 -.51 .88 
35-44 18-24 -.162 .338 -1.18 .86 
25-34 -.628* .160 -1.07 -.18 
45-54 .077 .118 -.25 .40 
55+ -.439 .228 -1.08 .20 
45-54 18-24 -.238 .335 -1.25 .77 
25-34 -.705* .152 -1.13 -.28 
35-44 -.077 .118 -.40 .25 
55+ -.516 .223 -1.14 .11 
55+ 18-24 .278 .387 -.88 1.43 
25-34 -.189 .247 -.88 .51 
35-44 .439 .228 -.20 1.08 
45-54 .516 .223 -.11 1.14 
18-24 25-34 -.967* .286 -1.82 -.11 
35-44 -1.162* .270 -1.98 -.35 
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7. Our default rates 
are anticipated and 
appropriate. 
45-54 -.884* .273 -1.71 -.06 
55+ -1.111* .329 -2.09 -.14 
25-34 18-24 .967* .286 .11 1.82 
35-44 -.195 .144 -.59 .20 
45-54 .083 .149 -.33 .50 
55+ -.144 .237 -.81 .52 
35-44 18-24 1.162* .270 .35 1.98 
25-34 .195 .144 -.20 .59 
45-54 .278 .116 -.04 .60 
55+ .051 .218 -.56 .66 
45-54 18-24 .884* .273 .06 1.71 
25-34 -.083 .149 -.50 .33 
35-44 -.278 .116 -.60 .04 
55+ -.227 .221 -.85 .40 
55+ 18-24 1.111* .329 .14 2.09 
25-34 .144 .237 -.52 .81 
35-44 -.051 .218 -.66 .56 
45-54 .227 .221 -.40 .85 
8. The financial 
instruments we use 
are market sensitive 
and vulnerable to 
risks. 
18-24 25-34 -.067 .256 -.83 .69 
35-44 .177 .233 -.52 .88 
45-54 .276 .229 -.41 .97 
55+ -.056 .269 -.85 .74 
25-34 18-24 .067 .256 -.69 .83 
35-44 .243 .159 -.20 .69 
45-54 .343 .153 -.08 .77 
55+ .011 .208 -.57 .59 
35-44 18-24 -.177 .233 -.88 .52 
25-34 -.243 .159 -.69 .20 
45-54 .100 .111 -.20 .40 
55+ -.232 .179 -.73 .27 
45-54 18-24 -.276 .229 -.97 .41 
25-34 -.343 .153 -.77 .08 
35-44 -.100 .111 -.40 .20 
55+ -.332 .173 -.82 .16 
55+ 18-24 .056 .269 -.74 .85 
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25-34 -.011 .208 -.59 .57 
35-44 .232 .179 -.27 .73 
45-54 .332 .173 -.16 .82 
9. We anticipate that 
the oil and gas market 
will recover in price 
and volume. 
18-24 25-34 -1.600* .201 -2.19 -1.01 
35-44 -1.361* .187 -1.92 -.80 
45-54 -1.306* .184 -1.86 -.76 
55+ -1.389* .266 -2.16 -.61 
25-34 18-24 1.600* .201 1.01 2.19 
35-44 .239 .140 -.15 .63 
45-54 .294 .136 -.08 .67 
55+ .211 .236 -.45 .87 
35-44 18-24 1.361* .187 .80 1.92 
25-34 -.239 .140 -.63 .15 
45-54 .055 .115 -.26 .37 
55+ -.028 .224 -.66 .60 
45-54 18-24 1.306* .184 .76 1.86 
25-34 -.294 .136 -.67 .08 
35-44 -.055 .115 -.37 .26 
55+ -.083 .222 -.71 .54 
55+ 18-24 1.389* .266 .61 2.16 
25-34 -.211 .236 -.87 .45 
35-44 .028 .224 -.60 .66 
45-54 .083 .222 -.54 .71 
10. Most citizens do 
not plan financially for 
long-term market 
shocks. 
18-24 25-34 -.467 .329 -1.45 .52 
35-44 -.443 .316 -1.40 .51 
45-54 -.312 .312 -1.26 .63 
55+ -.444 .352 -1.50 .61 
25-34 18-24 .467 .329 -.52 1.45 
35-44 .024 .158 -.42 .46 
45-54 .154 .151 -.26 .57 
55+ .022 .222 -.60 .65 
35-44 18-24 .443 .316 -.51 1.40 
25-34 -.024 .158 -.46 .42 
45-54 .131 .120 -.20 .46 
55+ -.002 .202 -.57 .57 
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45-54 18-24 .312 .312 -.63 1.26 
25-34 -.154 .151 -.57 .26 
35-44 -.131 .120 -.46 .20 
55+ -.132 .197 -.68 .42 
55+ 18-24 .444 .352 -.61 1.50 
25-34 -.022 .222 -.65 .60 
35-44 .002 .202 -.57 .57 
45-54 .132 .197 -.42 .68 
11. Government 
subsidies allow us to 
loan more freely to 
the private sector. 
18-24 25-34 -.300 .167 -.80 .20 
35-44 -.239 .150 -.69 .21 
45-54 -.152 .146 -.59 .29 
55+ -.333 .173 -.85 .18 
25-34 18-24 .300 .167 -.20 .80 
35-44 .061 .106 -.23 .36 
45-54 .148 .100 -.13 .43 
55+ -.033 .137 -.42 .35 
35-44 18-24 .239 .150 -.21 .69 
25-34 -.061 .106 -.36 .23 
45-54 .087 .068 -.10 .27 
55+ -.095 .115 -.42 .23 
45-54 18-24 .152 .146 -.29 .59 
25-34 -.148 .100 -.43 .13 
35-44 -.087 .068 -.27 .10 
55+ -.181 .110 -.49 .13 
55+ 18-24 .333 .173 -.18 .85 
25-34 .033 .137 -.35 .42 
35-44 .095 .115 -.23 .42 
45-54 .181 .110 -.13 .49 





18-24 25-34 -.500 .317 -1.46 .46 
35-44 -.502 .308 -1.44 .43 
45-54 -.325 .310 -1.26 .61 
55+ -.500 .333 -1.50 .50 
25-34 18-24 .500 .317 -.46 1.46 
35-44 -.002 .112 -.31 .31 
45-54 .175 .116 -.15 .50 
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55+ .000 .169 -.47 .47 
35-44 18-24 .502 .308 -.43 1.44 
25-34 .002 .112 -.31 .31 
45-54 .178 .089 -.07 .42 
55+ .002 .151 -.42 .43 
45-54 18-24 .325 .310 -.61 1.26 
25-34 -.175 .116 -.50 .15 
35-44 -.178 .089 -.42 .07 
55+ -.175 .154 -.61 .26 
55+ 18-24 .500 .333 -.50 1.50 
25-34 .000 .169 -.47 .47 
35-44 -.002 .151 -.43 .42 
45-54 .175 .154 -.26 .61 
13. There is an 
inadequate population 
of skilled 
entrepreneurs in our 
national population. 
18-24 25-34 .033 .230 -.65 .72 
35-44 -.060 .217 -.71 .59 
45-54 .051 .210 -.58 .68 
55+ .167 .267 -.62 .95 
25-34 18-24 -.033 .230 -.72 .65 
35-44 -.093 .147 -.50 .31 
45-54 .017 .137 -.36 .40 
55+ .133 .214 -.47 .74 
35-44 18-24 .060 .217 -.59 .71 
25-34 .093 .147 -.31 .50 
45-54 .110 .113 -.20 .42 
55+ .226 .199 -.33 .79 
45-54 18-24 -.051 .210 -.68 .58 
25-34 -.017 .137 -.40 .36 
35-44 -.110 .113 -.42 .20 
55+ .116 .192 -.42 .66 
55+ 18-24 -.167 .267 -.95 .62 
25-34 -.133 .214 -.74 .47 
35-44 -.226 .199 -.79 .33 
45-54 -.116 .192 -.66 .42 
14. Banks are 
essential to the 
18-24 25-34 .000 .231 -.70 .70 




and therefore must be 
protected during 
periods of financial 
duress and decline. 
45-54 -.011 .223 -.69 .67 
55+ -.278 .254 -1.04 .48 
25-34 18-24 .000 .231 -.70 .70 
35-44 -.072 .097 -.34 .20 
45-54 -.011 .092 -.27 .25 
55+ -.278 .153 -.71 .15 
35-44 18-24 .072 .225 -.61 .75 
25-34 .072 .097 -.20 .34 
45-54 .062 .076 -.15 .27 
55+ -.206 .143 -.61 .20 
45-54 18-24 .011 .223 -.67 .69 
25-34 .011 .092 -.25 .27 
35-44 -.062 .076 -.27 .15 
55+ -.267 .140 -.66 .13 
55+ 18-24 .278 .254 -.48 1.04 
25-34 .278 .153 -.15 .71 
35-44 .206 .143 -.20 .61 
45-54 .267 .140 -.13 .66 
15. The financial 
market is mature and 
competitive. 
18-24 25-34 -.467 .236 -1.18 .24 
35-44 -.585 .226 -1.27 .10 
45-54 -.496 .224 -1.17 .18 
55+ -.389 .243 -1.12 .34 
25-34 18-24 .467 .236 -.24 1.18 
35-44 -.118 .110 -.42 .19 
45-54 -.029 .105 -.32 .26 
55+ .078 .141 -.32 .47 
35-44 18-24 .585 .226 -.10 1.27 
25-34 .118 .110 -.19 .42 
45-54 .089 .080 -.13 .31 
55+ .196 .124 -.15 .54 
45-54 18-24 .496 .224 -.18 1.17 
25-34 .029 .105 -.26 .32 
35-44 -.089 .080 -.31 .13 
55+ .107 .120 -.23 .44 
55+ 18-24 .389 .243 -.34 1.12 
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25-34 -.078 .141 -.47 .32 
35-44 -.196 .124 -.54 .15 
45-54 -.107 .120 -.44 .23 
Section 3. 1. Global 
pressures on the oil 




18-24 25-34 .067 .295 -.82 .95 
35-44 -.172 .283 -1.03 .68 
45-54 .070 .279 -.77 .91 
55+ .000 .294 -.89 .89 
25-34 18-24 -.067 .295 -.95 .82 
35-44 -.238 .141 -.63 .15 
45-54 .003 .132 -.36 .37 
55+ -.067 .162 -.52 .39 
35-44 18-24 .172 .283 -.68 1.03 
25-34 .238 .141 -.15 .63 
45-54 .241 .104 -.05 .53 
55+ .172 .140 -.22 .56 
45-54 18-24 -.070 .279 -.91 .77 
25-34 -.003 .132 -.37 .36 
35-44 -.241 .104 -.53 .05 
55+ -.070 .132 -.44 .30 
55+ 18-24 .000 .294 -.89 .89 
25-34 .067 .162 -.39 .52 
35-44 -.172 .140 -.56 .22 
45-54 .070 .132 -.30 .44 
2. The variability of 
commodity pricing 
creates highly 
impactful risks for our 
nation. 
18-24 25-34 .500 .236 -.21 1.21 
35-44 .087 .230 -.61 .78 
45-54 .340 .226 -.34 1.02 
55+ .333 .246 -.40 1.07 
25-34 18-24 -.500 .236 -1.21 .21 
35-44 -.413* .119 -.74 -.08 
45-54 -.160 .110 -.47 .15 
55+ -.167 .147 -.58 .25 
35-44 18-24 -.087 .230 -.78 .61 
25-34 .413* .119 .08 .74 
45-54 .253 .096 -.01 .52 
55+ .246 .137 -.14 .63 
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45-54 18-24 -.340 .226 -1.02 .34 
25-34 .160 .110 -.15 .47 
35-44 -.253 .096 -.52 .01 
55+ -.006 .129 -.37 .36 
55+ 18-24 -.333 .246 -1.07 .40 
25-34 .167 .147 -.25 .58 
35-44 -.246 .137 -.63 .14 
45-54 .006 .129 -.36 .37 
3. Even if we 
diversified our 
industries. we would 
need decades to 
allow them to mature. 
18-24 25-34 .200 .267 -.60 1.00 
35-44 -.060 .259 -.84 .72 
45-54 -.025 .253 -.79 .74 
55+ .167 .276 -.66 .99 
25-34 18-24 -.200 .267 -1.00 .60 
35-44 -.260 .143 -.65 .14 
45-54 -.225 .132 -.59 .14 
55+ -.033 .172 -.52 .45 
35-44 18-24 .060 .259 -.72 .84 
25-34 .260 .143 -.14 .65 
45-54 .034 .115 -.28 .35 
55+ .226 .159 -.22 .67 
45-54 18-24 .025 .253 -.74 .79 
25-34 .225 .132 -.14 .59 
35-44 -.034 .115 -.35 .28 
55+ .192 .150 -.23 .61 
55+ 18-24 -.167 .276 -.99 .66 
25-34 .033 .172 -.45 .52 
35-44 -.226 .159 -.67 .22 
45-54 -.192 .150 -.61 .23 
4. Strategic 
partnerships and FDI 
allow rapid exchange 
of knowledge and 
technology and 
should be supported. 
18-24 25-34 -.467 .266 -1.26 .33 
35-44 -.507 .255 -1.28 .26 
45-54 -.392 .251 -1.15 .37 
55+ -.333 .259 -1.12 .45 
25-34 18-24 .467 .266 -.33 1.26 
35-44 -.041 .135 -.41 .33 
45-54 .074 .126 -.27 .42 
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55+ .133 .142 -.26 .53 
35-44 18-24 .507 .255 -.26 1.28 
25-34 .041 .135 -.33 .41 
45-54 .115 .102 -.16 .39 
55+ .174 .121 -.16 .51 
45-54 18-24 .392 .251 -.37 1.15 
25-34 -.074 .126 -.42 .27 
35-44 -.115 .102 -.39 .16 
55+ .059 .111 -.25 .37 
55+ 18-24 .333 .259 -.45 1.12 
25-34 -.133 .142 -.53 .26 
35-44 -.174 .121 -.51 .16 
45-54 -.059 .111 -.37 .25 
5. Our bank is 
vulnerable to systemic 
risks. 
18-24 25-34 .467 .327 -.52 1.45 
35-44 .224 .322 -.75 1.20 
45-54 .494 .318 -.47 1.46 
55+ .500 .330 -.50 1.50 
25-34 18-24 -.467 .327 -1.45 .52 
35-44 -.243 .121 -.58 .09 
45-54 .027 .109 -.28 .33 
55+ .033 .141 -.36 .43 
35-44 18-24 -.224 .322 -1.20 .75 
25-34 .243 .121 -.09 .58 
45-54 .270* .094 .01 .53 
55+ .276 .130 -.09 .64 
45-54 18-24 -.494 .318 -1.46 .47 
25-34 -.027 .109 -.33 .28 
35-44 -.270* .094 -.53 -.01 
55+ .006 .119 -.33 .34 
55+ 18-24 -.500 .330 -1.50 .50 
25-34 -.033 .141 -.43 .36 
35-44 -.276 .130 -.64 .09 
45-54 -.006 .119 -.34 .33 
6. Without 
government support. 
18-24 25-34 -.100 .236 -.81 .61 
35-44 -.415 .232 -1.11 .28 
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our bank would likely 
be exposed to 
performance shocks. 
45-54 -.175 .225 -.86 .51 
55+ -.278 .242 -1.00 .45 
25-34 18-24 .100 .236 -.61 .81 
35-44 -.315 .120 -.65 .02 
45-54 -.075 .107 -.37 .22 
55+ -.178 .138 -.57 .21 
35-44 18-24 .415 .232 -.28 1.11 
25-34 .315 .120 -.02 .65 
45-54 .240 .098 -.03 .51 
55+ .138 .131 -.23 .51 
45-54 18-24 .175 .225 -.51 .86 
25-34 .075 .107 -.22 .37 
35-44 -.240 .098 -.51 .03 
55+ -.103 .119 -.44 .23 
55+ 18-24 .278 .242 -.45 1.00 
25-34 .178 .138 -.21 .57 
35-44 -.138 .131 -.51 .23 
45-54 .103 .119 -.23 .44 
7. Liquidity levels are 
at an all-time low. 
18-24 25-34 -.567 .271 -1.38 .24 
35-44 -.627 .255 -1.40 .14 
45-54 -.544 .252 -1.31 .22 
55+ -.167 .264 -.96 .63 
25-34 18-24 .567 .271 -.24 1.38 
35-44 -.060 .145 -.46 .34 
45-54 .022 .140 -.37 .41 
55+ .400 .160 -.05 .85 
35-44 18-24 .627 .255 -.14 1.40 
25-34 .060 .145 -.34 .46 
45-54 .083 .106 -.21 .37 
55+ .460* .131 .09 .83 
45-54 18-24 .544 .252 -.22 1.31 
25-34 -.022 .140 -.41 .37 
35-44 -.083 .106 -.37 .21 
55+ .378* .126 .02 .73 
55+ 18-24 .167 .264 -.63 .96 
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25-34 -.400 .160 -.85 .05 
35-44 -.460* .131 -.83 -.09 
45-54 -.378* .126 -.73 -.02 
8. When oil prices 
decline. we are less 
likely to lend money to 
private enterprises. 
18-24 25-34 .367 .239 -.35 1.08 
35-44 .117 .230 -.58 .81 
45-54 .365 .226 -.32 1.05 
55+ .222 .241 -.50 .95 
25-34 18-24 -.367 .239 -1.08 .35 
35-44 -.250 .123 -.59 .09 
45-54 -.002 .116 -.32 .32 
55+ -.144 .143 -.54 .26 
35-44 18-24 -.117 .230 -.81 .58 
25-34 .250 .123 -.09 .59 
45-54 .248 .097 -.02 .51 
55+ .105 .128 -.25 .46 
45-54 18-24 -.365 .226 -1.05 .32 
25-34 .002 .116 -.32 .32 
35-44 -.248 .097 -.51 .02 
55+ -.143 .121 -.48 .20 
55+ 18-24 -.222 .241 -.95 .50 
25-34 .144 .143 -.26 .54 
35-44 -.105 .128 -.46 .25 
45-54 .143 .121 -.20 .48 
9. Citizens are more 
likely to withhold 
savings and 
investments when oil 
prices fluctuate or 
decline. 
18-24 25-34 .100 .292 -.78 .98 
35-44 -.157 .281 -1.01 .69 
45-54 -.006 .279 -.85 .84 
55+ .111 .290 -.76 .99 
25-34 18-24 -.100 .292 -.98 .78 
35-44 -.257 .130 -.62 .10 
45-54 -.106 .126 -.46 .24 
55+ .011 .150 -.41 .43 
35-44 18-24 .157 .281 -.69 1.01 
25-34 .257 .130 -.10 .62 
45-54 .150 .098 -.12 .42 
55+ .268 .127 -.09 .62 
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45-54 18-24 .006 .279 -.84 .85 
25-34 .106 .126 -.24 .46 
35-44 -.150 .098 -.42 .12 
55+ .117 .123 -.23 .46 
55+ 18-24 -.111 .290 -.99 .76 
25-34 -.011 .150 -.43 .41 
35-44 -.268 .127 -.62 .09 
45-54 -.117 .123 -.46 .23 
10. Investing in 
diversification offers a 
layer of stability that 
we desperately need 
at this time. 
18-24 25-34 -.933* .158 -1.40 -.47 
35-44 -1.052* .142 -1.47 -.63 
45-54 -.867* .136 -1.27 -.46 
55+ -.944* .160 -1.42 -.47 
25-34 18-24 .933* .158 .47 1.40 
35-44 -.119 .126 -.47 .23 
45-54 .066 .118 -.26 .39 
55+ -.011 .146 -.42 .40 
35-44 18-24 1.052* .142 .63 1.47 
25-34 .119 .126 -.23 .47 
45-54 .185 .097 -.08 .45 
55+ .108 .129 -.25 .47 
45-54 18-24 .867* .136 .46 1.27 
25-34 -.066 .118 -.39 .26 
35-44 -.185 .097 -.45 .08 
55+ -.077 .121 -.42 .26 
55+ 18-24 .944* .160 .47 1.42 
25-34 .011 .146 -.40 .42 
35-44 -.108 .129 -.47 .25 
45-54 .077 .121 -.26 .42 
11. Intra-bank loans 
create a dangerous 
cycle of risk and 
vulnerability. 
18-24 25-34 -.033 .291 -.91 .84 
35-44 -.187 .283 -1.04 .67 
45-54 .082 .279 -.76 .93 
55+ .000 .305 -.91 .91 
25-34 18-24 .033 .291 -.84 .91 
35-44 -.153 .132 -.52 .21 
45-54 .116 .124 -.23 .46 
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55+ .033 .174 -.46 .52 
35-44 18-24 .187 .283 -.67 1.04 
25-34 .153 .132 -.21 .52 
45-54 .269 .103 -.02 .55 
55+ .187 .161 -.26 .64 
45-54 18-24 -.082 .279 -.93 .76 
25-34 -.116 .124 -.46 .23 
35-44 -.269 .103 -.55 .02 
55+ -.082 .154 -.51 .35 
55+ 18-24 .000 .305 -.91 .91 
25-34 -.033 .174 -.52 .46 
35-44 -.187 .161 -.64 .26 
45-54 .082 .154 -.35 .51 
12. The increase in 
lending rates is a 
positive step towards 
industry maturity. 
18-24 25-34 .133 .256 -.63 .90 
35-44 -.005 .242 -.73 .72 
45-54 .122 .237 -.59 .84 
55+ .278 .251 -.48 1.03 
25-34 18-24 -.133 .256 -.90 .63 
35-44 -.138 .140 -.53 .25 
45-54 -.011 .132 -.38 .35 
55+ .144 .155 -.29 .58 
35-44 18-24 .005 .242 -.72 .73 
25-34 .138 .140 -.25 .53 
45-54 .127 .101 -.15 .41 
55+ .283 .130 -.08 .65 
45-54 18-24 -.122 .237 -.84 .59 
25-34 .011 .132 -.35 .38 
35-44 -.127 .101 -.41 .15 
55+ .155 .122 -.19 .50 
55+ 18-24 -.278 .251 -1.03 .48 
25-34 -.144 .155 -.58 .29 
35-44 -.283 .130 -.65 .08 
45-54 -.155 .122 -.50 .19 
13. Most of our 
internal investment 
18-24 25-34 .600* .195 .02 1.18 
35-44 .346 .185 -.21 .90 
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strategies are based 
on oil and gas 
exploitation. 
45-54 .534 .178 .00 1.07 
55+ .500 .206 -.11 1.11 
25-34 18-24 -.600* .195 -1.18 -.02 
35-44 -.254 .129 -.61 .10 
45-54 -.066 .119 -.40 .26 
55+ -.100 .158 -.54 .34 
35-44 18-24 -.346 .185 -.90 .21 
25-34 .254 .129 -.10 .61 
45-54 .188 .102 -.09 .47 
55+ .154 .145 -.25 .56 
45-54 18-24 -.534 .178 -1.07 .00 
25-34 .066 .119 -.26 .40 
35-44 -.188 .102 -.47 .09 
55+ -.034 .137 -.42 .35 
55+ 18-24 -.500 .206 -1.11 .11 
25-34 .100 .158 -.34 .54 
35-44 -.154 .145 -.56 .25 
45-54 .034 .137 -.35 .42 
14. Countries have 
national industries 
and products: Ours 
should remain oil and 
gas. 
18-24 25-34 .600* .197 .02 1.18 
35-44 .883* .182 .34 1.43 
45-54 .825* .178 .29 1.36 
55+ .667* .202 .07 1.27 
25-34 18-24 -.600* .197 -1.18 -.02 
35-44 .283 .128 -.07 .64 
45-54 .225 .122 -.11 .56 
55+ .067 .155 -.37 .50 
35-44 18-24 -.883* .182 -1.43 -.34 
25-34 -.283 .128 -.64 .07 
45-54 -.058 .096 -.32 .21 
55+ -.216 .136 -.60 .16 
45-54 18-24 -.825* .178 -1.36 -.29 
25-34 -.225 .122 -.56 .11 
35-44 .058 .096 -.21 .32 
55+ -.158 .131 -.52 .21 
55+ 18-24 -.667* .202 -1.27 -.07 
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25-34 -.067 .155 -.50 .37 
35-44 .216 .136 -.16 .60 
45-54 .158 .131 -.21 .52 
15. The gap between 
the citizen and 
expatriate population 
in our nation is 
worrying. 
18-24 25-34 .033 .201 -.57 .63 
35-44 .348 .195 -.24 .93 
45-54 .194 .190 -.38 .77 
55+ .056 .207 -.56 .67 
25-34 18-24 -.033 .201 -.63 .57 
35-44 .315 .114 .00 .63 
45-54 .161 .105 -.13 .45 
55+ .022 .133 -.35 .40 
35-44 18-24 -.348 .195 -.93 .24 
25-34 -.315 .114 -.63 .00 
45-54 -.154 .095 -.41 .11 
55+ -.293 .125 -.64 .06 
45-54 18-24 -.194 .190 -.77 .38 
25-34 -.161 .105 -.45 .13 
35-44 .154 .095 -.11 .41 
55+ -.139 .117 -.47 .19 
55+ 18-24 -.056 .207 -.67 .56 
25-34 -.022 .133 -.40 .35 
35-44 .293 .125 -.06 .64 
45-54 .139 .117 -.19 .47 
16. New companies 
are a liability; we 
would prefer to invest 
in tested models. 
18-24 25-34 .467 .177 -.06 .99 
35-44 .731* .159 .26 1.21 
45-54 .608* .154 .15 1.07 
55+ .500 .181 -.03 1.03 
25-34 18-24 -.467 .177 -.99 .06 
35-44 .265 .132 -.10 .63 
45-54 .141 .126 -.21 .49 
55+ .033 .158 -.41 .48 
35-44 18-24 -.731* .159 -1.21 -.26 
25-34 -.265 .132 -.63 .10 
45-54 -.124 .099 -.40 .15 
55+ -.231 .137 -.62 .15 
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45-54 18-24 -.608* .154 -1.07 -.15 
25-34 -.141 .126 -.49 .21 
35-44 .124 .099 -.15 .40 
55+ -.108 .131 -.47 .26 
55+ 18-24 -.500 .181 -1.03 .03 
25-34 -.033 .158 -.48 .41 
35-44 .231 .137 -.15 .62 
45-54 .108 .131 -.26 .47 
17. Most small 
businesses are likely 
to fail if given enough 
time. 
18-24 25-34 .100 .305 -.82 1.02 
35-44 .042 .303 -.87 .96 
45-54 -.002 .299 -.91 .90 
55+ -.056 .315 -1.00 .89 
25-34 18-24 -.100 .305 -1.02 .82 
35-44 -.058 .108 -.36 .24 
45-54 -.102 .097 -.37 .17 
55+ -.156 .138 -.54 .23 
35-44 18-24 -.042 .303 -.96 .87 
25-34 .058 .108 -.24 .36 
45-54 -.044 .088 -.29 .20 
55+ -.098 .132 -.47 .27 
45-54 18-24 .002 .299 -.90 .91 
25-34 .102 .097 -.17 .37 
35-44 .044 .088 -.20 .29 
55+ -.053 .123 -.40 .29 
55+ 18-24 .056 .315 -.89 1.00 
25-34 .156 .138 -.23 .54 
35-44 .098 .132 -.27 .47 
45-54 .053 .123 -.29 .40 
18. Our banks should 
invest more heavily in 
business 
development and 
growth to increase 
industry performance. 
18-24 25-34 .367 .382 -.79 1.52 
35-44 .826 .368 -.29 1.94 
45-54 .764 .367 -.35 1.88 
55+ .889 .382 -.26 2.04 
25-34 18-24 -.367 .382 -1.52 .79 
35-44 .459* .143 .06 .86 
45-54 .397* .140 .01 .78 
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55+ .522* .175 .03 1.01 
35-44 18-24 -.826 .368 -1.94 .29 
25-34 -.459* .143 -.86 -.06 
45-54 -.062 .096 -.33 .20 
55+ .063 .142 -.34 .46 
45-54 18-24 -.764 .367 -1.88 .35 
25-34 -.397* .140 -.78 -.01 
35-44 .062 .096 -.20 .33 
55+ .125 .139 -.26 .52 
55+ 18-24 -.889 .382 -2.04 .26 
25-34 -.522* .175 -1.01 -.03 
35-44 -.063 .142 -.46 .34 
45-54 -.125 .139 -.52 .26 
19. Without sufficient 
oil and gas liquidity. 
we cannot fund 
additional 
development. 
18-24 25-34 1.300* .204 .70 1.90 
35-44 1.286* .183 .74 1.83 
45-54 1.205* .182 .66 1.75 
55+ 1.000* .212 .37 1.63 
25-34 18-24 -1.300* .204 -1.90 -.70 
35-44 -.014 .141 -.40 .38 
45-54 -.095 .139 -.48 .29 
55+ -.300 .177 -.80 .20 
35-44 18-24 -1.286* .183 -1.83 -.74 
25-34 .014 .141 -.38 .40 
45-54 -.081 .105 -.37 .21 
55+ -.286 .152 -.71 .14 
45-54 18-24 -1.205* .182 -1.75 -.66 
25-34 .095 .139 -.29 .48 
35-44 .081 .105 -.21 .37 
55+ -.205 .150 -.63 .22 
55+ 18-24 -1.000* .212 -1.63 -.37 
25-34 .300 .177 -.20 .80 
35-44 .286 .152 -.14 .71 
45-54 .205 .150 -.22 .63 
20. The domestic 
financial markets are 
18-24 25-34 .400 .350 -.66 1.46 
35-44 .843 .342 -.19 1.88 
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unstable and high 
risk. 
45-54 .601 .340 -.43 1.63 
55+ .611 .362 -.48 1.70 
25-34 18-24 -.400 .350 -1.46 .66 
35-44 .443* .120 .11 .78 
45-54 .201 .113 -.11 .52 
55+ .211 .169 -.26 .69 
35-44 18-24 -.843 .342 -1.88 .19 
25-34 -.443* .120 -.78 -.11 
45-54 -.242* .085 -.48 -.01 
55+ -.232 .152 -.66 .19 
45-54 18-24 -.601 .340 -1.63 .43 
25-34 -.201 .113 -.52 .11 
35-44 .242* .085 .01 .48 
55+ .010 .147 -.40 .42 
55+ 18-24 -.611 .362 -1.70 .48 
25-34 -.211 .169 -.69 .26 
35-44 .232 .152 -.19 .66 
45-54 -.010 .147 -.42 .40 
Section 4. 1. Our 
government has a 
long-term vision that 
does not rely on oil 
and gas for 
development. 
18-24 25-34 .033 .352 -1.02 1.09 
35-44 .361 .334 -.65 1.37 
45-54 .129 .333 -.88 1.14 
55+ .444 .350 -.61 1.50 
25-34 18-24 -.033 .352 -1.09 1.02 
35-44 .327 .153 -.10 .75 
45-54 .095 .151 -.32 .51 
55+ .411 .185 -.11 .93 
35-44 18-24 -.361 .334 -1.37 .65 
25-34 -.327 .153 -.75 .10 
45-54 -.232 .103 -.51 .05 
55+ .084 .148 -.33 .50 
45-54 18-24 -.129 .333 -1.14 .88 
25-34 -.095 .151 -.51 .32 
35-44 .232 .103 -.05 .51 
55+ .316 .146 -.09 .73 
55+ 18-24 -.444 .350 -1.50 .61 
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25-34 -.411 .185 -.93 .11 
35-44 -.084 .148 -.50 .33 
45-54 -.316 .146 -.73 .09 
2. The primary 




18-24 25-34 .600 .407 -.62 1.82 
35-44 .306 .384 -.85 1.46 
45-54 .500 .383 -.66 1.66 
55+ .389 .442 -.92 1.70 
25-34 18-24 -.600 .407 -1.82 .62 
35-44 -.294 .220 -.90 .32 
45-54 -.100 .219 -.71 .51 
55+ -.211 .310 -1.08 .66 
35-44 18-24 -.306 .384 -1.46 .85 
25-34 .294 .220 -.32 .90 
45-54 .194 .172 -.28 .67 
55+ .083 .279 -.70 .87 
45-54 18-24 -.500 .383 -1.66 .66 
25-34 .100 .219 -.51 .71 
35-44 -.194 .172 -.67 .28 
55+ -.111 .278 -.89 .67 
55+ 18-24 -.389 .442 -1.70 .92 
25-34 .211 .310 -.66 1.08 
35-44 -.083 .279 -.87 .70 
45-54 .111 .278 -.67 .89 
3. The primary result 
of a government 
bailout in our nation 
is: 
18-24 25-34 .767 .439 -.54 2.08 
35-44 .560 .410 -.68 1.80 
45-54 .475 .407 -.75 1.70 
55+ 1.000 .441 -.32 2.32 
25-34 18-24 -.767 .439 -2.08 .54 
35-44 -.207 .238 -.87 .45 
45-54 -.292 .233 -.94 .35 
55+ .233 .288 -.57 1.04 
35-44 18-24 -.560 .410 -1.80 .68 
25-34 .207 .238 -.45 .87 
45-54 -.085 .173 -.56 .39 
55+ .440 .242 -.24 1.12 
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45-54 18-24 -.475 .407 -1.70 .75 
25-34 .292 .233 -.35 .94 
35-44 .085 .173 -.39 .56 
55+ .525 .237 -.14 1.19 
55+ 18-24 -1.000 .441 -2.32 .32 
25-34 -.233 .288 -1.04 .57 
35-44 -.440 .242 -1.12 .24 
45-54 -.525 .237 -1.19 .14 
4. Government 
investment in oil and 
gas is a necessary 
and sustainable 
commitment. 
18-24 25-34 .467 .433 -.84 1.77 
35-44 .692 .421 -.59 1.97 
45-54 .586 .421 -.69 1.86 
55+ .444 .448 -.90 1.79 
25-34 18-24 -.467 .433 -1.77 .84 
35-44 .225 .160 -.22 .67 
45-54 .120 .159 -.32 .56 
55+ -.022 .221 -.64 .60 
35-44 18-24 -.692 .421 -1.97 .59 
25-34 -.225 .160 -.67 .22 
45-54 -.105 .123 -.44 .23 
55+ -.247 .197 -.80 .31 
45-54 18-24 -.586 .421 -1.86 .69 
25-34 -.120 .159 -.56 .32 
35-44 .105 .123 -.23 .44 
55+ -.142 .196 -.69 .41 
55+ 18-24 -.444 .448 -1.79 .90 
25-34 .022 .221 -.60 .64 
35-44 .247 .197 -.31 .80 
45-54 .142 .196 -.41 .69 
5. The government’s 
role in stabilising the 
domestic economy is: 
18-24 25-34 -.400* .121 -.75 -.05 
35-44 -.311 .106 -.62 .00 
45-54 -.365* .105 -.68 -.05 
55+ -.389 .146 -.81 .03 
25-34 18-24 .400* .121 .05 .75 
35-44 .089 .098 -.18 .36 
45-54 .035 .097 -.23 .30 
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55+ .011 .140 -.38 .40 
35-44 18-24 .311 .106 .00 .62 
25-34 -.089 .098 -.36 .18 
45-54 -.054 .077 -.27 .16 
55+ -.078 .127 -.43 .28 
45-54 18-24 .365* .105 .05 .68 
25-34 -.035 .097 -.30 .23 
35-44 .054 .077 -.16 .27 
55+ -.024 .126 -.38 .33 
55+ 18-24 .389 .146 -.03 .81 
25-34 -.011 .140 -.40 .38 
35-44 .078 .127 -.28 .43 
45-54 .024 .126 -.33 .38 
6. Our dependence 
on a single export 
makes our country 
look: 
18-24 25-34 .033 .222 -.64 .71 
35-44 -.077 .220 -.74 .59 
45-54 -.040 .219 -.71 .63 
55+ -.111 .220 -.78 .56 
25-34 18-24 -.033 .222 -.71 .64 
35-44 -.110 .052 -.25 .03 
45-54 -.073 .049 -.21 .06 
55+ -.144 .053 -.29 .00 
35-44 18-24 .077 .220 -.59 .74 
25-34 .110 .052 -.03 .25 
45-54 .037 .038 -.07 .14 
55+ -.034 .043 -.15 .09 
45-54 18-24 .040 .219 -.63 .71 
25-34 .073 .049 -.06 .21 
35-44 -.037 .038 -.14 .07 
55+ -.071 .040 -.18 .04 
55+ 18-24 .111 .220 -.56 .78 
25-34 .144 .053 .00 .29 
35-44 .034 .043 -.09 .15 
45-54 .071 .040 -.04 .18 
7. The primary factor 
restricting the number 
18-24 25-34 -.700 .363 -1.79 .39 
35-44 -1.289* .354 -2.35 -.22 
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of national citizens in 
private sector 
employment is: 
45-54 -1.384* .350 -2.44 -.33 
55+ -1.444* .399 -2.63 -.26 
25-34 18-24 .700 .363 -.39 1.79 
35-44 -.589* .186 -1.10 -.07 
45-54 -.684* .179 -1.18 -.19 
55+ -.744* .262 -1.48 -.01 
35-44 18-24 1.289* .354 .22 2.35 
25-34 .589* .186 .07 1.10 
45-54 -.095 .160 -.54 .34 
55+ -.156 .249 -.86 .54 
45-54 18-24 1.384* .350 .33 2.44 
25-34 .684* .179 .19 1.18 
35-44 .095 .160 -.34 .54 
55+ -.060 .244 -.75 .62 
55+ 18-24 1.444* .399 .26 2.63 
25-34 .744* .262 .01 1.48 
35-44 .156 .249 -.54 .86 
45-54 .060 .244 -.62 .75 
8. The primary sector 
which national 
citizens would like to 
work in is: 
18-24 25-34 .400 .566 -1.30 2.10 
35-44 .701 .540 -.93 2.34 
45-54 .658 .539 -.97 2.29 
55+ .722 .582 -1.03 2.47 
25-34 18-24 -.400 .566 -2.10 1.30 
35-44 .301 .250 -.39 1.00 
45-54 .258 .248 -.43 .95 
55+ .322 .332 -.61 1.25 
35-44 18-24 -.701 .540 -2.34 .93 
25-34 -.301 .250 -1.00 .39 
45-54 -.043 .182 -.54 .46 
55+ .021 .286 -.78 .82 
45-54 18-24 -.658 .539 -2.29 .97 
25-34 -.258 .248 -.95 .43 
35-44 .043 .182 -.46 .54 
55+ .064 .284 -.73 .86 
55+ 18-24 -.722 .582 -2.47 1.03 
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25-34 -.322 .332 -1.25 .61 
35-44 -.021 .286 -.82 .78 
45-54 -.064 .284 -.86 .73 
9. Government 
analysts would rank 
the current threat 
level in oil and gas as 
follows: 
18-24 25-34 -.767* .159 -1.23 -.30 
35-44 -.428* .124 -.80 -.06 
45-54 -.148 .120 -.51 .21 
55+ -.444 .182 -.97 .09 
25-34 18-24 .767* .159 .30 1.23 
35-44 .339* .120 .00 .67 
45-54 .619* .116 .30 .94 
55+ .322 .180 -.18 .83 
35-44 18-24 .428* .124 .06 .80 
25-34 -.339* .120 -.67 .00 
45-54 .280* .059 .12 .44 
55+ -.017 .149 -.44 .40 
45-54 18-24 .148 .120 -.21 .51 
25-34 -.619* .116 -.94 -.30 
35-44 -.280* .059 -.44 -.12 
55+ -.297 .146 -.71 .11 
55+ 18-24 .444 .182 -.09 .97 
25-34 -.322 .180 -.83 .18 
35-44 .017 .149 -.40 .44 
45-54 .297 .146 -.11 .71 
10. The government 
investment in oil and 
gas is based on the 
following objective: 
18-24 25-34 -1.267* .221 -1.92 -.62 
35-44 -1.316* .198 -1.90 -.73 
45-54 -1.470* .194 -2.04 -.90 
55+ -1.556* .269 -2.34 -.77 
25-34 18-24 1.267* .221 .62 1.92 
35-44 -.049 .181 -.55 .45 
45-54 -.204 .176 -.69 .28 
55+ -.289 .256 -1.01 .43 
35-44 18-24 1.316* .198 .73 1.90 
25-34 .049 .181 -.45 .55 
45-54 -.155 .146 -.56 .25 
55+ -.240 .236 -.90 .42 
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45-54 18-24 1.470* .194 .90 2.04 
25-34 .204 .176 -.28 .69 
35-44 .155 .146 -.25 .56 
55+ -.085 .232 -.74 .57 
55+ 18-24 1.556* .269 .77 2.34 
25-34 .289 .256 -.43 1.01 
35-44 .240 .236 -.42 .90 





Price performance of 
the oil and gas 
industry 
18-24 25-34 -.467 .197 -1.06 .13 
35-44 -.592* .189 -1.16 -.02 
45-54 -.502 .187 -1.07 .06 
55+ -.500 .204 -1.11 .11 
25-34 18-24 .467 .197 -.13 1.06 
35-44 -.125 .097 -.39 .14 
45-54 -.035 .093 -.29 .22 
55+ -.033 .123 -.38 .31 
35-44 18-24 .592* .189 .02 1.16 
25-34 .125 .097 -.14 .39 
45-54 .090 .074 -.11 .29 
55+ .092 .109 -.21 .40 
45-54 18-24 .502 .187 -.06 1.07 
25-34 .035 .093 -.22 .29 
35-44 -.090 .074 -.29 .11 
55+ .002 .106 -.30 .30 
55+ 18-24 .500 .204 -.11 1.11 
25-34 .033 .123 -.31 .38 
35-44 -.092 .109 -.40 .21 




18-24 25-34 -.467* .140 -.88 -.05 
35-44 -.276 .133 -.67 .12 
45-54 -.475* .131 -.87 -.08 
55+ -.111 .153 -.56 .34 
25-34 18-24 .467* .140 .05 .88 
35-44 .191 .088 -.05 .44 
45-54 -.008 .086 -.25 .23 
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55+ .356* .116 .03 .68 
35-44 18-24 .276 .133 -.12 .67 
25-34 -.191 .088 -.44 .05 
45-54 -.199 .074 -.40 .01 
55+ .165 .108 -.14 .47 
45-54 18-24 .475* .131 .08 .87 
25-34 .008 .086 -.23 .25 
35-44 .199 .074 -.01 .40 
55+ .364* .106 .07 .66 
55+ 18-24 .111 .153 -.34 .56 
25-34 -.356* .116 -.68 -.03 
35-44 -.165 .108 -.47 .14 




18-24 25-34 -.900* .134 -1.30 -.50 
35-44 -.607* .129 -.99 -.22 
45-54 -.730* .129 -1.12 -.34 
55+ -.556* .153 -1.01 -.11 
25-34 18-24 .900* .134 .50 1.30 
35-44 .293* .093 .04 .55 
45-54 .170 .093 -.09 .43 
55+ .344 .124 .00 .69 
35-44 18-24 .607* .129 .22 .99 
25-34 -.293* .093 -.55 -.04 
45-54 -.123 .085 -.36 .11 
55+ .051 .118 -.28 .38 
45-54 18-24 .730* .129 .34 1.12 
25-34 -.170 .093 -.43 .09 
35-44 .123 .085 -.11 .36 
55+ .174 .118 -.16 .51 
55+ 18-24 .556* .153 .11 1.01 
25-34 -.344 .124 -.69 .00 
35-44 -.051 .118 -.38 .28 
45-54 -.174 .118 -.51 .16 
Diversification of 
industries 
18-24 25-34 -.567* .183 -1.12 -.02 
35-44 -.331 .174 -.85 .19 
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45-54 -.445 .178 -.98 .09 
55+ -.333 .192 -.91 .24 
25-34 18-24 .567* .183 .02 1.12 
35-44 .236 .090 -.01 .48 
45-54 .122 .097 -.15 .39 
55+ .233 .121 -.11 .57 
35-44 18-24 .331 .174 -.19 .85 
25-34 -.236 .090 -.48 .01 
45-54 -.114 .078 -.33 .10 
55+ -.002 .106 -.30 .30 
45-54 18-24 .445 .178 -.09 .98 
25-34 -.122 .097 -.39 .15 
35-44 .114 .078 -.10 .33 
55+ .112 .113 -.20 .43 
55+ 18-24 .333 .192 -.24 .91 
25-34 -.233 .121 -.57 .11 
35-44 .002 .106 -.30 .30 
45-54 -.112 .113 -.43 .20 
Strategic vision or 
agenda for national 
change 
18-24 25-34 .200 .271 -.62 1.02 
35-44 -.042 .264 -.84 .76 
45-54 -.061 .263 -.86 .74 
55+ -.111 .285 -.97 .75 
25-34 18-24 -.200 .271 -1.02 .62 
35-44 -.242 .095 -.51 .02 
45-54 -.261* .093 -.52 .00 
55+ -.311 .144 -.71 .09 
35-44 18-24 .042 .264 -.76 .84 
25-34 .242 .095 -.02 .51 
45-54 -.019 .070 -.21 .17 
55+ -.069 .130 -.43 .30 
45-54 18-24 .061 .263 -.74 .86 
25-34 .261* .093 .00 .52 
35-44 .019 .070 -.17 .21 
55+ -.050 .129 -.41 .31 
55+ 18-24 .111 .285 -.75 .97 
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25-34 .311 .144 -.09 .71 
35-44 .069 .130 -.30 .43 
45-54 .050 .129 -.31 .41 
Industry rules and 
regulations 
18-24 25-34 -.233 .199 -.83 .36 
35-44 -.214 .188 -.78 .35 
45-54 -.156 .187 -.72 .41 
55+ -.222 .202 -.83 .38 
25-34 18-24 .233 .199 -.36 .83 
35-44 .019 .098 -.25 .29 
45-54 .077 .097 -.19 .35 
55+ .011 .123 -.33 .36 
35-44 18-24 .214 .188 -.35 .78 
25-34 -.019 .098 -.29 .25 
45-54 .058 .071 -.14 .25 
55+ -.008 .104 -.30 .28 
45-54 18-24 .156 .187 -.41 .72 
25-34 -.077 .097 -.35 .19 
35-44 -.058 .071 -.25 .14 
55+ -.066 .103 -.35 .22 
55+ 18-24 .222 .202 -.38 .83 
25-34 -.011 .123 -.36 .33 
35-44 .008 .104 -.28 .30 
45-54 .066 .103 -.22 .35 
Citizen expectations 
and national demands 
18-24 25-34 -.033 .213 -.68 .61 
35-44 .090 .206 -.53 .71 
45-54 -.013 .206 -.64 .61 
55+ -.111 .236 -.81 .59 
25-34 18-24 .033 .213 -.61 .68 
35-44 .123 .099 -.15 .40 
45-54 .021 .099 -.25 .29 
55+ -.078 .151 -.50 .35 
35-44 18-24 -.090 .206 -.71 .53 
25-34 -.123 .099 -.40 .15 
45-54 -.102 .082 -.33 .12 
55+ -.201 .141 -.60 .20 
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45-54 18-24 .013 .206 -.61 .64 
25-34 -.021 .099 -.29 .25 
35-44 .102 .082 -.12 .33 
55+ -.098 .141 -.50 .30 
55+ 18-24 .111 .236 -.59 .81 
25-34 .078 .151 -.35 .50 
35-44 .201 .141 -.20 .60 




18-24 25-34 -.400 .135 -.80 .00 
35-44 -.677* .127 -1.06 -.30 
45-54 -.498* .125 -.87 -.12 
55+ -.500* .148 -.94 -.06 
25-34 18-24 .400 .135 .00 .80 
35-44 -.277* .091 -.53 -.02 
45-54 -.098 .088 -.34 .15 
55+ -.100 .119 -.43 .23 
35-44 18-24 .677* .127 .30 1.06 
25-34 .277* .091 .02 .53 
45-54 .179 .075 -.03 .38 
55+ .177 .109 -.13 .48 
45-54 18-24 .498* .125 .12 .87 
25-34 .098 .088 -.15 .34 
35-44 -.179 .075 -.38 .03 
55+ -.002 .107 -.30 .30 
55+ 18-24 .500* .148 .06 .94 
25-34 .100 .119 -.23 .43 
35-44 -.177 .109 -.48 .13 
45-54 .002 .107 -.30 .30 
Foreign interests and 
investments 
18-24 25-34 .033 .308 -.90 .96 
35-44 .211 .301 -.70 1.12 
45-54 .078 .299 -.83 .99 
55+ .000 .322 -.97 .97 
25-34 18-24 -.033 .308 -.96 .90 
35-44 .178 .109 -.13 .48 
45-54 .045 .105 -.25 .34 
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55+ -.033 .159 -.48 .41 
35-44 18-24 -.211 .301 -1.12 .70 
25-34 -.178 .109 -.48 .13 
45-54 -.133 .083 -.36 .10 
55+ -.211 .146 -.62 .20 
45-54 18-24 -.078 .299 -.99 .83 
25-34 -.045 .105 -.34 .25 
35-44 .133 .083 -.10 .36 
55+ -.078 .143 -.48 .32 
55+ 18-24 .000 .322 -.97 .97 
25-34 .033 .159 -.41 .48 
35-44 .211 .146 -.20 .62 
45-54 .078 .143 -.32 .48 
Defaults and risks in 
bank performance 
18-24 25-34 .700* .198 .11 1.29 
35-44 .766* .186 .20 1.33 
45-54 .738* .187 .17 1.30 
55+ .611 .226 -.06 1.28 
25-34 18-24 -.700* .198 -1.29 -.11 
35-44 .066 .091 -.19 .32 
45-54 .038 .094 -.22 .30 
55+ -.089 .158 -.53 .35 
35-44 18-24 -.766* .186 -1.33 -.20 
25-34 -.066 .091 -.32 .19 
45-54 -.028 .066 -.21 .15 
55+ -.155 .143 -.56 .25 
45-54 18-24 -.738* .187 -1.30 -.17 
25-34 -.038 .094 -.30 .22 
35-44 .028 .066 -.15 .21 
55+ -.127 .144 -.53 .28 
55+ 18-24 -.611 .226 -1.28 .06 
25-34 .089 .158 -.35 .53 
35-44 .155 .143 -.25 .56 
45-54 .127 .144 -.28 .53 
Impact their 
organisational 
18-24 25-34 -.233 .207 -.85 .38 
35-44 -.363 .190 -.94 .21 
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performance: Oil and 
gas industry prices 
45-54 -.422 .190 -.99 .15 
55+ -.556 .211 -1.18 .07 
25-34 18-24 .233 .207 -.38 .85 
35-44 -.130 .115 -.45 .19 
45-54 -.189 .116 -.51 .13 
55+ -.322 .147 -.74 .09 
35-44 18-24 .363 .190 -.21 .94 
25-34 .130 .115 -.19 .45 
45-54 -.059 .082 -.28 .17 
55+ -.192 .122 -.54 .15 
45-54 18-24 .422 .190 -.15 .99 
25-34 .189 .116 -.13 .51 
35-44 .059 .082 -.17 .28 
55+ -.134 .123 -.48 .21 
55+ 18-24 .556 .211 -.07 1.18 
25-34 .322 .147 -.09 .74 
35-44 .192 .122 -.15 .54 
45-54 .134 .123 -.21 .48 
Demand for loans and 
innovative financing 
products 
18-24 25-34 .467 .197 -.12 1.05 
35-44 .565* .179 .03 1.10 
45-54 .757* .176 .23 1.29 
55+ .278 .217 -.36 .92 
25-34 18-24 -.467 .197 -1.05 .12 
35-44 .098 .124 -.24 .44 
45-54 .291 .119 -.04 .62 
55+ -.189 .174 -.68 .30 
35-44 18-24 -.565* .179 -1.10 -.03 
25-34 -.098 .124 -.44 .24 
45-54 .193 .087 -.05 .43 
55+ -.287 .154 -.72 .15 
45-54 18-24 -.757* .176 -1.29 -.23 
25-34 -.291 .119 -.62 .04 
35-44 -.193 .087 -.43 .05 
55+ -.480* .150 -.90 -.06 
55+ 18-24 -.278 .217 -.92 .36 
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25-34 .189 .174 -.30 .68 
35-44 .287 .154 -.15 .72 




18-24 25-34 -.300 .150 -.74 .14 
35-44 -.527* .130 -.91 -.14 
45-54 -.333 .127 -.71 .05 
55+ -.722* .161 -1.19 -.25 
25-34 18-24 .300 .150 -.14 .74 
35-44 -.227 .115 -.55 .09 
45-54 -.033 .111 -.34 .28 
55+ -.422* .149 -.84 .00 
35-44 18-24 .527* .130 .14 .91 
25-34 .227 .115 -.09 .55 
45-54 .194 .082 -.03 .42 
55+ -.195 .129 -.56 .17 
45-54 18-24 .333 .127 -.05 .71 
25-34 .033 .111 -.28 .34 
35-44 -.194 .082 -.42 .03 
55+ -.389* .126 -.74 -.03 
55+ 18-24 .722* .161 .25 1.19 
25-34 .422* .149 .00 .84 
35-44 .195 .129 -.17 .56 
45-54 .389* .126 .03 .74 
Liquidity guidelines 
and standards 
18-24 25-34 -.233 .159 -.70 .23 
35-44 -.246 .137 -.65 .16 
45-54 -.184 .132 -.58 .21 
55+ -.167 .165 -.65 .32 
25-34 18-24 .233 .159 -.23 .70 
35-44 -.013 .120 -.35 .32 
45-54 .050 .114 -.27 .37 
55+ .067 .152 -.36 .49 
35-44 18-24 .246 .137 -.16 .65 
25-34 .013 .120 -.32 .35 
45-54 .063 .081 -.16 .29 
55+ .080 .128 -.28 .44 
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45-54 18-24 .184 .132 -.21 .58 
25-34 -.050 .114 -.37 .27 
35-44 -.063 .081 -.29 .16 
55+ .017 .123 -.33 .36 
55+ 18-24 .167 .165 -.32 .65 
25-34 -.067 .152 -.49 .36 
35-44 -.080 .128 -.44 .28 
45-54 -.017 .123 -.36 .33 
Auditing and 
governance oversight 
18-24 25-34 .067 .279 -.78 .91 
35-44 -.050 .274 -.88 .78 
45-54 -.093 .274 -.92 .74 
55+ .000 .280 -.85 .85 
25-34 18-24 -.067 .279 -.91 .78 
35-44 -.116 .095 -.38 .15 
45-54 -.159 .095 -.42 .10 
55+ -.067 .109 -.37 .24 
35-44 18-24 .050 .274 -.78 .88 
25-34 .116 .095 -.15 .38 
45-54 -.043 .081 -.27 .18 
55+ .050 .098 -.22 .32 
45-54 18-24 .093 .274 -.74 .92 
25-34 .159 .095 -.10 .42 
35-44 .043 .081 -.18 .27 
55+ .093 .098 -.18 .37 
55+ 18-24 .000 .280 -.85 .85 
25-34 .067 .109 -.24 .37 
35-44 -.050 .098 -.32 .22 




18-24 25-34 -.700* .145 -1.13 -.27 
35-44 -.736* .134 -1.13 -.34 
45-54 -.397* .124 -.77 -.02 
55+ -.611* .145 -1.04 -.18 
25-34 18-24 .700* .145 .27 1.13 
35-44 -.036 .112 -.35 .28 
45-54 .303* .101 .02 .58 
  
328 
55+ .089 .126 -.26 .44 
35-44 18-24 .736* .134 .34 1.13 
25-34 .036 .112 -.28 .35 
45-54 .340* .084 .11 .57 
55+ .125 .113 -.19 .44 
45-54 18-24 .397* .124 .02 .77 
25-34 -.303* .101 -.58 -.02 
35-44 -.340* .084 -.57 -.11 
55+ -.214 .101 -.50 .07 
55+ 18-24 .611* .145 .18 1.04 
25-34 -.089 .126 -.44 .26 
35-44 -.125 .113 -.44 .19 
45-54 .214 .101 -.07 .50 
Infrastructure and 
system 
18-24 25-34 .100 .209 -.52 .72 
35-44 .363 .190 -.21 .94 
45-54 .232 .189 -.34 .80 
55+ .389 .229 -.29 1.07 
25-34 18-24 -.100 .209 -.72 .52 
35-44 .263 .119 -.07 .60 
45-54 .132 .118 -.19 .46 
55+ .289 .176 -.20 .78 
35-44 18-24 -.363 .190 -.94 .21 
25-34 -.263 .119 -.60 .07 
45-54 -.131 .078 -.35 .08 
55+ .026 .152 -.40 .45 
45-54 18-24 -.232 .189 -.80 .34 
25-34 -.132 .118 -.46 .19 
35-44 .131 .078 -.08 .35 
55+ .157 .151 -.27 .58 
55+ 18-24 -.389 .229 -1.07 .29 
25-34 -.289 .176 -.78 .20 
35-44 -.026 .152 -.45 .40 
45-54 -.157 .151 -.58 .27 
Domestic competitive 
forces 
18-24 25-34 -.500 .233 -1.20 .20 
35-44 -.182 .224 -.86 .50 
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45-54 -.243 .223 -.92 .43 
55+ -.056 .240 -.78 .67 
25-34 18-24 .500 .233 -.20 1.20 
35-44 .318* .098 .05 .59 
45-54 .257 .097 -.01 .53 
55+ .444* .131 .08 .81 
35-44 18-24 .182 .224 -.50 .86 
25-34 -.318* .098 -.59 -.05 
45-54 -.061 .071 -.26 .13 
55+ .126 .113 -.19 .44 
45-54 18-24 .243 .223 -.43 .92 
25-34 -.257 .097 -.53 .01 
35-44 .061 .071 -.13 .26 
55+ .187 .113 -.13 .50 
55+ 18-24 .056 .240 -.67 .78 
25-34 -.444* .131 -.81 -.08 
35-44 -.126 .113 -.44 .19 
45-54 -.187 .113 -.50 .13 
International 
competitive forces 
18-24 25-34 .000 .153 -.46 .46 
35-44 -.060 .153 -.52 .40 
45-54 -.127 .149 -.57 .32 
55+ -.056 .164 -.54 .43 
25-34 18-24 .000 .153 -.46 .46 
35-44 -.060 .086 -.30 .18 
45-54 -.127 .079 -.35 .09 
55+ -.056 .105 -.35 .24 
35-44 18-24 .060 .153 -.40 .52 
25-34 .060 .086 -.18 .30 
45-54 -.067 .079 -.28 .15 
55+ .004 .105 -.29 .30 
45-54 18-24 .127 .149 -.32 .57 
25-34 .127 .079 -.09 .35 
35-44 .067 .079 -.15 .28 
55+ .071 .099 -.21 .35 
55+ 18-24 .056 .164 -.43 .54 
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25-34 .056 .105 -.24 .35 
35-44 -.004 .105 -.30 .29 
45-54 -.071 .099 -.35 .21 
Foreign investment 
and development 
18-24 25-34 -.333 .190 -.90 .23 
35-44 -.092 .179 -.63 .45 
45-54 -.129 .175 -.66 .40 
55+ -.389 .204 -.99 .22 
25-34 18-24 .333 .190 -.23 .90 
35-44 .241 .112 -.07 .55 
45-54 .205 .106 -.09 .50 
55+ -.056 .148 -.47 .36 
35-44 18-24 .092 .179 -.45 .63 
25-34 -.241 .112 -.55 .07 
45-54 -.037 .085 -.27 .20 
55+ -.297 .134 -.67 .08 
45-54 18-24 .129 .175 -.40 .66 
25-34 -.205 .106 -.50 .09 
35-44 .037 .085 -.20 .27 
55+ -.260 .129 -.62 .10 
55+ 18-24 .389 .204 -.22 .99 
25-34 .056 .148 -.36 .47 
35-44 .297 .134 -.08 .67 
45-54 .260 .129 -.10 .62 
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 /MISSING ANALYSIS 








Square F Sig. 
Section 2. 1. The 
banking industry is 
stable and diversified. 
Between Groups 29.055 4 7.264 6.699 .000 
Within Groups 645.105 595 1.084 
  
Total 674.160 599 
   
2. Current interest 
rates are competitive 
and in demand. 
Between Groups 9.349 4 2.337 1.577 .179 
Within Groups 882.116 595 1.483 
  
Total 891.465 599 
   
3. Central bank 
interventions have 
improved our lending 
strategies. 
Between Groups 1.198 4 .300 .657 .622 




   
4. We invest a high 
percentage of our 
funds in private 
sector enterprises. 
Between Groups 9.265 4 2.316 2.197 .068 




   
5. Most deposits are 
tied to oil and gas 
rents. 
Between Groups 3.311 4 .828 .547 .702 
Within Groups 901.189 595 1.515 
  
Total 904.500 599 
   
6. Our vision is 
global. and this 
Between Groups 16.700 4 4.175 2.550 .038 








   
7. Our default rates 
are anticipated and 
appropriate. 
Between Groups 20.102 4 5.026 3.249 .012 
Within Groups 920.398 595 1.547 
  
Total 940.500 599 
   
8. The financial 
instruments we use 
are market sensitive 
and vulnerable to 
risks. 
Between Groups 6.111 4 1.528 1.124 .344 




   
9. We anticipate that 
the oil and gas 
market will recover in 
price and volume. 
Between Groups 25.437 4 6.359 4.353 .002 




   
10. Most citizens do 
not plan financially for 
long-term market 
shocks. 
Between Groups 10.195 4 2.549 1.645 .161 




   
11. Government 
subsidies allow us to 
loan more freely to 
the private sector. 
Between Groups 3.042 4 .761 1.440 .219 




   





Between Groups 20.905 4 5.226 5.872 .000 




   
13. There is an 
inadequate 
population of skilled 
entrepreneurs in our 
national population. 
Between Groups 6.787 4 1.697 1.267 .282 




   
14. Banks are 
essential to the 
Between Groups 1.771 4 .443 .688 .601 





and therefore must 
be protected during 
periods of financial 
duress and decline. 
Total 
384.960 599 
   
15. The financial 
market is mature and 
competitive. 
Between Groups 2.238 4 .560 .796 .528 
Within Groups 418.422 595 .703 
  
Total 420.660 599 
   
Section 3. 1. Global 
pressures on the oil 




Between Groups 7.838 4 1.960 1.740 .139 




   
2. The variability of 
commodity pricing 
creates highly 
impactful risks for our 
nation. 
Between Groups 8.824 4 2.206 2.375 .051 




   
3. Even if we 
diversified our 
industries. we would 
need decades to 
allow them to mature. 
Between Groups 15.229 4 3.807 2.928 .020 




   
4. Strategic 
partnerships and FDI 
allow rapid exchange 
of knowledge and 
technology and 
should be supported. 
Between Groups 6.025 4 1.506 1.458 .213 




   
5. Our bank is 
vulnerable to 
systemic risks. 
Between Groups .223 4 .056 .060 .993 
Within Groups 549.842 595 .924 
  
Total 550.065 599 
   
6. Without 
government support. 
Between Groups 6.869 4 1.717 1.848 .118 




our bank would likely 




   
7. Liquidity levels are 
at an all-time low. 
Between Groups 21.474 4 5.368 4.655 .001 
Within Groups 686.151 595 1.153 
  
Total 707.625 599 
   
8. When oil prices 
decline. we are less 
likely to lend money 
to private enterprises. 
Between Groups 5.370 4 1.342 1.423 .225 




   
9. Citizens are more 
likely to withhold 
savings and 
investments when oil 
prices fluctuate or 
decline. 
Between Groups 3.307 4 .827 .817 .515 




   
10. Investing in 
diversification offers a 
layer of stability that 
we desperately need 
at this time. 
Between Groups 4.305 4 1.076 1.128 .342 




   
11. Intra-bank loans 
create a dangerous 
cycle of risk and 
vulnerability. 
Between Groups 5.410 4 1.352 1.208 .306 




   
12. The increase in 
lending rates is a 
positive step towards 
industry maturity. 
Between Groups 3.831 4 .958 .906 .460 




   
13. Most of our 
internal investment 
strategies are based 
on oil and gas 
exploitation. 
Between Groups 12.086 4 3.022 2.944 .020 




   
14. Countries have 
national industries 
Between Groups 15.535 4 3.884 4.041 .003 




and products: Ours 




   
15. The gap between 
the citizen and 
expatriate population 
in our nation is 
worrying. 
Between Groups 8.566 4 2.141 2.473 .043 




   
16. New companies 
are a liability; we 
would prefer to invest 
in tested models. 
Between Groups 29.150 4 7.287 7.517 .000 




   
17. Most small 
businesses are likely 
to fail if given enough 
time. 
Between Groups 9.240 4 2.310 2.981 .019 




   
18. Our banks should 
invest more heavily in 
business 
development and 
growth to increase 
industry performance. 
Between Groups 13.601 4 3.400 3.114 .015 




   
19. Without sufficient 
oil and gas liquidity. 
we cannot fund 
additional 
development. 
Between Groups 15.734 4 3.933 3.283 .011 




   
20. The domestic 
financial markets are 
unstable and high 
risk. 
Between Groups 3.995 4 .999 1.138 .337 




   
Section 4. 1. Our 
government has a 
long-term vision that 
does not rely on oil 
and gas for 
development. 
Between Groups 21.680 4 5.420 4.512 .001 
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2. The primary 




Between Groups 12.438 4 3.109 .973 .422 




   
3. The primary result 
of a government 
bailout in our nation 
is: 
Between Groups 152.259 4 38.065 12.710 .000 




   
4. Government 
investment in oil and 
gas is a necessary 
and sustainable 
commitment. 
Between Groups 4.156 4 1.039 .611 .655 




   
5. The government’s 
role in stabilising the 
domestic economy is: 
Between Groups 9.835 4 2.459 3.974 .003 
Within Groups 368.105 595 .619 
  
Total 377.940 599 
   
6. Our dependence 
on a single export 
makes our country 
look: 
Between Groups 1.482 4 .371 2.253 .062 




   
7. The primary factor 
restricting the number 
of national citizens in 
private sector 
employment is: 
Between Groups 4.362 4 1.090 .405 .805 




   
8. The primary sector 
which national 
citizens would like to 
work in is: 
Between Groups 44.530 4 11.133 3.023 .017 




   
9. Government 
analysts would rank 
the current threat 
level in oil and gas as 
follows: 
Between Groups 2.673 4 .668 1.144 .335 




   
Between Groups 65.691 4 16.423 7.606 .000 
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10. The government 
investment in oil and 
gas is based on the 
following objective: 









Price performance of 
the oil and gas 
industry 
Between Groups 6.556 4 1.639 2.851 .023 








Between Groups 3.313 4 .828 1.454 .215 
Within Groups 338.927 595 .570 
  
Total 342.240 599 




Between Groups 2.860 4 .715 .978 .419 
Within Groups 435.080 595 .731 
  
Total 437.940 599 
   
Diversification of 
industries 
Between Groups 20.586 4 5.147 8.292 .000 
Within Groups 369.279 595 .621 
  
Total 389.865 599 
   
Strategic vision or 
agenda for national 
change 
Between Groups 25.098 4 6.274 11.545 .000 
Within Groups 323.367 595 .543 
  
Total 348.465 599 
   
Industry rules and 
regulations 
Between Groups 9.101 4 2.275 4.188 .002 
Within Groups 323.284 595 .543 
  
Total 332.385 599 




Between Groups 15.370 4 3.843 5.411 .000 
Within Groups 422.570 595 .710 
  
Total 437.940 599 




Between Groups 5.697 4 1.424 2.489 .042 
Within Groups 340.488 595 .572 
  
Total 346.185 599 
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Foreign interests and 
investments 
Between Groups 4.054 4 1.014 1.289 .273 
Within Groups 467.786 595 .786 
  
Total 471.840 599 
   
Defaults and risks in 
bank performance 
Between Groups 1.866 4 .467 .824 .510 
Within Groups 336.759 595 .566 
  
Total 338.625 599 
   
Impact their 
organisational 
performance: Oil and 
gas industry prices 
Between Groups 14.725 4 3.681 4.975 .001 




   
Demand for loans 
and innovative 
financing products 
Between Groups 18.063 4 4.516 5.285 .000 
Within Groups 508.437 595 .855 
  
Total 526.500 599 




Between Groups 7.621 4 1.905 2.570 .037 
Within Groups 441.044 595 .741 
  
Total 448.665 599 
   
Liquidity guidelines 
and standards 
Between Groups 2.292 4 .573 .796 .528 
Within Groups 428.493 595 .720 
  
Total 430.785 599 
   
Auditing and 
governance oversight 
Between Groups 11.780 4 2.945 4.450 .001 
Within Groups 393.760 595 .662 
  
Total 405.540 599 




Between Groups 6.012 4 1.503 2.108 .078 
Within Groups 424.248 595 .713 
  
Total 430.260 599 
   
Infrastructure and 
system 
Between Groups 8.040 4 2.010 2.687 .031 
Within Groups 445.020 595 .748 
  
Total 453.060 599 
   
Domestic competitive 
forces 
Between Groups 5.603 4 1.401 2.412 .048 




Total 351.060 599 
   
International 
competitive forces 
Between Groups .712 4 .178 .305 .875 
Within Groups 346.913 595 .583 
  
Total 347.625 599 
   
Foreign investment 
and development 
Between Groups 12.893 4 3.223 4.328 .002 
Within Groups 443.107 595 .745 
  
Total 456.000 599 
   
 
 
Post Hoc Tests 
Multiple Comparisons 

















Section 2. 1. The 
banking industry is 
stable and 
diversified. 
secondary some college -2.000* .207 -2.62 -1.38 
bachelor's -1.316* .062 -1.49 -1.15 
master's -1.476* .067 -1.66 -1.29 
PhD -1.889* .145 -2.31 -1.47 
some college secondary 2.000* .207 1.38 2.62 
bachelor's .684* .216 .04 1.33 
master's .524 .218 -.12 1.17 
PhD .111 .252 -.64 .86 
bachelor's secondary 1.316* .062 1.15 1.49 
some college -.684* .216 -1.33 -.04 
master’s -.160 .091 -.41 .09 
PhD -.573* .157 -1.03 -.12 
master's secondary 1.476* .067 1.29 1.66 
some college -.524 .218 -1.17 .12 
bachelor’s .160 .091 -.09 .41 
PhD -.413 .159 -.87 .05 
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PhD secondary 1.889* .145 1.47 2.31 
some college -.111 .252 -.86 .64 
bachelor's .573* .157 .12 1.03 
master's .413 .159 -.05 .87 
2. Current interest 
rates are 
competitive and in 
demand. 
secondary some college .929 .701 -1.82 3.68 
bachelor's 1.020 .675 -1.68 3.72 
master's .881 .675 -1.82 3.58 
PhD .722 .719 -2.06 3.50 
some college secondary -.929 .701 -3.68 1.82 
bachelor's .092 .215 -.55 .73 
master's -.048 .215 -.68 .59 
PhD -.206 .328 -1.17 .76 
bachelor's secondary -1.020 .675 -3.72 1.68 
some college -.092 .215 -.73 .55 
master's -.139 .104 -.42 .15 
PhD -.298 .268 -1.08 .48 
master's secondary -.881 .675 -3.58 1.82 
some college .048 .215 -.59 .68 
bachelor's .139 .104 -.15 .42 
PhD -.159 .268 -.94 .62 
PhD secondary -.722 .719 -3.50 2.06 
some college .206 .328 -.76 1.17 
bachelor's .298 .268 -.48 1.08 
master's .159 .268 -.62 .94 




secondary some college -.143 .078 -.38 .09 
bachelor’s .041 .040 -.07 .15 
master’s .036 .044 -.09 .16 
PhD -.111 .111 -.44 .21 
some college secondary .143 .078 -.09 .38 
bachelor’s .184 .088 -.07 .44 
master’s .179 .090 -.08 .44 
PhD .032 .136 -.37 .43 
bachelor’s secondary -.041 .040 -.15 .07 
some college -.184 .088 -.44 .07 
master’s -.005 .059 -.17 .16 
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PhD -.152 .118 -.50 .19 
master’s secondary -.036 .044 -.16 .09 
some college -.179 .090 -.44 .08 
bachelor’s .005 .059 -.16 .17 
PhD -.147 .120 -.49 .20 
PhD secondary .111 .111 -.21 .44 
some college -.032 .136 -.43 .37 
bachelor’s .152 .118 -.19 .50 
master’s .147 .120 -.20 .49 
4. We invest a high 
percentage of our 
funds in private 
sector enterprises. 
secondary some college -.571 .202 -1.18 .03 
bachelor’s -.327* .062 -.50 -.16 
master’s -.524* .066 -.71 -.34 
PhD -.111 .062 -.29 .07 
some college secondary .571 .202 -.03 1.18 
bachelor’s .245 .211 -.38 .87 
master’s .048 .213 -.58 .68 
PhD .460 .211 -.17 1.09 
bachelor’s secondary .327* .062 .16 .50 
some college -.245 .211 -.87 .38 
master’s -.197 .091 -.45 .05 
PhD .215 .087 -.03 .46 
master’s secondary .524* .066 .34 .71 
some college -.048 .213 -.68 .58 
bachelor’s .197 .091 -.05 .45 
PhD .413* .091 .16 .67 
PhD secondary .111 .062 -.07 .29 
some college -.460 .211 -1.09 .17 
bachelor’s -.215 .087 -.46 .03 
master’s -.413* .091 -.67 -.16 
5. Most deposits 
are tied to oil and 
gas rents. 
secondary some college .643 .706 -2.12 3.41 
bachelor’s .673 .675 -2.02 3.37 
master’s .655 .675 -2.04 3.35 
PhD .500 .726 -2.30 3.30 
some college secondary -.643 .706 -3.41 2.12 
bachelor’s .031 .233 -.66 .72 
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master’s .012 .234 -.68 .71 
PhD -.143 .355 -1.19 .91 
bachelor’s secondary -.673 .675 -3.37 2.02 
some college -.031 .233 -.72 .66 
master’s -.019 .105 -.31 .27 
PhD -.173 .287 -1.01 .66 
master’s secondary -.655 .675 -3.35 2.04 
some college -.012 .234 -.71 .68 
bachelor’s .019 .105 -.27 .31 
PhD -.155 .287 -.99 .68 
PhD secondary -.500 .726 -3.30 2.30 
some college .143 .355 -.91 1.19 
bachelor’s .173 .287 -.66 1.01 
master’s .155 .287 -.68 .99 
6. Our vision is 
global. and this 
requires 
diversification. 
secondary some college -.500 .722 -3.30 2.30 
bachelor’s -.173 .675 -2.87 2.52 
master’s -.440 .675 -3.14 2.26 
PhD .167 .708 -2.60 2.93 
some college secondary .500 .722 -2.30 3.30 
bachelor’s .327 .278 -.50 1.15 
master’s .060 .279 -.77 .89 
PhD .667 .350 -.37 1.71 
bachelor’s secondary .173 .675 -2.52 2.87 
some college -.327 .278 -1.15 .50 
master’s -.267 .110 -.57 .03 
PhD .340 .239 -.36 1.04 
master’s secondary .440 .675 -2.26 3.14 
some college -.060 .279 -.89 .77 
bachelor’s .267 .110 -.03 .57 
PhD .607 .240 -.09 1.30 
PhD secondary -.167 .708 -2.93 2.60 
some college -.667 .350 -1.71 .37 
bachelor’s -.340 .239 -1.04 .36 
master’s -.607 .240 -1.30 .09 
secondary some college -1.500* .305 -2.58 -.42 
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7. Our default rates 
are anticipated and 
appropriate. 
bachelor’s -.582 .234 -1.50 .33 
master’s -.690 .238 -1.61 .23 
PhD -.500 .356 -1.70 .70 
some college secondary 1.500* .305 .42 2.58 
bachelor’s .918* .219 .27 1.57 
master’s .810* .223 .15 1.47 
PhD 1.000 .346 -.02 2.02 
bachelor’s secondary .582 .234 -.33 1.50 
some college -.918* .219 -1.57 -.27 
master’s -.109 .108 -.40 .19 
PhD .082 .286 -.75 .92 
master’s secondary .690 .238 -.23 1.61 
some college -.810* .223 -1.47 -.15 
bachelor’s .109 .108 -.19 .40 
PhD .190 .289 -.65 1.03 
PhD secondary .500 .356 -.70 1.70 
some college -1.000 .346 -2.02 .02 
bachelor’s -.082 .286 -.92 .75 
master’s -.190 .289 -1.03 .65 
8. The financial 
instruments we use 
are market 
sensitive and 
vulnerable to risks. 
secondary some college .929 .701 -1.82 3.68 
bachelor’s .878 .675 -1.82 3.57 
master’s .762 .675 -1.93 3.46 
PhD .833 .690 -1.89 3.56 
some college secondary -.929 .701 -3.68 1.82 
bachelor’s -.051 .214 -.69 .58 
master’s -.167 .215 -.80 .47 
PhD -.095 .258 -.86 .67 
bachelor’s secondary -.878 .675 -3.57 1.82 
some college .051 .214 -.58 .69 
master’s -.116 .101 -.39 .16 
PhD -.044 .175 -.55 .46 
master’s secondary -.762 .675 -3.46 1.93 
some college .167 .215 -.47 .80 
bachelor’s .116 .101 -.16 .39 
PhD .071 .176 -.44 .58 
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PhD secondary -.833 .690 -3.56 1.89 
some college .095 .258 -.67 .86 
bachelor’s .044 .175 -.46 .55 
master’s -.071 .176 -.58 .44 
9. We anticipate 
that the oil and gas 
market will recover 
in price and 
volume. 
secondary some college -2.000* .207 -2.62 -1.38 
bachelor’s -1.122* .068 -1.31 -.93 
master’s -1.155* .079 -1.37 -.94 
PhD -1.444* .263 -2.22 -.67 
some college secondary 2.000* .207 1.38 2.62 
bachelor’s .878* .218 .23 1.52 
master’s .845* .222 .19 1.50 
PhD .556 .335 -.43 1.54 
bachelor’s secondary 1.122* .068 .93 1.31 
some college -.878* .218 -1.52 -.23 
master’s -.032 .105 -.32 .26 
PhD -.322 .272 -1.12 .47 
master’s secondary 1.155* .079 .94 1.37 
some college -.845* .222 -1.50 -.19 
bachelor’s .032 .105 -.26 .32 
PhD -.290 .275 -1.09 .51 
PhD secondary 1.444* .263 .67 2.22 
some college -.556 .335 -1.54 .43 
bachelor’s .322 .272 -.47 1.12 
master’s .290 .275 -.51 1.09 
10. Most citizens do 
not plan financially 
for long-term 
market shocks. 
secondary some college .929 .701 -1.82 3.68 
bachelor’s .888 .675 -1.81 3.58 
master’s .679 .675 -2.02 3.38 
PhD .722 .719 -2.06 3.50 
some college secondary -.929 .701 -3.68 1.82 
bachelor’s -.041 .215 -.68 .60 
master’s -.250 .216 -.89 .39 
PhD -.206 .328 -1.17 .76 
bachelor’s secondary -.888 .675 -3.58 1.81 
some college .041 .215 -.60 .68 
master’s -.209 .107 -.50 .08 
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PhD -.166 .268 -.95 .62 
master’s secondary -.679 .675 -3.38 2.02 
some college .250 .216 -.39 .89 
bachelor’s .209 .107 -.08 .50 
PhD .044 .269 -.74 .83 
PhD secondary -.722 .719 -3.50 2.06 
some college .206 .328 -.76 1.17 
bachelor’s .166 .268 -.62 .95 
master’s -.044 .269 -.83 .74 
11. Government 
subsidies allow us 
to loan more freely 
to the private 
sector. 
secondary some college .500 .224 -.40 1.40 
bachelor’s .306 .228 -.60 1.21 
master’s .274 .229 -.63 1.18 
PhD .056 .244 -.88 .99 
some college secondary -.500 .224 -1.40 .40 
bachelor’s -.194* .042 -.31 -.08 
master’s -.226* .049 -.36 -.09 
PhD -.444* .097 -.73 -.16 
bachelor’s secondary -.306 .228 -1.21 .60 
some college .194* .042 .08 .31 
master’s -.032 .065 -.21 .15 
PhD -.251 .106 -.56 .06 
master’s secondary -.274 .229 -1.18 .63 
some college .226* .049 .09 .36 
bachelor’s .032 .065 -.15 .21 
PhD -.218 .109 -.53 .10 
PhD secondary -.056 .244 -.99 .88 
some college .444* .097 .16 .73 
bachelor’s .251 .106 -.06 .56 
master’s .218 .109 -.10 .53 





secondary some college -2.000* .207 -2.62 -1.38 
bachelor’s -1.786* .053 -1.93 -1.64 
master’s -1.714* .064 -1.89 -1.54 
PhD -1.889* .145 -2.31 -1.47 
some college secondary 2.000* .207 1.38 2.62 
bachelor’s .214 .214 -.42 .85 
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master’s .286 .217 -.36 .93 
PhD .111 .252 -.64 .86 
bachelor’s secondary 1.786* .053 1.64 1.93 
some college -.214 .214 -.85 .42 
master’s .071 .083 -.16 .30 
PhD -.103 .154 -.55 .34 
master’s secondary 1.714* .064 1.54 1.89 
some college -.286 .217 -.93 .36 
bachelor’s -.071 .083 -.30 .16 
PhD -.175 .158 -.63 .28 
PhD secondary 1.889* .145 1.47 2.31 
some college -.111 .252 -.86 .64 
bachelor’s .103 .154 -.34 .55 
master’s .175 .158 -.28 .63 
13. There is an 
inadequate 




secondary some college .214 .699 -2.53 2.96 
bachelor’s .592 .675 -2.10 3.29 
master’s .500 .674 -2.20 3.20 
PhD .278 .707 -2.48 3.04 
some college secondary -.214 .699 -2.96 2.53 
bachelor’s .378 .209 -.24 1.00 
master’s .286 .209 -.33 .90 
PhD .063 .297 -.81 .94 
bachelor’s secondary -.592 .675 -3.29 2.10 
some college -.378 .209 -1.00 .24 
master’s -.092 .099 -.36 .18 
PhD -.314 .233 -.99 .37 
master’s secondary -.500 .674 -3.20 2.20 
some college -.286 .209 -.90 .33 
bachelor’s .092 .099 -.18 .36 
PhD -.222 .233 -.90 .46 
PhD secondary -.278 .707 -3.04 2.48 
some college -.063 .297 -.94 .81 
bachelor’s .314 .233 -.37 .99 
master’s .222 .233 -.46 .90 
secondary some college .214 .273 -.79 1.22 
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14. Banks are 
essential to the 
domestic economy 
and therefore must 
be protected during 
periods of financial 
duress and decline. 
bachelor’s .327 .228 -.58 1.23 
master’s .250 .230 -.66 1.16 
PhD .167 .259 -.80 1.13 
some college secondary -.214 .273 -1.22 .79 
bachelor’s .112 .163 -.37 .60 
master’s .036 .165 -.45 .53 
PhD -.048 .204 -.65 .56 
bachelor’s secondary -.327 .228 -1.23 .58 
some college -.112 .163 -.60 .37 
master’s -.077 .070 -.27 .12 
PhD -.160 .139 -.56 .24 
master’s secondary -.250 .230 -1.16 .66 
some college -.036 .165 -.53 .45 
bachelor’s .077 .070 -.12 .27 
PhD -.083 .141 -.49 .33 
PhD secondary -.167 .259 -1.13 .80 
some college .048 .204 -.56 .65 
bachelor’s .160 .139 -.24 .56 
master’s .083 .141 -.33 .49 
15. The financial 
market is mature 
and competitive. 
secondary some college -.071 .277 -1.08 .94 
bachelor’s .204 .229 -.70 1.11 
master’s .143 .230 -.76 1.05 
PhD .278 .255 -.68 1.24 
some college secondary .071 .277 -.94 1.08 
bachelor’s .276 .170 -.23 .78 
master’s .214 .172 -.30 .72 
PhD .349 .204 -.26 .96 
bachelor’s secondary -.204 .229 -1.11 .70 
some college -.276 .170 -.78 .23 
master’s -.061 .073 -.26 .14 
PhD .074 .133 -.31 .46 
master’s secondary -.143 .230 -1.05 .76 
some college -.214 .172 -.72 .30 
bachelor’s .061 .073 -.14 .26 
PhD .135 .135 -.26 .53 
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PhD secondary -.278 .255 -1.24 .68 
some college -.349 .204 -.96 .26 
bachelor’s -.074 .133 -.46 .31 
master’s -.135 .135 -.53 .26 
Section 3. 1. Global 
pressures on the oil 




secondary some college -.357 .377 -1.62 .91 
bachelor’s .010 .232 -.90 .92 
master’s -.071 .233 -.98 .84 
PhD .389 .282 -.63 1.41 
some college secondary .357 .377 -.91 1.62 
bachelor’s .367 .309 -.56 1.29 
master’s .286 .310 -.64 1.21 
PhD .746 .348 -.29 1.78 
bachelor’s secondary -.010 .232 -.92 .90 
some college -.367 .309 -1.29 .56 
master’s -.082 .091 -.33 .17 
PhD .379 .183 -.15 .91 
master’s secondary .071 .233 -.84 .98 
some college -.286 .310 -1.21 .64 
bachelor’s .082 .091 -.17 .33 
PhD .460 .184 -.07 .99 
PhD secondary -.389 .282 -1.41 .63 
some college -.746 .348 -1.78 .29 
bachelor’s -.379 .183 -.91 .15 
master’s -.460 .184 -.99 .07 
2. The variability of 
commodity pricing 
creates highly 
impactful risks for 
our nation. 
secondary some college -.357 .377 -1.62 .91 
bachelor’s -.031 .230 -.94 .88 
master’s -.131 .231 -1.04 .78 
PhD .389 .282 -.63 1.41 
some college secondary .357 .377 -.91 1.62 
bachelor’s .327 .308 -.59 1.25 
master’s .226 .309 -.70 1.15 
PhD .746 .348 -.29 1.78 
bachelor’s secondary .031 .230 -.88 .94 
some college -.327 .308 -1.25 .59 
master’s -.100 .082 -.32 .12 
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PhD .420 .180 -.11 .94 
master’s secondary .131 .231 -.78 1.04 
some college -.226 .309 -1.15 .70 
bachelor’s .100 .082 -.12 .32 
PhD .520 .182 -.01 1.05 
PhD secondary -.389 .282 -1.41 .63 
some college -.746 .348 -1.78 .29 
bachelor’s -.420 .180 -.94 .11 
master’s -.520 .182 -1.05 .01 




decades to allow 
them to mature. 
secondary some college -1.071 .385 -2.35 .21 
bachelor’s -.439 .233 -1.35 .47 
master’s -.548 .235 -1.46 .37 
PhD -.056 .292 -1.10 .98 
some college secondary 1.071 .385 -.21 2.35 
bachelor’s .633 .320 -.32 1.59 
master’s .524 .321 -.43 1.48 
PhD 1.016 .365 -.07 2.10 
bachelor’s secondary .439 .233 -.47 1.35 
some college -.633 .320 -1.59 .32 
master’s -.109 .098 -.38 .16 
PhD .383 .199 -.20 .96 
master’s secondary .548 .235 -.37 1.46 
some college -.524 .321 -1.48 .43 
bachelor’s .109 .098 -.16 .38 
PhD .492 .200 -.09 1.07 
PhD secondary .056 .292 -.98 1.10 
some college -1.016 .365 -2.10 .07 
bachelor’s -.383 .199 -.96 .20 
master’s -.492 .200 -1.07 .09 
4. Strategic 
partnerships and 




secondary some college -.071 .366 -1.30 1.16 
bachelor’s .133 .231 -.78 1.04 
master’s -.012 .233 -.92 .90 
PhD .389 .282 -.63 1.41 
some college secondary .071 .366 -1.16 1.30 





master’s .060 .296 -.82 .94 
PhD .460 .336 -.54 1.46 
bachelor’s secondary -.133 .231 -1.04 .78 
some college -.204 .295 -1.08 .68 
master’s -.145 .087 -.38 .09 
PhD .256 .181 -.27 .78 
master’s secondary .012 .233 -.90 .92 
some college -.060 .296 -.94 .82 
bachelor’s .145 .087 -.09 .38 
PhD .401 .183 -.13 .93 
PhD secondary -.389 .282 -1.41 .63 
some college -.460 .336 -1.46 .54 
bachelor’s -.256 .181 -.78 .27 
master’s -.401 .183 -.93 .13 
5. Our bank is 
vulnerable to 
systemic risks. 
secondary some college -.071 .346 -1.25 1.11 
bachelor’s -.122 .231 -1.03 .79 
master’s -.107 .232 -1.02 .80 
PhD -.167 .259 -1.13 .80 
some college secondary .071 .346 -1.11 1.25 
bachelor’s -.051 .269 -.85 .75 
master’s -.036 .270 -.84 .77 
PhD -.095 .294 -.97 .78 
bachelor’s secondary .122 .231 -.79 1.03 
some college .051 .269 -.75 .85 
master’s .015 .083 -.21 .24 
PhD -.044 .143 -.46 .37 
master’s secondary .107 .232 -.80 1.02 
some college .036 .270 -.77 .84 
bachelor’s -.015 .083 -.24 .21 
PhD -.060 .144 -.48 .36 
PhD secondary .167 .259 -.80 1.13 
some college .095 .294 -.78 .97 
bachelor’s .044 .143 -.37 .46 
master’s .060 .144 -.36 .48 





support. our bank 




bachelor’s .041 .231 -.87 .95 
master’s .071 .233 -.84 .98 
PhD .500 .242 -.43 1.43 
some college secondary -.357 .265 -1.34 .63 
bachelor’s -.316 .153 -.77 .14 
master’s -.286 .157 -.75 .18 
PhD .143 .170 -.36 .65 
bachelor’s secondary -.041 .231 -.95 .87 
some college .316 .153 -.14 .77 
master’s .031 .086 -.20 .27 
PhD .459* .108 .15 .77 
master’s secondary -.071 .233 -.98 .84 
some college .286 .157 -.18 .75 
bachelor’s -.031 .086 -.27 .20 
PhD .429* .113 .10 .75 
PhD secondary -.500 .242 -1.43 .43 
some college -.143 .170 -.65 .36 
bachelor’s -.459* .108 -.77 -.15 
master’s -.429* .113 -.75 -.10 
7. Liquidity levels 
are at an all-time 
low. 
secondary some college -.786 .343 -1.96 .39 
bachelor’s .092 .232 -.82 1.00 
master’s -.131 .234 -1.04 .78 
PhD .278 .315 -.82 1.37 
some college secondary .786 .343 -.39 1.96 
bachelor’s .878* .267 .08 1.67 
master’s .655 .268 -.14 1.45 
PhD 1.063* .342 .05 2.08 
bachelor’s secondary -.092 .232 -1.00 .82 
some college -.878* .267 -1.67 -.08 
master’s -.223 .092 -.48 .03 
PhD .186 .231 -.49 .86 
master’s secondary .131 .234 -.78 1.04 
some college -.655 .268 -1.45 .14 
bachelor’s .223 .092 -.03 .48 
PhD .409 .232 -.27 1.09 
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PhD secondary -.278 .315 -1.37 .82 
some college -1.063* .342 -2.08 -.05 
bachelor’s -.186 .231 -.86 .49 
master’s -.409 .232 -1.09 .27 
8. When oil prices 
decline. we are less 
likely to lend money 
to private 
enterprises. 
secondary some college -.214 .321 -1.33 .91 
bachelor’s -.010 .231 -.92 .90 
master’s -.167 .231 -1.08 .74 
PhD .167 .275 -.84 1.17 
some college secondary .214 .321 -.91 1.33 
bachelor’s .204 .238 -.50 .91 
master’s .048 .238 -.66 .76 
PhD .381 .281 -.45 1.21 
bachelor’s secondary .010 .231 -.90 .92 
some college -.204 .238 -.91 .50 
master’s -.156 .083 -.39 .07 
PhD .177 .171 -.32 .67 
master’s secondary .167 .231 -.74 1.08 
some college -.048 .238 -.76 .66 
bachelor’s .156 .083 -.07 .39 
PhD .333 .171 -.16 .83 
PhD secondary -.167 .275 -1.17 .84 
some college -.381 .281 -1.21 .45 
bachelor’s -.177 .171 -.67 .32 
master’s -.333 .171 -.83 .16 
9. Citizens are 
more likely to 
withhold savings 
and investments 
when oil prices 
fluctuate or decline. 
secondary some college -.357 .377 -1.62 .91 
bachelor’s -.031 .232 -.94 .88 
master’s -.024 .231 -.93 .89 
PhD .167 .275 -.84 1.17 
some college secondary .357 .377 -.91 1.62 
bachelor’s .327 .309 -.60 1.25 
master’s .333 .309 -.59 1.25 
PhD .524 .343 -.50 1.54 
bachelor’s secondary .031 .232 -.88 .94 
some college -.327 .309 -1.25 .60 
master’s .007 .085 -.23 .24 
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PhD .197 .171 -.30 .69 
master’s secondary .024 .231 -.89 .93 
some college -.333 .309 -1.25 .59 
bachelor’s -.007 .085 -.24 .23 
PhD .190 .171 -.31 .69 
PhD secondary -.167 .275 -1.17 .84 
some college -.524 .343 -1.54 .50 
bachelor’s -.197 .171 -.69 .30 
master’s -.190 .171 -.69 .31 
10. Investing in 
diversification offers 
a layer of stability 
that we desperately 
need at this time. 
secondary some college .214 .363 -1.01 1.44 
bachelor’s .102 .231 -.81 1.01 
master’s .012 .232 -.90 .92 
PhD .389 .282 -.63 1.41 
some college secondary -.214 .363 -1.44 1.01 
bachelor’s -.112 .291 -.98 .76 
master’s -.202 .292 -1.07 .67 
PhD .175 .333 -.82 1.17 
bachelor’s secondary -.102 .231 -1.01 .81 
some college .112 .291 -.76 .98 
master’s -.090 .083 -.32 .14 
PhD .287 .181 -.24 .81 
master’s secondary -.012 .232 -.92 .90 
some college .202 .292 -.67 1.07 
bachelor’s .090 .083 -.14 .32 
PhD .377 .182 -.15 .91 
PhD secondary -.389 .282 -1.41 .63 
some college -.175 .333 -1.17 .82 
bachelor’s -.287 .181 -.81 .24 
master’s -.377 .182 -.91 .15 
11. Intra-bank loans 
create a dangerous 
cycle of risk and 
vulnerability. 
secondary some college -.357 .377 -1.62 .91 
bachelor’s .041 .231 -.87 .95 
master’s -.107 .234 -1.02 .81 
PhD .056 .292 -.98 1.10 
some college secondary .357 .377 -.91 1.62 
bachelor’s .398 .309 -.52 1.32 
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master’s .250 .311 -.68 1.18 
PhD .413 .356 -.65 1.47 
bachelor’s secondary -.041 .231 -.95 .87 
some college -.398 .309 -1.32 .52 
master’s -.148 .091 -.40 .10 
PhD .015 .197 -.56 .59 
master’s secondary .107 .234 -.81 1.02 
some college -.250 .311 -1.18 .68 
bachelor’s .148 .091 -.10 .40 
PhD .163 .200 -.42 .74 
PhD secondary -.056 .292 -1.10 .98 
some college -.413 .356 -1.47 .65 
bachelor’s -.015 .197 -.59 .56 
master’s -.163 .200 -.74 .42 
12. The increase in 




secondary some college -.357 .377 -1.62 .91 
bachelor’s -.020 .231 -.93 .89 
master’s -.131 .233 -1.04 .78 
PhD .056 .292 -.98 1.10 
some college secondary .357 .377 -.91 1.62 
bachelor’s .337 .309 -.58 1.26 
master’s .226 .310 -.70 1.15 
PhD .413 .356 -.65 1.47 
bachelor’s secondary .020 .231 -.89 .93 
some college -.337 .309 -1.26 .58 
master’s -.111 .087 -.35 .13 
PhD .076 .197 -.50 .65 
master’s secondary .131 .233 -.78 1.04 
some college -.226 .310 -1.15 .70 
bachelor’s .111 .087 -.13 .35 
PhD .187 .198 -.39 .76 
PhD secondary -.056 .292 -1.10 .98 
some college -.413 .356 -1.47 .65 
bachelor’s -.076 .197 -.65 .50 
master’s -.187 .198 -.76 .39 
secondary some college -.786 .321 -1.91 .33 
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13. Most of our 
internal investment 
strategies are 
based on oil and 
gas exploitation. 
bachelor’s -.163 .231 -1.07 .75 
master’s -.250 .233 -1.16 .66 
PhD .167 .275 -.84 1.17 
some college secondary .786 .321 -.33 1.91 
bachelor’s .622 .238 -.09 1.33 
master’s .536 .240 -.18 1.25 
PhD .952* .281 .12 1.79 
bachelor’s secondary .163 .231 -.75 1.07 
some college -.622 .238 -1.33 .09 
master’s -.087 .088 -.33 .16 
PhD .330 .170 -.17 .83 
master’s secondary .250 .233 -.66 1.16 
some college -.536 .240 -1.25 .18 
bachelor’s .087 .088 -.16 .33 
PhD .417 .173 -.09 .92 
PhD secondary -.167 .275 -1.17 .84 
some college -.952* .281 -1.79 -.12 
bachelor’s -.330 .170 -.83 .17 
master’s -.417 .173 -.92 .09 
14. Countries have 
national industries 
and products: Ours 
should remain oil 
and gas. 
secondary some college -.500 .254 -1.46 .46 
bachelor’s .224 .232 -.69 1.13 
master’s .000 .231 -.91 .91 
PhD .278 .301 -.78 1.34 
some college secondary .500 .254 -.46 1.46 
bachelor’s .724* .134 .33 1.12 
master’s .500* .133 .11 .89 
PhD .778* .235 .09 1.47 
bachelor’s secondary -.224 .232 -1.13 .69 
some college -.724* .134 -1.12 -.33 
master’s -.224 .084 -.46 .01 
PhD .053 .211 -.56 .67 
master’s secondary .000 .231 -.91 .91 
some college -.500* .133 -.89 -.11 
bachelor’s .224 .084 -.01 .46 
PhD .278 .210 -.34 .89 
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PhD secondary -.278 .301 -1.34 .78 
some college -.778* .235 -1.47 -.09 
bachelor’s -.053 .211 -.67 .56 
master’s -.278 .210 -.89 .34 
15. The gap 
between the citizen 
and expatriate 
population in our 
nation is worrying. 
secondary some college .500 .254 -.46 1.46 
bachelor’s .480 .232 -.43 1.39 
master’s .250 .229 -.66 1.16 
PhD .278 .301 -.78 1.34 
some college secondary -.500 .254 -1.46 .46 
bachelor’s -.020 .134 -.41 .37 
master’s -.250 .130 -.63 .13 
PhD -.222 .235 -.91 .47 
bachelor’s secondary -.480 .232 -1.39 .43 
some college .020 .134 -.37 .41 
master’s -.230* .079 -.45 -.01 
PhD -.202 .211 -.82 .41 
master’s secondary -.250 .229 -1.16 .66 
some college .250 .130 -.13 .63 
bachelor’s .230* .079 .01 .45 
PhD .028 .209 -.58 .64 
PhD secondary -.278 .301 -1.34 .78 
some college .222 .235 -.47 .91 
bachelor’s .202 .211 -.41 .82 
master’s -.028 .209 -.64 .58 
16. New companies 
are a liability; we 
would prefer to 
invest in tested 
models. 
secondary some college -.643 .265 -1.63 .34 
bachelor’s .204 .232 -.71 1.11 
master’s -.024 .231 -.93 .88 
PhD .722 .301 -.34 1.78 
some college secondary .643 .265 -.34 1.63 
bachelor’s .847* .156 .39 1.31 
master’s .619* .154 .16 1.08 
PhD 1.365* .247 .64 2.10 
bachelor’s secondary -.204 .232 -1.11 .71 
some college -.847* .156 -1.31 -.39 
master’s -.228 .085 -.46 .00 
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PhD .518 .211 -.10 1.13 
master’s secondary .024 .231 -.88 .93 
some college -.619* .154 -1.08 -.16 
bachelor’s .228 .085 .00 .46 
PhD .746* .210 .13 1.36 
PhD secondary -.722 .301 -1.78 .34 
some college -1.365* .247 -2.10 -.64 
bachelor’s -.518 .211 -1.13 .10 
master’s -.746* .210 -1.36 -.13 
17. Most small 
businesses are 
likely to fail if given 
enough time. 
secondary some college -1.143 .469 -2.98 .70 
bachelor’s -.776 .450 -2.57 1.02 
master’s -.869 .450 -2.67 .93 
PhD -.556 .476 -2.40 1.29 
some college secondary 1.143 .469 -.70 2.98 
bachelor’s .367 .153 -.08 .82 
master’s .274 .152 -.18 .73 
PhD .587 .217 -.05 1.23 
bachelor’s secondary .776 .450 -1.02 2.57 
some college -.367 .153 -.82 .08 
master’s -.094 .076 -.30 .11 
PhD .220 .172 -.28 .72 
master’s secondary .869 .450 -.93 2.67 
some college -.274 .152 -.73 .18 
bachelor’s .094 .076 -.11 .30 
PhD .313 .172 -.19 .81 
PhD secondary .556 .476 -1.29 2.40 
some college -.587 .217 -1.23 .05 
bachelor’s -.220 .172 -.72 .28 
master’s -.313 .172 -.81 .19 
18. Our banks 
should invest more 
heavily in business 
development and 
growth to increase 
secondary some college .643 .337 -.52 1.80 
bachelor’s .908 .231 .00 1.82 
master’s .833 .234 -.08 1.75 
PhD 1.389* .282 .37 2.41 
some college secondary -.643 .337 -1.80 .52 





master’s .190 .261 -.59 .97 
PhD .746 .304 -.16 1.65 
bachelor’s secondary -.908 .231 -1.82 .00 
some college -.265 .258 -1.04 .50 
master’s -.075 .091 -.32 .17 
PhD .481 .182 -.05 1.01 
master’s secondary -.833 .234 -1.75 .08 
some college -.190 .261 -.97 .59 
bachelor’s .075 .091 -.17 .32 
PhD .556* .185 .02 1.09 
PhD secondary -1.389* .282 -2.41 -.37 
some college -.746 .304 -1.65 .16 
bachelor’s -.481 .182 -1.01 .05 
master’s -.556* .185 -1.09 -.02 
19. Without 
sufficient oil and 




secondary some college -1.214* .298 -2.28 -.15 
bachelor’s -.469 .234 -1.38 .44 
master’s -.405 .233 -1.32 .51 
PhD -.722 .301 -1.78 .34 
some college secondary 1.214* .298 .15 2.28 
bachelor’s .745* .208 .13 1.36 
master’s .810* .208 .19 1.43 
PhD .492 .282 -.34 1.33 
bachelor’s secondary .469 .234 -.44 1.38 
some college -.745* .208 -1.36 -.13 
master’s .065 .094 -.19 .32 
PhD -.253 .213 -.87 .37 
master’s secondary .405 .233 -.51 1.32 
some college -.810* .208 -1.43 -.19 
bachelor’s -.065 .094 -.32 .19 
PhD -.317 .213 -.94 .30 
PhD secondary .722 .301 -.34 1.78 
some college -.492 .282 -1.33 .34 
bachelor’s .253 .213 -.37 .87 
master’s .317 .213 -.30 .94 
secondary some college .643 .291 -.40 1.69 
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20. The domestic 
financial markets 
are unstable and 
high risk. 
bachelor’s .684 .231 -.23 1.59 
master’s .583 .230 -.32 1.49 
PhD .722 .255 -.24 1.68 
some college secondary -.643 .291 -1.69 .40 
bachelor’s .041 .196 -.54 .62 
master’s -.060 .194 -.64 .52 
PhD .079 .223 -.58 .74 
bachelor’s secondary -.684 .231 -1.59 .23 
some college -.041 .196 -.62 .54 
master’s -.100 .081 -.32 .12 
PhD .039 .137 -.36 .43 
master’s secondary -.583 .230 -1.49 .32 
some college .060 .194 -.52 .64 
bachelor’s .100 .081 -.12 .32 
PhD .139 .135 -.25 .53 
PhD secondary -.722 .255 -1.68 .24 
some college -.079 .223 -.74 .58 
bachelor’s -.039 .137 -.43 .36 
master’s -.139 .135 -.53 .25 
Section 4. 1. Our 
government has a 
long-term vision 
that does not rely 
on oil and gas for 
development. 
secondary some college .214 .298 -.85 1.28 
bachelor’s .602 .233 -.31 1.51 
master’s .452 .234 -.46 1.36 
PhD 1.278* .287 .25 2.31 
some college secondary -.214 .298 -1.28 .85 
bachelor’s .388 .208 -.23 1.00 
master’s .238 .208 -.38 .86 
PhD 1.063* .267 .27 1.85 
bachelor’s secondary -.602 .233 -1.51 .31 
some college -.388 .208 -1.00 .23 
master’s -.150 .095 -.41 .11 
PhD .676* .192 .12 1.23 
master’s secondary -.452 .234 -1.36 .46 
some college -.238 .208 -.86 .38 
bachelor’s .150 .095 -.11 .41 
PhD .825* .192 .27 1.38 
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PhD secondary -1.278* .287 -2.31 -.25 
some college -1.063* .267 -1.85 -.27 
bachelor’s -.676* .192 -1.23 -.12 
master’s -.825* .192 -1.38 -.27 
2. The primary 
industry upon which 
lending and 
development 
should focus is: 
secondary some college .571 .977 -3.19 4.33 
bachelor’s -.092 .901 -3.69 3.51 
master’s -.143 .901 -3.74 3.46 
PhD .222 .954 -3.48 3.92 
some college secondary -.571 .977 -4.33 3.19 
bachelor’s -.663 .408 -1.88 .55 
master’s -.714 .409 -1.93 .50 
PhD -.349 .514 -1.87 1.18 
bachelor’s secondary .092 .901 -3.51 3.69 
some college .663 .408 -.55 1.88 
master’s -.051 .153 -.47 .37 
PhD .314 .347 -.70 1.32 
master’s secondary .143 .901 -3.46 3.74 
some college .714 .409 -.50 1.93 
bachelor’s .051 .153 -.37 .47 
PhD .365 .349 -.65 1.38 
PhD secondary -.222 .954 -3.92 3.48 
some college .349 .514 -1.18 1.87 
bachelor’s -.314 .347 -1.32 .70 
master’s -.365 .349 -1.38 .65 
3. The primary 
result of a 
government bailout 
in our nation is: 
secondary some college -.857 .326 -1.83 .12 
bachelor’s -2.337* .105 -2.63 -2.05 
master’s -1.500* .106 -1.79 -1.21 
PhD -2.556* .335 -3.54 -1.58 
some college secondary .857 .326 -.12 1.83 
bachelor’s -1.480* .342 -2.50 -.46 
master’s -.643 .342 -1.66 .37 
PhD -1.698* .467 -3.08 -.32 
bachelor’s secondary 2.337* .105 2.05 2.63 
some college 1.480* .342 .46 2.50 
master’s .837* .149 .43 1.25 
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PhD -.219 .351 -1.24 .80 
master’s secondary 1.500* .106 1.21 1.79 
some college .643 .342 -.37 1.66 
bachelor’s -.837* .149 -1.25 -.43 
PhD -1.056* .351 -2.08 -.03 
PhD secondary 2.556* .335 1.58 3.54 
some college 1.698* .467 .32 3.08 
bachelor’s .219 .351 -.80 1.24 
master’s 1.056* .351 .03 2.08 
4. Government 
investment in oil 




secondary some college -.357 .716 -3.14 2.43 
bachelor’s -.184 .675 -2.88 2.51 
master’s -.345 .676 -3.04 2.35 
PhD -.278 .713 -3.05 2.49 
some college secondary .357 .716 -2.43 3.14 
bachelor’s .173 .262 -.61 .95 
master’s .012 .265 -.78 .80 
PhD .079 .348 -.95 1.11 
bachelor’s secondary .184 .675 -2.51 2.88 
some college -.173 .262 -.95 .61 
master’s -.162 .113 -.47 .15 
PhD -.094 .252 -.83 .64 
master’s secondary .345 .676 -2.35 3.04 
some college -.012 .265 -.80 .78 
bachelor’s .162 .113 -.15 .47 
PhD .067 .255 -.67 .81 
PhD secondary .278 .713 -2.49 3.05 
some college -.079 .348 -1.11 .95 
bachelor’s .094 .252 -.64 .83 
master’s -.067 .255 -.81 .67 
5. The 
government’s role 
in stabilising the 
domestic economy 
is: 
secondary some college -.571* .111 -.90 -.24 
bachelor’s -.398* .042 -.51 -.28 
master’s -.643* .053 -.79 -.50 
PhD -.556 .209 -1.17 .06 
some college secondary .571* .111 .24 .90 
bachelor’s .173 .118 -.18 .52 
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master’s -.071 .123 -.43 .29 
PhD .016 .236 -.68 .71 
bachelor’s secondary .398* .042 .28 .51 
some college -.173 .118 -.52 .18 
master’s -.245* .068 -.43 -.06 
PhD -.158 .213 -.78 .47 
master’s secondary .643* .053 .50 .79 
some college .071 .123 -.29 .43 
bachelor’s .245* .068 .06 .43 
PhD .087 .216 -.54 .72 
PhD secondary .556 .209 -.06 1.17 
some college -.016 .236 -.71 .68 
bachelor’s .158 .213 -.47 .78 
master’s -.087 .216 -.72 .54 
6. Our dependence 
on a single export 
makes our country 
look: 
secondary some college .000 .000 .00 .00 
bachelor’s .163* .026 .09 .23 
master’s .095* .025 .03 .16 
PhD .000 .000 .00 .00 
some college secondary .000 .000 .00 .00 
bachelor’s .163* .026 .09 .23 
master’s .095* .025 .03 .16 
PhD .000 .000 .00 .00 
bachelor’s secondary -.163* .026 -.23 -.09 
some college -.163* .026 -.23 -.09 
master’s -.068 .036 -.17 .03 
PhD -.163* .026 -.23 -.09 
master’s secondary -.095* .025 -.16 -.03 
some college -.095* .025 -.16 -.03 
bachelor’s .068 .036 -.03 .17 
PhD -.095* .025 -.16 -.03 
PhD secondary .000 .000 .00 .00 
some college .000 .000 .00 .00 
bachelor’s .163* .026 .09 .23 
master’s .095* .025 .03 .16 
secondary some college .643 .801 -2.33 3.61 
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7. The primary 
factor restricting the 
number of national 
citizens in private 
sector employment 
is: 
bachelor’s .673 .677 -2.03 3.37 
master’s .560 .678 -2.14 3.26 
PhD .722 .781 -2.19 3.63 
some college secondary -.643 .801 -3.61 2.33 
bachelor’s .031 .448 -1.31 1.37 
master’s -.083 .449 -1.42 1.26 
PhD .079 .594 -1.68 1.84 
bachelor’s secondary -.673 .677 -3.37 2.03 
some college -.031 .448 -1.37 1.31 
master’s -.114 .137 -.49 .26 
PhD .049 .412 -1.15 1.25 
master’s secondary -.560 .678 -3.26 2.14 
some college .083 .449 -1.26 1.42 
bachelor’s .114 .137 -.26 .49 
PhD .163 .413 -1.04 1.37 
PhD secondary -.722 .781 -3.63 2.19 
some college -.079 .594 -1.84 1.68 
bachelor’s -.049 .412 -1.25 1.15 
master’s -.163 .413 -1.37 1.04 
8. The primary 
sector which 
national citizens 
would like to work 
in is: 
secondary some college -.071 .740 -2.91 2.76 
bachelor’s 1.163 .681 -1.54 3.87 
master’s 1.143 .682 -1.56 3.85 
PhD 1.611 .746 -1.23 4.45 
some college secondary .071 .740 -2.76 2.91 
bachelor’s 1.235* .333 .25 2.22 
master’s 1.214* .336 .22 2.21 
PhD 1.683* .452 .34 3.02 
bachelor’s secondary -1.163 .681 -3.87 1.54 
some college -1.235* .333 -2.22 -.25 
master’s -.020 .167 -.48 .44 
PhD .448 .346 -.56 1.45 
master’s secondary -1.143 .682 -3.85 1.56 
some college -1.214* .336 -2.21 -.22 
bachelor’s .020 .167 -.44 .48 
PhD .468 .348 -.54 1.48 
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PhD secondary -1.611 .746 -4.45 1.23 
some college -1.683* .452 -3.02 -.34 
bachelor’s -.448 .346 -1.45 .56 
master’s -.468 .348 -1.48 .54 
9. Government 
analysts would rank 
the current threat 
level in oil and gas 
as follows: 
secondary some college -.214 .273 -1.22 .79 
bachelor’s -.143 .228 -1.05 .76 
master’s -.262 .229 -1.17 .64 
PhD -.056 .244 -.99 .88 
some college secondary .214 .273 -.79 1.22 
bachelor’s .071 .163 -.41 .56 
master’s -.048 .164 -.53 .44 
PhD .159 .184 -.39 .71 
bachelor’s secondary .143 .228 -.76 1.05 
some college -.071 .163 -.56 .41 
master’s -.119 .067 -.30 .06 
PhD .087 .107 -.22 .40 
master’s secondary .262 .229 -.64 1.17 
some college .048 .164 -.44 .53 
bachelor’s .119 .067 -.06 .30 
PhD .206 .109 -.11 .52 
PhD secondary .056 .244 -.88 .99 
some college -.159 .184 -.71 .39 
bachelor’s -.087 .107 -.40 .22 
master’s -.206 .109 -.52 .11 
10. The 
government 
investment in oil 
and gas is based 
on the following 
objective: 
secondary some college -.429 .533 -2.41 1.55 
bachelor’s .143 .455 -1.66 1.95 
master’s -.488 .458 -2.30 1.32 
PhD -.778 .524 -2.73 1.17 
some college secondary .429 .533 -1.55 2.41 
bachelor’s .571 .301 -.32 1.47 
master’s -.060 .305 -.97 .85 
PhD -.349 .398 -1.53 .83 
bachelor’s secondary -.143 .455 -1.95 1.66 
some college -.571 .301 -1.47 .32 
master’s -.631* .128 -.98 -.28 
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PhD -.921* .286 -1.75 -.09 
master’s secondary .488 .458 -1.32 2.30 
some college .060 .305 -.85 .97 
bachelor’s .631* .128 .28 .98 
PhD -.290 .291 -1.14 .56 
PhD secondary .778 .524 -1.17 2.73 
some college .349 .398 -.83 1.53 
bachelor’s .921* .286 .09 1.75 






of the oil and gas 
industry 
secondary some college .500 .280 -.52 1.52 
bachelor’s .724 .228 -.18 1.63 
master’s .631 .229 -.27 1.54 
PhD .389 .266 -.59 1.37 
some college secondary -.500 .280 -1.52 .52 
bachelor’s .224 .174 -.29 .74 
master’s .131 .176 -.39 .65 
PhD -.111 .222 -.77 .55 
bachelor’s secondary -.724 .228 -1.63 .18 
some college -.224 .174 -.74 .29 
master’s -.094 .066 -.27 .09 
PhD -.336 .151 -.77 .10 
master’s secondary -.631 .229 -1.54 .27 
some college -.131 .176 -.65 .39 
bachelor’s .094 .066 -.09 .27 
PhD -.242 .153 -.69 .20 
PhD secondary -.389 .266 -1.37 .59 
some college .111 .222 -.55 .77 
bachelor’s .336 .151 -.10 .77 




secondary some college .000 .169 -.51 .51 
bachelor’s .112 .045 -.01 .24 
master’s .155* .047 .03 .28 
PhD .444* .134 .05 .84 
some college secondary .000 .169 -.51 .51 
bachelor’s .112 .175 -.41 .63 
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master’s .155 .175 -.37 .68 
PhD .444 .216 -.20 1.09 
bachelor’s secondary -.112 .045 -.24 .01 
some college -.112 .175 -.63 .41 
master’s .043 .065 -.14 .22 
PhD .332 .142 -.08 .74 
master’s secondary -.155* .047 -.28 -.03 
some college -.155 .175 -.68 .37 
bachelor’s -.043 .065 -.22 .14 
PhD .290 .142 -.12 .70 
PhD secondary -.444* .134 -.84 -.05 
some college -.444 .216 -1.09 .20 
bachelor’s -.332 .142 -.74 .08 




secondary some college .500 .305 -.58 1.58 
bachelor’s .449 .229 -.46 1.35 
master’s .536 .230 -.37 1.44 
PhD .611 .266 -.37 1.59 
some college secondary -.500 .305 -1.58 .58 
bachelor’s -.051 .213 -.69 .58 
master’s .036 .214 -.60 .67 
PhD .111 .252 -.64 .86 
bachelor’s secondary -.449 .229 -1.35 .46 
some college .051 .213 -.58 .69 
master’s .087 .073 -.12 .29 
PhD .162 .153 -.28 .61 
master’s secondary -.536 .230 -1.44 .37 
some college -.036 .214 -.67 .60 
bachelor’s -.087 .073 -.29 .12 
PhD .075 .154 -.37 .52 
PhD secondary -.611 .266 -1.59 .37 
some college -.111 .252 -.86 .64 
bachelor’s -.162 .153 -.61 .28 
master’s -.075 .154 -.52 .37 





bachelor’s 1.776 .449 -.02 3.57 
master’s 1.810* .450 .01 3.61 
PhD 1.556 .476 -.29 3.40 
some college secondary -1.857 .499 -3.76 .04 
bachelor’s -.082 .225 -.75 .59 
master’s -.048 .227 -.72 .63 
PhD -.302 .275 -1.12 .51 
bachelor’s secondary -1.776 .449 -3.57 .02 
some college .082 .225 -.59 .75 
master’s .034 .067 -.15 .22 
PhD -.220 .168 -.71 .27 
master’s secondary -1.810* .450 -3.61 -.01 
some college .048 .227 -.63 .72 
bachelor’s -.034 .067 -.22 .15 
PhD -.254 .171 -.75 .24 
PhD secondary -1.556 .476 -3.40 .29 
some college .302 .275 -.51 1.12 
bachelor’s .220 .168 -.27 .71 
master’s .254 .171 -.24 .75 
Strategic vision or 
agenda for national 
change 
secondary some college 1.071* .249 .12 2.02 
bachelor’s 1.469* .228 .57 2.37 
master’s 1.167* .228 .26 2.07 
PhD 1.500* .242 .57 2.43 
some college secondary -1.071* .249 -2.02 -.12 
bachelor’s .398* .120 .04 .75 
master’s .095 .119 -.26 .45 
PhD .429* .144 .00 .86 
bachelor’s secondary -1.469* .228 -2.37 -.57 
some college -.398* .120 -.75 -.04 
master’s -.303* .064 -.48 -.13 
PhD .031 .103 -.27 .33 
master’s secondary -1.167* .228 -2.07 -.26 
some college -.095 .119 -.45 .26 
bachelor’s .303* .064 .13 .48 
PhD .333* .103 .04 .63 
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PhD secondary -1.500* .242 -2.43 -.57 
some college -.429* .144 -.86 .00 
bachelor’s -.031 .103 -.33 .27 
master’s -.333* .103 -.63 -.04 
Industry rules and 
regulations 
secondary some college -.357 .265 -1.34 .63 
bachelor’s -.245 .227 -1.15 .66 
master’s -.464 .229 -1.37 .44 
PhD -.611 .266 -1.59 .37 
some college secondary .357 .265 -.63 1.34 
bachelor’s .112 .149 -.33 .55 
master’s -.107 .151 -.56 .34 
PhD -.254 .203 -.86 .35 
bachelor’s secondary .245 .227 -.66 1.15 
some college -.112 .149 -.55 .33 
master’s -.219* .064 -.40 -.04 
PhD -.366 .150 -.80 .07 
master’s secondary .464 .229 -.44 1.37 
some college .107 .151 -.34 .56 
bachelor’s .219* .064 .04 .40 
PhD -.147 .153 -.59 .30 
PhD secondary .611 .266 -.37 1.59 
some college .254 .203 -.35 .86 
bachelor’s .366 .150 -.07 .80 




secondary some college -.429* .111 -.76 -.10 
bachelor’s -.959* .048 -1.09 -.83 
master’s -1.083* .055 -1.24 -.93 
PhD -1.111* .195 -1.68 -.54 
some college secondary .429* .111 .10 .76 
bachelor’s -.531* .121 -.89 -.17 
master’s -.655* .124 -1.02 -.29 
PhD -.683* .224 -1.34 -.02 
bachelor’s secondary .959* .048 .83 1.09 
some college .531* .121 .17 .89 
master’s -.124 .073 -.33 .08 
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PhD -.152 .201 -.74 .43 
master’s secondary 1.083* .055 .93 1.24 
some college .655* .124 .29 1.02 
bachelor’s .124 .073 -.08 .33 
PhD -.028 .203 -.62 .56 
PhD secondary 1.111* .195 .54 1.68 
some college .683* .224 .02 1.34 
bachelor’s .152 .201 -.43 .74 




secondary some college -.429 .202 -1.03 .18 
bachelor’s -.143* .046 -.27 -.02 
master’s -.202* .046 -.33 -.07 
PhD -.556* .097 -.84 -.27 
some college secondary .429 .202 -.18 1.03 
bachelor’s .286 .207 -.33 .90 
master’s .226 .207 -.39 .84 
PhD -.127 .224 -.80 .54 
bachelor’s secondary .143* .046 .02 .27 
some college -.286 .207 -.90 .33 
master’s -.060 .065 -.24 .12 
PhD -.413* .108 -.72 -.10 
master’s secondary .202* .046 .07 .33 
some college -.226 .207 -.84 .39 
bachelor’s .060 .065 -.12 .24 
PhD -.353* .108 -.67 -.04 
PhD secondary .556* .097 .27 .84 
some college .127 .224 -.54 .80 
bachelor’s .413* .108 .10 .72 
master’s .353* .108 .04 .67 
Foreign interests 
and investments 
secondary some college -.286 .156 -.75 .18 
bachelor’s -.071 .052 -.21 .07 
master’s .000 .057 -.16 .16 
PhD -.333 .185 -.87 .21 
some college secondary .286 .156 -.18 .75 
bachelor’s .214 .165 -.27 .70 
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master’s .286 .166 -.21 .78 
PhD -.048 .242 -.76 .67 
bachelor’s secondary .071 .052 -.07 .21 
some college -.214 .165 -.70 .27 
master’s .071 .077 -.14 .28 
PhD -.262 .192 -.82 .30 
master’s secondary .000 .057 -.16 .16 
some college -.286 .166 -.78 .21 
bachelor’s -.071 .077 -.28 .14 
PhD -.333 .193 -.90 .23 
PhD secondary .333 .185 -.21 .87 
some college .048 .242 -.67 .76 
bachelor’s .262 .192 -.30 .82 
master’s .333 .193 -.23 .90 
Defaults and risks 
in bank 
performance 
secondary some college .286 .474 -1.56 2.13 
bachelor’s .378 .449 -1.42 2.17 
master’s .405 .449 -1.39 2.20 
PhD .222 .482 -1.64 2.08 
some college secondary -.286 .474 -2.13 1.56 
bachelor’s .092 .163 -.39 .58 
master’s .119 .163 -.37 .60 
PhD -.063 .238 -.77 .64 
bachelor’s secondary -.378 .449 -2.17 1.42 
some college -.092 .163 -.58 .39 
master’s .027 .063 -.15 .20 
PhD -.155 .185 -.70 .38 
master’s secondary -.405 .449 -2.20 1.39 
some college -.119 .163 -.60 .37 
bachelor’s -.027 .063 -.20 .15 
PhD -.183 .185 -.72 .36 
PhD secondary -.222 .482 -2.08 1.64 
some college .063 .238 -.64 .77 
bachelor’s .155 .185 -.38 .70 
master’s .183 .185 -.36 .72 






and gas industry 
prices 
bachelor’s -.990* .049 -1.12 -.86 
master’s -1.060* .055 -1.21 -.91 
PhD -1.556* .134 -1.95 -1.16 
some college secondary 1.143* .252 .39 1.90 
bachelor’s .153 .256 -.61 .92 
master’s .083 .258 -.68 .85 
PhD -.413 .285 -1.26 .44 
bachelor’s secondary .990* .049 .86 1.12 
some college -.153 .256 -.92 .61 
master’s -.070 .074 -.27 .13 
PhD -.566* .143 -.98 -.15 
master’s secondary 1.060* .055 .91 1.21 
some college -.083 .258 -.85 .68 
bachelor’s .070 .074 -.13 .27 
PhD -.496* .145 -.92 -.07 
PhD secondary 1.556* .134 1.16 1.95 
some college .413 .285 -.44 1.26 
bachelor’s .566* .143 .15 .98 
master’s .496* .145 .07 .92 
Demand for loans 
and innovative 
financing products 
secondary some college .643 .315 -.46 1.75 
bachelor’s .378 .230 -.53 1.28 
master’s .060 .232 -.85 .97 
PhD .389 .266 -.59 1.37 
some college secondary -.643 .315 -1.75 .46 
bachelor’s -.265 .228 -.94 .41 
master’s -.583 .229 -1.27 .10 
PhD -.254 .264 -1.04 .53 
bachelor’s secondary -.378 .230 -1.28 .53 
some college .265 .228 -.41 .94 
master’s -.318* .080 -.54 -.10 
PhD .011 .154 -.44 .46 
master’s secondary -.060 .232 -.97 .85 
some college .583 .229 -.10 1.27 
bachelor’s .318* .080 .10 .54 
PhD .329 .157 -.13 .78 
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PhD secondary -.389 .266 -1.37 .59 
some college .254 .264 -.53 1.04 
bachelor’s -.011 .154 -.46 .44 




secondary some college -.571 .491 -2.46 1.31 
bachelor’s -.092 .450 -1.89 1.71 
master’s -.071 .451 -1.87 1.73 
PhD .222 .473 -1.62 2.07 
some college secondary .571 .491 -1.31 2.46 
bachelor’s .480 .208 -.14 1.10 
master’s .500 .209 -.12 1.12 
PhD .794* .254 .04 1.55 
bachelor’s secondary .092 .450 -1.71 1.89 
some college -.480 .208 -1.10 .14 
master’s .020 .074 -.18 .22 
PhD .314 .162 -.16 .79 
master’s secondary .071 .451 -1.73 1.87 
some college -.500 .209 -1.12 .12 
bachelor’s -.020 .074 -.22 .18 
PhD .294 .164 -.18 .77 
PhD secondary -.222 .473 -2.07 1.62 
some college -.794* .254 -1.55 -.04 
bachelor’s -.314 .162 -.79 .16 
master’s -.294 .164 -.77 .18 
Liquidity guidelines 
and standards 
secondary some college .429 .476 -1.42 2.28 
bachelor’s .276 .450 -1.52 2.07 
master’s .333 .450 -1.47 2.13 
PhD .111 .479 -1.74 1.97 
some college secondary -.429 .476 -2.28 1.42 
bachelor’s -.153 .170 -.66 .35 
master’s -.095 .171 -.60 .41 
PhD -.317 .237 -1.02 .38 
bachelor’s secondary -.276 .450 -2.07 1.52 
some college .153 .170 -.35 .66 
master’s .058 .073 -.14 .26 
  
373 
PhD -.164 .179 -.69 .36 
master’s secondary -.333 .450 -2.13 1.47 
some college .095 .171 -.41 .60 
bachelor’s -.058 .073 -.26 .14 
PhD -.222 .180 -.75 .30 
PhD secondary -.111 .479 -1.97 1.74 
some college .317 .237 -.38 1.02 
bachelor’s .164 .179 -.36 .69 




secondary some college .357 .337 -.80 1.52 
bachelor’s .816 .229 -.09 1.72 
master’s .774 .229 -.13 1.68 
PhD 1.167* .242 .23 2.10 
some college secondary -.357 .337 -1.52 .80 
bachelor’s .459 .256 -.31 1.22 
master’s .417 .256 -.35 1.18 
PhD .810* .268 .01 1.61 
bachelor’s secondary -.816 .229 -1.72 .09 
some college -.459 .256 -1.22 .31 
master’s -.043 .070 -.23 .15 
PhD .350* .104 .05 .65 
master’s secondary -.774 .229 -1.68 .13 
some college -.417 .256 -1.18 .35 
bachelor’s .043 .070 -.15 .23 
PhD .393* .105 .09 .70 
PhD secondary -1.167* .242 -2.10 -.23 
some college -.810* .268 -1.61 -.01 
bachelor’s -.350* .104 -.65 -.05 




secondary some college .000 .120 -.36 .36 
bachelor’s -.173* .052 -.32 -.03 
master’s -.286* .050 -.42 -.15 
PhD -.556* .187 -1.10 -.01 
some college secondary .000 .120 -.36 .36 
bachelor’s -.173 .130 -.56 .21 
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master’s -.286 .130 -.67 .10 
PhD -.556 .222 -1.21 .10 
bachelor’s secondary .173* .052 .03 .32 
some college .173 .130 -.21 .56 
master’s -.112 .072 -.31 .09 
PhD -.382 .195 -.95 .19 
master’s secondary .286* .050 .15 .42 
some college .286 .130 -.10 .67 
bachelor’s .112 .072 -.09 .31 
PhD -.270 .194 -.84 .30 
PhD secondary .556* .187 .01 1.10 
some college .556 .222 -.10 1.21 
bachelor’s .382 .195 -.19 .95 
master’s .270 .194 -.30 .84 
Infrastructure and 
system 
secondary some college -1.071* .277 -2.08 -.06 
bachelor’s -.592 .230 -1.50 .31 
master’s -.524 .230 -1.43 .38 
PhD -.500 .275 -1.50 .50 
some college secondary 1.071* .277 .06 2.08 
bachelor’s .480 .171 -.03 .99 
master’s .548* .171 .04 1.06 
PhD .571 .228 -.10 1.25 
bachelor’s secondary .592 .230 -.31 1.50 
some college -.480 .171 -.99 .03 
master’s .068 .075 -.14 .27 
PhD .092 .168 -.40 .58 
master’s secondary .524 .230 -.38 1.43 
some college -.548* .171 -1.06 -.04 
bachelor’s -.068 .075 -.27 .14 
PhD .024 .169 -.47 .52 
PhD secondary .500 .275 -.50 1.50 
some college -.571 .228 -1.25 .10 
bachelor’s -.092 .168 -.58 .40 
master’s -.024 .169 -.52 .47 





bachelor’s -.153* .044 -.28 -.03 
master’s .036 .050 -.10 .17 
PhD -.222 .082 -.46 .02 
some college secondary .000 .169 -.51 .51 
bachelor’s -.153 .175 -.67 .37 
master’s .036 .176 -.49 .56 
PhD -.222 .188 -.78 .34 
bachelor’s secondary .153* .044 .03 .28 
some college .153 .175 -.37 .67 
master’s .189* .067 .00 .37 
PhD -.069 .093 -.34 .20 
master’s secondary -.036 .050 -.17 .10 
some college -.036 .176 -.56 .49 
bachelor’s -.189* .067 -.37 .00 
PhD -.258 .096 -.53 .02 
PhD secondary .222 .082 -.02 .46 
some college .222 .188 -.34 .78 
bachelor’s .069 .093 -.20 .34 
master’s .258 .096 -.02 .53 
International 
competitive forces 
secondary some college -.143 .513 -2.08 1.79 
bachelor’s -.051 .449 -1.85 1.75 
master’s -.107 .450 -1.90 1.69 
PhD .000 .466 -1.83 1.83 
some college secondary .143 .513 -1.79 2.08 
bachelor’s .092 .255 -.67 .85 
master’s .036 .256 -.73 .80 
PhD .143 .283 -.70 .99 
bachelor’s secondary .051 .449 -1.75 1.85 
some college -.092 .255 -.85 .67 
master’s -.056 .064 -.23 .12 
PhD .051 .138 -.35 .45 
master’s secondary .107 .450 -1.69 1.90 
some college -.036 .256 -.80 .73 
bachelor’s .056 .064 -.12 .23 
PhD .107 .139 -.30 .51 
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PhD secondary .000 .466 -1.83 1.83 
some college -.143 .283 -.99 .70 
bachelor’s -.051 .138 -.45 .35 
master’s -.107 .139 -.51 .30 
Foreign investment 
and development 
secondary some college -1.071* .249 -2.02 -.12 
bachelor’s -.429 .229 -1.33 .48 
master’s -.512 .231 -1.42 .40 
PhD -.833 .259 -1.80 .13 
some college secondary 1.071* .249 .12 2.02 
bachelor’s .643* .121 .29 1.00 
master’s .560* .125 .19 .93 
PhD .238 .171 -.27 .74 
bachelor’s secondary .429 .229 -.48 1.33 
some college -.643* .121 -1.00 -.29 
master’s -.083 .076 -.29 .13 
PhD -.405 .140 -.81 .00 
master’s secondary .512 .231 -.40 1.42 
some college -.560* .125 -.93 -.19 
bachelor’s .083 .076 -.13 .29 
PhD -.321 .143 -.74 .09 
PhD secondary .833 .259 -.13 1.80 
some college -.238 .171 -.74 .27 
bachelor’s .405 .140 .00 .81 
master’s .321 .143 -.09 .74 
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Square F Sig. 
Section 2. 1. The 
banking industry is 
stable and diversified. 
Between Groups 5.445 4 1.361 1.211 .305 
Within Groups 668.715 595 1.124 
  
Total 674.160 599 
   
2. Current interest 
rates are competitive 
and in demand. 
Between Groups 24.787 4 6.197 4.254 .002 
Within Groups 866.678 595 1.457 
  
Total 891.465 599 
   
3. Central bank 
interventions have 
improved our lending 
strategies. 
Between Groups 1.891 4 .473 1.039 .386 




   
4. We invest a high 
percentage of our 
funds in private 
sector enterprises. 
Between Groups 16.066 4 4.016 3.851 .004 




   
5. Most deposits are 
tied to oil and gas 
rents. 
Between Groups 27.987 4 6.997 4.750 .001 
Within Groups 876.513 595 1.473 
  
Total 904.500 599 
   
6. Our vision is 
global. and this 
Between Groups 23.864 4 5.966 3.670 .006 








   
7. Our default rates 
are anticipated and 
appropriate. 
Between Groups 26.902 4 6.725 4.380 .002 
Within Groups 913.598 595 1.535 
  
Total 940.500 599 
   
8. The financial 
instruments we use 
are market sensitive 
and vulnerable to 
risks. 
Between Groups 12.125 4 3.031 2.248 .063 




   
9. We anticipate that 
the oil and gas 
market will recover in 
price and volume. 
Between Groups 10.122 4 2.530 1.702 .148 




   
10. Most citizens do 
not plan financially for 
long-term market 
shocks. 
Between Groups 33.565 4 8.391 5.556 .000 




   
11. Government 
subsidies allow us to 
loan more freely to 
the private sector. 
Between Groups .320 4 .080 .150 .963 




   





Between Groups 7.218 4 1.805 1.976 .097 




   
13. There is an 
inadequate 
population of skilled 
entrepreneurs in our 
national population. 
Between Groups 15.508 4 3.877 2.927 .020 




   
14. Banks are 
essential to the 
Between Groups 6.792 4 1.698 2.672 .031 





and therefore must 
be protected during 
periods of financial 
duress and decline. 
Total 
384.960 599 
   
15. The financial 
market is mature and 
competitive. 
Between Groups 9.372 4 2.343 3.390 .009 
Within Groups 411.288 595 .691 
  
Total 420.660 599 
   
Section 3. 1. Global 
pressures on the oil 




Between Groups 8.244 4 2.061 1.832 .121 




   
2. The variability of 
commodity pricing 
creates highly 
impactful risks for our 
nation. 
Between Groups 6.554 4 1.638 1.757 .136 




   
3. Even if we 
diversified our 
industries. we would 
need decades to 
allow them to mature. 
Between Groups 3.790 4 .948 .718 .580 




   
4. Strategic 
partnerships and FDI 
allow rapid exchange 
of knowledge and 
technology and 
should be supported. 
Between Groups 15.080 4 3.770 3.704 .005 




   
5. Our bank is 
vulnerable to 
systemic risks. 
Between Groups 9.774 4 2.444 2.691 .030 
Within Groups 540.291 595 .908 
  
Total 550.065 599 
   
6. Without 
government support. 
Between Groups 6.177 4 1.544 1.660 .158 




our bank would likely 




   
7. Liquidity levels are 
at an all-time low. 
Between Groups 9.069 4 2.267 1.931 .104 
Within Groups 698.556 595 1.174 
  
Total 707.625 599 
   
8. When oil prices 
decline. we are less 
likely to lend money 
to private enterprises. 
Between Groups 2.147 4 .537 .566 .688 




   
9. Citizens are more 
likely to withhold 
savings and 
investments when oil 
prices fluctuate or 
decline. 
Between Groups 13.261 4 3.315 3.331 .010 




   
10. Investing in 
diversification offers a 
layer of stability that 
we desperately need 
at this time. 
Between Groups 4.848 4 1.212 1.271 .280 




   
11. Intra-bank loans 
create a dangerous 
cycle of risk and 
vulnerability. 
Between Groups 6.354 4 1.588 1.421 .225 




   
12. The increase in 
lending rates is a 
positive step towards 
industry maturity. 
Between Groups 14.012 4 3.503 3.369 .010 




   
13. Most of our 
internal investment 
strategies are based 
on oil and gas 
exploitation. 
Between Groups 4.636 4 1.159 1.116 .348 




   
14. Countries have 
national industries 
Between Groups 1.135 4 .284 .288 .886 




and products: Ours 




   
15. The gap between 
the citizen and 
expatriate population 
in our nation is 
worrying. 
Between Groups 13.024 4 3.256 3.793 .005 




   
16. New companies 
are a liability; we 
would prefer to invest 
in tested models. 
Between Groups 1.387 4 .347 .341 .850 




   
17. Most small 
businesses are likely 
to fail if given enough 
time. 
Between Groups 4.359 4 1.090 1.391 .235 




   
18. Our banks should 
invest more heavily in 
business 
development and 
growth to increase 
industry performance. 
Between Groups 8.929 4 2.232 2.030 .089 




   
19. Without sufficient 
oil and gas liquidity. 
we cannot fund 
additional 
development. 
Between Groups 2.062 4 .516 .422 .793 




   
20. The domestic 
financial markets are 
unstable and high 
risk. 
Between Groups 16.887 4 4.222 4.933 .001 




   
Section 4. 1. Our 
government has a 
long-term vision that 
does not rely on oil 
and gas for 
development. 
Between Groups 3.815 4 .954 .774 .542 
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2. The primary 




Between Groups 46.789 4 11.697 3.728 .005 




   
3. The primary result 
of a government 
bailout in our nation 
is: 
Between Groups 81.989 4 20.497 6.585 .000 




   
4. Government 
investment in oil and 
gas is a necessary 
and sustainable 
commitment. 
Between Groups 30.415 4 7.604 4.593 .001 




   
5. The government’s 
role in stabilising the 
domestic economy is: 
Between Groups 8.483 4 2.121 3.415 .009 
Within Groups 369.457 595 .621 
  
Total 377.940 599 
   
6. Our dependence 
on a single export 
makes our country 
look: 
Between Groups .645 4 .161 .971 .423 




   
7. The primary factor 
restricting the number 
of national citizens in 
private sector 
employment is: 
Between Groups 27.492 4 6.873 2.592 .036 




   
8. The primary sector 
which national 
citizens would like to 
work in is: 
Between Groups 91.693 4 22.923 6.363 .000 




   
9. Government 
analysts would rank 
the current threat 
level in oil and gas as 
follows: 
Between Groups 1.889 4 .472 .807 .521 




   
Between Groups 35.339 4 8.835 3.997 .003 
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10. The government 
investment in oil and 
gas is based on the 
following objective: 









Price performance of 
the oil and gas 
industry 
Between Groups 6.402 4 1.601 2.783 .026 








Between Groups .577 4 .144 .251 .909 
Within Groups 341.663 595 .574 
  
Total 342.240 599 




Between Groups 8.712 4 2.178 3.019 .018 
Within Groups 429.228 595 .721 
  
Total 437.940 599 
   
Diversification of 
industries 
Between Groups 29.757 4 7.439 12.292 .000 
Within Groups 360.108 595 .605 
  
Total 389.865 599 
   
Strategic vision or 
agenda for national 
change 
Between Groups 4.735 4 1.184 2.049 .086 
Within Groups 343.730 595 .578 
  
Total 348.465 599 
   
Industry rules and 
regulations 
Between Groups 3.646 4 .911 1.650 .160 
Within Groups 328.739 595 .553 
  
Total 332.385 599 




Between Groups 9.498 4 2.374 3.297 .011 
Within Groups 428.442 595 .720 
  
Total 437.940 599 




Between Groups 17.074 4 4.268 7.717 .000 
Within Groups 329.111 595 .553 
  
Total 346.185 599 
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Foreign interests and 
investments 
Between Groups 7.705 4 1.926 2.469 .044 
Within Groups 464.135 595 .780 
  
Total 471.840 599 
   
Defaults and risks in 
bank performance 
Between Groups 8.722 4 2.181 3.933 .004 
Within Groups 329.903 595 .554 
  
Total 338.625 599 
   
Impact their 
organisational 
performance: Oil and 
gas industry prices 
Between Groups 5.000 4 1.250 1.653 .160 




   
Demand for loans 
and innovative 
financing products 
Between Groups 6.799 4 1.700 1.946 .101 
Within Groups 519.701 595 .873 
  
Total 526.500 599 




Between Groups 2.837 4 .709 .947 .437 
Within Groups 445.828 595 .749 
  
Total 448.665 599 
   
Liquidity guidelines 
and standards 
Between Groups .528 4 .132 .183 .947 
Within Groups 430.257 595 .723 
  
Total 430.785 599 
   
Auditing and 
governance oversight 
Between Groups 10.012 4 2.503 3.765 .005 
Within Groups 395.528 595 .665 
  
Total 405.540 599 




Between Groups 5.038 4 1.260 1.762 .135 
Within Groups 425.222 595 .715 
  
Total 430.260 599 
   
Infrastructure and 
system 
Between Groups 14.103 4 3.526 4.779 .001 
Within Groups 438.957 595 .738 
  
Total 453.060 599 
   
Domestic competitive 
forces 
Between Groups 1.504 4 .376 .640 .634 




Total 351.060 599 
   
International 
competitive forces 
Between Groups 7.398 4 1.850 3.234 .012 
Within Groups 340.227 595 .572 
  
Total 347.625 599 
   
Foreign investment 
and development 
Between Groups 7.602 4 1.901 2.522 .040 
Within Groups 448.398 595 .754 
  
Total 456.000 599 
   
 
 
Post Hoc Tests 
Multiple Comparisons 
Dunnett C  
Dependent 
Variable 
(I) position or 












Section 2. 1. The 
banking industry 
is stable and 
diversified. 
teller/associate floor supervisor -.259 .143 -.66 .14 
dept./branch manager -.140 .173 -.63 .35 
regional manager -.164 .127 -.52 .19 
executive -.240 .141 -.67 .19 
floor supervisor teller/associate .259 .143 -.14 .66 
dept./branch manager .119 .211 -.48 .72 
regional manager .095 .176 -.40 .59 
executive .019 .186 -.53 .57 
dept./branch 
manager 
teller/associate .140 .173 -.35 .63 
floor supervisor -.119 .211 -.72 .48 
regional manager -.024 .201 -.59 .55 
executive -.100 .210 -.72 .52 
regional 
manager 
teller/associate .164 .127 -.19 .52 
floor supervisor -.095 .176 -.59 .40 
dept./branch manager .024 .201 -.55 .59 
executive -.076 .174 -.60 .44 
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executive teller/associate .240 .141 -.19 .67 
floor supervisor -.019 .186 -.57 .53 
dept./branch manager .100 .210 -.52 .72 
regional manager .076 .174 -.44 .60 
2. Current interest 
rates are 
competitive and in 
demand. 
teller/associate floor supervisor .585* .104 .30 .88 
dept./branch manager .276 .184 -.25 .80 
regional manager -.176 .158 -.62 .27 
executive .233 .280 -.63 1.10 
floor supervisor teller/associate -.585* .104 -.88 -.30 
dept./branch manager -.310 .192 -.86 .24 
regional manager -.762* .167 -1.23 -.29 
executive -.352 .285 -1.23 .53 
dept./branch 
manager 
teller/associate -.276 .184 -.80 .25 
floor supervisor .310 .192 -.24 .86 
regional manager -.452 .226 -1.09 .19 
executive -.043 .323 -1.02 .94 
regional 
manager 
teller/associate .176 .158 -.27 .62 
floor supervisor .762* .167 .29 1.23 
dept./branch manager .452 .226 -.19 1.09 
executive .410 .309 -.53 1.35 
executive teller/associate -.233 .280 -1.10 .63 
floor supervisor .352 .285 -.53 1.23 
dept./branch manager .043 .323 -.94 1.02 
regional manager -.410 .309 -1.35 .53 




teller/associate floor supervisor -.069 .090 -.32 .18 
dept./branch manager .193 .073 -.01 .40 
regional manager -.022 .086 -.26 .22 
executive -.022 .173 -.56 .51 
floor supervisor teller/associate .069 .090 -.18 .32 
dept./branch manager .262 .105 -.03 .56 
regional manager .048 .114 -.27 .37 
executive .048 .188 -.53 .62 
dept./branch 
manager 
teller/associate -.193 .073 -.40 .01 
floor supervisor -.262 .105 -.56 .03 
regional manager -.214 .101 -.50 .07 
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executive -.214 .181 -.77 .34 
regional 
manager 
teller/associate .022 .086 -.22 .26 
floor supervisor -.048 .114 -.37 .27 
dept./branch manager .214 .101 -.07 .50 
executive .000 .186 -.57 .57 
executive teller/associate .022 .173 -.51 .56 
floor supervisor -.048 .188 -.62 .53 
dept./branch manager .214 .181 -.34 .77 
regional manager .000 .186 -.57 .57 
4. We invest a 
high percentage 
of our funds in 
private sector 
enterprises. 
teller/associate floor supervisor .344* .093 .08 .60 
dept./branch manager .296 .140 -.10 .69 
regional manager -.275 .156 -.71 .16 
executive .239 .267 -.59 1.07 
floor supervisor teller/associate -.344* .093 -.60 -.08 
dept./branch manager -.048 .151 -.48 .38 
regional manager -.619* .167 -1.09 -.15 
executive -.105 .273 -.95 .74 
dept./branch 
manager 
teller/associate -.296 .140 -.69 .10 
floor supervisor .048 .151 -.38 .48 
regional manager -.571* .197 -1.13 -.02 
executive -.057 .292 -.95 .84 
regional 
manager 
teller/associate .275 .156 -.16 .71 
floor supervisor .619* .167 .15 1.09 
dept./branch manager .571* .197 .02 1.13 
executive .514 .300 -.40 1.43 
executive teller/associate -.239 .267 -1.07 .59 
floor supervisor .105 .273 -.74 .95 
dept./branch manager .057 .292 -.84 .95 
regional manager -.514 .300 -1.43 .40 
5. Most deposits 
are tied to oil and 
gas rents. 
teller/associate floor supervisor .471* .157 .03 .91 
dept./branch manager .328 .185 -.20 .85 
regional manager -.339 .158 -.78 .10 
executive .499 .279 -.37 1.36 
floor supervisor teller/associate -.471* .157 -.91 -.03 
dept./branch manager -.143 .226 -.78 .50 
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regional manager -.810* .205 -1.39 -.23 
executive .029 .308 -.91 .97 
dept./branch 
manager 
teller/associate -.328 .185 -.85 .20 
floor supervisor .143 .226 -.50 .78 
regional manager -.667* .227 -1.31 -.02 
executive .171 .323 -.81 1.15 
regional 
manager 
teller/associate .339 .158 -.10 .78 
floor supervisor .810* .205 .23 1.39 
dept./branch manager .667* .227 .02 1.31 
executive .838 .309 -.10 1.78 
executive teller/associate -.499 .279 -1.36 .37 
floor supervisor -.029 .308 -.97 .91 
dept./branch manager -.171 .323 -1.15 .81 
regional manager -.838 .309 -1.78 .10 
6. Our vision is 
global. and this 
requires 
diversification. 
teller/associate floor supervisor .048 .161 -.40 .50 
dept./branch manager .334 .204 -.25 .91 
regional manager -.523* .151 -.95 -.10 
executive .363 .280 -.50 1.23 
floor supervisor teller/associate -.048 .161 -.50 .40 
dept./branch manager .286 .243 -.40 .98 
regional manager -.571* .201 -1.14 -.01 
executive .314 .310 -.63 1.26 
dept./branch 
manager 
teller/associate -.334 .204 -.91 .25 
floor supervisor -.286 .243 -.98 .40 
regional manager -.857* .237 -1.53 -.19 
executive .029 .334 -.98 1.04 
regional 
manager 
teller/associate .523* .151 .10 .95 
floor supervisor .571* .201 .01 1.14 
dept./branch manager .857* .237 .19 1.53 
executive .886 .305 -.05 1.82 
executive teller/associate -.363 .280 -1.23 .50 
floor supervisor -.314 .310 -1.26 .63 
dept./branch manager -.029 .334 -1.04 .98 
regional manager -.886 .305 -1.82 .05 
teller/associate floor supervisor -.471* .157 -.91 -.03 
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dept./branch manager .386 .225 -.25 1.03 
regional manager -.328 .152 -.75 .10 
executive .301 .269 -.53 1.13 
floor supervisor teller/associate .471* .157 .03 .91 
dept./branch manager .857* .260 .12 1.60 
regional manager .143 .200 -.42 .71 
executive .771 .299 -.14 1.68 
dept./branch 
manager 
teller/associate -.386 .225 -1.03 .25 
floor supervisor -.857* .260 -1.60 -.12 
regional manager -.714 .257 -1.44 .02 
executive -.086 .340 -1.11 .94 
regional 
manager 
teller/associate .328 .152 -.10 .75 
floor supervisor -.143 .200 -.71 .42 
dept./branch manager .714 .257 -.02 1.44 
executive .629 .296 -.28 1.53 
executive teller/associate -.301 .269 -1.13 .53 
floor supervisor -.771 .299 -1.68 .14 
dept./branch manager .086 .340 -.94 1.11 
regional manager -.629 .296 -1.53 .28 
8. The financial 
instruments we 




teller/associate floor supervisor .393* .086 .16 .63 
dept./branch manager .155 .175 -.34 .65 
regional manager -.131 .155 -.57 .30 
executive .327 .279 -.54 1.19 
floor supervisor teller/associate -.393* .086 -.63 -.16 
dept./branch manager -.238 .175 -.74 .26 
regional manager -.524* .155 -.96 -.09 
executive -.067 .279 -.93 .80 
dept./branch 
manager 
teller/associate -.155 .175 -.65 .34 
floor supervisor .238 .175 -.26 .74 
regional manager -.286 .217 -.90 .33 
executive .171 .318 -.80 1.14 
regional 
manager 
teller/associate .131 .155 -.30 .57 
floor supervisor .524* .155 .09 .96 
dept./branch manager .286 .217 -.33 .90 
executive .457 .308 -.48 1.40 
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executive teller/associate -.327 .279 -1.19 .54 
floor supervisor .067 .279 -.80 .93 
dept./branch manager -.171 .318 -1.14 .80 
regional manager -.457 .308 -1.40 .48 
9. We anticipate 
that the oil and 
gas market will 
recover in price 
and volume. 
teller/associate floor supervisor -.287 .179 -.79 .21 
dept./branch manager -.406 .154 -.84 .03 
regional manager -.145 .163 -.60 .31 
executive -.106 .269 -.94 .73 
floor supervisor teller/associate .287 .179 -.21 .79 
dept./branch manager -.119 .220 -.74 .50 
regional manager .143 .226 -.49 .78 
executive .181 .311 -.76 1.12 
dept./branch 
manager 
teller/associate .406 .154 -.03 .84 
floor supervisor .119 .220 -.50 .74 
regional manager .262 .207 -.32 .85 
executive .300 .298 -.61 1.21 
regional 
manager 
teller/associate .145 .163 -.31 .60 
floor supervisor -.143 .226 -.78 .49 
dept./branch manager -.262 .207 -.85 .32 
executive .038 .302 -.88 .96 
executive teller/associate .106 .269 -.73 .94 
floor supervisor -.181 .311 -1.12 .76 
dept./branch manager -.300 .298 -1.21 .61 
regional manager -.038 .302 -.96 .88 
10. Most citizens 




teller/associate floor supervisor .408* .118 .08 .74 
dept./branch manager .384 .185 -.14 .91 
regional manager -.497* .160 -.94 -.05 
executive .341 .280 -.53 1.21 
floor supervisor teller/associate -.408* .118 -.74 -.08 
dept./branch manager -.024 .199 -.59 .54 
regional manager -.905* .176 -1.40 -.41 
executive -.067 .290 -.96 .83 
dept./branch 
manager 
teller/associate -.384 .185 -.91 .14 
floor supervisor .024 .199 -.54 .59 
regional manager -.881* .227 -1.52 -.24 
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executive -.043 .323 -1.02 .94 
regional 
manager 
teller/associate .497* .160 .05 .94 
floor supervisor .905* .176 .41 1.40 
dept./branch manager .881* .227 .24 1.52 
executive .838 .309 -.10 1.78 
executive teller/associate -.341 .280 -1.21 .53 
floor supervisor .067 .290 -.83 .96 
dept./branch manager .043 .323 -.94 1.02 
regional manager -.838 .309 -1.78 .10 
11. Government 
subsidies allow us 
to loan more 
freely to the 
private sector. 
teller/associate floor supervisor .033 .074 -.17 .24 
dept./branch manager .080 .107 -.22 .38 
regional manager -.015 .087 -.26 .23 
executive .023 .114 -.33 .37 
floor supervisor teller/associate -.033 .074 -.24 .17 
dept./branch manager .048 .118 -.29 .38 
regional manager -.048 .100 -.33 .23 
executive -.010 .124 -.39 .37 
dept./branch 
manager 
teller/associate -.080 .107 -.38 .22 
floor supervisor -.048 .118 -.38 .29 
regional manager -.095 .126 -.45 .26 
executive -.057 .146 -.49 .38 
regional 
manager 
teller/associate .015 .087 -.23 .26 
floor supervisor .048 .100 -.23 .33 
dept./branch manager .095 .126 -.26 .45 
executive .038 .132 -.36 .44 
executive teller/associate -.023 .114 -.37 .33 
floor supervisor .010 .124 -.37 .39 
dept./branch manager .057 .146 -.38 .49 
regional manager -.038 .132 -.44 .36 






teller/associate floor supervisor -.335 .124 -.68 .01 
dept./branch manager .069 .136 -.32 .45 
regional manager -.097 .119 -.43 .23 
executive .112 .140 -.32 .54 
floor supervisor teller/associate .335 .124 -.01 .68 
dept./branch manager .405 .171 -.08 .89 
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regional manager .238 .157 -.20 .68 
executive .448 .174 -.07 .97 
dept./branch 
manager 
teller/associate -.069 .136 -.45 .32 
floor supervisor -.405 .171 -.89 .08 
regional manager -.167 .167 -.64 .31 
executive .043 .182 -.50 .59 
regional 
manager 
teller/associate .097 .119 -.23 .43 
floor supervisor -.238 .157 -.68 .20 
dept./branch manager .167 .167 -.31 .64 
executive .210 .170 -.30 .72 
executive teller/associate -.112 .140 -.54 .32 
floor supervisor -.448 .174 -.97 .07 
dept./branch manager -.043 .182 -.59 .50 
regional manager -.210 .170 -.72 .30 







teller/associate floor supervisor .186 .128 -.17 .54 
dept./branch manager .472* .128 .11 .84 
regional manager -.052 .158 -.49 .39 
executive .643 .279 -.22 1.51 
floor supervisor teller/associate -.186 .128 -.54 .17 
dept./branch manager .286 .160 -.17 .74 
regional manager -.238 .185 -.76 .28 
executive .457 .295 -.45 1.36 
dept./branch 
manager 
teller/associate -.472* .128 -.84 -.11 
floor supervisor -.286 .160 -.74 .17 
regional manager -.524* .185 -1.05 .00 
executive .171 .295 -.74 1.08 
regional 
manager 
teller/associate .052 .158 -.39 .49 
floor supervisor .238 .185 -.28 .76 
dept./branch manager .524* .185 .00 1.05 
executive .695 .309 -.25 1.64 
executive teller/associate -.643 .279 -1.51 .22 
floor supervisor -.457 .295 -1.36 .45 
dept./branch manager -.171 .295 -1.08 .74 
regional manager -.695 .309 -1.64 .25 
teller/associate floor supervisor .142 .088 -.10 .39 
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14. Banks are 
essential to the 
domestic 
economy and 





dept./branch manager .309* .082 .08 .54 
regional manager -.144 .108 -.45 .16 
executive -.163 .276 -1.02 .69 
floor supervisor teller/associate -.142 .088 -.39 .10 
dept./branch manager .167 .105 -.13 .46 
regional manager -.286 .126 -.64 .07 
executive -.305 .283 -1.18 .57 
dept./branch 
manager 
teller/associate -.309* .082 -.54 -.08 
floor supervisor -.167 .105 -.46 .13 
regional manager -.452* .123 -.80 -.11 
executive -.471 .282 -1.34 .40 
regional 
manager 
teller/associate .144 .108 -.16 .45 
floor supervisor .286 .126 -.07 .64 
dept./branch manager .452* .123 .11 .80 
executive -.019 .290 -.91 .87 
executive teller/associate .163 .276 -.69 1.02 
floor supervisor .305 .283 -.57 1.18 
dept./branch manager .471 .282 -.40 1.34 
regional manager .019 .290 -.87 .91 
15. The financial 
market is mature 
and competitive. 
teller/associate floor supervisor .140 .094 -.12 .40 
dept./branch manager .260 .132 -.11 .63 
regional manager -.288 .108 -.59 .01 
executive -.069 .276 -.93 .79 
floor supervisor teller/associate -.140 .094 -.40 .12 
dept./branch manager .119 .151 -.31 .55 
regional manager -.429* .131 -.80 -.06 
executive -.210 .285 -1.09 .67 
dept./branch 
manager 
teller/associate -.260 .132 -.63 .11 
floor supervisor -.119 .151 -.55 .31 
regional manager -.548* .160 -1.00 -.09 
executive -.329 .300 -1.25 .59 
regional 
manager 
teller/associate .288 .108 -.01 .59 
floor supervisor .429* .131 .06 .80 
dept./branch manager .548* .160 .09 1.00 
executive .219 .290 -.67 1.11 
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executive teller/associate .069 .276 -.79 .93 
floor supervisor .210 .285 -.67 1.09 
dept./branch manager .329 .300 -.59 1.25 
regional manager -.219 .290 -1.11 .67 
Section 3. 1. 
Global pressures 





teller/associate floor supervisor .013 .144 -.39 .42 
dept./branch manager .061 .151 -.37 .49 
regional manager -.368 .136 -.75 .01 
executive .089 .278 -.77 .95 
floor supervisor teller/associate -.013 .144 -.42 .39 
dept./branch manager .048 .194 -.50 .60 
regional manager -.381 .183 -.90 .13 
executive .076 .304 -.85 1.00 
dept./branch 
manager 
teller/associate -.061 .151 -.49 .37 
floor supervisor -.048 .194 -.60 .50 
regional manager -.429 .189 -.96 .11 
executive .029 .307 -.91 .97 
regional 
manager 
teller/associate .368 .136 -.01 .75 
floor supervisor .381 .183 -.13 .90 
dept./branch manager .429 .189 -.11 .96 
executive .457 .300 -.46 1.38 
executive teller/associate -.089 .278 -.95 .77 
floor supervisor -.076 .304 -1.00 .85 
dept./branch manager -.029 .307 -.97 .91 
regional manager -.457 .300 -1.38 .46 




risks for our 
nation. 
teller/associate floor supervisor .063 .125 -.29 .41 
dept./branch manager -.032 .137 -.42 .36 
regional manager -.318 .135 -.69 .06 
executive .140 .277 -.72 1.00 
floor supervisor teller/associate -.063 .125 -.41 .29 
dept./branch manager -.095 .172 -.58 .39 
regional manager -.381 .170 -.86 .10 
executive .076 .296 -.83 .98 
dept./branch 
manager 
teller/associate .032 .137 -.36 .42 
floor supervisor .095 .172 -.39 .58 
regional manager -.286 .180 -.79 .22 
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executive .171 .301 -.75 1.10 
regional 
manager 
teller/associate .318 .135 -.06 .69 
floor supervisor .381 .170 -.10 .86 
dept./branch manager .286 .180 -.22 .79 
executive .457 .300 -.46 1.38 
executive teller/associate -.140 .277 -1.00 .72 
floor supervisor -.076 .296 -.98 .83 
dept./branch manager -.171 .301 -1.10 .75 
regional manager -.457 .300 -1.38 .46 




decades to allow 
them to mature. 
teller/associate floor supervisor .179 .149 -.24 .60 
dept./branch manager .107 .161 -.35 .56 
regional manager .179 .139 -.21 .57 
executive .236 .317 -.75 1.22 
floor supervisor teller/associate -.179 .149 -.60 .24 
dept./branch manager -.071 .203 -.65 .51 
regional manager .000 .186 -.52 .52 
executive .057 .341 -.99 1.10 
dept./branch 
manager 
teller/associate -.107 .161 -.56 .35 
floor supervisor .071 .203 -.51 .65 
regional manager .071 .196 -.48 .63 
executive .129 .346 -.93 1.19 
regional 
manager 
teller/associate -.179 .139 -.57 .21 
floor supervisor .000 .186 -.52 .52 
dept./branch manager -.071 .196 -.63 .48 
executive .057 .336 -.98 1.09 
executive teller/associate -.236 .317 -1.22 .75 
floor supervisor -.057 .341 -1.10 .99 
dept./branch manager -.129 .346 -1.19 .93 
regional manager -.057 .336 -1.09 .98 
4. Strategic 
partnerships and 




teller/associate floor supervisor .194 .115 -.13 .51 
dept./branch manager .360 .147 -.06 .78 
regional manager -.330 .149 -.75 .09 
executive -.168 .277 -1.03 .69 
floor supervisor teller/associate -.194 .115 -.51 .13 





regional manager -.524* .174 -1.01 -.03 
executive -.362 .291 -1.26 .53 
dept./branch 
manager 
teller/associate -.360 .147 -.78 .06 
floor supervisor -.167 .172 -.66 .32 
regional manager -.690* .197 -1.25 -.13 
executive -.529 .305 -1.46 .41 
regional 
manager 
teller/associate .330 .149 -.09 .75 
floor supervisor .524* .174 .03 1.01 
dept./branch manager .690* .197 .13 1.25 
executive .162 .307 -.77 1.10 
executive teller/associate .168 .277 -.69 1.03 
floor supervisor .362 .291 -.53 1.26 
dept./branch manager .529 .305 -.41 1.46 
regional manager -.162 .307 -1.10 .77 
5. Our bank is 
vulnerable to 
systemic risks. 
teller/associate floor supervisor -.010 .118 -.34 .32 
dept./branch manager -.296 .151 -.72 .13 
regional manager -.344 .126 -.70 .01 
executive .161 .277 -.70 1.02 
floor supervisor teller/associate .010 .118 -.32 .34 
dept./branch manager -.286 .179 -.79 .22 
regional manager -.333 .159 -.78 .11 
executive .171 .293 -.73 1.07 
dept./branch 
manager 
teller/associate .296 .151 -.13 .72 
floor supervisor .286 .179 -.22 .79 
regional manager -.048 .185 -.57 .48 
executive .457 .308 -.48 1.40 
regional 
manager 
teller/associate .344 .126 -.01 .70 
floor supervisor .333 .159 -.11 .78 
dept./branch manager .048 .185 -.48 .57 
executive .505 .297 -.41 1.41 
executive teller/associate -.161 .277 -1.02 .70 
floor supervisor -.171 .293 -1.07 .73 
dept./branch manager -.457 .308 -1.40 .48 
regional manager -.505 .297 -1.41 .41 





support. our bank 




dept./branch manager .217 .116 -.11 .55 
regional manager -.187 .142 -.58 .21 
executive .232 .206 -.41 .87 
floor supervisor teller/associate -.146 .109 -.45 .16 
dept./branch manager .071 .143 -.33 .48 
regional manager -.333 .165 -.80 .13 
executive .086 .222 -.59 .77 
dept./branch 
manager 
teller/associate -.217 .116 -.55 .11 
floor supervisor -.071 .143 -.48 .33 
regional manager -.405 .169 -.88 .07 
executive .014 .226 -.68 .71 
regional 
manager 
teller/associate .187 .142 -.21 .58 
floor supervisor .333 .165 -.13 .80 
dept./branch manager .405 .169 -.07 .88 
executive .419 .240 -.31 1.14 
executive teller/associate -.232 .206 -.87 .41 
floor supervisor -.086 .222 -.77 .59 
dept./branch manager -.014 .226 -.71 .68 
regional manager -.419 .240 -1.14 .31 
7. Liquidity levels 
are at an all-time 
low. 
teller/associate floor supervisor .151 .154 -.28 .58 
dept./branch manager .247 .136 -.14 .63 
regional manager -.277 .128 -.63 .08 
executive .132 .278 -.73 .99 
floor supervisor teller/associate -.151 .154 -.58 .28 
dept./branch manager .095 .190 -.44 .63 
regional manager -.429 .184 -.95 .09 
executive -.019 .308 -.96 .92 
dept./branch 
manager 
teller/associate -.247 .136 -.63 .14 
floor supervisor -.095 .190 -.63 .44 
regional manager -.524* .169 -1.00 -.04 
executive -.114 .300 -1.03 .81 
regional 
manager 
teller/associate .277 .128 -.08 .63 
floor supervisor .429 .184 -.09 .95 
dept./branch manager .524* .169 .04 1.00 
executive .410 .296 -.50 1.32 
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executive teller/associate -.132 .278 -.99 .73 
floor supervisor .019 .308 -.92 .96 
dept./branch manager .114 .300 -.81 1.03 
regional manager -.410 .296 -1.32 .50 
8. When oil prices 
decline. we are 
less likely to lend 
money to private 
enterprises. 
teller/associate floor supervisor .066 .131 -.30 .43 
dept./branch manager .161 .149 -.26 .59 
regional manager -.077 .110 -.38 .23 
executive .190 .277 -.67 1.05 
floor supervisor teller/associate -.066 .131 -.43 .30 
dept./branch manager .095 .186 -.43 .62 
regional manager -.143 .157 -.58 .30 
executive .124 .298 -.79 1.04 
dept./branch 
manager 
teller/associate -.161 .149 -.59 .26 
floor supervisor -.095 .186 -.62 .43 
regional manager -.238 .172 -.73 .25 
executive .029 .307 -.91 .97 
regional 
manager 
teller/associate .077 .110 -.23 .38 
floor supervisor .143 .157 -.30 .58 
dept./branch manager .238 .172 -.25 .73 
executive .267 .290 -.63 1.16 
executive teller/associate -.190 .277 -1.05 .67 
floor supervisor -.124 .298 -1.04 .79 
dept./branch manager -.029 .307 -.97 .91 
regional manager -.267 .290 -1.16 .63 
9. Citizens are 
more likely to 
withhold savings 
and investments 
when oil prices 
fluctuate or 
decline. 
teller/associate floor supervisor -.104 .137 -.49 .28 
dept./branch manager -.032 .138 -.42 .36 
regional manager -.485* .125 -.83 -.14 
executive .068 .277 -.79 .93 
floor supervisor teller/associate .104 .137 -.28 .49 
dept./branch manager .071 .181 -.44 .58 
regional manager -.381 .171 -.86 .10 
executive .171 .301 -.75 1.09 
dept./branch 
manager 
teller/associate .032 .138 -.36 .42 
floor supervisor -.071 .181 -.58 .44 
regional manager -.452 .172 -.94 .03 
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executive .100 .301 -.82 1.02 
regional 
manager 
teller/associate .485* .125 .14 .83 
floor supervisor .381 .171 -.10 .86 
dept./branch manager .452 .172 -.03 .94 
executive .552 .295 -.35 1.46 
executive teller/associate -.068 .277 -.93 .79 
floor supervisor -.171 .301 -1.09 .75 
dept./branch manager -.100 .301 -1.02 .82 
regional manager -.552 .295 -1.46 .35 
10. Investing in 
diversification 
offers a layer of 
stability that we 
desperately need 
at this time. 
teller/associate floor supervisor -.033 .125 -.38 .32 
dept./branch manager .110 .168 -.37 .59 
regional manager -.271 .117 -.60 .06 
executive -.004 .277 -.86 .86 
floor supervisor teller/associate .033 .125 -.32 .38 
dept./branch manager .143 .198 -.42 .70 
regional manager -.238 .156 -.68 .20 
executive .029 .296 -.88 .94 
dept./branch 
manager 
teller/associate -.110 .168 -.59 .37 
floor supervisor -.143 .198 -.70 .42 
regional manager -.381 .193 -.93 .17 
executive -.114 .316 -1.08 .85 
regional 
manager 
teller/associate .271 .117 -.06 .60 
floor supervisor .238 .156 -.20 .68 
dept./branch manager .381 .193 -.17 .93 
executive .267 .292 -.63 1.17 
executive teller/associate .004 .277 -.86 .86 
floor supervisor -.029 .296 -.94 .88 
dept./branch manager .114 .316 -.85 1.08 
regional manager -.267 .292 -1.17 .63 
11. Intra-bank 
loans create a 
dangerous cycle 
of risk and 
vulnerability. 
teller/associate floor supervisor .063 .144 -.34 .47 
dept./branch manager .254 .159 -.20 .70 
regional manager -.222 .134 -.60 .15 
executive .140 .278 -.72 1.00 
floor supervisor teller/associate -.063 .144 -.47 .34 
dept./branch manager .190 .201 -.38 .76 
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regional manager -.286 .182 -.80 .23 
executive .076 .304 -.85 1.00 
dept./branch 
manager 
teller/associate -.254 .159 -.70 .20 
floor supervisor -.190 .201 -.76 .38 
regional manager -.476 .194 -1.03 .07 
executive -.114 .311 -1.06 .84 
regional 
manager 
teller/associate .222 .134 -.15 .60 
floor supervisor .286 .182 -.23 .80 
dept./branch manager .476 .194 -.07 1.03 
executive .362 .299 -.55 1.28 
executive teller/associate -.140 .278 -1.00 .72 
floor supervisor -.076 .304 -1.00 .85 
dept./branch manager .114 .311 -.84 1.06 
regional manager -.362 .299 -1.28 .55 
12. The increase 
in lending rates is 
a positive step 
towards industry 
maturity. 
teller/associate floor supervisor .242 .124 -.11 .59 
dept./branch manager .147 .150 -.28 .57 
regional manager -.377 .137 -.76 .01 
executive .176 .277 -.69 1.04 
floor supervisor teller/associate -.242 .124 -.59 .11 
dept./branch manager -.095 .181 -.61 .42 
regional manager -.619* .170 -1.10 -.14 
executive -.067 .295 -.97 .84 
dept./branch 
manager 
teller/associate -.147 .150 -.57 .28 
floor supervisor .095 .181 -.42 .61 
regional manager -.524 .190 -1.06 .01 
executive .029 .307 -.91 .97 
regional 
manager 
teller/associate .377 .137 -.01 .76 
floor supervisor .619* .170 .14 1.10 
dept./branch manager .524 .190 -.01 1.06 
executive .552 .301 -.37 1.47 
executive teller/associate -.176 .277 -1.04 .69 
floor supervisor .067 .295 -.84 .97 
dept./branch manager -.029 .307 -.97 .91 
regional manager -.552 .301 -1.47 .37 
teller/associate floor supervisor .203 .142 -.20 .60 
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based on oil and 
gas exploitation. 
dept./branch manager .155 .150 -.27 .58 
regional manager -.131 .135 -.51 .25 
executive .127 .366 -1.01 1.26 
floor supervisor teller/associate -.203 .142 -.60 .20 
dept./branch manager -.048 .194 -.60 .50 
regional manager -.333 .183 -.85 .18 
executive -.076 .386 -1.27 1.11 
dept./branch 
manager 
teller/associate -.155 .150 -.58 .27 
floor supervisor .048 .194 -.50 .60 
regional manager -.286 .189 -.82 .25 
executive -.029 .389 -1.23 1.17 
regional 
manager 
teller/associate .131 .135 -.25 .51 
floor supervisor .333 .183 -.18 .85 
dept./branch manager .286 .189 -.25 .82 
executive .257 .384 -.93 1.44 
executive teller/associate -.127 .366 -1.26 1.01 
floor supervisor .076 .386 -1.11 1.27 
dept./branch manager .029 .389 -1.17 1.23 





should remain oil 
and gas. 
teller/associate floor supervisor .008 .142 -.39 .41 
dept./branch manager -.112 .150 -.54 .31 
regional manager -.040 .112 -.35 .27 
executive .188 .206 -.45 .83 
floor supervisor teller/associate -.008 .142 -.41 .39 
dept./branch manager -.119 .194 -.67 .43 
regional manager -.048 .167 -.52 .42 
executive .181 .240 -.54 .91 
dept./branch 
manager 
teller/associate .112 .150 -.31 .54 
floor supervisor .119 .194 -.43 .67 
regional manager .071 .174 -.42 .56 
executive .300 .245 -.44 1.04 
regional 
manager 
teller/associate .040 .112 -.27 .35 
floor supervisor .048 .167 -.42 .52 
dept./branch manager -.071 .174 -.56 .42 
executive .229 .224 -.46 .91 
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executive teller/associate -.188 .206 -.83 .45 
floor supervisor -.181 .240 -.91 .54 
dept./branch manager -.300 .245 -1.04 .44 
regional manager -.229 .224 -.91 .46 




population in our 
nation is worrying. 
teller/associate floor supervisor -.347* .089 -.59 -.10 
dept./branch manager .129 .152 -.30 .56 
regional manager .272 .116 -.05 .60 
executive -.071 .206 -.71 .57 
floor supervisor teller/associate .347* .089 .10 .59 
dept./branch manager .476* .163 .01 .94 
regional manager .619* .129 .26 .98 
executive .276 .213 -.38 .93 
dept./branch 
manager 
teller/associate -.129 .152 -.56 .30 
floor supervisor -.476* .163 -.94 -.01 
regional manager .143 .179 -.37 .65 
executive -.200 .247 -.95 .55 
regional 
manager 
teller/associate -.272 .116 -.60 .05 
floor supervisor -.619* .129 -.98 -.26 
dept./branch manager -.143 .179 -.65 .37 
executive -.343 .226 -1.03 .35 
executive teller/associate .071 .206 -.57 .71 
floor supervisor -.276 .213 -.93 .38 
dept./branch manager .200 .247 -.55 .95 
regional manager .343 .226 -.35 1.03 
16. New 
companies are a 
liability; we would 
prefer to invest in 
tested models. 
teller/associate floor supervisor .139 .146 -.27 .55 
dept./branch manager -.004 .171 -.49 .48 
regional manager .091 .117 -.24 .42 
executive .024 .140 -.41 .45 
floor supervisor teller/associate -.139 .146 -.55 .27 
dept./branch manager -.143 .213 -.75 .46 
regional manager -.048 .173 -.53 .44 
executive -.114 .189 -.67 .45 
dept./branch 
manager 
teller/associate .004 .171 -.48 .49 
floor supervisor .143 .213 -.46 .75 
regional manager .095 .195 -.46 .65 
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executive .029 .210 -.59 .65 
regional 
manager 
teller/associate -.091 .117 -.42 .24 
floor supervisor .048 .173 -.44 .53 
dept./branch manager -.095 .195 -.65 .46 
executive -.067 .169 -.57 .44 
executive teller/associate -.024 .140 -.45 .41 
floor supervisor .114 .189 -.45 .67 
dept./branch manager -.029 .210 -.65 .59 
regional manager .067 .169 -.44 .57 
17. Most small 
businesses are 
likely to fail if 
given enough 
time. 
teller/associate floor supervisor .237 .116 -.09 .56 
dept./branch manager .213 .147 -.20 .63 
regional manager .047 .103 -.24 .33 
executive .056 .205 -.58 .69 
floor supervisor teller/associate -.237 .116 -.56 .09 
dept./branch manager -.024 .176 -.52 .48 
regional manager -.190 .142 -.59 .21 
executive -.181 .227 -.87 .51 
dept./branch 
manager 
teller/associate -.213 .147 -.63 .20 
floor supervisor .024 .176 -.48 .52 
regional manager -.167 .168 -.64 .31 
executive -.157 .244 -.90 .58 
regional 
manager 
teller/associate -.047 .103 -.33 .24 
floor supervisor .190 .142 -.21 .59 
dept./branch manager .167 .168 -.31 .64 
executive .010 .221 -.67 .68 
executive teller/associate -.056 .205 -.69 .58 
floor supervisor .181 .227 -.51 .87 
dept./branch manager .157 .244 -.58 .90 
regional manager -.010 .221 -.68 .67 
18. Our banks 
should invest 




teller/associate floor supervisor .002 .132 -.37 .37 
dept./branch manager .455* .132 .08 .83 
regional manager .098 .127 -.26 .45 
executive .269 .142 -.17 .70 
floor supervisor teller/associate -.002 .132 -.37 .37 





regional manager .095 .166 -.37 .56 
executive .267 .177 -.26 .79 
dept./branch 
manager 
teller/associate -.455* .132 -.83 -.08 
floor supervisor -.452 .170 -.93 .03 
regional manager -.357 .167 -.83 .11 
executive -.186 .178 -.72 .35 
regional 
manager 
teller/associate -.098 .127 -.45 .26 
floor supervisor -.095 .166 -.56 .37 
dept./branch manager .357 .167 -.11 .83 
executive .171 .174 -.35 .69 
executive teller/associate -.269 .142 -.70 .17 
floor supervisor -.267 .177 -.79 .26 
dept./branch manager .186 .178 -.35 .72 
regional manager -.171 .174 -.69 .35 
19. Without 
sufficient oil and 




teller/associate floor supervisor .121 .158 -.32 .56 
dept./branch manager -.093 .190 -.63 .45 
regional manager -.069 .127 -.42 .29 
executive .178 .207 -.46 .82 
floor supervisor teller/associate -.121 .158 -.56 .32 
dept./branch manager -.214 .234 -.88 .45 
regional manager -.190 .187 -.72 .33 
executive .057 .249 -.69 .81 
dept./branch 
manager 
teller/associate .093 .190 -.45 .63 
floor supervisor .214 .234 -.45 .88 
regional manager .024 .214 -.59 .63 
executive .271 .270 -.54 1.08 
regional 
manager 
teller/associate .069 .127 -.29 .42 
floor supervisor .190 .187 -.33 .72 
dept./branch manager -.024 .214 -.63 .59 
executive .248 .230 -.45 .95 
executive teller/associate -.178 .207 -.82 .46 
floor supervisor -.057 .249 -.81 .69 
dept./branch manager -.271 .270 -1.08 .54 
regional manager -.248 .230 -.95 .45 
teller/associate floor supervisor .533* .111 .22 .84 
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20. The domestic 
financial markets 
are unstable and 
high-risk. 
dept./branch manager -.086 .128 -.45 .28 
regional manager .009 .100 -.27 .29 
executive -.086 .176 -.63 .46 
floor supervisor teller/associate -.533* .111 -.84 -.22 
dept./branch manager -.619* .155 -1.06 -.18 
regional manager -.524* .132 -.90 -.15 
executive -.619* .196 -1.22 -.02 
dept./branch 
manager 
teller/associate .086 .128 -.28 .45 
floor supervisor .619* .155 .18 1.06 
regional manager .095 .147 -.32 .51 
executive .000 .206 -.62 .62 
regional 
manager 
teller/associate -.009 .100 -.29 .27 
floor supervisor .524* .132 .15 .90 
dept./branch manager -.095 .147 -.51 .32 
executive -.095 .190 -.68 .48 
executive teller/associate .086 .176 -.46 .63 
floor supervisor .619* .196 .02 1.22 
dept./branch manager .000 .206 -.62 .62 
regional manager .095 .190 -.48 .68 
Section 4. 1. Our 
government has a 
long-term vision 
that does not rely 
on oil and gas for 
development. 
teller/associate floor supervisor .045 .161 -.41 .50 
dept./branch manager -.050 .203 -.63 .53 
regional manager .092 .125 -.26 .44 
executive -.450* .142 -.88 -.02 
floor supervisor teller/associate -.045 .161 -.50 .41 
dept./branch manager -.095 .247 -.80 .61 
regional manager .048 .189 -.48 .58 
executive -.495 .200 -1.08 .09 
dept./branch 
manager 
teller/associate .050 .203 -.53 .63 
floor supervisor .095 .247 -.61 .80 
regional manager .143 .226 -.50 .79 
executive -.400 .236 -1.09 .29 
regional 
manager 
teller/associate -.092 .125 -.44 .26 
floor supervisor -.048 .189 -.58 .48 
dept./branch manager -.143 .226 -.79 .50 
executive -.543* .173 -1.06 -.03 
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executive teller/associate .450* .142 .02 .88 
floor supervisor .495 .200 -.09 1.08 
dept./branch manager .400 .236 -.29 1.09 
regional manager .543* .173 .03 1.06 
2. The primary 
industry upon 
which lending and 
development 
should focus is: 
teller/associate floor supervisor .582 .233 -.07 1.23 
dept./branch manager -.013 .314 -.91 .88 
regional manager .297 .250 -.40 1.00 
executive 1.401* .276 .55 2.25 
floor supervisor teller/associate -.582 .233 -1.23 .07 
dept./branch manager -.595 .372 -1.65 .46 
regional manager -.286 .319 -1.18 .61 
executive .819 .340 -.20 1.84 
dept./branch 
manager 
teller/associate .013 .314 -.88 .91 
floor supervisor .595 .372 -.46 1.65 
regional manager .310 .383 -.78 1.39 
executive 1.414* .400 .23 2.60 
regional 
manager 
teller/associate -.297 .250 -1.00 .40 
floor supervisor .286 .319 -.61 1.18 
dept./branch manager -.310 .383 -1.39 .78 
executive 1.105* .352 .06 2.15 
executive teller/associate -1.401* .276 -2.25 -.55 
floor supervisor -.819 .340 -1.84 .20 
dept./branch manager -1.414* .400 -2.60 -.23 
regional manager -1.105* .352 -2.15 -.06 
3. The primary 
result of a 
government 
bailout in our 
nation is: 
teller/associate floor supervisor 1.095* .207 .52 1.67 
dept./branch manager .143 .296 -.70 .98 
regional manager -.333 .249 -1.03 .36 
executive -.400 .373 -1.55 .75 
floor supervisor teller/associate -1.095* .207 -1.67 -.52 
dept./branch manager -.952 .339 -1.91 .01 
regional manager -1.429* .299 -2.27 -.59 
executive -1.495* .408 -2.74 -.25 
dept./branch 
manager 
teller/associate -.143 .296 -.98 .70 
floor supervisor .952 .339 -.01 1.91 
regional manager -.476 .366 -1.51 .56 
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executive -.543 .459 -1.93 .84 
regional 
manager 
teller/associate .333 .249 -.36 1.03 
floor supervisor 1.429* .299 .59 2.27 
dept./branch manager .476 .366 -.56 1.51 
executive -.067 .431 -1.37 1.24 
executive teller/associate .400 .373 -.75 1.55 
floor supervisor 1.495* .408 .25 2.74 
dept./branch manager .543 .459 -.84 1.93 
regional manager .067 .431 -1.24 1.37 
4. Government 
investment in oil 




teller/associate floor supervisor .563* .166 .10 1.03 
dept./branch manager .563 .201 -.01 1.14 
regional manager -.008 .171 -.49 .47 
executive -.351 .210 -1.00 .30 
floor supervisor teller/associate -.563* .166 -1.03 -.10 
dept./branch manager .000 .244 -.69 .69 
regional manager -.571 .220 -1.19 .05 
executive -.914* .252 -1.67 -.16 
dept./branch 
manager 
teller/associate -.563 .201 -1.14 .01 
floor supervisor .000 .244 -.69 .69 
regional manager -.571 .248 -1.27 .13 
executive -.914* .276 -1.74 -.09 
regional 
manager 
teller/associate .008 .171 -.47 .49 
floor supervisor .571 .220 -.05 1.19 
dept./branch manager .571 .248 -.13 1.27 
executive -.343 .255 -1.11 .42 
executive teller/associate .351 .210 -.30 1.00 
floor supervisor .914* .252 .16 1.67 
dept./branch manager .914* .276 .09 1.74 
regional manager .343 .255 -.42 1.11 
5. The 
government’s role 
in stabilising the 
domestic 
economy is: 
teller/associate floor supervisor .094 .082 -.14 .32 
dept./branch manager -.025 .146 -.44 .39 
regional manager -.335 .121 -.67 .00 
executive -.325 .314 -1.30 .65 
floor supervisor teller/associate -.094 .082 -.32 .14 
dept./branch manager -.119 .159 -.57 .33 
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regional manager -.429* .136 -.81 -.05 
executive -.419 .320 -1.41 .57 
dept./branch 
manager 
teller/associate .025 .146 -.39 .44 
floor supervisor .119 .159 -.33 .57 
regional manager -.310 .182 -.83 .21 
executive -.300 .342 -1.35 .75 
regional 
manager 
teller/associate .335 .121 .00 .67 
floor supervisor .429* .136 .05 .81 
dept./branch manager .310 .182 -.21 .83 
executive .010 .332 -1.01 1.03 
executive teller/associate .325 .314 -.65 1.30 
floor supervisor .419 .320 -.57 1.41 
dept./branch manager .300 .342 -.75 1.35 
regional manager -.010 .332 -1.03 1.01 
6. Our 




teller/associate floor supervisor .083 .066 -.10 .27 
dept./branch manager .035 .083 -.20 .27 
regional manager .035 .048 -.10 .17 
executive -.108* .019 -.16 -.06 
floor supervisor teller/associate -.083 .066 -.27 .10 
dept./branch manager -.048 .102 -.34 .24 
regional manager -.048 .077 -.27 .17 
executive -.190* .063 -.37 -.01 
dept./branch 
manager 
teller/associate -.035 .083 -.27 .20 
floor supervisor .048 .102 -.24 .34 
regional manager .000 .092 -.26 .26 
executive -.143 .080 -.37 .09 
regional 
manager 
teller/associate -.035 .048 -.17 .10 
floor supervisor .048 .077 -.17 .27 
dept./branch manager .000 .092 -.26 .26 
executive -.143* .044 -.27 -.02 
executive teller/associate .108* .019 .06 .16 
floor supervisor .190* .063 .01 .37 
dept./branch manager .143 .080 -.09 .37 
regional manager .143* .044 .02 .27 
teller/associate floor supervisor .168 .221 -.45 .79 
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7. The primary 
factor restricting 
the number of 
national citizens 
in private sector 
employment is: 
dept./branch manager .120 .216 -.49 .73 
regional manager -.642* .211 -1.23 -.05 
executive -.165 .455 -1.58 1.25 
floor supervisor teller/associate -.168 .221 -.79 .45 
dept./branch manager -.048 .286 -.86 .76 
regional manager -.810* .282 -1.60 -.02 
executive -.333 .492 -1.84 1.17 
dept./branch 
manager 
teller/associate -.120 .216 -.73 .49 
floor supervisor .048 .286 -.76 .86 
regional manager -.762 .279 -1.55 .03 
executive -.286 .490 -1.79 1.22 
regional 
manager 
teller/associate .642* .211 .05 1.23 
floor supervisor .810* .282 .02 1.60 
dept./branch manager .762 .279 -.03 1.55 
executive .476 .488 -1.02 1.97 
executive teller/associate .165 .455 -1.25 1.58 
floor supervisor .333 .492 -1.17 1.84 
dept./branch manager .286 .490 -1.22 1.79 
regional manager -.476 .488 -1.97 1.02 
8. The primary 
sector which 
national citizens 
would like to work 
in is: 
teller/associate floor supervisor .690 .248 -.01 1.39 
dept./branch manager .618 .318 -.29 1.52 
regional manager .785* .231 .14 1.43 
executive -1.253* .404 -2.50 .00 
floor supervisor teller/associate -.690 .248 -1.39 .01 
dept./branch manager -.071 .381 -1.15 1.01 
regional manager .095 .312 -.78 .97 
executive -1.943* .455 -3.32 -.56 
dept./branch 
manager 
teller/associate -.618 .318 -1.52 .29 
floor supervisor .071 .381 -1.01 1.15 
regional manager .167 .370 -.88 1.22 
executive -1.871* .496 -3.37 -.37 
regional 
manager 
teller/associate -.785* .231 -1.43 -.14 
floor supervisor -.095 .312 -.97 .78 
dept./branch manager -.167 .370 -1.22 .88 
executive -2.038* .446 -3.40 -.68 
  
410 
executive teller/associate 1.253* .404 .00 2.50 
floor supervisor 1.943* .455 .56 3.32 
dept./branch manager 1.871* .496 .37 3.37 
regional manager 2.038* .446 .68 3.40 
9. Government 
analysts would 
rank the current 
threat level in oil 
and gas as 
follows: 
teller/associate floor supervisor .072 .083 -.16 .30 
dept./branch manager .048 .085 -.19 .29 
regional manager -.024 .097 -.30 .25 
executive -.309 .242 -1.06 .44 
floor supervisor teller/associate -.072 .083 -.30 .16 
dept./branch manager -.024 .105 -.32 .27 
regional manager -.095 .115 -.42 .23 
executive -.381 .250 -1.15 .39 
dept./branch 
manager 
teller/associate -.048 .085 -.29 .19 
floor supervisor .024 .105 -.27 .32 
regional manager -.071 .116 -.40 .26 
executive -.357 .250 -1.13 .42 
regional 
manager 
teller/associate .024 .097 -.25 .30 
floor supervisor .095 .115 -.23 .42 
dept./branch manager .071 .116 -.26 .40 
executive -.286 .255 -1.07 .50 
executive teller/associate .309 .242 -.44 1.06 
floor supervisor .381 .250 -.39 1.15 
dept./branch manager .357 .250 -.42 1.13 
regional manager .286 .255 -.50 1.07 
10. The 
government 
investment in oil 
and gas is based 
on the following 
objective: 
teller/associate floor supervisor .118 .204 -.45 .69 
dept./branch manager -.549 .243 -1.24 .14 
regional manager .308 .195 -.24 .85 
executive -1.035* .320 -2.03 -.04 
floor supervisor teller/associate -.118 .204 -.69 .45 
dept./branch manager -.667 .300 -1.52 .18 
regional manager .190 .262 -.55 .93 
executive -1.152* .365 -2.26 -.05 
dept./branch 
manager 
teller/associate .549 .243 -.14 1.24 
floor supervisor .667 .300 -.18 1.52 
regional manager .857* .294 .02 1.69 
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executive -.486 .388 -1.66 .69 
regional 
manager 
teller/associate -.308 .195 -.85 .24 
floor supervisor -.190 .262 -.93 .55 
dept./branch manager -.857* .294 -1.69 -.02 
executive -1.343* .360 -2.44 -.25 
executive teller/associate 1.035* .320 .04 2.03 
floor supervisor 1.152* .365 .05 2.26 
dept./branch manager .486 .388 -.69 1.66 







the oil and gas 
industry 
teller/associate floor supervisor .018 .100 -.26 .30 
dept./branch manager -.387* .126 -.75 -.03 
regional manager .065 .094 -.20 .33 
executive .027 .264 -.79 .85 
floor supervisor teller/associate -.018 .100 -.30 .26 
dept./branch manager -.405 .152 -.84 .03 
regional manager .048 .127 -.31 .40 
executive .010 .278 -.85 .87 
dept./branch 
manager 
teller/associate .387* .126 .03 .75 
floor supervisor .405 .152 -.03 .84 
regional manager .452* .149 .03 .87 
executive .414 .288 -.47 1.30 
regional 
manager 
teller/associate -.065 .094 -.33 .20 
floor supervisor -.048 .127 -.40 .31 
dept./branch manager -.452* .149 -.87 -.03 
executive -.038 .276 -.89 .81 
executive teller/associate -.027 .264 -.85 .79 
floor supervisor -.010 .278 -.87 .85 
dept./branch manager -.414 .288 -1.30 .47 




teller/associate floor supervisor .021 .089 -.23 .27 
dept./branch manager .092 .139 -.30 .49 
regional manager .068 .100 -.21 .35 
executive .078 .203 -.55 .71 
floor supervisor teller/associate -.021 .089 -.27 .23 
dept./branch manager .071 .157 -.37 .52 
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regional manager .048 .123 -.30 .39 
executive .057 .216 -.61 .72 
dept./branch 
manager 
teller/associate -.092 .139 -.49 .30 
floor supervisor -.071 .157 -.52 .37 
regional manager -.024 .163 -.49 .44 
executive -.014 .241 -.75 .72 
regional 
manager 
teller/associate -.068 .100 -.35 .21 
floor supervisor -.048 .123 -.39 .30 
dept./branch manager .024 .163 -.44 .49 
executive .010 .221 -.67 .68 
executive teller/associate -.078 .203 -.71 .55 
floor supervisor -.057 .216 -.72 .61 
dept./branch manager .014 .241 -.72 .75 




teller/associate floor supervisor -.176 .122 -.52 .17 
dept./branch manager .157 .136 -.23 .55 
regional manager -.033 .121 -.37 .31 
executive .614* .137 .19 1.04 
floor supervisor teller/associate .176 .122 -.17 .52 
dept./branch manager .333 .174 -.16 .83 
regional manager .143 .162 -.31 .60 
executive .790* .174 .27 1.31 
dept./branch 
manager 
teller/associate -.157 .136 -.55 .23 
floor supervisor -.333 .174 -.83 .16 
regional manager -.190 .173 -.68 .30 
executive .457 .185 -.09 1.01 
regional 
manager 
teller/associate .033 .121 -.31 .37 
floor supervisor -.143 .162 -.60 .31 
dept./branch manager .190 .173 -.30 .68 
executive .648* .174 .13 1.17 
executive teller/associate -.614* .137 -1.04 -.19 
floor supervisor -.790* .174 -1.31 -.27 
dept./branch manager -.457 .185 -1.01 .09 
regional manager -.648* .174 -1.17 -.13 





dept./branch manager .487* .099 .21 .77 
regional manager -.037 .110 -.34 .27 
executive -.199 .275 -1.05 .66 
floor supervisor teller/associate .560* .110 .25 .87 
dept./branch manager 1.048* .138 .66 1.44 
regional manager .524* .146 .11 .93 
executive .362 .291 -.53 1.26 
dept./branch 
manager 
teller/associate -.487* .099 -.77 -.21 
floor supervisor -1.048* .138 -1.44 -.66 
regional manager -.524* .138 -.91 -.13 
executive -.686 .288 -1.57 .20 
regional 
manager 
teller/associate .037 .110 -.27 .34 
floor supervisor -.524* .146 -.93 -.11 
dept./branch manager .524* .138 .13 .91 
executive -.162 .291 -1.06 .73 
executive teller/associate .199 .275 -.66 1.05 
floor supervisor -.362 .291 -1.26 .53 
dept./branch manager .686 .288 -.20 1.57 
regional manager .162 .291 -.73 1.06 
Strategic vision or 
agenda for 
national change 
teller/associate floor supervisor .175 .091 -.08 .43 
dept./branch manager .152 .131 -.22 .52 
regional manager -.015 .087 -.26 .23 
executive .423 .204 -.21 1.05 
floor supervisor teller/associate -.175 .091 -.43 .08 
dept./branch manager -.024 .150 -.45 .40 
regional manager -.190 .113 -.51 .13 
executive .248 .217 -.42 .91 
dept./branch 
manager 
teller/associate -.152 .131 -.52 .22 
floor supervisor .024 .150 -.40 .45 
regional manager -.167 .147 -.58 .25 
executive .271 .236 -.45 .99 
regional 
manager 
teller/associate .015 .087 -.23 .26 
floor supervisor .190 .113 -.13 .51 
dept./branch manager .167 .147 -.25 .58 
executive .438 .214 -.22 1.10 
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executive teller/associate -.423 .204 -1.05 .21 
floor supervisor -.248 .217 -.91 .42 
dept./branch manager -.271 .236 -.99 .45 
regional manager -.438 .214 -1.10 .22 
Industry rules and 
regulations 
teller/associate floor supervisor -.103 .120 -.44 .23 
dept./branch manager -.008 .106 -.31 .29 
regional manager .135 .096 -.13 .40 
executive -.351 .203 -.98 .28 
floor supervisor teller/associate .103 .120 -.23 .44 
dept./branch manager .095 .152 -.33 .52 
regional manager .238 .145 -.17 .64 
executive -.248 .230 -.95 .45 
dept./branch 
manager 
teller/associate .008 .106 -.29 .31 
floor supervisor -.095 .152 -.52 .33 
regional manager .143 .134 -.24 .52 
executive -.343 .224 -1.03 .34 
regional 
manager 
teller/associate -.135 .096 -.40 .13 
floor supervisor -.238 .145 -.64 .17 
dept./branch manager -.143 .134 -.52 .24 
executive -.486 .219 -1.16 .19 
executive teller/associate .351 .203 -.28 .98 
floor supervisor .248 .230 -.45 .95 
dept./branch manager .343 .224 -.34 1.03 




teller/associate floor supervisor .193 .107 -.11 .49 
dept./branch manager -.021 .186 -.55 .51 
regional manager .384* .099 .11 .66 
executive .050 .174 -.49 .59 
floor supervisor teller/associate -.193 .107 -.49 .11 
dept./branch manager -.214 .206 -.80 .37 
regional manager .190 .134 -.18 .57 
executive -.143 .196 -.74 .45 
dept./branch 
manager 
teller/associate .021 .186 -.51 .55 
floor supervisor .214 .206 -.37 .80 
regional manager .405 .203 -.17 .98 
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executive .071 .248 -.67 .81 
regional 
manager 
teller/associate -.384* .099 -.66 -.11 
floor supervisor -.190 .134 -.57 .18 
dept./branch manager -.405 .203 -.98 .17 
executive -.333 .192 -.92 .25 
executive teller/associate -.050 .174 -.59 .49 
floor supervisor .143 .196 -.45 .74 
dept./branch manager -.071 .248 -.81 .67 




teller/associate floor supervisor -.263* .083 -.50 -.03 
dept./branch manager .237 .116 -.09 .57 
regional manager -.311* .108 -.61 -.01 
executive .565* .136 .14 .99 
floor supervisor teller/associate .263* .083 .03 .50 
dept./branch manager .500* .133 .12 .88 
regional manager -.048 .125 -.40 .30 
executive .829* .150 .37 1.29 
dept./branch 
manager 
teller/associate -.237 .116 -.57 .09 
floor supervisor -.500* .133 -.88 -.12 
regional manager -.548* .149 -.97 -.13 
executive .329 .171 -.19 .84 
regional 
manager 
teller/associate .311* .108 .01 .61 
floor supervisor .048 .125 -.30 .40 
dept./branch manager .548* .149 .13 .97 
executive .876* .165 .38 1.37 
executive teller/associate -.565* .136 -.99 -.14 
floor supervisor -.829* .150 -1.29 -.37 
dept./branch manager -.329 .171 -.84 .19 
regional manager -.876* .165 -1.37 -.38 
Foreign interests 
and investments 
teller/associate floor supervisor -.152 .112 -.47 .16 
dept./branch manager .158 .132 -.22 .53 
regional manager .182 .119 -.15 .51 
executive .486* .138 .06 .91 
floor supervisor teller/associate .152 .112 -.16 .47 
dept./branch manager .310 .162 -.15 .77 
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regional manager .333 .151 -.09 .76 
executive .638* .167 .14 1.14 
dept./branch 
manager 
teller/associate -.158 .132 -.53 .22 
floor supervisor -.310 .162 -.77 .15 
regional manager .024 .166 -.45 .50 
executive .329 .181 -.21 .87 
regional 
manager 
teller/associate -.182 .119 -.51 .15 
floor supervisor -.333 .151 -.76 .09 
dept./branch manager -.024 .166 -.50 .45 
executive .305 .171 -.21 .82 
executive teller/associate -.486* .138 -.91 -.06 
floor supervisor -.638* .167 -1.14 -.14 
dept./branch manager -.329 .181 -.87 .21 
regional manager -.305 .171 -.82 .21 
Defaults and risks 
in bank 
performance 
teller/associate floor supervisor .238* .073 .03 .44 
dept./branch manager -.024 .103 -.32 .27 
regional manager -.286 .103 -.57 .00 
executive .019 .137 -.40 .44 
floor supervisor teller/associate -.238* .073 -.44 -.03 
dept./branch manager -.262 .114 -.58 .06 
regional manager -.524* .113 -.84 -.21 
executive -.219 .145 -.66 .22 
dept./branch 
manager 
teller/associate .024 .103 -.27 .32 
floor supervisor .262 .114 -.06 .58 
regional manager -.262 .135 -.64 .12 
executive .043 .162 -.45 .53 
regional 
manager 
teller/associate .286 .103 .00 .57 
floor supervisor .524* .113 .21 .84 
dept./branch manager .262 .135 -.12 .64 
executive .305 .162 -.18 .79 
executive teller/associate -.019 .137 -.44 .40 
floor supervisor .219 .145 -.22 .66 
dept./branch manager -.043 .162 -.53 .45 
regional manager -.305 .162 -.79 .18 






and gas industry 
prices 
dept./branch manager -.186 .141 -.59 .22 
regional manager -.114 .108 -.42 .19 
executive .429 .218 -.25 1.11 
floor supervisor teller/associate -.029 .098 -.30 .25 
dept./branch manager -.214 .160 -.67 .24 
regional manager -.143 .132 -.51 .23 
executive .400 .231 -.31 1.11 
dept./branch 
manager 
teller/associate .186 .141 -.22 .59 
floor supervisor .214 .160 -.24 .67 
regional manager .071 .166 -.40 .54 
executive .614 .253 -.15 1.38 
regional 
manager 
teller/associate .114 .108 -.19 .42 
floor supervisor .143 .132 -.23 .51 
dept./branch manager -.071 .166 -.54 .40 
executive .543 .235 -.18 1.26 
executive teller/associate -.429 .218 -1.11 .25 
floor supervisor -.400 .231 -1.11 .31 
dept./branch manager -.614 .253 -1.38 .15 
regional manager -.543 .235 -1.26 .18 
Demand for loans 
and innovative 
financing products 
teller/associate floor supervisor .090 .136 -.29 .47 
dept./branch manager .352 .133 -.03 .73 
regional manager .042 .131 -.33 .41 
executive -.319 .219 -1.00 .36 
floor supervisor teller/associate -.090 .136 -.47 .29 
dept./branch manager .262 .179 -.24 .77 
regional manager -.048 .178 -.55 .45 
executive -.410 .249 -1.17 .35 
dept./branch 
manager 
teller/associate -.352 .133 -.73 .03 
floor supervisor -.262 .179 -.77 .24 
regional manager -.310 .175 -.81 .19 
executive -.671 .248 -1.43 .08 
regional 
manager 
teller/associate -.042 .131 -.41 .33 
floor supervisor .048 .178 -.45 .55 
dept./branch manager .310 .175 -.19 .81 
executive -.362 .247 -1.11 .39 
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executive teller/associate .319 .219 -.36 1.00 
floor supervisor .410 .249 -.35 1.17 
dept./branch manager .671 .248 -.08 1.43 





teller/associate floor supervisor -.045 .112 -.36 .27 
dept./branch manager -.092 .137 -.48 .30 
regional manager -.140 .110 -.45 .17 
executive -.350 .218 -1.03 .33 
floor supervisor teller/associate .045 .112 -.27 .36 
dept./branch manager -.048 .166 -.52 .42 
regional manager -.095 .144 -.50 .31 
executive -.305 .237 -1.03 .42 
dept./branch 
manager 
teller/associate .092 .137 -.30 .48 
floor supervisor .048 .166 -.42 .52 
regional manager -.048 .165 -.51 .42 
executive -.257 .250 -1.02 .50 
regional 
manager 
teller/associate .140 .110 -.17 .45 
floor supervisor .095 .144 -.31 .50 
dept./branch manager .048 .165 -.42 .51 
executive -.210 .236 -.93 .51 
executive teller/associate .350 .218 -.33 1.03 
floor supervisor .305 .237 -.42 1.03 
dept./branch manager .257 .250 -.50 1.02 




teller/associate floor supervisor -.064 .146 -.47 .34 
dept./branch manager .055 .118 -.28 .39 
regional manager -.016 .130 -.38 .35 
executive -.102 .314 -1.08 .87 
floor supervisor teller/associate .064 .146 -.34 .47 
dept./branch manager .119 .180 -.39 .63 
regional manager .048 .188 -.48 .58 
executive -.038 .342 -1.09 1.01 
dept./branch 
manager 
teller/associate -.055 .118 -.39 .28 
floor supervisor -.119 .180 -.63 .39 
regional manager -.071 .168 -.55 .40 
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executive -.157 .331 -1.18 .86 
regional 
manager 
teller/associate .016 .130 -.35 .38 
floor supervisor -.048 .188 -.58 .48 
dept./branch manager .071 .168 -.40 .55 
executive -.086 .336 -1.12 .95 
executive teller/associate .102 .314 -.87 1.08 
floor supervisor .038 .342 -1.01 1.09 
dept./branch manager .157 .331 -.86 1.18 




teller/associate floor supervisor .079 .100 -.20 .36 
dept./branch manager -.445* .136 -.83 -.06 
regional manager .031 .107 -.27 .33 
executive .298 .218 -.38 .97 
floor supervisor teller/associate -.079 .100 -.36 .20 
dept./branch manager -.524* .159 -.98 -.07 
regional manager -.048 .135 -.43 .33 
executive .219 .233 -.49 .93 
dept./branch 
manager 
teller/associate .445* .136 .06 .83 
floor supervisor .524* .159 .07 .98 
regional manager .476* .163 .01 .94 
executive .743 .250 -.02 1.50 
regional 
manager 
teller/associate -.031 .107 -.33 .27 
floor supervisor .048 .135 -.33 .43 
dept./branch manager -.476* .163 -.94 -.01 
executive .267 .235 -.45 .99 
executive teller/associate -.298 .218 -.97 .38 
floor supervisor -.219 .233 -.93 .49 
dept./branch manager -.743 .250 -1.50 .02 




teller/associate floor supervisor -.041 .125 -.39 .31 
dept./branch manager .245 .172 -.24 .73 
regional manager .102 .106 -.20 .40 
executive -.355 .137 -.78 .07 
floor supervisor teller/associate .041 .125 -.31 .39 
dept./branch manager .286 .205 -.30 .87 
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regional manager .143 .154 -.29 .58 
executive -.314 .177 -.84 .21 
dept./branch 
manager 
teller/associate -.245 .172 -.73 .24 
floor supervisor -.286 .205 -.87 .30 
regional manager -.143 .194 -.69 .41 
executive -.600 .212 -1.23 .03 
regional 
manager 
teller/associate -.102 .106 -.40 .20 
floor supervisor -.143 .154 -.58 .29 
dept./branch manager .143 .194 -.41 .69 
executive -.457 .164 -.95 .03 
executive teller/associate .355 .137 -.07 .78 
floor supervisor .314 .177 -.21 .84 
dept./branch manager .600 .212 -.03 1.23 
regional manager .457 .164 -.03 .95 
Infrastructure and 
system 
teller/associate floor supervisor -.381* .122 -.72 -.04 
dept./branch manager .071 .132 -.30 .45 
regional manager -.190 .102 -.48 .10 
executive -.600* .138 -1.02 -.18 
floor supervisor teller/associate .381* .122 .04 .72 
dept./branch manager .452 .169 -.03 .93 
regional manager .190 .147 -.22 .60 
executive -.219 .174 -.74 .30 
dept./branch 
manager 
teller/associate -.071 .132 -.45 .30 
floor supervisor -.452 .169 -.93 .03 
regional manager -.262 .156 -.70 .18 
executive -.671* .181 -1.21 -.13 
regional 
manager 
teller/associate .190 .102 -.10 .48 
floor supervisor -.190 .147 -.60 .22 
dept./branch manager .262 .156 -.18 .70 
executive -.410 .161 -.89 .07 
executive teller/associate .600* .138 .18 1.02 
floor supervisor .219 .174 -.30 .74 
dept./branch manager .671* .181 .13 1.21 
regional manager .410 .161 -.07 .89 





dept./branch manager -.071 .122 -.42 .28 
regional manager -.071 .097 -.34 .20 
executive .072 .173 -.46 .61 
floor supervisor teller/associate -.120 .120 -.46 .22 
dept./branch manager -.190 .163 -.65 .27 
regional manager -.190 .145 -.60 .22 
executive -.048 .204 -.66 .57 
dept./branch 
manager 
teller/associate .071 .122 -.28 .42 
floor supervisor .190 .163 -.27 .65 
regional manager .000 .147 -.42 .42 
executive .143 .205 -.48 .76 
regional 
manager 
teller/associate .071 .097 -.20 .34 
floor supervisor .190 .145 -.22 .60 
dept./branch manager .000 .147 -.42 .42 
executive .143 .192 -.44 .73 
executive teller/associate -.072 .173 -.61 .46 
floor supervisor .048 .204 -.57 .66 
dept./branch manager -.143 .205 -.76 .48 
regional manager -.143 .192 -.73 .44 
International 
competitive forces 
teller/associate floor supervisor .196 .102 -.09 .48 
dept./branch manager -.185 .115 -.51 .14 
regional manager .053 .099 -.22 .33 
executive .501 .217 -.17 1.17 
floor supervisor teller/associate -.196 .102 -.48 .09 
dept./branch manager -.381 .145 -.79 .03 
regional manager -.143 .132 -.51 .23 
executive .305 .234 -.41 1.02 
dept./branch 
manager 
teller/associate .185 .115 -.14 .51 
floor supervisor .381 .145 -.03 .79 
regional manager .238 .143 -.17 .64 
executive .686 .240 -.05 1.42 
regional 
manager 
teller/associate -.053 .099 -.33 .22 
floor supervisor .143 .132 -.23 .51 
dept./branch manager -.238 .143 -.64 .17 
executive .448 .233 -.27 1.16 
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executive teller/associate -.501 .217 -1.17 .17 
floor supervisor -.305 .234 -1.02 .41 
dept./branch manager -.686 .240 -1.42 .05 




teller/associate floor supervisor .066 .124 -.28 .41 
dept./branch manager -.029 .111 -.34 .29 
regional manager -.172 .121 -.51 .17 
executive -.629 .276 -1.49 .23 
floor supervisor teller/associate -.066 .124 -.41 .28 
dept./branch manager -.095 .155 -.53 .34 
regional manager -.238 .163 -.69 .22 
executive -.695 .297 -1.61 .21 
dept./branch 
manager 
teller/associate .029 .111 -.29 .34 
floor supervisor .095 .155 -.34 .53 
regional manager -.143 .152 -.57 .29 
executive -.600 .291 -1.50 .30 
regional 
manager 
teller/associate .172 .121 -.17 .51 
floor supervisor .238 .163 -.22 .69 
dept./branch manager .143 .152 -.29 .57 
executive -.457 .295 -1.36 .45 
executive teller/associate .629 .276 -.23 1.49 
floor supervisor .695 .297 -.21 1.61 
dept./branch manager .600 .291 -.30 1.50 
regional manager .457 .295 -.45 1.36 
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Square F Sig. 
Section 2. 1. The 
banking industry is 
stable and diversified. 
Between Groups 14.842 4 3.710 3.349 .010 
Within Groups 659.318 595 1.108 
  
Total 674.160 599 
   
2. Current interest 
rates are competitive 
and in demand. 
Between Groups 68.990 4 17.248 12.477 .000 
Within Groups 822.475 595 1.382 
  
Total 891.465 599 
   
3. Central bank 
interventions have 
improved our lending 
strategies. 
Between Groups 3.581 4 .895 1.980 .096 




   
4. We invest a high 
percentage of our 
funds in private 
sector enterprises. 
Between Groups 35.522 4 8.881 8.791 .000 




   
5. Most deposits are 
tied to oil and gas 
rents. 
Between Groups 50.084 4 12.521 8.719 .000 
Within Groups 854.416 595 1.436 
  
Total 904.500 599 
   
6. Our vision is 
global. and this 
Between Groups 17.294 4 4.324 2.642 .033 








   
7. Our default rates 
are anticipated and 
appropriate. 
Between Groups 19.484 4 4.871 3.147 .014 
Within Groups 921.016 595 1.548 
  
Total 940.500 599 
   
8. The financial 
instruments we use 
are market sensitive 
and vulnerable to 
risks. 
Between Groups 63.204 4 15.801 12.513 .000 




   
9. We anticipate that 
the oil and gas 
market will recover in 
price and volume. 
Between Groups 5.381 4 1.345 .900 .464 




   
10. Most citizens do 
not plan financially for 
long-term market 
shocks. 
Between Groups 77.778 4 19.444 13.540 .000 




   
11. Government 
subsidies allow us to 
loan more freely to 
the private sector. 
Between Groups 10.842 4 2.710 5.263 .000 




   





Between Groups 16.192 4 4.048 4.508 .001 




   
13. There is an 
inadequate 
population of skilled 
entrepreneurs in our 
national population. 
Between Groups 43.104 4 10.776 8.429 .000 




   
14. Banks are 
essential to the 
Between Groups 9.974 4 2.494 3.957 .004 





and therefore must 
be protected during 
periods of financial 
duress and decline. 
Total 
384.960 599 
   
15. The financial 
market is mature and 
competitive. 
Between Groups 15.656 4 3.914 5.750 .000 
Within Groups 405.004 595 .681 
  
Total 420.660 599 
   
Section 3. 1. Global 
pressures on the oil 




Between Groups 21.951 4 5.488 4.979 .001 




   
2. The variability of 
commodity pricing 
creates highly 
impactful risks for our 
nation. 
Between Groups 18.221 4 4.555 4.989 .001 




   
3. Even if we 
diversified our 
industries. we would 
need decades to 
allow them to mature. 
Between Groups 8.217 4 2.054 1.566 .182 




   
4. Strategic 
partnerships and FDI 
allow rapid exchange 
of knowledge and 
technology and 
should be supported. 
Between Groups 36.163 4 9.041 9.204 .000 




   
5. Our bank is 
vulnerable to 
systemic risks. 
Between Groups 12.268 4 3.067 3.393 .009 
Within Groups 537.797 595 .904 
  
Total 550.065 599 
   
6. Without 
government support. 
Between Groups 18.582 4 4.645 5.108 .000 




our bank would likely 




   
7. Liquidity levels are 
at an all-time low. 
Between Groups 25.258 4 6.314 5.506 .000 
Within Groups 682.367 595 1.147 
  
Total 707.625 599 
   
8. When oil prices 
decline. we are less 
likely to lend money 
to private enterprises. 
Between Groups 20.287 4 5.072 5.524 .000 




   
9. Citizens are more 
likely to withhold 
savings and 
investments when oil 
prices fluctuate or 
decline. 
Between Groups 24.253 4 6.063 6.207 .000 




   
10. Investing in 
diversification offers a 
layer of stability that 
we desperately need 
at this time. 
Between Groups 31.995 4 7.999 8.811 .000 




   
11. Intra-bank loans 
create a dangerous 
cycle of risk and 
vulnerability. 
Between Groups 21.407 4 5.352 4.900 .001 




   
12. The increase in 
lending rates is a 
positive step towards 
industry maturity. 
Between Groups 9.075 4 2.269 2.165 .072 




   
13. Most of our 
internal investment 
strategies are based 
on oil and gas 
exploitation. 
Between Groups 15.879 4 3.970 3.892 .004 




   
14. Countries have 
national industries 
Between Groups 7.443 4 1.861 1.909 .107 




and products: Ours 




   
15. The gap between 
the citizen and 
expatriate population 
in our nation is 
worrying. 
Between Groups 4.193 4 1.048 1.200 .310 




   
16. New companies 
are a liability; we 
would prefer to invest 
in tested models. 
Between Groups 5.615 4 1.404 1.391 .236 




   
17. Most small 
businesses are likely 
to fail if given enough 
time. 
Between Groups 7.841 4 1.960 2.522 .040 




   
18. Our banks should 
invest more heavily in 
business 
development and 
growth to increase 
industry performance. 
Between Groups 5.316 4 1.329 1.202 .309 




   
19. Without sufficient 
oil and gas liquidity. 
we cannot fund 
additional 
development. 
Between Groups 16.781 4 4.195 3.507 .008 




   
20. The domestic 
financial markets are 
unstable and high 
risk. 
Between Groups 10.284 4 2.571 2.966 .019 




   
Section 4. 1. Our 
government has a 
long-term vision that 
does not rely on oil 
and gas for 
development. 
Between Groups 4.363 4 1.091 .886 .472 
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2. The primary 




Between Groups 16.468 4 4.117 1.291 .272 




   
3. The primary result 
of a government 
bailout in our nation 
is: 
Between Groups 5.898 4 1.474 .455 .769 




   
4. Government 
investment in oil and 
gas is a necessary 
and sustainable 
commitment. 
Between Groups 10.297 4 2.574 1.524 .194 




   
5. The government’s 
role in stabilising the 
domestic economy is: 
Between Groups 12.908 4 3.227 5.260 .000 
Within Groups 365.032 595 .613 
  
Total 377.940 599 
   
6. Our dependence 
on a single export 
makes our country 
look: 
Between Groups .847 4 .212 1.279 .277 




   
7. The primary factor 
restricting the number 
of national citizens in 
private sector 
employment is: 
Between Groups 18.365 4 4.591 1.721 .144 




   
8. The primary sector 
which national 
citizens would like to 
work in is: 
Between Groups 54.266 4 13.566 3.701 .005 




   
9. Government 
analysts would rank 
the current threat 
level in oil and gas as 
follows: 
Between Groups 8.021 4 2.005 3.485 .008 




   
Between Groups 39.644 4 9.911 4.499 .001 
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10. The government 
investment in oil and 
gas is based on the 
following objective: 









Price performance of 
the oil and gas 
industry 
Between Groups 5.129 4 1.282 2.221 .065 








Between Groups 7.543 4 1.886 3.352 .010 
Within Groups 334.697 595 .563 
  
Total 342.240 599 




Between Groups 7.723 4 1.931 2.670 .031 
Within Groups 430.217 595 .723 
  
Total 437.940 599 
   
Diversification of 
industries 
Between Groups 3.866 4 .966 1.490 .204 
Within Groups 385.999 595 .649 
  
Total 389.865 599 
   
Strategic vision or 
agenda for national 
change 
Between Groups 4.131 4 1.033 1.784 .130 
Within Groups 344.334 595 .579 
  
Total 348.465 599 
   
Industry rules and 
regulations 
Between Groups 4.464 4 1.116 2.025 .089 
Within Groups 327.921 595 .551 
  
Total 332.385 599 




Between Groups 1.987 4 .497 .678 .607 
Within Groups 435.953 595 .733 
  
Total 437.940 599 




Between Groups 5.377 4 1.344 2.347 .053 
Within Groups 340.808 595 .573 
  
Total 346.185 599 
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Foreign interests and 
investments 
Between Groups 4.577 4 1.144 1.457 .214 
Within Groups 467.263 595 .785 
  
Total 471.840 599 
   
Defaults and risks in 
bank performance 
Between Groups 2.177 4 .544 .963 .427 
Within Groups 336.448 595 .565 
  
Total 338.625 599 
   
Impact their 
organisational 
performance: Oil and 
gas industry prices 
Between Groups 8.673 4 2.168 2.890 .022 




   
Demand for loans 
and innovative 
financing products 
Between Groups 6.927 4 1.732 1.983 .096 
Within Groups 519.573 595 .873 
  
Total 526.500 599 




Between Groups 32.993 4 8.248 11.807 .000 
Within Groups 415.672 595 .699 
  
Total 448.665 599 
   
Liquidity guidelines 
and standards 
Between Groups 4.719 4 1.180 1.648 .161 
Within Groups 426.066 595 .716 
  
Total 430.785 599 
   
Auditing and 
governance oversight 
Between Groups 18.942 4 4.735 7.288 .000 
Within Groups 386.598 595 .650 
  
Total 405.540 599 




Between Groups 5.450 4 1.362 1.908 .107 
Within Groups 424.810 595 .714 
  
Total 430.260 599 
   
Infrastructure and 
system 
Between Groups 1.027 4 .257 .338 .852 
Within Groups 452.033 595 .760 
  
Total 453.060 599 
   
Domestic competitive 
forces 
Between Groups 6.978 4 1.744 3.017 .018 




Total 351.060 599 
   
International 
competitive forces 
Between Groups 4.394 4 1.099 1.904 .108 
Within Groups 343.231 595 .577 
  
Total 347.625 599 
   
Foreign investment 
and development 
Between Groups 10.973 4 2.743 3.668 .006 
Within Groups 445.027 595 .748 
  
Total 456.000 599 
   
 
 
Post Hoc Tests 
Multiple Comparisons 
Dunnett C  
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Variable 



















Section 2. 1. The 
banking industry 
is stable and 
diversified. 
less than 1 year 1-3 years -.215 .171 -.70 .27 
4-6 years .050 .167 -.42 .52 
7-9 years -.080 .194 -.63 .47 
10+ years .525 .288 -.32 1.37 
1-3 years less than 1 year .215 .171 -.27 .70 
4-6 years .265 .098 .00 .54 
7-9 years .135 .140 -.26 .53 
10+ years .740 .254 -.01 1.49 
4-6 years less than 1 year -.050 .167 -.52 .42 
1-3 years -.265 .098 -.54 .00 
7-9 years -.130 .135 -.51 .25 
10+ years .475 .251 -.26 1.21 
7-9 years less than 1 year .080 .194 -.47 .63 
1-3 years -.135 .140 -.53 .26 
4-6 years .130 .135 -.25 .51 
10+ years .605 .271 -.19 1.40 
  
432 
10+ years less than 1 year -.525 .288 -1.37 .32 
1-3 years -.740 .254 -1.49 .01 
4-6 years -.475 .251 -1.21 .26 
7-9 years -.605 .271 -1.40 .19 
2. Current interest 
rates are 
competitive and in 
demand. 
less than 1 year 1-3 years -1.133* .133 -1.50 -.76 
4-6 years -.703* .104 -.99 -.41 
7-9 years -.413* .126 -.77 -.06 
10+ years -.008 .102 -.30 .29 
1-3 years less than 1 year 1.133* .133 .76 1.50 
4-6 years .430* .131 .07 .79 
7-9 years .720* .149 .31 1.13 
10+ years 1.125* .129 .76 1.49 
4-6 years less than 1 year .703* .104 .41 .99 
1-3 years -.430* .131 -.79 -.07 
7-9 years .290 .124 -.06 .64 
10+ years .695* .100 .41 .98 
7-9 years less than 1 year .413* .126 .06 .77 
1-3 years -.720* .149 -1.13 -.31 
4-6 years -.290 .124 -.64 .06 
10+ years .405* .123 .06 .75 
10+ years less than 1 year .008 .102 -.29 .30 
1-3 years -1.125* .129 -1.49 -.76 
4-6 years -.695* .100 -.98 -.41 
7-9 years -.405* .123 -.75 -.06 




less than 1 year 1-3 years -.172 .102 -.46 .11 
4-6 years -.063 .082 -.30 .17 
7-9 years -.253 .116 -.58 .07 
10+ years -.008 .102 -.30 .29 
1-3 years less than 1 year .172 .102 -.11 .46 
4-6 years .108 .076 -.10 .32 
7-9 years -.082 .112 -.39 .23 
10+ years .163 .097 -.11 .44 
4-6 years less than 1 year .063 .082 -.17 .30 
1-3 years -.108 .076 -.32 .10 
7-9 years -.190 .095 -.45 .07 
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10+ years .055 .076 -.17 .28 
7-9 years less than 1 year .253 .116 -.07 .58 
1-3 years .082 .112 -.23 .39 
4-6 years .190 .095 -.07 .45 
10+ years .245 .113 -.08 .57 
10+ years less than 1 year .008 .102 -.29 .30 
1-3 years -.163 .097 -.44 .11 
4-6 years -.055 .076 -.28 .17 
7-9 years -.245 .113 -.57 .08 
4. We invest a 
high percentage 
of our funds in 
private sector 
enterprises. 
less than 1 year 1-3 years -.854* .113 -1.17 -.54 
4-6 years -.650* .084 -.89 -.41 
7-9 years -.440* .117 -.77 -.11 
10+ years -.075 .092 -.34 .19 
1-3 years less than 1 year .854* .113 .54 1.17 
4-6 years .204 .112 -.11 .51 
7-9 years .414* .139 .03 .80 
10+ years .779* .118 .45 1.11 
4-6 years less than 1 year .650* .084 .41 .89 
1-3 years -.204 .112 -.51 .11 
7-9 years .210 .116 -.11 .53 
10+ years .575* .091 .31 .84 
7-9 years less than 1 year .440* .117 .11 .77 
1-3 years -.414* .139 -.80 -.03 
4-6 years -.210 .116 -.53 .11 
10+ years .365* .122 .02 .71 
10+ years less than 1 year .075 .092 -.19 .34 
1-3 years -.779* .118 -1.11 -.45 
4-6 years -.575* .091 -.84 -.31 
7-9 years -.365* .122 -.71 -.02 
5. Most deposits 
are tied to oil and 
gas rents. 
less than 1 year 1-3 years -.726* .187 -1.25 -.20 
4-6 years -.313 .169 -.79 .16 
7-9 years -.493 .214 -1.10 .11 
10+ years .592* .169 .11 1.08 
1-3 years less than 1 year .726* .187 .20 1.25 
4-6 years .412* .126 .07 .76 
  
434 
7-9 years .232 .183 -.28 .74 
10+ years 1.317* .126 .96 1.67 
4-6 years less than 1 year .313 .169 -.16 .79 
1-3 years -.412* .126 -.76 -.07 
7-9 years -.180 .163 -.64 .28 
10+ years .905* .097 .63 1.18 
7-9 years less than 1 year .493 .214 -.11 1.10 
1-3 years -.232 .183 -.74 .28 
4-6 years .180 .163 -.28 .64 
10+ years 1.085* .164 .62 1.55 
10+ years less than 1 year -.592* .169 -1.08 -.11 
1-3 years -1.317* .126 -1.67 -.96 
4-6 years -.905* .097 -1.18 -.63 
7-9 years -1.085* .164 -1.55 -.62 
6. Our vision is 
global. and this 
requires 
diversification. 
less than 1 year 1-3 years -.391 .207 -.98 .19 
4-6 years -.013 .195 -.56 .54 
7-9 years .027 .230 -.62 .68 
10+ years -.208 .302 -1.09 .67 
1-3 years less than 1 year .391 .207 -.19 .98 
4-6 years .378* .127 .03 .73 
7-9 years .418 .176 -.07 .91 
10+ years .183 .264 -.59 .95 
4-6 years less than 1 year .013 .195 -.54 .56 
1-3 years -.378* .127 -.73 -.03 
7-9 years .040 .162 -.41 .49 
10+ years -.195 .255 -.94 .55 
7-9 years less than 1 year -.027 .230 -.68 .62 
1-3 years -.418 .176 -.91 .07 
4-6 years -.040 .162 -.49 .41 
10+ years -.235 .282 -1.06 .59 
10+ years less than 1 year .208 .302 -.67 1.09 
1-3 years -.183 .264 -.95 .59 
4-6 years .195 .255 -.55 .94 
7-9 years .235 .282 -.59 1.06 
less than 1 year 1-3 years -.659* .206 -1.24 -.08 
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4-6 years -.647* .195 -1.20 -.09 
7-9 years -.707* .225 -1.34 -.07 
10+ years -.842 .361 -1.90 .21 
1-3 years less than 1 year .659* .206 .08 1.24 
4-6 years .012 .122 -.32 .35 
7-9 years -.048 .165 -.51 .41 
10+ years -.183 .327 -1.14 .78 
4-6 years less than 1 year .647* .195 .09 1.20 
1-3 years -.012 .122 -.35 .32 
7-9 years -.060 .151 -.48 .36 
10+ years -.195 .320 -1.14 .75 
7-9 years less than 1 year .707* .225 .07 1.34 
1-3 years .048 .165 -.41 .51 
4-6 years .060 .151 -.36 .48 
10+ years -.135 .339 -1.13 .86 
10+ years less than 1 year .842 .361 -.21 1.90 
1-3 years .183 .327 -.78 1.14 
4-6 years .195 .320 -.75 1.14 
7-9 years .135 .339 -.86 1.13 
8. The financial 
instruments we 




less than 1 year 1-3 years -1.058* .125 -1.41 -.71 
4-6 years -.730* .105 -1.02 -.44 
7-9 years -.280 .128 -.64 .08 
10+ years -.125 .104 -.43 .18 
1-3 years less than 1 year 1.058* .125 .71 1.41 
4-6 years .328 .121 .00 .66 
7-9 years .778* .141 .39 1.17 
10+ years .933* .120 .59 1.27 
4-6 years less than 1 year .730* .105 .44 1.02 
1-3 years -.328 .121 -.66 .00 
7-9 years .450* .124 .11 .79 
10+ years .605* .099 .32 .89 
7-9 years less than 1 year .280 .128 -.08 .64 
1-3 years -.778* .141 -1.17 -.39 
4-6 years -.450* .124 -.79 -.11 
10+ years .155 .123 -.19 .50 
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10+ years less than 1 year .125 .104 -.18 .43 
1-3 years -.933* .120 -1.27 -.59 
4-6 years -.605* .099 -.89 -.32 
7-9 years -.155 .123 -.50 .19 
9. We anticipate 
that the oil and 
gas market will 
recover in price 
and volume. 
less than 1 year 1-3 years -.145 .210 -.74 .45 
4-6 years -.113 .200 -.68 .45 
7-9 years -.173 .229 -.82 .47 
10+ years .317 .312 -.59 1.23 
1-3 years less than 1 year .145 .210 -.45 .74 
4-6 years .032 .120 -.30 .36 
7-9 years -.028 .164 -.48 .43 
10+ years .462 .268 -.32 1.25 
4-6 years less than 1 year .113 .200 -.45 .68 
1-3 years -.032 .120 -.36 .30 
7-9 years -.060 .151 -.48 .36 
10+ years .430 .260 -.33 1.19 
7-9 years less than 1 year .173 .229 -.47 .82 
1-3 years .028 .164 -.43 .48 
4-6 years .060 .151 -.36 .48 
10+ years .490 .283 -.34 1.32 
10+ years less than 1 year -.317 .312 -1.23 .59 
1-3 years -.462 .268 -1.25 .32 
4-6 years -.430 .260 -1.19 .33 
7-9 years -.490 .283 -1.32 .34 
10. Most citizens 




less than 1 year 1-3 years -1.097* .170 -1.58 -.62 
4-6 years -.517* .152 -.94 -.09 
7-9 years -.387 .182 -.90 .13 
10+ years .258 .150 -.17 .69 
1-3 years less than 1 year 1.097* .170 .62 1.58 
4-6 years .581* .127 .23 .93 
7-9 years .711* .162 .26 1.16 
10+ years 1.356* .126 1.00 1.71 
4-6 years less than 1 year .517* .152 .09 .94 
1-3 years -.581* .127 -.93 -.23 
7-9 years .130 .143 -.27 .53 
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10+ years .775* .100 .49 1.06 
7-9 years less than 1 year .387 .182 -.13 .90 
1-3 years -.711* .162 -1.16 -.26 
4-6 years -.130 .143 -.53 .27 
10+ years .645* .141 .24 1.05 
10+ years less than 1 year -.258 .150 -.69 .17 
1-3 years -1.356* .126 -1.71 -1.00 
4-6 years -.775* .100 -1.06 -.49 
7-9 years -.645* .141 -1.05 -.24 
11. Government 
subsidies allow us 
to loan more 
freely to the 
private sector. 
less than 1 year 1-3 years -.499* .104 -.79 -.21 
4-6 years -.363* .085 -.60 -.12 
7-9 years -.253 .102 -.54 .03 
10+ years -.133 .075 -.35 .08 
1-3 years less than 1 year .499* .104 .21 .79 
4-6 years .135 .083 -.09 .36 
7-9 years .245 .099 -.03 .52 
10+ years .365* .072 .17 .56 
4-6 years less than 1 year .363* .085 .12 .60 
1-3 years -.135 .083 -.36 .09 
7-9 years .110 .079 -.11 .33 
10+ years .230* .040 .12 .34 
7-9 years less than 1 year .253 .102 -.03 .54 
1-3 years -.245 .099 -.52 .03 
4-6 years -.110 .079 -.33 .11 
10+ years .120 .068 -.07 .31 
10+ years less than 1 year .133 .075 -.08 .35 
1-3 years -.365* .072 -.56 -.17 
4-6 years -.230* .040 -.34 -.12 
7-9 years -.120 .068 -.31 .07 






less than 1 year 1-3 years -.371 .137 -.76 .02 
4-6 years -.157 .135 -.54 .23 
7-9 years -.427 .155 -.86 .01 
10+ years .283 .297 -.59 1.16 
1-3 years less than 1 year .371 .137 -.02 .76 
4-6 years .214 .087 -.03 .45 
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7-9 years -.056 .115 -.38 .26 
10+ years .654 .278 -.17 1.47 
4-6 years less than 1 year .157 .135 -.23 .54 
1-3 years -.214 .087 -.45 .03 
7-9 years -.270 .113 -.58 .04 
10+ years .440 .277 -.38 1.26 
7-9 years less than 1 year .427 .155 -.01 .86 
1-3 years .056 .115 -.26 .38 
4-6 years .270 .113 -.04 .58 
10+ years .710 .287 -.13 1.55 
10+ years less than 1 year -.283 .297 -1.16 .59 
1-3 years -.654 .278 -1.47 .17 
4-6 years -.440 .277 -1.26 .38 
7-9 years -.710 .287 -1.55 .13 







less than 1 year 1-3 years -.908* .183 -1.42 -.39 
4-6 years -.600* .168 -1.07 -.13 
7-9 years -.200 .183 -.72 .32 
10+ years -.475 .224 -1.13 .18 
1-3 years less than 1 year .908* .183 .39 1.42 
4-6 years .308 .120 -.02 .64 
7-9 years .708* .140 .32 1.10 
10+ years .433 .191 -.12 .99 
4-6 years less than 1 year .600* .168 .13 1.07 
1-3 years -.308 .120 -.64 .02 
7-9 years .400* .119 .07 .73 
10+ years .125 .176 -.39 .64 
7-9 years less than 1 year .200 .183 -.32 .72 
1-3 years -.708* .140 -1.10 -.32 
4-6 years -.400* .119 -.73 -.07 
10+ years -.275 .190 -.83 .28 
10+ years less than 1 year .475 .224 -.18 1.13 
1-3 years -.433 .191 -.99 .12 
4-6 years -.125 .176 -.64 .39 
7-9 years .275 .190 -.28 .83 
less than 1 year 1-3 years -.441* .104 -.73 -.15 
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14. Banks are 
essential to the 
domestic 
economy and 





4-6 years -.383* .088 -.63 -.13 
7-9 years -.373* .116 -.70 -.05 
10+ years -.008 .102 -.30 .29 
1-3 years less than 1 year .441* .104 .15 .73 
4-6 years .058 .085 -.18 .29 
7-9 years .068 .114 -.25 .38 
10+ years .433* .099 .15 .72 
4-6 years less than 1 year .383* .088 .13 .63 
1-3 years -.058 .085 -.29 .18 
7-9 years .010 .100 -.27 .29 
10+ years .375* .083 .13 .62 
7-9 years less than 1 year .373* .116 .05 .70 
1-3 years -.068 .114 -.38 .25 
4-6 years -.010 .100 -.29 .27 
10+ years .365* .112 .04 .69 
10+ years less than 1 year .008 .102 -.29 .30 
1-3 years -.433* .099 -.72 -.15 
4-6 years -.375* .083 -.62 -.13 
7-9 years -.365* .112 -.69 -.04 
15. The financial 
market is mature 
and competitive. 
less than 1 year 1-3 years -.405* .121 -.75 -.06 
4-6 years -.197 .104 -.49 .10 
7-9 years -.027 .130 -.39 .34 
10+ years .258 .116 -.08 .59 
1-3 years less than 1 year .405* .121 .06 .75 
4-6 years .208 .091 -.04 .46 
7-9 years .378* .120 .05 .71 
10+ years .663* .104 .37 .96 
4-6 years less than 1 year .197 .104 -.10 .49 
1-3 years -.208 .091 -.46 .04 
7-9 years .170 .102 -.11 .45 
10+ years .455* .083 .21 .70 
7-9 years less than 1 year .027 .130 -.34 .39 
1-3 years -.378* .120 -.71 -.05 
4-6 years -.170 .102 -.45 .11 
10+ years .285 .114 -.04 .61 
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10+ years less than 1 year -.258 .116 -.59 .08 
1-3 years -.663* .104 -.96 -.37 
4-6 years -.455* .083 -.70 -.21 
7-9 years -.285 .114 -.61 .04 
Section 3. 1. 
Global pressures 





less than 1 year 1-3 years -.588* .158 -1.03 -.14 
4-6 years -.310 .138 -.70 .08 
7-9 years -.080 .183 -.60 .44 
10+ years -.050 .186 -.59 .49 
1-3 years less than 1 year .588* .158 .14 1.03 
4-6 years .278 .112 -.03 .59 
7-9 years .508* .165 .05 .97 
10+ years .538* .168 .05 1.02 
4-6 years less than 1 year .310 .138 -.08 .70 
1-3 years -.278 .112 -.59 .03 
7-9 years .230 .145 -.18 .64 
10+ years .260 .149 -.18 .70 
7-9 years less than 1 year .080 .183 -.44 .60 
1-3 years -.508* .165 -.97 -.05 
4-6 years -.230 .145 -.64 .18 
10+ years .030 .192 -.52 .58 
10+ years less than 1 year .050 .186 -.49 .59 
1-3 years -.538* .168 -1.02 -.05 
4-6 years -.260 .149 -.70 .18 
7-9 years -.030 .192 -.58 .52 




risks for our 
nation. 
less than 1 year 1-3 years -.655* .135 -1.04 -.27 
4-6 years -.427* .121 -.77 -.09 
7-9 years -.307 .167 -.78 .16 
10+ years -.242 .181 -.77 .29 
1-3 years less than 1 year .655* .135 .27 1.04 
4-6 years .228 .097 -.04 .50 
7-9 years .348 .151 -.07 .77 
10+ years .413 .166 -.07 .90 
4-6 years less than 1 year .427* .121 .09 .77 
1-3 years -.228 .097 -.50 .04 
7-9 years .120 .139 -.27 .51 
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10+ years .185 .155 -.27 .64 
7-9 years less than 1 year .307 .167 -.16 .78 
1-3 years -.348 .151 -.77 .07 
4-6 years -.120 .139 -.51 .27 
10+ years .065 .193 -.49 .62 
10+ years less than 1 year .242 .181 -.29 .77 
1-3 years -.413 .166 -.90 .07 
4-6 years -.185 .155 -.64 .27 
7-9 years -.065 .193 -.62 .49 




decades to allow 
them to mature. 
less than 1 year 1-3 years -.401 .191 -.94 .14 
4-6 years -.257 .181 -.77 .26 
7-9 years -.107 .226 -.74 .53 
10+ years -.142 .296 -1.01 .72 
1-3 years less than 1 year .401 .191 -.14 .94 
4-6 years .145 .109 -.16 .45 
7-9 years .295 .173 -.19 .78 
10+ years .260 .258 -.50 1.02 
4-6 years less than 1 year .257 .181 -.26 .77 
1-3 years -.145 .109 -.45 .16 
7-9 years .150 .163 -.30 .60 
10+ years .115 .252 -.63 .86 
7-9 years less than 1 year .107 .226 -.53 .74 
1-3 years -.295 .173 -.78 .19 
4-6 years -.150 .163 -.60 .30 
10+ years -.035 .285 -.87 .80 
10+ years less than 1 year .142 .296 -.72 1.01 
1-3 years -.260 .258 -1.02 .50 
4-6 years -.115 .252 -.86 .63 
7-9 years .035 .285 -.80 .87 
4. Strategic 
partnerships and 




less than 1 year 1-3 years -.731* .143 -1.13 -.33 
4-6 years -.450* .123 -.80 -.10 
7-9 years -.080 .165 -.54 .38 
10+ years .000 .110 -.31 .31 
1-3 years less than 1 year .731* .143 .33 1.13 





7-9 years .651* .153 .22 1.08 
10+ years .731* .092 .48 .98 
4-6 years less than 1 year .450* .123 .10 .80 
1-3 years -.281 .107 -.58 .01 
7-9 years .370 .134 .00 .74 
10+ years .450* .055 .30 .60 
7-9 years less than 1 year .080 .165 -.38 .54 
1-3 years -.651* .153 -1.08 -.22 
4-6 years -.370 .134 -.74 .00 
10+ years .080 .123 -.26 .42 
10+ years less than 1 year .000 .110 -.31 .31 
1-3 years -.731* .092 -.98 -.48 
4-6 years -.450* .055 -.60 -.30 
7-9 years -.080 .123 -.42 .26 
5. Our bank is 
vulnerable to 
systemic risks. 
less than 1 year 1-3 years -.160 .172 -.65 .33 
4-6 years .117 .161 -.34 .57 
7-9 years .147 .196 -.41 .70 
10+ years .417 .177 -.09 .93 
1-3 years less than 1 year .160 .172 -.33 .65 
4-6 years .277* .096 .01 .54 
7-9 years .307 .147 -.10 .72 
10+ years .577* .121 .23 .92 
4-6 years less than 1 year -.117 .161 -.57 .34 
1-3 years -.277* .096 -.54 -.01 
7-9 years .030 .134 -.34 .40 
10+ years .300 .104 .00 .60 
7-9 years less than 1 year -.147 .196 -.70 .41 
1-3 years -.307 .147 -.72 .10 
4-6 years -.030 .134 -.40 .34 
10+ years .270 .153 -.17 .71 
10+ years less than 1 year -.417 .177 -.93 .09 
1-3 years -.577* .121 -.92 -.23 
4-6 years -.300 .104 -.60 .00 
7-9 years -.270 .153 -.71 .17 





support. our bank 




4-6 years -.363* .115 -.69 -.04 
7-9 years -.093 .159 -.54 .35 
10+ years -.183 .172 -.68 .32 
1-3 years less than 1 year .568* .134 .19 .94 
4-6 years .205 .101 -.07 .48 
7-9 years .475* .149 .06 .89 
10+ years .385 .163 -.09 .86 
4-6 years less than 1 year .363* .115 .04 .69 
1-3 years -.205 .101 -.48 .07 
7-9 years .270 .132 -.10 .64 
10+ years .180 .148 -.25 .61 
7-9 years less than 1 year .093 .159 -.35 .54 
1-3 years -.475* .149 -.89 -.06 
4-6 years -.270 .132 -.64 .10 
10+ years -.090 .184 -.62 .44 
10+ years less than 1 year .183 .172 -.32 .68 
1-3 years -.385 .163 -.86 .09 
4-6 years -.180 .148 -.61 .25 
7-9 years .090 .184 -.44 .62 
7. Liquidity levels 
are at an all-time 
low. 
less than 1 year 1-3 years -.531* .159 -.98 -.08 
4-6 years -.270 .138 -.66 .12 
7-9 years -.520 .195 -1.07 .03 
10+ years .325 .143 -.09 .74 
1-3 years less than 1 year .531* .159 .08 .98 
4-6 years .261 .113 -.05 .57 
7-9 years .011 .178 -.48 .51 
10+ years .856* .119 .52 1.19 
4-6 years less than 1 year .270 .138 -.12 .66 
1-3 years -.261 .113 -.57 .05 
7-9 years -.250 .160 -.70 .20 
10+ years .595* .090 .34 .85 
7-9 years less than 1 year .520 .195 -.03 1.07 
1-3 years -.011 .178 -.51 .48 
4-6 years .250 .160 -.20 .70 
10+ years .845* .164 .38 1.31 
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10+ years less than 1 year -.325 .143 -.74 .09 
1-3 years -.856* .119 -1.19 -.52 
4-6 years -.595* .090 -.85 -.34 
7-9 years -.845* .164 -1.31 -.38 
8. When oil prices 
decline. we are 
less likely to lend 
money to private 
enterprises. 
less than 1 year 1-3 years -.513* .136 -.89 -.13 
4-6 years -.217 .118 -.55 .12 
7-9 years -.027 .168 -.50 .45 
10+ years .083 .174 -.42 .59 
1-3 years less than 1 year .513* .136 .13 .89 
4-6 years .296* .100 .02 .57 
7-9 years .486* .156 .05 .92 
10+ years .596* .162 .13 1.07 
4-6 years less than 1 year .217 .118 -.12 .55 
1-3 years -.296* .100 -.57 -.02 
7-9 years .190 .141 -.20 .58 
10+ years .300 .147 -.13 .73 
7-9 years less than 1 year .027 .168 -.45 .50 
1-3 years -.486* .156 -.92 -.05 
4-6 years -.190 .141 -.58 .20 
10+ years .110 .190 -.44 .66 
10+ years less than 1 year -.083 .174 -.59 .42 
1-3 years -.596* .162 -1.07 -.13 
4-6 years -.300 .147 -.73 .13 
7-9 years -.110 .190 -.66 .44 
9. Citizens are 
more likely to 
withhold savings 
and investments 
when oil prices 
fluctuate or 
decline. 
less than 1 year 1-3 years -.494* .151 -.92 -.07 
4-6 years -.147 .132 -.52 .23 
7-9 years -.067 .155 -.50 .37 
10+ years .333 .119 .00 .67 
1-3 years less than 1 year .494* .151 .07 .92 
4-6 years .347* .109 .05 .65 
7-9 years .427* .135 .05 .80 
10+ years .827* .093 .57 1.08 
4-6 years less than 1 year .147 .132 -.23 .52 
1-3 years -.347* .109 -.65 -.05 
7-9 years .080 .114 -.24 .40 
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10+ years .480* .057 .32 .64 
7-9 years less than 1 year .067 .155 -.37 .50 
1-3 years -.427* .135 -.80 -.05 
4-6 years -.080 .114 -.40 .24 
10+ years .400* .099 .12 .68 
10+ years less than 1 year -.333 .119 -.67 .00 
1-3 years -.827* .093 -1.08 -.57 
4-6 years -.480* .057 -.64 -.32 
7-9 years -.400* .099 -.68 -.12 
10. Investing in 
diversification 
offers a layer of 
stability that we 
desperately need 
at this time. 
less than 1 year 1-3 years -.750* .142 -1.15 -.35 
4-6 years -.390* .122 -.73 -.05 
7-9 years -.120 .156 -.56 .32 
10+ years -.375 .182 -.91 .16 
1-3 years less than 1 year .750* .142 .35 1.15 
4-6 years .360* .104 .07 .65 
7-9 years .630* .143 .23 1.03 
10+ years .375 .171 -.12 .87 
4-6 years less than 1 year .390* .122 .05 .73 
1-3 years -.360* .104 -.65 -.07 
7-9 years .270 .122 -.07 .61 
10+ years .015 .154 -.44 .47 
7-9 years less than 1 year .120 .156 -.32 .56 
1-3 years -.630* .143 -1.03 -.23 
4-6 years -.270 .122 -.61 .07 
10+ years -.255 .182 -.78 .27 
10+ years less than 1 year .375 .182 -.16 .91 
1-3 years -.375 .171 -.87 .12 
4-6 years -.015 .154 -.47 .44 
7-9 years .255 .182 -.27 .78 
11. Intra-bank 
loans create a 
dangerous cycle 
of risk and 
vulnerability. 
less than 1 year 1-3 years -.446 .163 -.91 .01 
4-6 years -.030 .144 -.44 .38 
7-9 years -.080 .193 -.62 .46 
10+ years .150 .191 -.41 .71 
1-3 years less than 1 year .446 .163 -.01 .91 
4-6 years .416* .110 .11 .72 
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7-9 years .366 .169 -.10 .84 
10+ years .596* .167 .11 1.08 
4-6 years less than 1 year .030 .144 -.38 .44 
1-3 years -.416* .110 -.72 -.11 
7-9 years -.050 .151 -.47 .37 
10+ years .180 .149 -.26 .62 
7-9 years less than 1 year .080 .193 -.46 .62 
1-3 years -.366 .169 -.84 .10 
4-6 years .050 .151 -.37 .47 
10+ years .230 .196 -.33 .79 
10+ years less than 1 year -.150 .191 -.71 .41 
1-3 years -.596* .167 -1.08 -.11 
4-6 years -.180 .149 -.62 .26 
7-9 years -.230 .196 -.79 .33 
12. The increase 
in lending rates is 
a positive step 
towards industry 
maturity. 
less than 1 year 1-3 years -.350 .157 -.79 .09 
4-6 years -.140 .144 -.55 .27 
7-9 years -.160 .195 -.71 .39 
10+ years .150 .191 -.41 .71 
1-3 years less than 1 year .350 .157 -.09 .79 
4-6 years .210 .102 -.07 .49 
7-9 years .190 .167 -.27 .65 
10+ years .500* .162 .03 .97 
4-6 years less than 1 year .140 .144 -.27 .55 
1-3 years -.210 .102 -.49 .07 
7-9 years -.020 .154 -.45 .41 
10+ years .290 .149 -.15 .73 
7-9 years less than 1 year .160 .195 -.39 .71 
1-3 years -.190 .167 -.65 .27 
4-6 years .020 .154 -.41 .45 
10+ years .310 .199 -.26 .88 
10+ years less than 1 year -.150 .191 -.71 .41 
1-3 years -.500* .162 -.97 -.03 
4-6 years -.290 .149 -.73 .15 
7-9 years -.310 .199 -.88 .26 
less than 1 year 1-3 years -.342 .141 -.74 .05 
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based on oil and 
gas exploitation. 
4-6 years -.080 .120 -.42 .26 
7-9 years .120 .173 -.37 .61 
10+ years .225 .180 -.30 .75 
1-3 years less than 1 year .342 .141 -.05 .74 
4-6 years .262 .106 -.03 .56 
7-9 years .462* .164 .01 .92 
10+ years .567* .171 .07 1.06 
4-6 years less than 1 year .080 .120 -.26 .42 
1-3 years -.262 .106 -.56 .03 
7-9 years .200 .147 -.21 .61 
10+ years .305 .155 -.15 .76 
7-9 years less than 1 year -.120 .173 -.61 .37 
1-3 years -.462* .164 -.92 -.01 
4-6 years -.200 .147 -.61 .21 
10+ years .105 .199 -.47 .68 
10+ years less than 1 year -.225 .180 -.75 .30 
1-3 years -.567* .171 -1.06 -.07 
4-6 years -.305 .155 -.76 .15 





should remain oil 
and gas. 
less than 1 year 1-3 years -.147 .159 -.60 .30 
4-6 years .033 .154 -.40 .47 
7-9 years -.267 .188 -.80 .26 
10+ years -.167 .230 -.84 .50 
1-3 years less than 1 year .147 .159 -.30 .60 
4-6 years .181 .093 -.07 .44 
7-9 years -.119 .142 -.52 .28 
10+ years -.019 .194 -.59 .55 
4-6 years less than 1 year -.033 .154 -.47 .40 
1-3 years -.181 .093 -.44 .07 
7-9 years -.300 .137 -.68 .08 
10+ years -.200 .190 -.76 .36 
7-9 years less than 1 year .267 .188 -.26 .80 
1-3 years .119 .142 -.28 .52 
4-6 years .300 .137 -.08 .68 
10+ years .100 .219 -.53 .73 
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10+ years less than 1 year .167 .230 -.50 .84 
1-3 years .019 .194 -.55 .59 
4-6 years .200 .190 -.36 .76 
7-9 years -.100 .219 -.73 .53 




population in our 
nation is worrying. 
less than 1 year 1-3 years .123 .143 -.28 .53 
4-6 years .110 .138 -.28 .50 
7-9 years -.120 .165 -.59 .35 
10+ years -.050 .155 -.50 .40 
1-3 years less than 1 year -.123 .143 -.53 .28 
4-6 years -.013 .090 -.26 .23 
7-9 years -.243 .128 -.60 .11 
10+ years -.173 .113 -.50 .15 
4-6 years less than 1 year -.110 .138 -.50 .28 
1-3 years .013 .090 -.23 .26 
7-9 years -.230 .123 -.57 .11 
10+ years -.160 .108 -.47 .15 
7-9 years less than 1 year .120 .165 -.35 .59 
1-3 years .243 .128 -.11 .60 
4-6 years .230 .123 -.11 .57 
10+ years .070 .141 -.33 .47 
10+ years less than 1 year .050 .155 -.40 .50 
1-3 years .173 .113 -.15 .50 
4-6 years .160 .108 -.15 .47 
7-9 years -.070 .141 -.47 .33 
16. New 
companies are a 
liability; we would 
prefer to invest in 
tested models. 
less than 1 year 1-3 years -.167 .160 -.62 .29 
4-6 years .013 .154 -.42 .45 
7-9 years -.227 .185 -.75 .30 
10+ years -.042 .272 -.84 .75 
1-3 years less than 1 year .167 .160 -.29 .62 
4-6 years .180 .095 -.08 .44 
7-9 years -.060 .140 -.45 .33 
10+ years .125 .243 -.59 .84 
4-6 years less than 1 year -.013 .154 -.45 .42 
1-3 years -.180 .095 -.44 .08 
7-9 years -.240 .133 -.61 .13 
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10+ years -.055 .239 -.76 .65 
7-9 years less than 1 year .227 .185 -.30 .75 
1-3 years .060 .140 -.33 .45 
4-6 years .240 .133 -.13 .61 
10+ years .185 .260 -.58 .95 
10+ years less than 1 year .042 .272 -.75 .84 
1-3 years -.125 .243 -.84 .59 
4-6 years .055 .239 -.65 .76 
7-9 years -.185 .260 -.95 .58 
17. Most small 
businesses are 
likely to fail if 
given enough 
time. 
less than 1 year 1-3 years -.028 .171 -.51 .46 
4-6 years .183 .167 -.29 .66 
7-9 years .173 .205 -.41 .75 
10+ years .433 .241 -.27 1.13 
1-3 years less than 1 year .028 .171 -.46 .51 
4-6 years .212 .078 .00 .43 
7-9 years .202 .142 -.20 .60 
10+ years .462 .191 -.10 1.02 
4-6 years less than 1 year -.183 .167 -.66 .29 
1-3 years -.212 .078 -.43 .00 
7-9 years -.010 .137 -.39 .37 
10+ years .250 .187 -.30 .80 
7-9 years less than 1 year -.173 .205 -.75 .41 
1-3 years -.202 .142 -.60 .20 
4-6 years .010 .137 -.37 .39 
10+ years .260 .222 -.38 .90 
10+ years less than 1 year -.433 .241 -1.13 .27 
1-3 years -.462 .191 -1.02 .10 
4-6 years -.250 .187 -.80 .30 
7-9 years -.260 .222 -.90 .38 
18. Our banks 
should invest 




less than 1 year 1-3 years .088 .200 -.48 .65 
4-6 years .240 .193 -.31 .79 
7-9 years .160 .233 -.50 .82 
10+ years .425 .277 -.38 1.23 
1-3 years less than 1 year -.088 .200 -.65 .48 





7-9 years .072 .163 -.38 .52 
10+ years .337 .221 -.31 .98 
4-6 years less than 1 year -.240 .193 -.79 .31 
1-3 years -.152 .097 -.42 .12 
7-9 years -.080 .154 -.51 .35 
10+ years .185 .215 -.45 .82 
7-9 years less than 1 year -.160 .233 -.82 .50 
1-3 years -.072 .163 -.52 .38 
4-6 years .080 .154 -.35 .51 
10+ years .265 .251 -.47 1.00 
10+ years less than 1 year -.425 .277 -1.23 .38 
1-3 years -.337 .221 -.98 .31 
4-6 years -.185 .215 -.82 .45 
7-9 years -.265 .251 -1.00 .47 
19. Without 
sufficient oil and 




less than 1 year 1-3 years .028 .191 -.51 .57 
4-6 years .237 .180 -.27 .75 
7-9 years -.253 .214 -.86 .35 
10+ years -.058 .296 -.92 .81 
1-3 years less than 1 year -.028 .191 -.57 .51 
4-6 years .208 .107 -.09 .50 
7-9 years -.282 .157 -.72 .16 
10+ years -.087 .258 -.84 .67 
4-6 years less than 1 year -.237 .180 -.75 .27 
1-3 years -.208 .107 -.50 .09 
7-9 years -.490* .144 -.89 -.09 
10+ years -.295 .251 -1.03 .44 
7-9 years less than 1 year .253 .214 -.35 .86 
1-3 years .282 .157 -.16 .72 
4-6 years .490* .144 .09 .89 
10+ years .195 .276 -.61 1.00 
10+ years less than 1 year .058 .296 -.81 .92 
1-3 years .087 .258 -.67 .84 
4-6 years .295 .251 -.44 1.03 
7-9 years -.195 .276 -1.00 .61 
less than 1 year 1-3 years -.058 .151 -.48 .37 
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20. The domestic 
financial markets 
are unstable and 
high risk. 
4-6 years .240 .145 -.17 .65 
7-9 years .160 .187 -.37 .69 
10+ years .250 .243 -.46 .96 
1-3 years less than 1 year .058 .151 -.37 .48 
4-6 years .298* .086 .06 .53 
7-9 years .218 .147 -.19 .63 
10+ years .308 .213 -.32 .93 
4-6 years less than 1 year -.240 .145 -.65 .17 
1-3 years -.298* .086 -.53 -.06 
7-9 years -.080 .141 -.47 .31 
10+ years .010 .209 -.60 .62 
7-9 years less than 1 year -.160 .187 -.69 .37 
1-3 years -.218 .147 -.63 .19 
4-6 years .080 .141 -.31 .47 
10+ years .090 .240 -.61 .79 
10+ years less than 1 year -.250 .243 -.96 .46 
1-3 years -.308 .213 -.93 .32 
4-6 years -.010 .209 -.62 .60 
7-9 years -.090 .240 -.79 .61 
Section 4. 1. Our 
government has a 
long-term vision 
that does not rely 
on oil and gas for 
development. 
less than 1 year 1-3 years .219 .171 -.26 .70 
4-6 years .310 .162 -.15 .77 
7-9 years .200 .192 -.34 .74 
10+ years .325 .284 -.51 1.16 
1-3 years less than 1 year -.219 .171 -.70 .26 
4-6 years .091 .108 -.21 .39 
7-9 years -.019 .150 -.44 .40 
10+ years .106 .258 -.65 .86 
4-6 years less than 1 year -.310 .162 -.77 .15 
1-3 years -.091 .108 -.39 .21 
7-9 years -.110 .140 -.50 .28 
10+ years .015 .252 -.73 .76 
7-9 years less than 1 year -.200 .192 -.74 .34 
1-3 years .019 .150 -.40 .44 
4-6 years .110 .140 -.28 .50 
10+ years .125 .272 -.67 .92 
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10+ years less than 1 year -.325 .284 -1.16 .51 
1-3 years -.106 .258 -.86 .65 
4-6 years -.015 .252 -.76 .73 
7-9 years -.125 .272 -.92 .67 
2. The primary 
industry upon 
which lending and 
development 
should focus is: 
less than 1 year 1-3 years .456 .281 -.34 1.25 
4-6 years .533 .266 -.22 1.29 
7-9 years .573 .332 -.36 1.51 
10+ years .033 .472 -1.35 1.42 
1-3 years less than 1 year -.456 .281 -1.25 .34 
4-6 years .077 .172 -.40 .55 
7-9 years .117 .263 -.62 .85 
10+ years -.423 .426 -1.68 .83 
4-6 years less than 1 year -.533 .266 -1.29 .22 
1-3 years -.077 .172 -.55 .40 
7-9 years .040 .247 -.65 .73 
10+ years -.500 .417 -1.73 .73 
7-9 years less than 1 year -.573 .332 -1.51 .36 
1-3 years -.117 .263 -.85 .62 
4-6 years -.040 .247 -.73 .65 
10+ years -.540 .462 -1.89 .81 
10+ years less than 1 year -.033 .472 -1.42 1.35 
1-3 years .423 .426 -.83 1.68 
4-6 years .500 .417 -.73 1.73 
7-9 years .540 .462 -.81 1.89 
3. The primary 
result of a 
government 
bailout in our 
nation is: 
less than 1 year 1-3 years .086 .298 -.75 .93 
4-6 years .167 .280 -.63 .96 
7-9 years .147 .340 -.81 1.11 
10+ years .567 .481 -.84 1.97 
1-3 years less than 1 year -.086 .298 -.93 .75 
4-6 years .081 .176 -.40 .57 
7-9 years .061 .261 -.67 .79 
10+ years .481 .428 -.78 1.74 
4-6 years less than 1 year -.167 .280 -.96 .63 
1-3 years -.081 .176 -.57 .40 
7-9 years -.020 .241 -.69 .65 
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10+ years .400 .417 -.83 1.63 
7-9 years less than 1 year -.147 .340 -1.11 .81 
1-3 years -.061 .261 -.79 .67 
4-6 years .020 .241 -.65 .69 
10+ years .420 .459 -.92 1.76 
10+ years less than 1 year -.567 .481 -1.97 .84 
1-3 years -.481 .428 -1.74 .78 
4-6 years -.400 .417 -1.63 .83 
7-9 years -.420 .459 -1.76 .92 
4. Government 
investment in oil 




less than 1 year 1-3 years -.371 .223 -1.00 .26 
4-6 years -.187 .212 -.79 .41 
7-9 years -.107 .244 -.80 .58 
10+ years -.592 .313 -1.50 .32 
1-3 years less than 1 year .371 .223 -.26 1.00 
4-6 years .184 .129 -.17 .54 
7-9 years .264 .176 -.23 .76 
10+ years -.221 .264 -.99 .55 
4-6 years less than 1 year .187 .212 -.41 .79 
1-3 years -.184 .129 -.54 .17 
7-9 years .080 .162 -.37 .53 
10+ years -.405 .255 -1.15 .34 
7-9 years less than 1 year .107 .244 -.58 .80 
1-3 years -.264 .176 -.76 .23 
4-6 years -.080 .162 -.53 .37 
10+ years -.485 .282 -1.31 .34 
10+ years less than 1 year .592 .313 -.32 1.50 
1-3 years .221 .264 -.55 .99 
4-6 years .405 .255 -.34 1.15 
7-9 years .485 .282 -.34 1.31 
5. The 
government’s role 
in stabilising the 
domestic 
economy is: 
less than 1 year 1-3 years .023 .174 -.47 .52 
4-6 years .150 .169 -.33 .63 
7-9 years .240 .179 -.27 .75 
10+ years -.525 .274 -1.32 .27 
1-3 years less than 1 year -.023 .174 -.52 .47 
4-6 years .127 .074 -.08 .33 
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7-9 years .217 .094 -.04 .48 
10+ years -.548 .228 -1.22 .12 
4-6 years less than 1 year -.150 .169 -.63 .33 
1-3 years -.127 .074 -.33 .08 
7-9 years .090 .085 -.15 .33 
10+ years -.675* .224 -1.34 -.01 
7-9 years less than 1 year -.240 .179 -.75 .27 
1-3 years -.217 .094 -.48 .04 
4-6 years -.090 .085 -.33 .15 
10+ years -.765* .231 -1.45 -.08 
10+ years less than 1 year .525 .274 -.27 1.32 
1-3 years .548 .228 -.12 1.22 
4-6 years .675* .224 .01 1.34 
7-9 years .765* .231 .08 1.45 
6. Our 




less than 1 year 1-3 years -.085 .104 -.38 .21 
4-6 years -.090 .100 -.38 .20 
7-9 years -.120 .109 -.43 .19 
10+ years .050 .134 -.34 .44 
1-3 years less than 1 year .085 .104 -.21 .38 
4-6 years -.005 .039 -.11 .10 
7-9 years -.035 .057 -.19 .12 
10+ years .135 .096 -.15 .42 
4-6 years less than 1 year .090 .100 -.20 .38 
1-3 years .005 .039 -.10 .11 
7-9 years -.030 .050 -.17 .11 
10+ years .140 .092 -.13 .41 
7-9 years less than 1 year .120 .109 -.19 .43 
1-3 years .035 .057 -.12 .19 
4-6 years .030 .050 -.11 .17 
10+ years .170 .101 -.13 .47 
10+ years less than 1 year -.050 .134 -.44 .34 
1-3 years -.135 .096 -.42 .15 
4-6 years -.140 .092 -.41 .13 
7-9 years -.170 .101 -.47 .13 
less than 1 year 1-3 years -.283 .287 -1.09 .53 
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7. The primary 
factor restricting 
the number of 
national citizens 
in private sector 
employment is: 
4-6 years -.473 .275 -1.25 .31 
7-9 years -.533 .312 -1.42 .35 
10+ years -.908 .376 -2.00 .18 
1-3 years less than 1 year .283 .287 -.53 1.09 
4-6 years -.190 .160 -.63 .25 
7-9 years -.250 .218 -.86 .36 
10+ years -.625 .302 -1.51 .26 
4-6 years less than 1 year .473 .275 -.31 1.25 
1-3 years .190 .160 -.25 .63 
7-9 years -.060 .202 -.62 .50 
10+ years -.435 .291 -1.29 .42 
7-9 years less than 1 year .533 .312 -.35 1.42 
1-3 years .250 .218 -.36 .86 
4-6 years .060 .202 -.50 .62 
10+ years -.375 .327 -1.33 .58 
10+ years less than 1 year .908 .376 -.18 2.00 
1-3 years .625 .302 -.26 1.51 
4-6 years .435 .291 -.42 1.29 
7-9 years .375 .327 -.58 1.33 
8. The primary 
sector which 
national citizens 
would like to work 
in is: 
less than 1 year 1-3 years .978* .318 .08 1.88 
4-6 years .857* .298 .01 1.70 
7-9 years 1.107* .357 .10 2.12 
10+ years 1.642* .511 .15 3.14 
1-3 years less than 1 year -.978* .318 -1.88 -.08 
4-6 years -.122 .190 -.64 .40 
7-9 years .128 .273 -.63 .89 
10+ years .663 .456 -.68 2.00 
4-6 years less than 1 year -.857* .298 -1.70 -.01 
1-3 years .122 .190 -.40 .64 
7-9 years .250 .250 -.45 .95 
10+ years .785 .443 -.52 2.09 
7-9 years less than 1 year -1.107* .357 -2.12 -.10 
1-3 years -.128 .273 -.89 .63 
4-6 years -.250 .250 -.95 .45 
10+ years .535 .484 -.88 1.95 
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10+ years less than 1 year -1.642* .511 -3.14 -.15 
1-3 years -.663 .456 -2.00 .68 
4-6 years -.785 .443 -2.09 .52 
7-9 years -.535 .484 -1.95 .88 
9. Government 
analysts would 
rank the current 
threat level in oil 
and gas as 
follows: 
less than 1 year 1-3 years .222 .145 -.19 .63 
4-6 years .233 .135 -.15 .62 
7-9 years .333 .155 -.11 .77 
10+ years .683* .157 .23 1.14 
1-3 years less than 1 year -.222 .145 -.63 .19 
4-6 years .012 .079 -.21 .23 
7-9 years .112 .110 -.19 .42 
10+ years .462* .113 .14 .79 
4-6 years less than 1 year -.233 .135 -.62 .15 
1-3 years -.012 .079 -.23 .21 
7-9 years .100 .096 -.17 .37 
10+ years .450* .099 .16 .74 
7-9 years less than 1 year -.333 .155 -.77 .11 
1-3 years -.112 .110 -.42 .19 
4-6 years -.100 .096 -.37 .17 
10+ years .350 .125 -.01 .71 
10+ years less than 1 year -.683* .157 -1.14 -.23 
1-3 years -.462* .113 -.79 -.14 
4-6 years -.450* .099 -.74 -.16 
7-9 years -.350 .125 -.71 .01 
10. The 
government 
investment in oil 
and gas is based 
on the following 
objective: 
less than 1 year 1-3 years -.526 .248 -1.23 .17 
4-6 years -.523 .235 -1.19 .14 
7-9 years -.453 .276 -1.23 .33 
10+ years -1.583* .348 -2.60 -.57 
1-3 years less than 1 year .526 .248 -.17 1.23 
4-6 years .002 .147 -.40 .41 
7-9 years .072 .206 -.50 .65 
10+ years -1.058* .295 -1.92 -.19 
4-6 years less than 1 year .523 .235 -.14 1.19 
1-3 years -.002 .147 -.41 .40 
7-9 years .070 .190 -.46 .60 
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10+ years -1.060* .285 -1.90 -.22 
7-9 years less than 1 year .453 .276 -.33 1.23 
1-3 years -.072 .206 -.65 .50 
4-6 years -.070 .190 -.60 .46 
10+ years -1.130* .319 -2.06 -.20 
10+ years less than 1 year 1.583* .348 .57 2.60 
1-3 years 1.058* .295 .19 1.92 
4-6 years 1.060* .285 .22 1.90 







the oil and gas 
industry 
less than 1 year 1-3 years .259 .130 -.11 .63 
4-6 years .187 .124 -.17 .54 
7-9 years .347 .147 -.07 .76 
10+ years .442 .186 -.10 .98 
1-3 years less than 1 year -.259 .130 -.63 .11 
4-6 years -.072 .074 -.28 .13 
7-9 years .088 .108 -.21 .39 
10+ years .183 .157 -.28 .64 
4-6 years less than 1 year -.187 .124 -.54 .17 
1-3 years .072 .074 -.13 .28 
7-9 years .160 .100 -.12 .44 
10+ years .255 .152 -.19 .70 
7-9 years less than 1 year -.347 .147 -.76 .07 
1-3 years -.088 .108 -.39 .21 
4-6 years -.160 .100 -.44 .12 
10+ years .095 .171 -.40 .59 
10+ years less than 1 year -.442 .186 -.98 .10 
1-3 years -.183 .157 -.64 .28 
4-6 years -.255 .152 -.70 .19 




less than 1 year 1-3 years .019 .124 -.33 .37 
4-6 years .230 .119 -.11 .57 
7-9 years .200 .132 -.17 .57 
10+ years -.125 .167 -.61 .36 
1-3 years less than 1 year -.019 .124 -.37 .33 
4-6 years .211* .074 .01 .41 
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7-9 years .181 .094 -.08 .44 
10+ years -.144 .138 -.55 .26 
4-6 years less than 1 year -.230 .119 -.57 .11 
1-3 years -.211* .074 -.41 -.01 
7-9 years -.030 .087 -.27 .21 
10+ years -.355 .133 -.75 .04 
7-9 years less than 1 year -.200 .132 -.57 .17 
1-3 years -.181 .094 -.44 .08 
4-6 years .030 .087 -.21 .27 
10+ years -.325 .145 -.75 .10 
10+ years less than 1 year .125 .167 -.36 .61 
1-3 years .144 .138 -.26 .55 
4-6 years .355 .133 -.04 .75 




less than 1 year 1-3 years -.019 .148 -.44 .40 
4-6 years .070 .145 -.34 .48 
7-9 years -.280 .152 -.71 .15 
10+ years -.125 .258 -.88 .63 
1-3 years less than 1 year .019 .148 -.40 .44 
4-6 years .089 .081 -.13 .31 
7-9 years -.261* .093 -.52 .00 
10+ years -.106 .228 -.78 .57 
4-6 years less than 1 year -.070 .145 -.48 .34 
1-3 years -.089 .081 -.31 .13 
7-9 years -.350* .087 -.59 -.11 
10+ years -.195 .226 -.86 .47 
7-9 years less than 1 year .280 .152 -.15 .71 
1-3 years .261* .093 .00 .52 
4-6 years .350* .087 .11 .59 
10+ years .155 .230 -.52 .83 
10+ years less than 1 year .125 .258 -.63 .88 
1-3 years .106 .228 -.57 .78 
4-6 years .195 .226 -.47 .86 
7-9 years -.155 .230 -.83 .52 





4-6 years -.047 .131 -.42 .32 
7-9 years -.267 .153 -.70 .17 
10+ years -.117 .211 -.73 .50 
1-3 years less than 1 year .155 .135 -.23 .54 
4-6 years .108 .077 -.10 .32 
7-9 years -.112 .110 -.42 .20 
10+ years .038 .183 -.50 .58 
4-6 years less than 1 year .047 .131 -.32 .42 
1-3 years -.108 .077 -.32 .10 
7-9 years -.220 .105 -.51 .07 
10+ years -.070 .179 -.60 .46 
7-9 years less than 1 year .267 .153 -.17 .70 
1-3 years .112 .110 -.20 .42 
4-6 years .220 .105 -.07 .51 
10+ years .150 .196 -.42 .72 
10+ years less than 1 year .117 .211 -.50 .73 
1-3 years -.038 .183 -.58 .50 
4-6 years .070 .179 -.46 .60 
7-9 years -.150 .196 -.72 .42 
Strategic vision or 
agenda for 
national change 
less than 1 year 1-3 years -.088 .141 -.49 .31 
4-6 years .090 .134 -.29 .47 
7-9 years -.080 .140 -.48 .32 
10+ years .075 .177 -.44 .59 
1-3 years less than 1 year .088 .141 -.31 .49 
4-6 years .178 .078 -.04 .39 
7-9 years .008 .089 -.24 .25 
10+ years .163 .140 -.25 .57 
4-6 years less than 1 year -.090 .134 -.47 .29 
1-3 years -.178 .078 -.39 .04 
7-9 years -.170 .077 -.38 .04 
10+ years -.015 .133 -.40 .37 
7-9 years less than 1 year .080 .140 -.32 .48 
1-3 years -.008 .089 -.25 .24 
4-6 years .170 .077 -.04 .38 
10+ years .155 .139 -.25 .56 
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10+ years less than 1 year -.075 .177 -.59 .44 
1-3 years -.163 .140 -.57 .25 
4-6 years .015 .133 -.37 .40 
7-9 years -.155 .139 -.56 .25 
Industry rules and 
regulations 
less than 1 year 1-3 years -.208 .097 -.48 .07 
4-6 years -.290* .086 -.53 -.05 
7-9 years -.320 .114 -.64 .00 
10+ years -.400 .165 -.88 .08 
1-3 years less than 1 year .208 .097 -.07 .48 
4-6 years -.082 .076 -.29 .13 
7-9 years -.112 .107 -.41 .19 
10+ years -.192 .160 -.66 .28 
4-6 years less than 1 year .290* .086 .05 .53 
1-3 years .082 .076 -.13 .29 
7-9 years -.030 .097 -.30 .24 
10+ years -.110 .154 -.56 .34 
7-9 years less than 1 year .320 .114 .00 .64 
1-3 years .112 .107 -.19 .41 
4-6 years .030 .097 -.24 .30 
10+ years -.080 .171 -.58 .42 
10+ years less than 1 year .400 .165 -.08 .88 
1-3 years .192 .160 -.28 .66 
4-6 years .110 .154 -.34 .56 




less than 1 year 1-3 years .163 .146 -.25 .58 
4-6 years .057 .138 -.33 .45 
7-9 years .067 .148 -.35 .49 
10+ years -.058 .294 -.92 .80 
1-3 years less than 1 year -.163 .146 -.58 .25 
4-6 years -.106 .085 -.34 .13 
7-9 years -.096 .101 -.38 .18 
10+ years -.221 .273 -1.03 .58 
4-6 years less than 1 year -.057 .138 -.45 .33 
1-3 years .106 .085 -.13 .34 
7-9 years .010 .089 -.24 .26 
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10+ years -.115 .269 -.91 .68 
7-9 years less than 1 year -.067 .148 -.49 .35 
1-3 years .096 .101 -.18 .38 
4-6 years -.010 .089 -.26 .24 
10+ years -.125 .275 -.93 .68 
10+ years less than 1 year .058 .294 -.80 .92 
1-3 years .221 .273 -.58 1.03 
4-6 years .115 .269 -.68 .91 




less than 1 year 1-3 years -.279 .122 -.62 .07 
4-6 years -.073 .111 -.39 .24 
7-9 years -.093 .129 -.46 .27 
10+ years -.183 .172 -.68 .32 
1-3 years less than 1 year .279 .122 -.07 .62 
4-6 years .206 .079 -.01 .43 
7-9 years .186 .103 -.10 .47 
10+ years .096 .153 -.35 .54 
4-6 years less than 1 year .073 .111 -.24 .39 
1-3 years -.206 .079 -.43 .01 
7-9 years -.020 .090 -.27 .23 
10+ years -.110 .145 -.53 .31 
7-9 years less than 1 year .093 .129 -.27 .46 
1-3 years -.186 .103 -.47 .10 
4-6 years .020 .090 -.23 .27 
10+ years -.090 .159 -.55 .37 
10+ years less than 1 year .183 .172 -.32 .68 
1-3 years -.096 .153 -.54 .35 
4-6 years .110 .145 -.31 .53 
7-9 years .090 .159 -.37 .55 
Foreign interests 
and investments 
less than 1 year 1-3 years -.354 .146 -.77 .06 
4-6 years -.250 .135 -.63 .13 
7-9 years -.240 .161 -.70 .22 
10+ years -.325 .206 -.92 .27 
1-3 years less than 1 year .354 .146 -.06 .77 
4-6 years .104 .090 -.14 .35 
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7-9 years .114 .126 -.24 .46 
10+ years .029 .179 -.49 .55 
4-6 years less than 1 year .250 .135 -.13 .63 
1-3 years -.104 .090 -.35 .14 
7-9 years .010 .113 -.31 .33 
10+ years -.075 .170 -.58 .43 
7-9 years less than 1 year .240 .161 -.22 .70 
1-3 years -.114 .126 -.46 .24 
4-6 years -.010 .113 -.33 .31 
10+ years -.085 .192 -.64 .47 
10+ years less than 1 year .325 .206 -.27 .92 
1-3 years -.029 .179 -.55 .49 
4-6 years .075 .170 -.43 .58 
7-9 years .085 .192 -.47 .64 
Defaults and risks 
in bank 
performance 
less than 1 year 1-3 years -.054 .111 -.37 .26 
4-6 years -.040 .102 -.33 .25 
7-9 years .120 .118 -.21 .45 
10+ years -.150 .222 -.80 .50 
1-3 years less than 1 year .054 .111 -.26 .37 
4-6 years .014 .076 -.20 .22 
7-9 years .174 .097 -.10 .44 
10+ years -.096 .211 -.72 .53 
4-6 years less than 1 year .040 .102 -.25 .33 
1-3 years -.014 .076 -.22 .20 
7-9 years .160 .086 -.08 .40 
10+ years -.110 .207 -.72 .50 
7-9 years less than 1 year -.120 .118 -.45 .21 
1-3 years -.174 .097 -.44 .10 
4-6 years -.160 .086 -.40 .08 
10+ years -.270 .215 -.90 .36 
10+ years less than 1 year .150 .222 -.50 .80 
1-3 years .096 .211 -.53 .72 
4-6 years .110 .207 -.50 .72 
7-9 years .270 .215 -.36 .90 






and gas industry 
prices 
4-6 years -.193 .143 -.60 .21 
7-9 years -.373 .160 -.83 .08 
10+ years .242 .197 -.33 .81 
1-3 years less than 1 year .153 .150 -.27 .58 
4-6 years -.041 .086 -.28 .19 
7-9 years -.221 .112 -.53 .09 
10+ years .394 .160 -.07 .86 
4-6 years less than 1 year .193 .143 -.21 .60 
1-3 years .041 .086 -.19 .28 
7-9 years -.180 .103 -.47 .11 
10+ years .435 .154 -.02 .89 
7-9 years less than 1 year .373 .160 -.08 .83 
1-3 years .221 .112 -.09 .53 
4-6 years .180 .103 -.11 .47 
10+ years .615* .170 .12 1.11 
10+ years less than 1 year -.242 .197 -.81 .33 
1-3 years -.394 .160 -.86 .07 
4-6 years -.435 .154 -.89 .02 
7-9 years -.615* .170 -1.11 -.12 
Demand for loans 
and innovative 
financing products 
less than 1 year 1-3 years -.251 .146 -.66 .16 
4-6 years -.057 .132 -.43 .32 
7-9 years -.227 .163 -.69 .23 
10+ years .133 .218 -.50 .77 
1-3 years less than 1 year .251 .146 -.16 .66 
4-6 years .195 .096 -.07 .46 
7-9 years .025 .135 -.35 .40 
10+ years .385 .198 -.19 .96 
4-6 years less than 1 year .057 .132 -.32 .43 
1-3 years -.195 .096 -.46 .07 
7-9 years -.170 .121 -.51 .17 
10+ years .190 .188 -.36 .74 
7-9 years less than 1 year .227 .163 -.23 .69 
1-3 years -.025 .135 -.40 .35 
4-6 years .170 .121 -.17 .51 
10+ years .360 .211 -.25 .97 
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10+ years less than 1 year -.133 .218 -.77 .50 
1-3 years -.385 .198 -.96 .19 
4-6 years -.190 .188 -.74 .36 





less than 1 year 1-3 years -.323 .148 -.74 .10 
4-6 years -.650* .141 -1.05 -.25 
7-9 years -.280 .160 -.73 .17 
10+ years -1.025* .222 -1.67 -.38 
1-3 years less than 1 year .323 .148 -.10 .74 
4-6 years -.327* .082 -.55 -.10 
7-9 years .043 .111 -.27 .35 
10+ years -.702* .191 -1.26 -.14 
4-6 years less than 1 year .650* .141 .25 1.05 
1-3 years .327* .082 .10 .55 
7-9 years .370* .101 .09 .65 
10+ years -.375 .185 -.92 .17 
7-9 years less than 1 year .280 .160 -.17 .73 
1-3 years -.043 .111 -.35 .27 
4-6 years -.370* .101 -.65 -.09 
10+ years -.745* .200 -1.33 -.16 
10+ years less than 1 year 1.025* .222 .38 1.67 
1-3 years .702* .191 .14 1.26 
4-6 years .375 .185 -.17 .92 




less than 1 year 1-3 years -.092 .126 -.45 .26 
4-6 years -.170 .118 -.50 .16 
7-9 years -.040 .153 -.47 .39 
10+ years .225 .180 -.30 .75 
1-3 years less than 1 year .092 .126 -.26 .45 
4-6 years -.078 .083 -.31 .15 
7-9 years .052 .127 -.30 .41 
10+ years .317 .159 -.15 .78 
4-6 years less than 1 year .170 .118 -.16 .50 
1-3 years .078 .083 -.15 .31 
7-9 years .130 .119 -.20 .46 
  
465 
10+ years .395 .153 -.05 .84 
7-9 years less than 1 year .040 .153 -.39 .47 
1-3 years -.052 .127 -.41 .30 
4-6 years -.130 .119 -.46 .20 
10+ years .265 .181 -.26 .79 
10+ years less than 1 year -.225 .180 -.75 .30 
1-3 years -.317 .159 -.78 .15 
4-6 years -.395 .153 -.84 .05 




less than 1 year 1-3 years -.399* .101 -.68 -.12 
4-6 years -.113 .088 -.36 .14 
7-9 years -.453* .119 -.79 -.12 
10+ years -.658 .232 -1.34 .03 
1-3 years less than 1 year .399* .101 .12 .68 
4-6 years .285* .081 .06 .51 
7-9 years -.055 .114 -.37 .26 
10+ years -.260 .230 -.93 .42 
4-6 years less than 1 year .113 .088 -.14 .36 
1-3 years -.285* .081 -.51 -.06 
7-9 years -.340* .104 -.63 -.05 
10+ years -.545 .224 -1.21 .12 
7-9 years less than 1 year .453* .119 .12 .79 
1-3 years .055 .114 -.26 .37 
4-6 years .340* .104 .05 .63 
10+ years -.205 .238 -.90 .49 
10+ years less than 1 year .658 .232 -.03 1.34 
1-3 years .260 .230 -.42 .93 
4-6 years .545 .224 -.12 1.21 




less than 1 year 1-3 years .017 .136 -.37 .40 
4-6 years .087 .125 -.27 .44 
7-9 years -.173 .163 -.63 .29 
10+ years .267 .188 -.28 .81 
1-3 years less than 1 year -.017 .136 -.40 .37 
4-6 years .070 .084 -.16 .30 
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7-9 years -.190 .134 -.56 .18 
10+ years .250 .163 -.23 .73 
4-6 years less than 1 year -.087 .125 -.44 .27 
1-3 years -.070 .084 -.30 .16 
7-9 years -.260 .123 -.60 .08 
10+ years .180 .155 -.27 .63 
7-9 years less than 1 year .173 .163 -.29 .63 
1-3 years .190 .134 -.18 .56 
4-6 years .260 .123 -.08 .60 
10+ years .440 .187 -.10 .98 
10+ years less than 1 year -.267 .188 -.81 .28 
1-3 years -.250 .163 -.73 .23 
4-6 years -.180 .155 -.63 .27 
7-9 years -.440 .187 -.98 .10 
Infrastructure and 
system 
less than 1 year 1-3 years .037 .158 -.41 .49 
4-6 years .103 .153 -.33 .54 
7-9 years .013 .173 -.48 .50 
10+ years .008 .241 -.69 .71 
1-3 years less than 1 year -.037 .158 -.49 .41 
4-6 years .066 .083 -.16 .30 
7-9 years -.024 .115 -.34 .30 
10+ years -.029 .204 -.63 .57 
4-6 years less than 1 year -.103 .153 -.54 .33 
1-3 years -.066 .083 -.30 .16 
7-9 years -.090 .108 -.39 .21 
10+ years -.095 .200 -.68 .49 
7-9 years less than 1 year -.013 .173 -.50 .48 
1-3 years .024 .115 -.30 .34 
4-6 years .090 .108 -.21 .39 
10+ years -.005 .215 -.63 .62 
10+ years less than 1 year -.008 .241 -.71 .69 
1-3 years .029 .204 -.57 .63 
4-6 years .095 .200 -.49 .68 
7-9 years .005 .215 -.62 .63 





4-6 years .027 .096 -.24 .30 
7-9 years -.253 .130 -.62 .11 
10+ years -.183 .193 -.75 .38 
1-3 years less than 1 year -.086 .109 -.39 .22 
4-6 years -.059 .078 -.27 .16 
7-9 years -.339* .117 -.67 -.01 
10+ years -.269 .185 -.81 .27 
4-6 years less than 1 year -.027 .096 -.30 .24 
1-3 years .059 .078 -.16 .27 
7-9 years -.280 .106 -.57 .01 
10+ years -.210 .178 -.73 .31 
7-9 years less than 1 year .253 .130 -.11 .62 
1-3 years .339* .117 .01 .67 
4-6 years .280 .106 -.01 .57 
10+ years .070 .198 -.51 .65 
10+ years less than 1 year .183 .193 -.38 .75 
1-3 years .269 .185 -.27 .81 
4-6 years .210 .178 -.31 .73 
7-9 years -.070 .198 -.65 .51 
International 
competitive forces 
less than 1 year 1-3 years .124 .122 -.22 .47 
4-6 years -.043 .112 -.36 .27 
7-9 years -.093 .129 -.46 .27 
10+ years -.183 .172 -.68 .32 
1-3 years less than 1 year -.124 .122 -.47 .22 
4-6 years -.168 .079 -.39 .05 
7-9 years -.218 .102 -.50 .07 
10+ years -.308 .153 -.75 .14 
4-6 years less than 1 year .043 .112 -.27 .36 
1-3 years .168 .079 -.05 .39 
7-9 years -.050 .090 -.30 .20 
10+ years -.140 .145 -.57 .29 
7-9 years less than 1 year .093 .129 -.27 .46 
1-3 years .218 .102 -.07 .50 
4-6 years .050 .090 -.20 .30 
10+ years -.090 .159 -.55 .37 
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10+ years less than 1 year .183 .172 -.32 .68 
1-3 years .308 .153 -.14 .75 
4-6 years .140 .145 -.29 .57 




less than 1 year 1-3 years -.277 .123 -.62 .07 
4-6 years -.110 .110 -.42 .20 
7-9 years -.440* .144 -.85 -.03 
10+ years -.450 .199 -1.03 .13 
1-3 years less than 1 year .277 .123 -.07 .62 
4-6 years .167 .089 -.08 .41 
7-9 years -.163 .129 -.52 .19 
10+ years -.173 .188 -.72 .38 
4-6 years less than 1 year .110 .110 -.20 .42 
1-3 years -.167 .089 -.41 .08 
7-9 years -.330* .116 -.65 -.01 
10+ years -.340 .180 -.87 .19 
7-9 years less than 1 year .440* .144 .03 .85 
1-3 years .163 .129 -.19 .52 
4-6 years .330* .116 .01 .65 
10+ years -.010 .202 -.60 .58 
10+ years less than 1 year .450 .199 -.13 1.03 
1-3 years .173 .188 -.38 .72 
4-6 years .340 .180 -.19 .87 
7-9 years .010 .202 -.58 .60 
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Square F Sig. 
Section 2. 1. The 
banking industry is 
stable and diversified. 
Between Groups 15.592 4 3.898 3.522 .007 
Within Groups 658.568 595 1.107 
  
Total 674.160 599 
   
2. Current interest 
rates are competitive 
and in demand. 
Between Groups 62.062 4 15.515 11.130 .000 
Within Groups 829.403 595 1.394 
  
Total 891.465 599 
   
3. Central bank 
interventions have 
improved our lending 
strategies. 
Between Groups 5.586 4 1.396 3.112 .015 




   
4. We invest a high 
percentage of our 
funds in private 
sector enterprises. 
Between Groups 27.383 4 6.846 6.686 .000 




   
5. Most deposits are 
tied to oil and gas 
rents. 
Between Groups 41.808 4 10.452 7.209 .000 
Within Groups 862.692 595 1.450 
  
Total 904.500 599 
   
6. Our vision is 
global. and this 
Between Groups 25.618 4 6.405 3.948 .004 








   
7. Our default rates 
are anticipated and 
appropriate. 
Between Groups 19.861 4 4.965 3.209 .013 
Within Groups 920.639 595 1.547 
  
Total 940.500 599 
   
8. The financial 
instruments we use 
are market sensitive 
and vulnerable to 
risks. 
Between Groups 61.034 4 15.258 12.048 .000 




   
9. We anticipate that 
the oil and gas 
market will recover in 
price and volume. 
Between Groups 5.883 4 1.471 .985 .415 




   
10. Most citizens do 
not plan financially for 
long-term market 
shocks. 
Between Groups 72.643 4 18.161 12.570 .000 




   
11. Government 
subsidies allow us to 
loan more freely to 
the private sector. 
Between Groups 12.009 4 3.002 5.852 .000 




   





Between Groups 11.980 4 2.995 3.309 .011 




   
13. There is an 
inadequate 
population of skilled 
entrepreneurs in our 
national population. 
Between Groups 39.137 4 9.784 7.614 .000 




   
14. Banks are 
essential to the 
Between Groups 10.712 4 2.678 4.258 .002 





and therefore must 
be protected during 
periods of financial 
duress and decline. 
Total 
384.960 599 
   
15. The financial 
market is mature and 
competitive. 
Between Groups 13.411 4 3.353 4.899 .001 
Within Groups 407.249 595 .684 
  
Total 420.660 599 
   
Section 3. 1. Global 
pressures on the oil 




Between Groups 18.443 4 4.611 4.161 .002 




   
2. The variability of 
commodity pricing 
creates highly 
impactful risks for our 
nation. 
Between Groups 16.660 4 4.165 4.549 .001 




   
3. Even if we 
diversified our 
industries. we would 
need decades to 
allow them to mature. 
Between Groups 9.204 4 2.301 1.756 .136 




   
4. Strategic 
partnerships and FDI 
allow rapid exchange 
of knowledge and 
technology and 
should be supported. 
Between Groups 24.877 4 6.219 6.211 .000 




   
5. Our bank is 
vulnerable to 
systemic risks. 
Between Groups 9.818 4 2.454 2.703 .030 
Within Groups 540.247 595 .908 
  
Total 550.065 599 
   
6. Without 
government support. 
Between Groups 18.260 4 4.565 5.017 .001 




our bank would likely 




   
7. Liquidity levels are 
at an all-time low. 
Between Groups 17.820 4 4.455 3.843 .004 
Within Groups 689.805 595 1.159 
  
Total 707.625 599 
   
8. When oil prices 
decline. we are less 
likely to lend money 
to private enterprises. 
Between Groups 15.755 4 3.939 4.254 .002 




   
9. Citizens are more 
likely to withhold 
savings and 
investments when oil 
prices fluctuate or 
decline. 
Between Groups 19.129 4 4.782 4.853 .001 




   
10. Investing in 
diversification offers a 
layer of stability that 
we desperately need 
at this time. 
Between Groups 32.224 4 8.056 8.877 .000 




   
11. Intra-bank loans 
create a dangerous 
cycle of risk and 
vulnerability. 
Between Groups 23.454 4 5.864 5.386 .000 




   
12. The increase in 
lending rates is a 
positive step towards 
industry maturity. 
Between Groups 7.046 4 1.761 1.675 .154 




   
13. Most of our 
internal investment 
strategies are based 
on oil and gas 
exploitation. 
Between Groups 12.536 4 3.134 3.056 .016 




   
14. Countries have 
national industries 
Between Groups 10.367 4 2.592 2.672 .031 




and products: Ours 




   
15. The gap between 
the citizen and 
expatriate population 
in our nation is 
worrying. 
Between Groups 4.102 4 1.026 1.174 .321 




   
16. New companies 
are a liability; we 
would prefer to invest 
in tested models. 
Between Groups 7.589 4 1.897 1.886 .111 




   
17. Most small 
businesses are likely 
to fail if given enough 
time. 
Between Groups 5.931 4 1.483 1.900 .109 




   
18. Our banks should 
invest more heavily in 
business 
development and 
growth to increase 
industry performance. 
Between Groups 6.031 4 1.508 1.365 .245 




   
19. Without sufficient 
oil and gas liquidity. 
we cannot fund 
additional 
development. 
Between Groups 20.363 4 5.091 4.277 .002 




   
20. The domestic 
financial markets are 
unstable and high 
risk. 
Between Groups 12.967 4 3.242 3.759 .005 




   
Section 4. 1. Our 
government has a 
long-term vision that 
does not rely on oil 
and gas for 
development. 
Between Groups 17.647 4 4.412 3.652 .006 
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2. The primary 




Between Groups 19.440 4 4.860 1.527 .193 




   
3. The primary result 
of a government 
bailout in our nation 
is: 
Between Groups 1.188 4 .297 .091 .985 




   
4. Government 
investment in oil and 
gas is a necessary 
and sustainable 
commitment. 
Between Groups 12.232 4 3.058 1.814 .125 




   
5. The government’s 
role in stabilising the 
domestic economy is: 
Between Groups 6.816 4 1.704 2.732 .028 
Within Groups 371.124 595 .624 
  
Total 377.940 599 
   
6. Our dependence 
on a single export 
makes our country 
look: 
Between Groups .289 4 .072 .434 .784 




   
7. The primary factor 
restricting the number 
of national citizens in 
private sector 
employment is: 
Between Groups 17.867 4 4.467 1.674 .154 




   
8. The primary sector 
which national 
citizens would like to 
work in is: 
Between Groups 32.488 4 8.122 2.194 .068 




   
9. Government 
analysts would rank 
the current threat 
level in oil and gas as 
follows: 
Between Groups 7.246 4 1.812 3.142 .014 




   
Between Groups 33.159 4 8.290 3.744 .005 
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10. The government 
investment in oil and 
gas is based on the 
following objective: 









Price performance of 
the oil and gas 
industry 
Between Groups 10.342 4 2.585 4.548 .001 








Between Groups 5.007 4 1.252 2.209 .067 
Within Groups 337.233 595 .567 
  
Total 342.240 599 




Between Groups 5.529 4 1.382 1.902 .109 
Within Groups 432.411 595 .727 
  
Total 437.940 599 
   
Diversification of 
industries 
Between Groups 7.473 4 1.868 2.907 .021 
Within Groups 382.392 595 .643 
  
Total 389.865 599 
   
Strategic vision or 
agenda for national 
change 
Between Groups 4.725 4 1.181 2.045 .087 
Within Groups 343.740 595 .578 
  
Total 348.465 599 
   
Industry rules and 
regulations 
Between Groups 4.925 4 1.231 2.237 .064 
Within Groups 327.460 595 .550 
  
Total 332.385 599 




Between Groups 4.251 4 1.063 1.458 .214 
Within Groups 433.689 595 .729 
  
Total 437.940 599 




Between Groups 6.982 4 1.745 3.062 .016 
Within Groups 339.203 595 .570 
  
Total 346.185 599 
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Foreign interests and 
investments 
Between Groups 5.407 4 1.352 1.724 .143 
Within Groups 466.433 595 .784 
  
Total 471.840 599 
   
Defaults and risks in 
bank performance 
Between Groups 1.098 4 .274 .484 .748 
Within Groups 337.527 595 .567 
  
Total 338.625 599 
   
Impact their 
organisational 
performance: Oil and 
gas industry prices 
Between Groups 8.876 4 2.219 2.959 .019 




   
Demand for loans 
and innovative 
financing products 
Between Groups 15.111 4 3.778 4.395 .002 
Within Groups 511.389 595 .859 
  
Total 526.500 599 




Between Groups 39.619 4 9.905 14.408 .000 
Within Groups 409.046 595 .687 
  
Total 448.665 599 
   
Liquidity guidelines 
and standards 
Between Groups .956 4 .239 .331 .857 
Within Groups 429.829 595 .722 
  
Total 430.785 599 
   
Auditing and 
governance oversight 
Between Groups 13.758 4 3.439 5.224 .000 
Within Groups 391.782 595 .658 
  
Total 405.540 599 




Between Groups 3.987 4 .997 1.391 .236 
Within Groups 426.273 595 .716 
  
Total 430.260 599 
   
Infrastructure and 
system 
Between Groups .267 4 .067 .088 .986 
Within Groups 452.793 595 .761 
  
Total 453.060 599 
   
Domestic competitive 
forces 
Between Groups 5.652 4 1.413 2.434 .046 




Total 351.060 599 
   
International 
competitive forces 
Between Groups 3.984 4 .996 1.725 .143 
Within Groups 343.641 595 .578 
  
Total 347.625 599 
   
Foreign investment 
and development 
Between Groups 8.109 4 2.027 2.693 .030 
Within Groups 447.891 595 .753 
  
Total 456.000 599 
   
 
 
Post Hoc Tests 
Multiple Comparisons 
Dunnett C  
Dependent 
Variable 
(I) employment at 
current 
organisation 














Section 2. 1. The 
banking industry 
is stable and 
diversified. 
less than 1 year 1-3 years -.343 .145 -.75 .06 
4-6 years -.136 .142 -.53 .26 
7-9 years -.119 .175 -.61 .37 
10+ years .373 .245 -.33 1.08 
1-3 years less than 1 year .343 .145 -.06 .75 
4-6 years .207 .100 -.07 .48 
7-9 years .224 .143 -.18 .62 
10+ years .715* .224 .07 1.36 
4-6 years less than 1 year .136 .142 -.26 .53 
1-3 years -.207 .100 -.48 .07 
7-9 years .017 .140 -.37 .41 
10+ years .509 .221 -.13 1.15 
7-9 years less than 1 year .119 .175 -.37 .61 
1-3 years -.224 .143 -.62 .18 
4-6 years -.017 .140 -.41 .37 
10+ years .491 .244 -.21 1.19 
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10+ years less than 1 year -.373 .245 -1.08 .33 
1-3 years -.715* .224 -1.36 -.07 
4-6 years -.509 .221 -1.15 .13 
7-9 years -.491 .244 -1.19 .21 
2. Current interest 
rates are 
competitive and in 
demand. 
less than 1 year 1-3 years -1.091* .137 -1.47 -.71 
4-6 years -.639* .111 -.95 -.33 
7-9 years -.439* .134 -.81 -.06 
10+ years -.491 .223 -1.14 .15 
1-3 years less than 1 year 1.091* .137 .71 1.47 
4-6 years .452* .132 .09 .81 
7-9 years .652* .151 .23 1.07 
10+ years .600 .234 -.07 1.27 
4-6 years less than 1 year .639* .111 .33 .95 
1-3 years -.452* .132 -.81 -.09 
7-9 years .201 .128 -.16 .56 
10+ years .148 .220 -.49 .78 
7-9 years less than 1 year .439* .134 .06 .81 
1-3 years -.652* .151 -1.07 -.23 
4-6 years -.201 .128 -.56 .16 
10+ years -.052 .232 -.72 .62 
10+ years less than 1 year .491 .223 -.15 1.14 
1-3 years -.600 .234 -1.27 .07 
4-6 years -.148 .220 -.78 .49 
7-9 years .052 .232 -.62 .72 




less than 1 year 1-3 years -.220 .092 -.47 .03 
4-6 years -.117 .070 -.31 .08 
7-9 years -.356* .110 -.67 -.05 
10+ years -.082 .082 -.32 .15 
1-3 years less than 1 year .220 .092 -.03 .47 
4-6 years .103 .077 -.11 .32 
7-9 years -.135 .115 -.46 .18 
10+ years .138 .088 -.11 .39 
4-6 years less than 1 year .117 .070 -.08 .31 
1-3 years -.103 .077 -.32 .11 
7-9 years -.238 .099 -.51 .04 
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10+ years .035 .066 -.15 .22 
7-9 years less than 1 year .356* .110 .05 .67 
1-3 years .135 .115 -.18 .46 
4-6 years .238 .099 -.04 .51 
10+ years .274 .108 -.03 .58 
10+ years less than 1 year .082 .082 -.15 .32 
1-3 years -.138 .088 -.39 .11 
4-6 years -.035 .066 -.22 .15 
7-9 years -.274 .108 -.58 .03 
4. We invest a 
high percentage 
of our funds in 
private sector 
enterprises. 
less than 1 year 1-3 years -.745* .121 -1.08 -.41 
4-6 years -.510* .095 -.77 -.25 
7-9 years -.352 .131 -.72 .02 
10+ years -.491 .220 -1.13 .14 
1-3 years less than 1 year .745* .121 .41 1.08 
4-6 years .234 .113 -.08 .54 
7-9 years .393 .145 -.01 .80 
10+ years .254 .228 -.40 .91 
4-6 years less than 1 year .510* .095 .25 .77 
1-3 years -.234 .113 -.54 .08 
7-9 years .158 .124 -.19 .50 
10+ years .019 .215 -.60 .64 
7-9 years less than 1 year .352 .131 -.02 .72 
1-3 years -.393 .145 -.80 .01 
4-6 years -.158 .124 -.50 .19 
10+ years -.139 .234 -.81 .53 
10+ years less than 1 year .491 .220 -.14 1.13 
1-3 years -.254 .228 -.91 .40 
4-6 years -.019 .215 -.64 .60 
7-9 years .139 .234 -.53 .81 
5. Most deposits 
are tied to oil and 
gas rents. 
less than 1 year 1-3 years -.738* .166 -1.20 -.27 
4-6 years -.287 .146 -.69 .12 
7-9 years -.632* .198 -1.19 -.08 
10+ years .055 .243 -.65 .75 
1-3 years less than 1 year .738* .166 .27 1.20 
4-6 years .450* .127 .10 .80 
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7-9 years .105 .185 -.41 .62 
10+ years .792* .232 .12 1.46 
4-6 years less than 1 year .287 .146 -.12 .69 
1-3 years -.450* .127 -.80 -.10 
7-9 years -.345 .167 -.81 .12 
10+ years .342 .218 -.29 .97 
7-9 years less than 1 year .632* .198 .08 1.19 
1-3 years -.105 .185 -.62 .41 
4-6 years .345 .167 -.12 .81 
10+ years .687 .256 -.05 1.42 
10+ years less than 1 year -.055 .243 -.75 .65 
1-3 years -.792* .232 -1.46 -.12 
4-6 years -.342 .218 -.97 .29 
7-9 years -.687 .256 -1.42 .05 
6. Our vision is 
global. and this 
requires 
diversification. 
less than 1 year 1-3 years -.421 .183 -.93 .09 
4-6 years .013 .171 -.46 .49 
7-9 years -.103 .213 -.70 .49 
10+ years -.564 .277 -1.36 .23 
1-3 years less than 1 year .421 .183 -.09 .93 
4-6 years .434* .128 .08 .79 
7-9 years .319 .180 -.18 .82 
10+ years -.142 .254 -.87 .59 
4-6 years less than 1 year -.013 .171 -.49 .46 
1-3 years -.434* .128 -.79 -.08 
7-9 years -.115 .167 -.58 .35 
10+ years -.576 .244 -1.28 .13 
7-9 years less than 1 year .103 .213 -.49 .70 
1-3 years -.319 .180 -.82 .18 
4-6 years .115 .167 -.35 .58 
10+ years -.461 .275 -1.25 .33 
10+ years less than 1 year .564 .277 -.23 1.36 
1-3 years .142 .254 -.59 .87 
4-6 years .576 .244 -.13 1.28 
7-9 years .461 .275 -.33 1.25 
less than 1 year 1-3 years -.556* .177 -1.05 -.06 
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4-6 years -.579* .166 -1.04 -.12 
7-9 years -.581* .199 -1.14 -.02 
10+ years -.664 .302 -1.53 .21 
1-3 years less than 1 year .556* .177 .06 1.05 
4-6 years -.023 .124 -.37 .32 
7-9 years -.025 .166 -.49 .44 
10+ years -.108 .281 -.92 .70 
4-6 years less than 1 year .579* .166 .12 1.04 
1-3 years .023 .124 -.32 .37 
7-9 years -.002 .154 -.43 .43 
10+ years -.085 .274 -.88 .71 
7-9 years less than 1 year .581* .199 .02 1.14 
1-3 years .025 .166 -.44 .49 
4-6 years .002 .154 -.43 .43 
10+ years -.083 .295 -.93 .77 
10+ years less than 1 year .664 .302 -.21 1.53 
1-3 years .108 .281 -.70 .92 
4-6 years .085 .274 -.71 .88 
7-9 years .083 .295 -.77 .93 
8. The financial 
instruments we 




less than 1 year 1-3 years -1.058* .129 -1.41 -.70 
4-6 years -.720* .111 -1.03 -.41 
7-9 years -.348 .134 -.72 .03 
10+ years -.600* .207 -1.20 .00 
1-3 years less than 1 year 1.058* .129 .70 1.41 
4-6 years .337* .122 .00 .67 
7-9 years .710* .143 .31 1.11 
10+ years .458 .213 -.16 1.07 
4-6 years less than 1 year .720* .111 .41 1.03 
1-3 years -.337* .122 -.67 .00 
7-9 years .373* .128 .02 .73 
10+ years .120 .203 -.47 .71 
7-9 years less than 1 year .348 .134 -.03 .72 
1-3 years -.710* .143 -1.11 -.31 
4-6 years -.373* .128 -.73 -.02 
10+ years -.252 .216 -.88 .37 
  
482 
10+ years less than 1 year .600* .207 .00 1.20 
1-3 years -.458 .213 -1.07 .16 
4-6 years -.120 .203 -.71 .47 
7-9 years .252 .216 -.37 .88 
9. We anticipate 
that the oil and 
gas market will 
recover in price 
and volume. 
less than 1 year 1-3 years -.166 .172 -.65 .31 
4-6 years -.159 .162 -.61 .29 
7-9 years -.172 .195 -.72 .38 
10+ years .245 .259 -.50 .99 
1-3 years less than 1 year .166 .172 -.31 .65 
4-6 years .007 .123 -.33 .35 
7-9 years -.006 .165 -.46 .45 
10+ years .412 .237 -.27 1.09 
4-6 years less than 1 year .159 .162 -.29 .61 
1-3 years -.007 .123 -.35 .33 
7-9 years -.013 .154 -.44 .42 
10+ years .404 .230 -.26 1.07 
7-9 years less than 1 year .172 .195 -.38 .72 
1-3 years .006 .165 -.45 .46 
4-6 years .013 .154 -.42 .44 
10+ years .417 .254 -.31 1.15 
10+ years less than 1 year -.245 .259 -.99 .50 
1-3 years -.412 .237 -1.09 .27 
4-6 years -.404 .230 -1.07 .26 
7-9 years -.417 .254 -1.15 .31 
10. Most citizens 




less than 1 year 1-3 years -1.094* .151 -1.51 -.68 
4-6 years -.530* .131 -.90 -.16 
7-9 years -.298 .160 -.75 .15 
10+ years -.264 .233 -.94 .41 
1-3 years less than 1 year 1.094* .151 .68 1.51 
4-6 years .564* .129 .21 .92 
7-9 years .796* .158 .36 1.24 
10+ years .831* .232 .16 1.50 
4-6 years less than 1 year .530* .131 .16 .90 
1-3 years -.564* .129 -.92 -.21 
7-9 years .232 .140 -.16 .62 
  
483 
10+ years .267 .220 -.37 .90 
7-9 years less than 1 year .298 .160 -.15 .75 
1-3 years -.796* .158 -1.24 -.36 
4-6 years -.232 .140 -.62 .16 
10+ years .035 .238 -.65 .72 
10+ years less than 1 year .264 .233 -.41 .94 
1-3 years -.831* .232 -1.50 -.16 
4-6 years -.267 .220 -.90 .37 
7-9 years -.035 .238 -.72 .65 
11. Government 
subsidies allow us 
to loan more 
freely to the 
private sector. 
less than 1 year 1-3 years -.502* .092 -.76 -.25 
4-6 years -.351* .070 -.55 -.16 
7-9 years -.310* .089 -.56 -.06 
10+ years -.436* .132 -.82 -.06 
1-3 years less than 1 year .502* .092 .25 .76 
4-6 years .150 .083 -.08 .38 
7-9 years .191 .099 -.08 .47 
10+ years .065 .139 -.33 .46 
4-6 years less than 1 year .351* .070 .16 .55 
1-3 years -.150 .083 -.38 .08 
7-9 years .041 .080 -.18 .26 
10+ years -.085 .126 -.45 .28 
7-9 years less than 1 year .310* .089 .06 .56 
1-3 years -.191 .099 -.47 .08 
4-6 years -.041 .080 -.26 .18 
10+ years -.126 .137 -.52 .27 
10+ years less than 1 year .436* .132 .06 .82 
1-3 years -.065 .139 -.46 .33 
4-6 years .085 .126 -.28 .45 
7-9 years .126 .137 -.27 .52 






less than 1 year 1-3 years -.404* .128 -.76 -.05 
4-6 years -.210 .126 -.56 .14 
7-9 years -.413 .150 -.83 .01 
10+ years .000 .263 -.76 .76 
1-3 years less than 1 year .404* .128 .05 .76 
4-6 years .194 .088 -.05 .44 
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7-9 years -.009 .119 -.34 .32 
10+ years .404 .247 -.31 1.12 
4-6 years less than 1 year .210 .126 -.14 .56 
1-3 years -.194 .088 -.44 .05 
7-9 years -.203 .118 -.53 .12 
10+ years .210 .246 -.50 .92 
7-9 years less than 1 year .413 .150 -.01 .83 
1-3 years .009 .119 -.32 .34 
4-6 years .203 .118 -.12 .53 
10+ years .413 .259 -.34 1.16 
10+ years less than 1 year .000 .263 -.76 .76 
1-3 years -.404 .247 -1.12 .31 
4-6 years -.210 .246 -.92 .50 
7-9 years -.413 .259 -1.16 .34 







less than 1 year 1-3 years -.808* .162 -1.26 -.36 
4-6 years -.457* .146 -.87 -.05 
7-9 years -.196 .161 -.65 .26 
10+ years -.700* .223 -1.34 -.06 
1-3 years less than 1 year .808* .162 .36 1.26 
4-6 years .351* .121 .02 .69 
7-9 years .612* .139 .23 1.00 
10+ years .108 .207 -.49 .70 
4-6 years less than 1 year .457* .146 .05 .87 
1-3 years -.351* .121 -.69 -.02 
7-9 years .261 .120 -.07 .60 
10+ years -.243 .195 -.81 .32 
7-9 years less than 1 year .196 .161 -.26 .65 
1-3 years -.612* .139 -1.00 -.23 
4-6 years -.261 .120 -.60 .07 
10+ years -.504 .206 -1.10 .09 
10+ years less than 1 year .700* .223 .06 1.34 
1-3 years -.108 .207 -.70 .49 
4-6 years .243 .195 -.32 .81 
7-9 years .504 .206 -.09 1.10 
less than 1 year 1-3 years -.444* .091 -.70 -.19 
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14. Banks are 
essential to the 
domestic 
economy and 





4-6 years -.384* .075 -.59 -.17 
7-9 years -.441* .107 -.74 -.14 
10+ years -.236 .115 -.57 .09 
1-3 years less than 1 year .444* .091 .19 .70 
4-6 years .060 .087 -.18 .30 
7-9 years .003 .115 -.32 .32 
10+ years .208 .123 -.14 .56 
4-6 years less than 1 year .384* .075 .17 .59 
1-3 years -.060 .087 -.30 .18 
7-9 years -.057 .103 -.35 .23 
10+ years .147 .112 -.17 .47 
7-9 years less than 1 year .441* .107 .14 .74 
1-3 years -.003 .115 -.32 .32 
4-6 years .057 .103 -.23 .35 
10+ years .204 .135 -.18 .59 
10+ years less than 1 year .236 .115 -.09 .57 
1-3 years -.208 .123 -.56 .14 
4-6 years -.147 .112 -.47 .17 
7-9 years -.204 .135 -.59 .18 
15. The financial 
market is mature 
and competitive. 
less than 1 year 1-3 years -.402* .110 -.71 -.10 
4-6 years -.186 .091 -.44 .07 
7-9 years -.081 .122 -.42 .26 
10+ years .136 .163 -.33 .61 
1-3 years less than 1 year .402* .110 .10 .71 
4-6 years .216 .091 -.04 .47 
7-9 years .321 .122 -.02 .66 
10+ years .538* .164 .07 1.01 
4-6 years less than 1 year .186 .091 -.07 .44 
1-3 years -.216 .091 -.47 .04 
7-9 years .105 .106 -.19 .40 
10+ years .323 .151 -.12 .76 
7-9 years less than 1 year .081 .122 -.26 .42 
1-3 years -.321 .122 -.66 .02 
4-6 years -.105 .106 -.40 .19 
10+ years .217 .172 -.28 .71 
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10+ years less than 1 year -.136 .163 -.61 .33 
1-3 years -.538* .164 -1.01 -.07 
4-6 years -.323 .151 -.76 .12 
7-9 years -.217 .172 -.71 .28 
Section 3. 1. 
Global pressures 





less than 1 year 1-3 years -.516* .153 -.94 -.09 
4-6 years -.190 .132 -.56 .18 
7-9 years -.075 .185 -.59 .44 
10+ years -.327 .208 -.92 .27 
1-3 years less than 1 year .516* .153 .09 .94 
4-6 years .326* .112 .02 .63 
7-9 years .441 .171 -.04 .92 
10+ years .188 .196 -.37 .75 
4-6 years less than 1 year .190 .132 -.18 .56 
1-3 years -.326* .112 -.63 -.02 
7-9 years .115 .152 -.31 .54 
10+ years -.138 .180 -.66 .38 
7-9 years less than 1 year .075 .185 -.44 .59 
1-3 years -.441 .171 -.92 .04 
4-6 years -.115 .152 -.54 .31 
10+ years -.252 .221 -.89 .38 
10+ years less than 1 year .327 .208 -.27 .92 
1-3 years -.188 .196 -.75 .37 
4-6 years .138 .180 -.38 .66 
7-9 years .252 .221 -.38 .89 




risks for our 
nation. 
less than 1 year 1-3 years -.561* .138 -.95 -.18 
4-6 years -.289 .124 -.64 .06 
7-9 years -.294 .174 -.78 .19 
10+ years -.473 .201 -1.05 .11 
1-3 years less than 1 year .561* .138 .18 .95 
4-6 years .272* .097 .00 .54 
7-9 years .267 .156 -.17 .70 
10+ years .088 .186 -.45 .62 
4-6 years less than 1 year .289 .124 -.06 .64 
1-3 years -.272* .097 -.54 .00 
7-9 years -.006 .144 -.41 .40 
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10+ years -.184 .176 -.69 .32 
7-9 years less than 1 year .294 .174 -.19 .78 
1-3 years -.267 .156 -.70 .17 
4-6 years .006 .144 -.40 .41 
10+ years -.178 .214 -.79 .43 
10+ years less than 1 year .473 .201 -.11 1.05 
1-3 years -.088 .186 -.62 .45 
4-6 years .184 .176 -.32 .69 
7-9 years .178 .214 -.43 .79 




decades to allow 
them to mature. 
less than 1 year 1-3 years -.407 .170 -.88 .07 
4-6 years -.251 .161 -.70 .20 
7-9 years -.142 .211 -.73 .45 
10+ years -.373 .256 -1.11 .36 
1-3 years less than 1 year .407 .170 -.07 .88 
4-6 years .156 .111 -.15 .46 
7-9 years .265 .176 -.23 .76 
10+ years .035 .228 -.62 .69 
4-6 years less than 1 year .251 .161 -.20 .70 
1-3 years -.156 .111 -.46 .15 
7-9 years .109 .167 -.36 .58 
10+ years -.122 .221 -.76 .52 
7-9 years less than 1 year .142 .211 -.45 .73 
1-3 years -.265 .176 -.76 .23 
4-6 years -.109 .167 -.58 .36 
10+ years -.230 .261 -.98 .52 
10+ years less than 1 year .373 .256 -.36 1.11 
1-3 years -.035 .228 -.69 .62 
4-6 years .122 .221 -.52 .76 
7-9 years .230 .261 -.52 .98 
4. Strategic 
partnerships and 




less than 1 year 1-3 years -.503* .145 -.91 -.10 
4-6 years -.171 .125 -.52 .18 
7-9 years .097 .172 -.38 .58 
10+ years .027 .158 -.42 .48 
1-3 years less than 1 year .503* .145 .10 .91 





7-9 years .600* .160 .16 1.05 
10+ years .531* .144 .12 .94 
4-6 years less than 1 year .171 .125 -.18 .52 
1-3 years -.333* .108 -.63 -.04 
7-9 years .267 .142 -.13 .66 
10+ years .198 .125 -.16 .56 
7-9 years less than 1 year -.097 .172 -.58 .38 
1-3 years -.600* .160 -1.05 -.16 
4-6 years -.267 .142 -.66 .13 
10+ years -.070 .172 -.56 .42 
10+ years less than 1 year -.027 .158 -.48 .42 
1-3 years -.531* .144 -.94 -.12 
4-6 years -.198 .125 -.56 .16 
7-9 years .070 .172 -.42 .56 
5. Our bank is 
vulnerable to 
systemic risks. 
less than 1 year 1-3 years -.236 .141 -.63 .16 
4-6 years .064 .128 -.29 .42 
7-9 years .069 .177 -.43 .56 
10+ years -.009 .189 -.55 .53 
1-3 years less than 1 year .236 .141 -.16 .63 
4-6 years .300* .096 .03 .57 
7-9 years .305 .155 -.13 .74 
10+ years .227 .169 -.26 .71 
4-6 years less than 1 year -.064 .128 -.42 .29 
1-3 years -.300* .096 -.57 -.03 
7-9 years .005 .144 -.40 .41 
10+ years -.073 .158 -.53 .38 
7-9 years less than 1 year -.069 .177 -.56 .43 
1-3 years -.305 .155 -.74 .13 
4-6 years -.005 .144 -.41 .40 
10+ years -.078 .200 -.65 .49 
10+ years less than 1 year .009 .189 -.53 .55 
1-3 years -.227 .169 -.71 .26 
4-6 years .073 .158 -.38 .53 
7-9 years .078 .200 -.49 .65 





support. our bank 




4-6 years -.307* .099 -.58 -.03 
7-9 years -.126 .153 -.56 .30 
10+ years -.509 .189 -1.06 .04 
1-3 years less than 1 year .544* .120 .21 .88 
4-6 years .237 .102 -.04 .52 
7-9 years .417 .155 -.02 .85 
10+ years .035 .191 -.51 .58 
4-6 years less than 1 year .307* .099 .03 .58 
1-3 years -.237 .102 -.52 .04 
7-9 years .180 .140 -.21 .57 
10+ years -.202 .179 -.72 .31 
7-9 years less than 1 year .126 .153 -.30 .56 
1-3 years -.417 .155 -.85 .02 
4-6 years -.180 .140 -.57 .21 
10+ years -.383 .213 -.99 .23 
10+ years less than 1 year .509 .189 -.04 1.06 
1-3 years -.035 .191 -.58 .51 
4-6 years .202 .179 -.31 .72 
7-9 years .383 .213 -.23 .99 
7. Liquidity levels 
are at an all-time 
low. 
less than 1 year 1-3 years -.276 .165 -.74 .18 
4-6 years .003 .145 -.40 .41 
7-9 years -.198 .201 -.76 .37 
10+ years .455 .196 -.11 1.02 
1-3 years less than 1 year .276 .165 -.18 .74 
4-6 years .279 .113 -.03 .59 
7-9 years .079 .179 -.42 .58 
10+ years .731* .174 .23 1.23 
4-6 years less than 1 year -.003 .145 -.41 .40 
1-3 years -.279 .113 -.59 .03 
7-9 years -.201 .161 -.65 .25 
10+ years .452* .155 .00 .90 
7-9 years less than 1 year .198 .201 -.37 .76 
1-3 years -.079 .179 -.58 .42 
4-6 years .201 .161 -.25 .65 
10+ years .652* .208 .06 1.25 
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10+ years less than 1 year -.455 .196 -1.02 .11 
1-3 years -.731* .174 -1.23 -.23 
4-6 years -.452* .155 -.90 .00 
7-9 years -.652* .208 -1.25 -.06 
8. When oil prices 
decline. we are 
less likely to lend 
money to private 
enterprises. 
less than 1 year 1-3 years -.392* .135 -.77 -.02 
4-6 years -.040 .117 -.37 .29 
7-9 years .020 .173 -.46 .50 
10+ years -.045 .182 -.57 .48 
1-3 years less than 1 year .392* .135 .02 .77 
4-6 years .352* .101 .07 .63 
7-9 years .411 .162 -.04 .86 
10+ years .346 .172 -.15 .84 
4-6 years less than 1 year .040 .117 -.29 .37 
1-3 years -.352* .101 -.63 -.07 
7-9 years .060 .148 -.35 .47 
10+ years -.005 .159 -.46 .45 
7-9 years less than 1 year -.020 .173 -.50 .46 
1-3 years -.411 .162 -.86 .04 
4-6 years -.060 .148 -.47 .35 
10+ years -.065 .203 -.65 .52 
10+ years less than 1 year .045 .182 -.48 .57 
1-3 years -.346 .172 -.84 .15 
4-6 years .005 .159 -.45 .46 
7-9 years .065 .203 -.52 .65 
9. Citizens are 
more likely to 
withhold savings 
and investments 
when oil prices 
fluctuate or 
decline. 
less than 1 year 1-3 years -.463* .148 -.88 -.05 
4-6 years -.088 .129 -.45 .27 
7-9 years -.028 .157 -.47 .41 
10+ years -.036 .188 -.58 .50 
1-3 years less than 1 year .463* .148 .05 .88 
4-6 years .375* .109 .08 .68 
7-9 years .436* .141 .04 .83 
10+ years .427 .175 -.08 .93 
4-6 years less than 1 year .088 .129 -.27 .45 
1-3 years -.375* .109 -.68 -.08 
7-9 years .060 .120 -.27 .39 
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10+ years .052 .159 -.41 .51 
7-9 years less than 1 year .028 .157 -.41 .47 
1-3 years -.436* .141 -.83 -.04 
4-6 years -.060 .120 -.39 .27 
10+ years -.009 .182 -.53 .51 
10+ years less than 1 year .036 .188 -.50 .58 
1-3 years -.427 .175 -.93 .08 
4-6 years -.052 .159 -.51 .41 
7-9 years .009 .182 -.51 .53 
10. Investing in 
diversification 
offers a layer of 
stability that we 
desperately need 
at this time. 
less than 1 year 1-3 years -.705* .126 -1.05 -.35 
4-6 years -.320* .102 -.61 -.04 
7-9 years -.128 .146 -.54 .28 
10+ years -.555 .209 -1.16 .05 
1-3 years less than 1 year .705* .126 .35 1.05 
4-6 years .384* .105 .10 .67 
7-9 years .576* .148 .16 .99 
10+ years .150 .210 -.45 .75 
4-6 years less than 1 year .320* .102 .04 .61 
1-3 years -.384* .105 -.67 -.10 
7-9 years .192 .128 -.17 .55 
10+ years -.234 .197 -.80 .33 
7-9 years less than 1 year .128 .146 -.28 .54 
1-3 years -.576* .148 -.99 -.16 
4-6 years -.192 .128 -.55 .17 
10+ years -.426 .222 -1.07 .21 
10+ years less than 1 year .555 .209 -.05 1.16 
1-3 years -.150 .210 -.75 .45 
4-6 years .234 .197 -.33 .80 
7-9 years .426 .222 -.21 1.07 
11. Intra-bank 
loans create a 
dangerous cycle 
of risk and 
vulnerability. 
less than 1 year 1-3 years -.573* .138 -.96 -.19 
4-6 years -.211 .117 -.54 .11 
7-9 years -.119 .170 -.60 .36 
10+ years -.027 .195 -.59 .53 
1-3 years less than 1 year .573* .138 .19 .96 
4-6 years .362* .112 .05 .67 
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7-9 years .455 .167 -.01 .92 
10+ years .546 .192 -.01 1.10 
4-6 years less than 1 year .211 .117 -.11 .54 
1-3 years -.362* .112 -.67 -.05 
7-9 years .093 .150 -.33 .51 
10+ years .184 .177 -.33 .70 
7-9 years less than 1 year .119 .170 -.36 .60 
1-3 years -.455 .167 -.92 .01 
4-6 years -.093 .150 -.51 .33 
10+ years .091 .216 -.53 .71 
10+ years less than 1 year .027 .195 -.53 .59 
1-3 years -.546 .192 -1.10 .01 
4-6 years -.184 .177 -.70 .33 
7-9 years -.091 .216 -.71 .53 
12. The increase 
in lending rates is 
a positive step 
towards industry 
maturity. 
less than 1 year 1-3 years -.205 .149 -.62 .21 
4-6 years .019 .136 -.36 .40 
7-9 years .067 .188 -.46 .59 
10+ years .145 .193 -.41 .70 
1-3 years less than 1 year .205 .149 -.21 .62 
4-6 years .223 .103 -.06 .51 
7-9 years .272 .166 -.19 .73 
10+ years .350 .171 -.14 .84 
4-6 years less than 1 year -.019 .136 -.40 .36 
1-3 years -.223 .103 -.51 .06 
7-9 years .049 .154 -.38 .48 
10+ years .127 .160 -.33 .59 
7-9 years less than 1 year -.067 .188 -.59 .46 
1-3 years -.272 .166 -.73 .19 
4-6 years -.049 .154 -.48 .38 
10+ years .078 .206 -.51 .67 
10+ years less than 1 year -.145 .193 -.70 .41 
1-3 years -.350 .171 -.84 .14 
4-6 years -.127 .160 -.59 .33 
7-9 years -.078 .206 -.67 .51 
less than 1 year 1-3 years -.260 .136 -.64 .12 
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based on oil and 
gas exploitation. 
4-6 years .069 .116 -.26 .39 
7-9 years .117 .175 -.37 .61 
10+ years -.018 .196 -.58 .55 
1-3 years less than 1 year .260 .136 -.12 .64 
4-6 years .329* .107 .03 .62 
7-9 years .377 .169 -.09 .85 
10+ years .242 .190 -.30 .79 
4-6 years less than 1 year -.069 .116 -.39 .26 
1-3 years -.329* .107 -.62 -.03 
7-9 years .048 .153 -.38 .48 
10+ years -.087 .176 -.60 .42 
7-9 years less than 1 year -.117 .175 -.61 .37 
1-3 years -.377 .169 -.85 .09 
4-6 years -.048 .153 -.48 .38 
10+ years -.135 .219 -.76 .49 
10+ years less than 1 year .018 .196 -.55 .58 
1-3 years -.242 .190 -.79 .30 
4-6 years .087 .176 -.42 .60 





should remain oil 
and gas. 
less than 1 year 1-3 years .019 .132 -.35 .39 
4-6 years .242 .127 -.11 .60 
7-9 years -.065 .173 -.55 .42 
10+ years -.100 .185 -.63 .43 
1-3 years less than 1 year -.019 .132 -.39 .35 
4-6 years .223 .095 -.04 .48 
7-9 years -.084 .151 -.51 .34 
10+ years -.119 .165 -.59 .36 
4-6 years less than 1 year -.242 .127 -.60 .11 
1-3 years -.223 .095 -.48 .04 
7-9 years -.307 .147 -.72 .10 
10+ years -.342 .161 -.81 .12 
7-9 years less than 1 year .065 .173 -.42 .55 
1-3 years .084 .151 -.34 .51 
4-6 years .307 .147 -.10 .72 
10+ years -.035 .199 -.61 .54 
  
494 
10+ years less than 1 year .100 .185 -.43 .63 
1-3 years .119 .165 -.36 .59 
4-6 years .342 .161 -.12 .81 
7-9 years .035 .199 -.54 .61 




population in our 
nation is worrying. 
less than 1 year 1-3 years .014 .120 -.32 .35 
4-6 years -.017 .116 -.34 .31 
7-9 years -.257 .152 -.68 .17 
10+ years -.109 .123 -.46 .24 
1-3 years less than 1 year -.014 .120 -.35 .32 
4-6 years -.031 .092 -.28 .22 
7-9 years -.271 .135 -.65 .11 
10+ years -.123 .101 -.41 .16 
4-6 years less than 1 year .017 .116 -.31 .34 
1-3 years .031 .092 -.22 .28 
7-9 years -.240 .132 -.61 .13 
10+ years -.092 .097 -.37 .18 
7-9 years less than 1 year .257 .152 -.17 .68 
1-3 years .271 .135 -.11 .65 
4-6 years .240 .132 -.13 .61 
10+ years .148 .138 -.24 .54 
10+ years less than 1 year .109 .123 -.24 .46 
1-3 years .123 .101 -.16 .41 
4-6 years .092 .097 -.18 .37 
7-9 years -.148 .138 -.54 .24 
16. New 
companies are a 
liability; we would 
prefer to invest in 
tested models. 
less than 1 year 1-3 years .000 .133 -.37 .37 
4-6 years .220 .127 -.13 .58 
7-9 years -.022 .169 -.50 .45 
10+ years .000 .220 -.63 .63 
1-3 years less than 1 year .000 .133 -.37 .37 
4-6 years .220 .096 -.05 .49 
7-9 years -.022 .148 -.43 .39 
10+ years .000 .204 -.59 .59 
4-6 years less than 1 year -.220 .127 -.58 .13 
1-3 years -.220 .096 -.49 .05 
7-9 years -.242 .143 -.64 .16 
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10+ years -.220 .200 -.80 .36 
7-9 years less than 1 year .022 .169 -.45 .50 
1-3 years .022 .148 -.39 .43 
4-6 years .242 .143 -.16 .64 
10+ years .022 .229 -.64 .68 
10+ years less than 1 year .000 .220 -.63 .63 
1-3 years .000 .204 -.59 .59 
4-6 years .220 .200 -.36 .80 
7-9 years -.022 .229 -.68 .64 
17. Most small 
businesses are 
likely to fail if 
given enough 
time. 
less than 1 year 1-3 years -.189 .143 -.59 .21 
4-6 years -.012 .139 -.40 .38 
7-9 years .121 .185 -.40 .64 
10+ years .073 .211 -.53 .68 
1-3 years less than 1 year .189 .143 -.21 .59 
4-6 years .177 .079 -.04 .39 
7-9 years .309 .145 -.10 .72 
10+ years .262 .178 -.25 .78 
4-6 years less than 1 year .012 .139 -.38 .40 
1-3 years -.177 .079 -.39 .04 
7-9 years .133 .141 -.26 .53 
10+ years .085 .175 -.42 .59 
7-9 years less than 1 year -.121 .185 -.64 .40 
1-3 years -.309 .145 -.72 .10 
4-6 years -.133 .141 -.53 .26 
10+ years -.048 .213 -.66 .56 
10+ years less than 1 year -.073 .211 -.68 .53 
1-3 years -.262 .178 -.78 .25 
4-6 years -.085 .175 -.59 .42 
7-9 years .048 .213 -.56 .66 
18. Our banks 
should invest 




less than 1 year 1-3 years .107 .167 -.36 .57 
4-6 years .259 .160 -.19 .71 
7-9 years .296 .208 -.29 .88 
10+ years .318 .241 -.37 1.01 
1-3 years less than 1 year -.107 .167 -.57 .36 





7-9 years .190 .166 -.27 .65 
10+ years .212 .206 -.38 .80 
4-6 years less than 1 year -.259 .160 -.71 .19 
1-3 years -.152 .099 -.42 .12 
7-9 years .037 .159 -.41 .48 
10+ years .059 .200 -.52 .64 
7-9 years less than 1 year -.296 .208 -.88 .29 
1-3 years -.190 .166 -.65 .27 
4-6 years -.037 .159 -.48 .41 
10+ years .022 .240 -.67 .71 
10+ years less than 1 year -.318 .241 -1.01 .37 
1-3 years -.212 .206 -.80 .38 
4-6 years -.059 .200 -.64 .52 
7-9 years -.022 .240 -.71 .67 
19. Without 
sufficient oil and 




less than 1 year 1-3 years -.084 .171 -.56 .39 
4-6 years .137 .160 -.31 .58 
7-9 years -.393 .201 -.96 .17 
10+ years -.345 .252 -1.07 .38 
1-3 years less than 1 year .084 .171 -.39 .56 
4-6 years .221 .108 -.08 .52 
7-9 years -.309 .162 -.76 .14 
10+ years -.262 .222 -.90 .38 
4-6 years less than 1 year -.137 .160 -.58 .31 
1-3 years -.221 .108 -.52 .08 
7-9 years -.531* .150 -.95 -.11 
10+ years -.483 .214 -1.10 .14 
7-9 years less than 1 year .393 .201 -.17 .96 
1-3 years .309 .162 -.14 .76 
4-6 years .531* .150 .11 .95 
10+ years .048 .246 -.66 .75 
10+ years less than 1 year .345 .252 -.38 1.07 
1-3 years .262 .222 -.38 .90 
4-6 years .483 .214 -.14 1.10 
7-9 years -.048 .246 -.75 .66 
less than 1 year 1-3 years -.058 .131 -.42 .31 
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20. The domestic 
financial markets 
are unstable and 
high risk. 
4-6 years .269 .125 -.08 .62 
7-9 years .087 .174 -.40 .58 
10+ years .300 .201 -.28 .88 
1-3 years less than 1 year .058 .131 -.31 .42 
4-6 years .327* .088 .09 .57 
7-9 years .145 .150 -.27 .56 
10+ years .358 .180 -.16 .88 
4-6 years less than 1 year -.269 .125 -.62 .08 
1-3 years -.327* .088 -.57 -.09 
7-9 years -.182 .145 -.59 .22 
10+ years .031 .176 -.48 .54 
7-9 years less than 1 year -.087 .174 -.58 .40 
1-3 years -.145 .150 -.56 .27 
4-6 years .182 .145 -.22 .59 
10+ years .213 .214 -.40 .83 
10+ years less than 1 year -.300 .201 -.88 .28 
1-3 years -.358 .180 -.88 .16 
4-6 years -.031 .176 -.54 .48 
7-9 years -.213 .214 -.83 .40 
Section 4. 1. Our 
government has a 
long-term vision 
that does not rely 
on oil and gas for 
development. 
less than 1 year 1-3 years .428* .144 .03 .83 
4-6 years .560* .135 .18 .94 
7-9 years .496* .173 .01 .98 
10+ years .609 .259 -.14 1.36 
1-3 years less than 1 year -.428* .144 -.83 -.03 
4-6 years .131 .109 -.17 .43 
7-9 years .068 .154 -.36 .50 
10+ years .181 .247 -.53 .90 
4-6 years less than 1 year -.560* .135 -.94 -.18 
1-3 years -.131 .109 -.43 .17 
7-9 years -.064 .145 -.47 .34 
10+ years .049 .242 -.65 .75 
7-9 years less than 1 year -.496* .173 -.98 -.01 
1-3 years -.068 .154 -.50 .36 
4-6 years .064 .145 -.34 .47 
10+ years .113 .265 -.65 .88 
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10+ years less than 1 year -.609 .259 -1.36 .14 
1-3 years -.181 .247 -.90 .53 
4-6 years -.049 .242 -.75 .65 
7-9 years -.113 .265 -.88 .65 
2. The primary 
industry upon 
which lending and 
development 
should focus is: 
less than 1 year 1-3 years .059 .253 -.65 .77 
4-6 years .169 .238 -.50 .83 
7-9 years .006 .315 -.88 .89 
10+ years -.664 .401 -1.82 .49 
1-3 years less than 1 year -.059 .253 -.77 .65 
4-6 years .109 .174 -.37 .59 
7-9 years -.054 .270 -.81 .70 
10+ years -.723 .367 -1.78 .34 
4-6 years less than 1 year -.169 .238 -.83 .50 
1-3 years -.109 .174 -.59 .37 
7-9 years -.163 .256 -.88 .55 
10+ years -.832 .357 -1.86 .20 
7-9 years less than 1 year -.006 .315 -.89 .88 
1-3 years .054 .270 -.70 .81 
4-6 years .163 .256 -.55 .88 
10+ years -.670 .412 -1.85 .52 
10+ years less than 1 year .664 .401 -.49 1.82 
1-3 years .723 .367 -.34 1.78 
4-6 years .832 .357 -.20 1.86 
7-9 years .670 .412 -.52 1.85 
3. The primary 
result of a 
government 
bailout in our 
nation is: 
less than 1 year 1-3 years -.072 .258 -.79 .65 
4-6 years .027 .240 -.64 .70 
7-9 years -.004 .312 -.88 .87 
10+ years -.091 .429 -1.33 1.14 
1-3 years less than 1 year .072 .258 -.65 .79 
4-6 years .099 .178 -.39 .59 
7-9 years .068 .267 -.68 .81 
10+ years -.019 .398 -1.17 1.13 
4-6 years less than 1 year -.027 .240 -.70 .64 
1-3 years -.099 .178 -.59 .39 
7-9 years -.031 .250 -.73 .67 
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10+ years -.118 .386 -1.24 1.00 
7-9 years less than 1 year .004 .312 -.87 .88 
1-3 years -.068 .267 -.81 .68 
4-6 years .031 .250 -.67 .73 
10+ years -.087 .435 -1.34 1.16 
10+ years less than 1 year .091 .429 -1.14 1.33 
1-3 years .019 .398 -1.13 1.17 
4-6 years .118 .386 -1.00 1.24 
7-9 years .087 .435 -1.16 1.34 
4. Government 
investment in oil 




less than 1 year 1-3 years -.495 .192 -1.03 .04 
4-6 years -.354 .180 -.86 .15 
7-9 years -.287 .220 -.90 .33 
10+ years -.491 .278 -1.29 .31 
1-3 years less than 1 year .495 .192 -.04 1.03 
4-6 years .140 .130 -.22 .50 
7-9 years .208 .182 -.30 .71 
10+ years .004 .249 -.71 .72 
4-6 years less than 1 year .354 .180 -.15 .86 
1-3 years -.140 .130 -.50 .22 
7-9 years .068 .169 -.40 .54 
10+ years -.137 .240 -.83 .56 
7-9 years less than 1 year .287 .220 -.33 .90 
1-3 years -.208 .182 -.71 .30 
4-6 years -.068 .169 -.54 .40 
10+ years -.204 .271 -.98 .58 
10+ years less than 1 year .491 .278 -.31 1.29 
1-3 years -.004 .249 -.72 .71 
4-6 years .137 .240 -.56 .83 
7-9 years .204 .271 -.58 .98 
5. The 
government’s role 
in stabilising the 
domestic 
economy is: 
less than 1 year 1-3 years -.122 .131 -.49 .24 
4-6 years -.019 .125 -.37 .33 
7-9 years .063 .140 -.33 .46 
10+ years -.445 .226 -1.10 .21 
1-3 years less than 1 year .122 .131 -.24 .49 
4-6 years .104 .075 -.10 .31 
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7-9 years .186 .098 -.09 .46 
10+ years -.323 .203 -.91 .26 
4-6 years less than 1 year .019 .125 -.33 .37 
1-3 years -.104 .075 -.31 .10 
7-9 years .082 .091 -.17 .33 
10+ years -.427 .199 -1.00 .15 
7-9 years less than 1 year -.063 .140 -.46 .33 
1-3 years -.186 .098 -.46 .09 
4-6 years -.082 .091 -.33 .17 
10+ years -.509 .209 -1.11 .10 
10+ years less than 1 year .445 .226 -.21 1.10 
1-3 years .323 .203 -.26 .91 
4-6 years .427 .199 -.15 1.00 
7-9 years .509 .209 -.10 1.11 
6. Our 




less than 1 year 1-3 years -.021 .076 -.23 .19 
4-6 years -.018 .071 -.22 .18 
7-9 years -.049 .084 -.28 .19 
10+ years .064 .101 -.22 .35 
1-3 years less than 1 year .021 .076 -.19 .23 
4-6 years .003 .040 -.11 .11 
7-9 years -.028 .060 -.20 .14 
10+ years .085 .082 -.15 .32 
4-6 years less than 1 year .018 .071 -.18 .22 
1-3 years -.003 .040 -.11 .11 
7-9 years -.031 .054 -.18 .12 
10+ years .082 .077 -.14 .31 
7-9 years less than 1 year .049 .084 -.19 .28 
1-3 years .028 .060 -.14 .20 
4-6 years .031 .054 -.12 .18 
10+ years .113 .089 -.14 .37 
10+ years less than 1 year -.064 .101 -.35 .22 
1-3 years -.085 .082 -.32 .15 
4-6 years -.082 .077 -.31 .14 
7-9 years -.113 .089 -.37 .14 
less than 1 year 1-3 years -.205 .240 -.88 .47 
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7. The primary 
factor restricting 
the number of 
national citizens 
in private sector 
employment is: 
4-6 years -.422 .227 -1.06 .21 
7-9 years -.411 .279 -1.19 .37 
10+ years -.755 .343 -1.74 .23 
1-3 years less than 1 year .205 .240 -.47 .88 
4-6 years -.218 .162 -.66 .23 
7-9 years -.207 .229 -.85 .43 
10+ years -.550 .304 -1.43 .33 
4-6 years less than 1 year .422 .227 -.21 1.06 
1-3 years .218 .162 -.23 .66 
7-9 years .011 .216 -.59 .61 
10+ years -.332 .294 -1.18 .52 
7-9 years less than 1 year .411 .279 -.37 1.19 
1-3 years .207 .229 -.43 .85 
4-6 years -.011 .216 -.61 .59 
10+ years -.343 .336 -1.31 .62 
10+ years less than 1 year .755 .343 -.23 1.74 
1-3 years .550 .304 -.33 1.43 
4-6 years .332 .294 -.52 1.18 
7-9 years .343 .336 -.62 1.31 
8. The primary 
sector which 
national citizens 
would like to work 
in is: 
less than 1 year 1-3 years .212 .297 -.62 1.04 
4-6 years -.027 .277 -.80 .75 
7-9 years .239 .347 -.73 1.21 
10+ years 1.000 .436 -.25 2.25 
1-3 years less than 1 year -.212 .297 -1.04 .62 
4-6 years -.238 .191 -.77 .29 
7-9 years .028 .284 -.76 .82 
10+ years .788 .387 -.33 1.91 
4-6 years less than 1 year .027 .277 -.75 .80 
1-3 years .238 .191 -.29 .77 
7-9 years .266 .263 -.47 1.00 
10+ years 1.027 .372 -.05 2.10 
7-9 years less than 1 year -.239 .347 -1.21 .73 
1-3 years -.028 .284 -.82 .76 
4-6 years -.266 .263 -1.00 .47 
10+ years .761 .427 -.47 1.99 
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10+ years less than 1 year -1.000 .436 -2.25 .25 
1-3 years -.788 .387 -1.91 .33 
4-6 years -1.027 .372 -2.10 .05 
7-9 years -.761 .427 -1.99 .47 
9. Government 
analysts would 
rank the current 
threat level in oil 
and gas as 
follows: 
less than 1 year 1-3 years .107 .118 -.22 .43 
4-6 years .087 .106 -.21 .38 
7-9 years .340* .119 .01 .67 
10+ years .418 .156 -.03 .87 
1-3 years less than 1 year -.107 .118 -.43 .22 
4-6 years -.020 .081 -.24 .20 
7-9 years .233 .097 -.04 .50 
10+ years .312 .140 -.09 .72 
4-6 years less than 1 year -.087 .106 -.38 .21 
1-3 years .020 .081 -.20 .24 
7-9 years .253* .083 .02 .49 
10+ years .331 .131 -.05 .71 
7-9 years less than 1 year -.340* .119 -.67 -.01 
1-3 years -.233 .097 -.50 .04 
4-6 years -.253* .083 -.49 -.02 
10+ years .078 .142 -.33 .49 
10+ years less than 1 year -.418 .156 -.87 .03 
1-3 years -.312 .140 -.72 .09 
4-6 years -.331 .131 -.71 .05 
7-9 years -.078 .142 -.49 .33 
10. The 
government 
investment in oil 
and gas is based 
on the following 
objective: 
less than 1 year 1-3 years -.374 .213 -.97 .22 
4-6 years -.418 .200 -.98 .14 
7-9 years -.138 .246 -.83 .55 
10+ years -1.182* .306 -2.06 -.30 
1-3 years less than 1 year .374 .213 -.22 .97 
4-6 years -.044 .150 -.46 .37 
7-9 years .236 .207 -.34 .81 
10+ years -.808* .276 -1.60 -.01 
4-6 years less than 1 year .418 .200 -.14 .98 
1-3 years .044 .150 -.37 .46 
7-9 years .280 .193 -.26 .82 
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10+ years -.763 .266 -1.53 .00 
7-9 years less than 1 year .138 .246 -.55 .83 
1-3 years -.236 .207 -.81 .34 
4-6 years -.280 .193 -.82 .26 
10+ years -1.043* .301 -1.91 -.18 
10+ years less than 1 year 1.182* .306 .30 2.06 
1-3 years .808* .276 .01 1.60 
4-6 years .763 .266 .00 1.53 







the oil and gas 
industry 
less than 1 year 1-3 years .374* .113 .06 .69 
4-6 years .343* .106 .05 .64 
7-9 years .530* .133 .16 .90 
10+ years .382 .169 -.10 .87 
1-3 years less than 1 year -.374* .113 -.69 -.06 
4-6 years -.031 .074 -.24 .17 
7-9 years .156 .109 -.15 .46 
10+ years .008 .151 -.43 .44 
4-6 years less than 1 year -.343* .106 -.64 -.05 
1-3 years .031 .074 -.17 .24 
7-9 years .187 .102 -.10 .47 
10+ years .039 .146 -.38 .46 
7-9 years less than 1 year -.530* .133 -.90 -.16 
1-3 years -.156 .109 -.46 .15 
4-6 years -.187 .102 -.47 .10 
10+ years -.148 .167 -.63 .33 
10+ years less than 1 year -.382 .169 -.87 .10 
1-3 years -.008 .151 -.44 .43 
4-6 years -.039 .146 -.46 .38 




less than 1 year 1-3 years -.072 .108 -.37 .23 
4-6 years .124 .103 -.16 .41 
7-9 years .126 .121 -.21 .47 
10+ years -.091 .149 -.52 .34 
1-3 years less than 1 year .072 .108 -.23 .37 
4-6 years .196 .075 -.01 .40 
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7-9 years .198 .098 -.08 .47 
10+ years -.019 .131 -.40 .36 
4-6 years less than 1 year -.124 .103 -.41 .16 
1-3 years -.196 .075 -.40 .01 
7-9 years .002 .093 -.26 .26 
10+ years -.215 .127 -.58 .15 
7-9 years less than 1 year -.126 .121 -.47 .21 
1-3 years -.198 .098 -.47 .08 
4-6 years -.002 .093 -.26 .26 
10+ years -.217 .142 -.63 .19 
10+ years less than 1 year .091 .149 -.34 .52 
1-3 years .019 .131 -.36 .40 
4-6 years .215 .127 -.15 .58 




less than 1 year 1-3 years -.110 .133 -.48 .26 
4-6 years -.059 .129 -.42 .30 
7-9 years -.352 .139 -.74 .04 
10+ years -.091 .220 -.72 .54 
1-3 years less than 1 year .110 .133 -.26 .48 
4-6 years .051 .082 -.17 .28 
7-9 years -.242 .096 -.51 .03 
10+ years .019 .196 -.55 .59 
4-6 years less than 1 year .059 .129 -.30 .42 
1-3 years -.051 .082 -.28 .17 
7-9 years -.293* .091 -.55 -.04 
10+ years -.032 .193 -.59 .53 
7-9 years less than 1 year .352 .139 -.04 .74 
1-3 years .242 .096 -.03 .51 
4-6 years .293* .091 .04 .55 
10+ years .261 .200 -.32 .84 
10+ years less than 1 year .091 .220 -.54 .72 
1-3 years -.019 .196 -.59 .55 
4-6 years .032 .193 -.53 .59 
7-9 years -.261 .200 -.84 .32 





4-6 years -.271 .113 -.59 .05 
7-9 years -.437* .143 -.84 -.04 
10+ years -.345 .177 -.86 .16 
1-3 years less than 1 year .334* .118 .00 .66 
4-6 years .063 .077 -.15 .28 
7-9 years -.103 .116 -.43 .22 
10+ years -.012 .157 -.46 .44 
4-6 years less than 1 year .271 .113 -.05 .59 
1-3 years -.063 .077 -.28 .15 
7-9 years -.165 .111 -.48 .14 
10+ years -.074 .153 -.52 .37 
7-9 years less than 1 year .437* .143 .04 .84 
1-3 years .103 .116 -.22 .43 
4-6 years .165 .111 -.14 .48 
10+ years .091 .176 -.41 .60 
10+ years less than 1 year .345 .177 -.16 .86 
1-3 years .012 .157 -.44 .46 
4-6 years .074 .153 -.37 .52 
7-9 years -.091 .176 -.60 .41 
Strategic vision or 
agenda for 
national change 
less than 1 year 1-3 years -.243 .120 -.58 .09 
4-6 years -.094 .112 -.41 .22 
7-9 years -.259 .122 -.60 .08 
10+ years -.055 .165 -.53 .42 
1-3 years less than 1 year .243 .120 -.09 .58 
4-6 years .149 .079 -.07 .37 
7-9 years -.016 .092 -.27 .24 
10+ years .188 .145 -.23 .61 
4-6 years less than 1 year .094 .112 -.22 .41 
1-3 years -.149 .079 -.37 .07 
7-9 years -.165 .081 -.39 .06 
10+ years .040 .138 -.36 .44 
7-9 years less than 1 year .259 .122 -.08 .60 
1-3 years .016 .092 -.24 .27 
4-6 years .165 .081 -.06 .39 
10+ years .204 .146 -.22 .63 
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10+ years less than 1 year .055 .165 -.42 .53 
1-3 years -.188 .145 -.61 .23 
4-6 years -.040 .138 -.44 .36 
7-9 years -.204 .146 -.63 .22 
Industry rules and 
regulations 
less than 1 year 1-3 years -.171 .095 -.43 .09 
4-6 years -.267* .084 -.50 -.03 
7-9 years -.320 .115 -.64 .00 
10+ years -.264 .148 -.69 .16 
1-3 years less than 1 year .171 .095 -.09 .43 
4-6 years -.096 .077 -.31 .12 
7-9 years -.149 .111 -.46 .16 
10+ years -.092 .144 -.51 .32 
4-6 years less than 1 year .267* .084 .03 .50 
1-3 years .096 .077 -.12 .31 
7-9 years -.053 .101 -.34 .23 
10+ years .003 .138 -.39 .40 
7-9 years less than 1 year .320 .115 .00 .64 
1-3 years .149 .111 -.16 .46 
4-6 years .053 .101 -.23 .34 
10+ years .057 .159 -.40 .51 
10+ years less than 1 year .264 .148 -.16 .69 
1-3 years .092 .144 -.32 .51 
4-6 years -.003 .138 -.40 .39 




less than 1 year 1-3 years .051 .123 -.29 .40 
4-6 years -.056 .114 -.38 .26 
7-9 years -.045 .125 -.40 .30 
10+ years -.345 .257 -1.09 .40 
1-3 years less than 1 year -.051 .123 -.40 .29 
4-6 years -.107 .086 -.34 .13 
7-9 years -.096 .099 -.37 .18 
10+ years -.396 .246 -1.11 .31 
4-6 years less than 1 year .056 .114 -.26 .38 
1-3 years .107 .086 -.13 .34 
7-9 years .011 .088 -.23 .26 
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10+ years -.289 .241 -.99 .41 
7-9 years less than 1 year .045 .125 -.30 .40 
1-3 years .096 .099 -.18 .37 
4-6 years -.011 .088 -.26 .23 
10+ years -.300 .246 -1.01 .41 
10+ years less than 1 year .345 .257 -.40 1.09 
1-3 years .396 .246 -.31 1.11 
4-6 years .289 .241 -.41 .99 




less than 1 year 1-3 years -.210 .102 -.49 .07 
4-6 years .018 .090 -.23 .27 
7-9 years .006 .113 -.31 .32 
10+ years -.264 .146 -.68 .16 
1-3 years less than 1 year .210 .102 -.07 .49 
4-6 years .228* .081 .01 .45 
7-9 years .216 .106 -.08 .51 
10+ years -.054 .140 -.46 .35 
4-6 years less than 1 year -.018 .090 -.27 .23 
1-3 years -.228* .081 -.45 -.01 
7-9 years -.012 .094 -.27 .25 
10+ years -.282 .131 -.66 .10 
7-9 years less than 1 year -.006 .113 -.32 .31 
1-3 years -.216 .106 -.51 .08 
4-6 years .012 .094 -.25 .27 
10+ years -.270 .148 -.70 .16 
10+ years less than 1 year .264 .146 -.16 .68 
1-3 years .054 .140 -.35 .46 
4-6 years .282 .131 -.10 .66 
7-9 years .270 .148 -.16 .70 
Foreign interests 
and investments 
less than 1 year 1-3 years -.199 .137 -.58 .18 
4-6 years -.088 .127 -.44 .27 
7-9 years .042 .149 -.38 .46 
10+ years -.345 .185 -.88 .19 
1-3 years less than 1 year .199 .137 -.18 .58 
4-6 years .111 .091 -.14 .36 
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7-9 years .241 .120 -.09 .58 
10+ years -.146 .163 -.62 .32 
4-6 years less than 1 year .088 .127 -.27 .44 
1-3 years -.111 .091 -.36 .14 
7-9 years .130 .108 -.17 .43 
10+ years -.257 .154 -.70 .19 
7-9 years less than 1 year -.042 .149 -.46 .38 
1-3 years -.241 .120 -.58 .09 
4-6 years -.130 .108 -.43 .17 
10+ years -.387 .173 -.88 .11 
10+ years less than 1 year .345 .185 -.19 .88 
1-3 years .146 .163 -.32 .62 
4-6 years .257 .154 -.19 .70 
7-9 years .387 .173 -.11 .88 
Defaults and risks 
in bank 
performance 
less than 1 year 1-3 years .028 .100 -.25 .31 
4-6 years .058 .091 -.19 .31 
7-9 years .160 .111 -.15 .47 
10+ years .082 .187 -.46 .62 
1-3 years less than 1 year -.028 .100 -.31 .25 
4-6 years .030 .078 -.18 .24 
7-9 years .132 .101 -.15 .41 
10+ years .054 .181 -.47 .58 
4-6 years less than 1 year -.058 .091 -.31 .19 
1-3 years -.030 .078 -.24 .18 
7-9 years .102 .091 -.15 .36 
10+ years .024 .176 -.49 .53 
7-9 years less than 1 year -.160 .111 -.47 .15 
1-3 years -.132 .101 -.41 .15 
4-6 years -.102 .091 -.36 .15 
10+ years -.078 .188 -.62 .46 
10+ years less than 1 year -.082 .187 -.62 .46 
1-3 years -.054 .181 -.58 .47 
4-6 years -.024 .176 -.53 .49 
7-9 years .078 .188 -.46 .62 






and gas industry 
prices 
4-6 years -.121 .122 -.46 .22 
7-9 years -.263 .144 -.67 .14 
10+ years .355 .164 -.12 .83 
1-3 years less than 1 year .065 .128 -.29 .42 
4-6 years -.056 .087 -.30 .18 
7-9 years -.198 .116 -.52 .13 
10+ years .419* .141 .02 .82 
4-6 years less than 1 year .121 .122 -.22 .46 
1-3 years .056 .087 -.18 .30 
7-9 years -.142 .109 -.45 .16 
10+ years .475* .135 .09 .86 
7-9 years less than 1 year .263 .144 -.14 .67 
1-3 years .198 .116 -.13 .52 
4-6 years .142 .109 -.16 .45 
10+ years .617* .155 .17 1.06 
10+ years less than 1 year -.355 .164 -.83 .12 
1-3 years -.419* .141 -.82 -.02 
4-6 years -.475* .135 -.86 -.09 
7-9 years -.617* .155 -1.06 -.17 
Demand for loans 
and innovative 
financing products 
less than 1 year 1-3 years -.430* .130 -.79 -.07 
4-6 years -.325* .116 -.65 .00 
7-9 years -.350 .150 -.77 .07 
10+ years .155 .191 -.40 .71 
1-3 years less than 1 year .430* .130 .07 .79 
4-6 years .105 .097 -.16 .37 
7-9 years .080 .136 -.30 .46 
10+ years .585* .181 .06 1.10 
4-6 years less than 1 year .325* .116 .00 .65 
1-3 years -.105 .097 -.37 .16 
7-9 years -.025 .123 -.37 .32 
10+ years .480 .171 -.01 .97 
7-9 years less than 1 year .350 .150 -.07 .77 
1-3 years -.080 .136 -.46 .30 
4-6 years .025 .123 -.32 .37 
10+ years .504 .196 -.06 1.07 
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10+ years less than 1 year -.155 .191 -.71 .40 
1-3 years -.585* .181 -1.10 -.06 
4-6 years -.480 .171 -.97 .01 





less than 1 year 1-3 years -.196 .131 -.56 .17 
4-6 years -.542* .124 -.89 -.19 
7-9 years -.055 .138 -.44 .33 
10+ years -.973* .184 -1.50 -.44 
1-3 years less than 1 year .196 .131 -.17 .56 
4-6 years -.346* .084 -.58 -.12 
7-9 years .140 .104 -.15 .43 
10+ years -.777* .160 -1.24 -.32 
4-6 years less than 1 year .542* .124 .19 .89 
1-3 years .346* .084 .12 .58 
7-9 years .486* .094 .22 .75 
10+ years -.431 .154 -.88 .01 
7-9 years less than 1 year .055 .138 -.33 .44 
1-3 years -.140 .104 -.43 .15 
4-6 years -.486* .094 -.75 -.22 
10+ years -.917* .165 -1.39 -.44 
10+ years less than 1 year .973* .184 .44 1.50 
1-3 years .777* .160 .32 1.24 
4-6 years .431 .154 -.01 .88 




less than 1 year 1-3 years .126 .117 -.20 .45 
4-6 years .130 .108 -.17 .43 
7-9 years .123 .150 -.30 .54 
10+ years .118 .210 -.49 .72 
1-3 years less than 1 year -.126 .117 -.45 .20 
4-6 years .004 .083 -.22 .23 
7-9 years -.003 .133 -.37 .37 
10+ years -.008 .198 -.58 .56 
4-6 years less than 1 year -.130 .108 -.43 .17 
1-3 years -.004 .083 -.23 .22 
7-9 years -.007 .126 -.36 .34 
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10+ years -.012 .193 -.57 .55 
7-9 years less than 1 year -.123 .150 -.54 .30 
1-3 years .003 .133 -.37 .37 
4-6 years .007 .126 -.34 .36 
10+ years -.004 .219 -.64 .63 
10+ years less than 1 year -.118 .210 -.72 .49 
1-3 years .008 .198 -.56 .58 
4-6 years .012 .193 -.55 .57 




less than 1 year 1-3 years -.320* .098 -.59 -.05 
4-6 years -.046 .087 -.29 .20 
7-9 years -.324 .121 -.66 .01 
10+ years -.455 .199 -1.03 .12 
1-3 years less than 1 year .320* .098 .05 .59 
4-6 years .274* .083 .05 .50 
7-9 years -.004 .118 -.33 .32 
10+ years -.135 .197 -.71 .44 
4-6 years less than 1 year .046 .087 -.20 .29 
1-3 years -.274* .083 -.50 -.05 
7-9 years -.278 .108 -.58 .02 
10+ years -.409 .192 -.96 .15 
7-9 years less than 1 year .324 .121 -.01 .66 
1-3 years .004 .118 -.32 .33 
4-6 years .278 .108 -.02 .58 
10+ years -.130 .209 -.73 .47 
10+ years less than 1 year .455 .199 -.12 1.03 
1-3 years .135 .197 -.44 .71 
4-6 years .409 .192 -.15 .96 




less than 1 year 1-3 years -.068 .113 -.38 .25 
4-6 years -.012 .101 -.30 .27 
7-9 years -.253 .152 -.68 .17 
10+ years .082 .157 -.37 .53 
1-3 years less than 1 year .068 .113 -.25 .38 
4-6 years .056 .086 -.18 .29 
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7-9 years -.185 .142 -.58 .21 
10+ years .150 .148 -.27 .57 
4-6 years less than 1 year .012 .101 -.27 .30 
1-3 years -.056 .086 -.29 .18 
7-9 years -.241 .132 -.61 .13 
10+ years .094 .139 -.31 .49 
7-9 years less than 1 year .253 .152 -.17 .68 
1-3 years .185 .142 -.21 .58 
4-6 years .241 .132 -.13 .61 
10+ years .335 .179 -.18 .85 
10+ years less than 1 year -.082 .157 -.53 .37 
1-3 years -.150 .148 -.57 .27 
4-6 years -.094 .139 -.49 .31 
7-9 years -.335 .179 -.85 .18 
Infrastructure and 
system 
less than 1 year 1-3 years -.051 .132 -.42 .32 
4-6 years -.008 .127 -.36 .35 
7-9 years -.042 .153 -.47 .39 
10+ years -.055 .192 -.61 .50 
1-3 years less than 1 year .051 .132 -.32 .42 
4-6 years .042 .085 -.19 .28 
7-9 years .009 .120 -.33 .34 
10+ years -.004 .168 -.49 .48 
4-6 years less than 1 year .008 .127 -.35 .36 
1-3 years -.042 .085 -.28 .19 
7-9 years -.033 .114 -.35 .29 
10+ years -.046 .163 -.52 .43 
7-9 years less than 1 year .042 .153 -.39 .47 
1-3 years -.009 .120 -.34 .33 
4-6 years .033 .114 -.29 .35 
10+ years -.013 .184 -.54 .52 
10+ years less than 1 year .055 .192 -.50 .61 
1-3 years .004 .168 -.48 .49 
4-6 years .046 .163 -.43 .52 
7-9 years .013 .184 -.52 .54 





4-6 years -.008 .090 -.26 .24 
7-9 years -.259 .131 -.62 .11 
10+ years -.155 .160 -.62 .31 
1-3 years less than 1 year -.065 .103 -.35 .22 
4-6 years -.073 .079 -.29 .14 
7-9 years -.324 .123 -.67 .02 
10+ years -.219 .154 -.66 .22 
4-6 years less than 1 year .008 .090 -.24 .26 
1-3 years .073 .079 -.14 .29 
7-9 years -.251 .113 -.57 .06 
10+ years -.146 .146 -.57 .27 
7-9 years less than 1 year .259 .131 -.11 .62 
1-3 years .324 .123 -.02 .67 
4-6 years .251 .113 -.06 .57 
10+ years .104 .173 -.39 .60 
10+ years less than 1 year .155 .160 -.31 .62 
1-3 years .219 .154 -.22 .66 
4-6 years .146 .146 -.27 .57 
7-9 years -.104 .173 -.60 .39 
International 
competitive forces 
less than 1 year 1-3 years .194 .102 -.09 .48 
4-6 years .029 .090 -.22 .28 
7-9 years -.038 .115 -.36 .29 
10+ years .036 .151 -.40 .47 
1-3 years less than 1 year -.194 .102 -.48 .09 
4-6 years -.165 .080 -.39 .06 
7-9 years -.232 .107 -.53 .07 
10+ years -.158 .146 -.58 .26 
4-6 years less than 1 year -.029 .090 -.28 .22 
1-3 years .165 .080 -.06 .39 
7-9 years -.066 .097 -.34 .20 
10+ years .008 .138 -.39 .41 
7-9 years less than 1 year .038 .115 -.29 .36 
1-3 years .232 .107 -.07 .53 
4-6 years .066 .097 -.20 .34 
10+ years .074 .155 -.37 .52 
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10+ years less than 1 year -.036 .151 -.47 .40 
1-3 years .158 .146 -.26 .58 
4-6 years -.008 .138 -.41 .39 




less than 1 year 1-3 years -.304 .111 -.61 .00 
4-6 years -.184 .098 -.46 .09 
7-9 years -.445* .140 -.84 -.05 
10+ years -.227 .186 -.76 .31 
1-3 years less than 1 year .304 .111 .00 .61 
4-6 years .120 .090 -.13 .37 
7-9 years -.140 .135 -.52 .24 
10+ years .077 .182 -.45 .60 
4-6 years less than 1 year .184 .098 -.09 .46 
1-3 years -.120 .090 -.37 .13 
7-9 years -.260 .124 -.61 .09 
10+ years -.043 .174 -.55 .46 
7-9 years less than 1 year .445* .140 .05 .84 
1-3 years .140 .135 -.24 .52 
4-6 years .260 .124 -.09 .61 
10+ years .217 .201 -.36 .79 
10+ years less than 1 year .227 .186 -.31 .76 
1-3 years -.077 .182 -.60 .45 
4-6 years .043 .174 -.46 .55 
7-9 years -.217 .201 -.79 .36 
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Square F Sig. 
Section 2. 1. The 
banking industry is 
stable and diversified. 
Between Groups 14.967 4 3.742 3.377 .010 
Within Groups 659.193 595 1.108 
  
Total 674.160 599 
   
2. Current interest 
rates are competitive 
and in demand. 
Between Groups 11.197 4 2.799 1.892 .110 
Within Groups 880.268 595 1.479 
  
Total 891.465 599 
   
3. Central bank 
interventions have 
improved our lending 
strategies. 
Between Groups 8.378 4 2.094 4.716 .001 




   
4. We invest a high 
percentage of our 
funds in private 
sector enterprises. 
Between Groups 21.647 4 5.412 5.236 .000 




   
5. Most deposits are 
tied to oil and gas 
rents. 
Between Groups 37.071 4 9.268 6.357 .000 
Within Groups 867.429 595 1.458 
  
Total 904.500 599 
   
6. Our vision is 
global. and this 
Between Groups 26.422 4 6.605 4.075 .003 








   
7. Our default rates 
are anticipated and 
appropriate. 
Between Groups 12.148 4 3.037 1.946 .101 
Within Groups 928.352 595 1.560 
  
Total 940.500 599 
   
8. The financial 
instruments we use 
are market sensitive 
and vulnerable to 
risks. 
Between Groups 15.645 4 3.911 2.913 .021 




   
9. We anticipate that 
the oil and gas 
market will recover in 
price and volume. 
Between Groups 11.219 4 2.805 1.889 .111 




   
10. Most citizens do 
not plan financially for 
long-term market 
shocks. 
Between Groups 8.051 4 2.013 1.296 .270 




   
11. Government 
subsidies allow us to 
loan more freely to 
the private sector. 
Between Groups 5.997 4 1.499 2.866 .023 




   





Between Groups 28.896 4 7.224 8.241 .000 




   
13. There is an 
inadequate 
population of skilled 
entrepreneurs in our 
national population. 
Between Groups 4.429 4 1.107 .824 .510 




   
14. Banks are 
essential to the 
Between Groups 7.327 4 1.832 2.886 .022 





and therefore must 
be protected during 
periods of financial 
duress and decline. 
Total 
384.960 599 
   
15. The financial 
market is mature and 
competitive. 
Between Groups .621 4 .155 .220 .927 
Within Groups 420.039 595 .706 
  
Total 420.660 599 
   
Section 3. 1. Global 
pressures on the oil 




Between Groups 12.357 4 3.089 2.762 .027 




   
2. The variability of 
commodity pricing 
creates highly 
impactful risks for our 
nation. 
Between Groups 9.396 4 2.349 2.532 .039 




   
3. Even if we 
diversified our 
industries. we would 
need decades to 
allow them to mature. 
Between Groups 7.413 4 1.853 1.411 .229 




   
4. Strategic 
partnerships and FDI 
allow rapid exchange 
of knowledge and 
technology and 
should be supported. 
Between Groups 11.473 4 2.868 2.802 .025 




   
5. Our bank is 
vulnerable to 
systemic risks. 
Between Groups 6.687 4 1.672 1.831 .121 
Within Groups 543.378 595 .913 
  
Total 550.065 599 
   
6. Without 
government support. 
Between Groups 3.073 4 .768 .821 .512 




our bank would likely 




   
7. Liquidity levels are 
at an all-time low. 
Between Groups 18.429 4 4.607 3.977 .003 
Within Groups 689.196 595 1.158 
  
Total 707.625 599 
   
8. When oil prices 
decline. we are less 
likely to lend money 
to private enterprises. 
Between Groups 9.407 4 2.352 2.511 .041 




   
9. Citizens are more 
likely to withhold 
savings and 
investments when oil 
prices fluctuate or 
decline. 
Between Groups 7.435 4 1.859 1.849 .118 




   
10. Investing in 
diversification offers a 
layer of stability that 
we desperately need 
at this time. 
Between Groups 5.667 4 1.417 1.488 .204 




   
11. Intra-bank loans 
create a dangerous 
cycle of risk and 
vulnerability. 
Between Groups 39.266 4 9.817 9.242 .000 




   
12. The increase in 
lending rates is a 
positive step towards 
industry maturity. 
Between Groups 5.200 4 1.300 1.233 .296 




   
13. Most of our 
internal investment 
strategies are based 
on oil and gas 
exploitation. 
Between Groups 15.637 4 3.909 3.831 .004 




   
14. Countries have 
national industries 
Between Groups 4.866 4 1.217 1.243 .292 




and products: Ours 




   
15. The gap between 
the citizen and 
expatriate population 
in our nation is 
worrying. 
Between Groups 16.875 4 4.219 4.951 .001 




   
16. New companies 
are a liability; we 
would prefer to invest 
in tested models. 
Between Groups 3.319 4 .830 .819 .513 




   
17. Most small 
businesses are likely 
to fail if given enough 
time. 
Between Groups 13.902 4 3.475 4.530 .001 




   
18. Our banks should 
invest more heavily in 
business 
development and 
growth to increase 
industry performance. 
Between Groups 10.602 4 2.651 2.416 .048 




   
19. Without sufficient 
oil and gas liquidity. 
we cannot fund 
additional 
development. 
Between Groups 3.734 4 .933 .766 .548 




   
20. The domestic 
financial markets are 
unstable and high 
risk. 
Between Groups 20.847 4 5.212 6.138 .000 




   
Section 4. 1. Our 
government has a 
long-term vision that 
does not rely on oil 
and gas for 
development. 
Between Groups 10.042 4 2.510 2.056 .085 
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2. The primary 




Between Groups 34.533 4 8.633 2.734 .028 




   
3. The primary result 
of a government 
bailout in our nation 
is: 
Between Groups 41.715 4 10.429 3.279 .011 




   
4. Government 
investment in oil and 
gas is a necessary 
and sustainable 
commitment. 
Between Groups 2.704 4 .676 .397 .811 




   
5. The government’s 
role in stabilising the 
domestic economy is: 
Between Groups 9.795 4 2.449 3.958 .004 
Within Groups 368.145 595 .619 
  
Total 377.940 599 
   
6. Our dependence 
on a single export 
makes our country 
look: 
Between Groups 1.297 4 .324 1.967 .098 




   
7. The primary factor 
restricting the number 
of national citizens in 
private sector 
employment is: 
Between Groups 11.928 4 2.982 1.113 .349 




   
8. The primary sector 
which national 
citizens would like to 
work in is: 
Between Groups 30.335 4 7.584 2.046 .086 




   
9. Government 
analysts would rank 
the current threat 
level in oil and gas as 
follows: 
Between Groups 7.496 4 1.874 3.252 .012 




   
Between Groups 16.539 4 4.135 1.844 .119 
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10. The government 
investment in oil and 
gas is based on the 
following objective: 









Price performance of 
the oil and gas 
industry 
Between Groups 6.320 4 1.580 2.747 .028 








Between Groups 6.697 4 1.674 2.969 .019 
Within Groups 335.543 595 .564 
  
Total 342.240 599 




Between Groups 10.433 4 2.608 3.630 .006 
Within Groups 427.507 595 .718 
  
Total 437.940 599 
   
Diversification of 
industries 
Between Groups 9.681 4 2.420 3.788 .005 
Within Groups 380.184 595 .639 
  
Total 389.865 599 
   
Strategic vision or 
agenda for national 
change 
Between Groups 3.221 4 .805 1.388 .237 
Within Groups 345.244 595 .580 
  
Total 348.465 599 
   
Industry rules and 
regulations 
Between Groups 5.495 4 1.374 2.501 .042 
Within Groups 326.890 595 .549 
  
Total 332.385 599 




Between Groups 8.568 4 2.142 2.968 .019 
Within Groups 429.372 595 .722 
  
Total 437.940 599 




Between Groups 7.233 4 1.808 3.174 .013 
Within Groups 338.952 595 .570 
  
Total 346.185 599 
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Foreign interests and 
investments 
Between Groups 31.315 4 7.829 10.574 .000 
Within Groups 440.525 595 .740 
  
Total 471.840 599 
   
Defaults and risks in 
bank performance 
Between Groups 8.857 4 2.214 3.995 .003 
Within Groups 329.768 595 .554 
  
Total 338.625 599 
   
Impact their 
organisational 
performance: Oil and 
gas industry prices 
Between Groups 4.816 4 1.204 1.591 .175 




   
Demand for loans 
and innovative 
financing products 
Between Groups 22.265 4 5.566 6.568 .000 
Within Groups 504.235 595 .847 
  
Total 526.500 599 




Between Groups 9.893 4 2.473 3.354 .010 
Within Groups 438.772 595 .737 
  
Total 448.665 599 
   
Liquidity guidelines 
and standards 
Between Groups 8.797 4 2.199 3.101 .015 
Within Groups 421.988 595 .709 
  
Total 430.785 599 
   
Auditing and 
governance oversight 
Between Groups 6.566 4 1.641 2.448 .045 
Within Groups 398.974 595 .671 
  
Total 405.540 599 




Between Groups 7.235 4 1.809 2.544 .039 
Within Groups 423.025 595 .711 
  
Total 430.260 599 
   
Infrastructure and 
system 
Between Groups 2.409 4 .602 .795 .529 
Within Groups 450.651 595 .757 
  
Total 453.060 599 
   
Domestic competitive 
forces 
Between Groups 8.355 4 2.089 3.627 .006 




Total 351.060 599 
   
International 
competitive forces 
Between Groups 2.392 4 .598 1.031 .391 
Within Groups 345.233 595 .580 
  
Total 347.625 599 
   
Foreign investment 
and development 
Between Groups 7.838 4 1.960 2.602 .035 
Within Groups 448.162 595 .753 
  
Total 456.000 599 
   
 
 
Post Hoc Tests 
Multiple Comparisons 
Dunnett C  
Dependent 
Variable 
(I) average loan 
default 
percentage at the 
current 
organisation 
(J) average loan 
default 














Section 2. 1. The 
banking industry 
is stable and 
diversified. 
less than 1% 1-4% .696* .179 .18 1.21 
5-8% .569* .169 .09 1.05 
9-12% .655* .166 .18 1.13 
12%+ .450 .221 -.18 1.08 
1-4% less than 1% -.696* .179 -1.21 -.18 
5-8% -.126 .123 -.47 .21 
9-12% -.040 .120 -.37 .29 
12%+ -.246 .189 -.77 .28 
5-8% less than 1% -.569* .169 -1.05 -.09 
1-4% .126 .123 -.21 .47 
9-12% .086 .103 -.20 .37 
12%+ -.119 .179 -.62 .38 
9-12% less than 1% -.655* .166 -1.13 -.18 
1-4% .040 .120 -.29 .37 
5-8% -.086 .103 -.37 .20 
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12%+ -.205 .176 -.70 .29 
12%+ less than 1% -.450 .221 -1.08 .18 
1-4% .246 .189 -.28 .77 
5-8% .119 .179 -.38 .62 
9-12% .205 .176 -.29 .70 
2. Current interest 
rates are 
competitive and in 
demand. 
less than 1% 1-4% .449 .237 -.23 1.13 
5-8% .295 .227 -.36 .95 
9-12% .163 .230 -.50 .82 
12%+ .068 .264 -.69 .82 
1-4% less than 1% -.449 .237 -1.13 .23 
5-8% -.154 .137 -.53 .23 
9-12% -.286 .143 -.68 .11 
12%+ -.380 .193 -.92 .16 
5-8% less than 1% -.295 .227 -.95 .36 
1-4% .154 .137 -.23 .53 
9-12% -.132 .124 -.47 .21 
12%+ -.227 .179 -.73 .28 
9-12% less than 1% -.163 .230 -.82 .50 
1-4% .286 .143 -.11 .68 
5-8% .132 .124 -.21 .47 
12%+ -.095 .184 -.61 .42 
12%+ less than 1% -.068 .264 -.82 .69 
1-4% .380 .193 -.16 .92 
5-8% .227 .179 -.28 .73 
9-12% .095 .184 -.42 .61 




less than 1% 1-4% .468 .180 -.05 .99 
5-8% .227 .176 -.28 .73 
9-12% .273 .177 -.24 .78 
12%+ .373 .189 -.17 .91 
1-4% less than 1% -.468 .180 -.99 .05 
5-8% -.242* .073 -.44 -.04 
9-12% -.196 .076 -.41 .01 
12%+ -.096 .100 -.38 .18 
5-8% less than 1% -.227 .176 -.73 .28 
1-4% .242* .073 .04 .44 
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9-12% .046 .066 -.14 .23 
12%+ .146 .093 -.11 .41 
9-12% less than 1% -.273 .177 -.78 .24 
1-4% .196 .076 -.01 .41 
5-8% -.046 .066 -.23 .14 
12%+ .100 .095 -.17 .37 
12%+ less than 1% -.373 .189 -.91 .17 
1-4% .096 .100 -.18 .38 
5-8% -.146 .093 -.41 .11 
9-12% -.100 .095 -.37 .17 
4. We invest a 
high percentage 
of our funds in 
private sector 
enterprises. 
less than 1% 1-4% .626 .236 -.05 1.31 
5-8% .663* .227 .01 1.32 
9-12% .426 .233 -.24 1.10 
12%+ .209 .271 -.57 .99 
1-4% less than 1% -.626 .236 -1.31 .05 
5-8% .036 .107 -.26 .33 
9-12% -.200 .119 -.53 .13 
12%+ -.417 .183 -.93 .09 
5-8% less than 1% -.663* .227 -1.32 -.01 
1-4% -.036 .107 -.33 .26 
9-12% -.237 .099 -.51 .04 
12%+ -.454 .171 -.93 .03 
9-12% less than 1% -.426 .233 -1.10 .24 
1-4% .200 .119 -.13 .53 
5-8% .237 .099 -.04 .51 
12%+ -.217 .178 -.72 .28 
12%+ less than 1% -.209 .271 -.99 .57 
1-4% .417 .183 -.09 .93 
5-8% .454 .171 -.03 .93 
9-12% .217 .178 -.28 .72 
5. Most deposits 
are tied to oil and 
gas rents. 
less than 1% 1-4% .976* .204 .39 1.56 
5-8% .501 .196 -.06 1.06 
9-12% .627* .197 .06 1.19 
12%+ .355 .225 -.29 1.00 
1-4% less than 1% -.976* .204 -1.56 -.39 
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5-8% -.476* .138 -.86 -.09 
9-12% -.349 .141 -.74 .04 
12%+ -.622* .178 -1.12 -.13 
5-8% less than 1% -.501 .196 -1.06 .06 
1-4% .476* .138 .09 .86 
9-12% .126 .127 -.22 .48 
12%+ -.146 .167 -.61 .32 
9-12% less than 1% -.627* .197 -1.19 -.06 
1-4% .349 .141 -.04 .74 
5-8% -.126 .127 -.48 .22 
12%+ -.272 .169 -.75 .20 
12%+ less than 1% -.355 .225 -1.00 .29 
1-4% .622* .178 .13 1.12 
5-8% .146 .167 -.32 .61 
9-12% .272 .169 -.20 .75 
6. Our vision is 
global. and this 
requires 
diversification. 
less than 1% 1-4% .144 .215 -.47 .76 
5-8% .080 .203 -.50 .66 
9-12% .129 .203 -.45 .71 
12%+ -.582 .260 -1.32 .16 
1-4% less than 1% -.144 .215 -.76 .47 
5-8% -.065 .146 -.47 .34 
9-12% -.016 .146 -.42 .39 
12%+ -.726* .218 -1.34 -.12 
5-8% less than 1% -.080 .203 -.66 .50 
1-4% .065 .146 -.34 .47 
9-12% .049 .128 -.31 .40 
12%+ -.662* .207 -1.24 -.08 
9-12% less than 1% -.129 .203 -.71 .45 
1-4% .016 .146 -.39 .42 
5-8% -.049 .128 -.40 .31 
12%+ -.710* .207 -1.29 -.13 
12%+ less than 1% .582 .260 -.16 1.32 
1-4% .726* .218 .12 1.34 
5-8% .662* .207 .08 1.24 
9-12% .710* .207 .13 1.29 
  
527 




less than 1% 1-4% .368 .245 -.33 1.07 
5-8% .224 .236 -.45 .90 
9-12% .472 .236 -.20 1.15 
12%+ .105 .274 -.68 .89 
1-4% less than 1% -.368 .245 -1.07 .33 
5-8% -.144 .143 -.54 .25 
9-12% .104 .143 -.29 .50 
12%+ -.263 .200 -.82 .30 
5-8% less than 1% -.224 .236 -.90 .45 
1-4% .144 .143 -.25 .54 
9-12% .248 .127 -.10 .60 
12%+ -.119 .189 -.65 .41 
9-12% less than 1% -.472 .236 -1.15 .20 
1-4% -.104 .143 -.50 .29 
5-8% -.248 .127 -.60 .10 
12%+ -.367 .189 -.90 .16 
12%+ less than 1% -.105 .274 -.89 .68 
1-4% .263 .200 -.30 .82 
5-8% .119 .189 -.41 .65 
9-12% .367 .189 -.16 .90 
8. The financial 
instruments we 




less than 1% 1-4% .431 .230 -.23 1.09 
5-8% .248 .221 -.39 .88 
9-12% .219 .223 -.42 .86 
12%+ -.141 .255 -.87 .59 
1-4% less than 1% -.431 .230 -1.09 .23 
5-8% -.183 .131 -.54 .18 
9-12% -.211 .133 -.58 .16 
12%+ -.572* .182 -1.08 -.06 
5-8% less than 1% -.248 .221 -.88 .39 
1-4% .183 .131 -.18 .54 
9-12% -.028 .119 -.36 .30 
12%+ -.388 .172 -.87 .09 
9-12% less than 1% -.219 .223 -.86 .42 
1-4% .211 .133 -.16 .58 
5-8% .028 .119 -.30 .36 
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12%+ -.360 .174 -.85 .13 
12%+ less than 1% .141 .255 -.59 .87 
1-4% .572* .182 .06 1.08 
5-8% .388 .172 -.09 .87 
9-12% .360 .174 -.13 .85 
9. We anticipate 
that the oil and 
gas market will 
recover in price 
and volume. 
less than 1% 1-4% .004 .285 -.82 .82 
5-8% -.109 .281 -.92 .70 
9-12% .005 .279 -.80 .81 
12%+ -.459 .311 -1.35 .43 
1-4% less than 1% -.004 .285 -.82 .82 
5-8% -.113 .137 -.49 .26 
9-12% .001 .133 -.37 .37 
12%+ -.463 .192 -1.00 .08 
5-8% less than 1% .109 .281 -.70 .92 
1-4% .113 .137 -.26 .49 
9-12% .114 .122 -.22 .45 
12%+ -.350 .185 -.87 .17 
9-12% less than 1% -.005 .279 -.81 .80 
1-4% -.001 .133 -.37 .37 
5-8% -.114 .122 -.45 .22 
12%+ -.464 .182 -.97 .05 
12%+ less than 1% .459 .311 -.43 1.35 
1-4% .463 .192 -.08 1.00 
5-8% .350 .185 -.17 .87 
9-12% .464 .182 -.05 .97 
10. Most citizens 




less than 1% 1-4% .435 .263 -.32 1.19 
5-8% .308 .254 -.42 1.04 
9-12% .259 .256 -.48 .99 
12%+ .100 .284 -.71 .91 
1-4% less than 1% -.435 .263 -1.19 .32 
5-8% -.127 .141 -.52 .26 
9-12% -.176 .145 -.58 .22 
12%+ -.335 .189 -.86 .19 
5-8% less than 1% -.308 .254 -1.04 .42 
1-4% .127 .141 -.26 .52 
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9-12% -.049 .128 -.40 .30 
12%+ -.208 .177 -.70 .29 
9-12% less than 1% -.259 .256 -.99 .48 
1-4% .176 .145 -.22 .58 
5-8% .049 .128 -.30 .40 
12%+ -.159 .180 -.66 .34 
12%+ less than 1% -.100 .284 -.91 .71 
1-4% .335 .189 -.19 .86 
5-8% .208 .177 -.29 .70 
9-12% .159 .180 -.34 .66 
11. Government 
subsidies allow us 
to loan more 
freely to the 
private sector. 
less than 1% 1-4% .389 .198 -.18 .96 
5-8% .193 .196 -.37 .76 
9-12% .196 .199 -.38 .77 
12%+ .305 .204 -.28 .89 
1-4% less than 1% -.389 .198 -.96 .18 
5-8% -.196 .074 -.40 .01 
9-12% -.193 .081 -.42 .03 
12%+ -.085 .092 -.34 .17 
5-8% less than 1% -.193 .196 -.76 .37 
1-4% .196 .074 -.01 .40 
9-12% .003 .077 -.21 .21 
12%+ .112 .089 -.14 .36 
9-12% less than 1% -.196 .199 -.77 .38 
1-4% .193 .081 -.03 .42 
5-8% -.003 .077 -.21 .21 
12%+ .109 .095 -.16 .37 
12%+ less than 1% -.305 .204 -.89 .28 
1-4% .085 .092 -.17 .34 
5-8% -.112 .089 -.36 .14 
9-12% -.109 .095 -.37 .16 




less than 1% 1-4% .621* .140 .22 1.02 
5-8% .580* .130 .21 .95 
9-12% .652* .126 .29 1.01 
12%+ .023 .164 -.44 .49 





5-8% -.040 .113 -.35 .27 
9-12% .031 .108 -.27 .33 
12%+ -.598* .151 -1.02 -.18 
5-8% less than 1% -.580* .130 -.95 -.21 
1-4% .040 .113 -.27 .35 
9-12% .072 .095 -.19 .33 
12%+ -.558* .142 -.95 -.16 
9-12% less than 1% -.652* .126 -1.01 -.29 
1-4% -.031 .108 -.33 .27 
5-8% -.072 .095 -.33 .19 
12%+ -.629* .138 -1.02 -.24 
12%+ less than 1% -.023 .164 -.49 .44 
1-4% .598* .151 .18 1.02 
5-8% .558* .142 .16 .95 
9-12% .629* .138 .24 1.02 







less than 1% 1-4% .338 .226 -.31 .98 
5-8% .242 .216 -.38 .86 
9-12% .359 .220 -.27 .99 
12%+ .323 .251 -.40 1.04 
1-4% less than 1% -.338 .226 -.98 .31 
5-8% -.096 .130 -.45 .26 
9-12% .021 .136 -.36 .40 
12%+ -.015 .183 -.53 .50 
5-8% less than 1% -.242 .216 -.86 .38 
1-4% .096 .130 -.26 .45 
9-12% .117 .119 -.21 .45 
12%+ .081 .170 -.40 .56 
9-12% less than 1% -.359 .220 -.99 .27 
1-4% -.021 .136 -.40 .36 
5-8% -.117 .119 -.45 .21 
12%+ -.036 .176 -.53 .46 
12%+ less than 1% -.323 .251 -1.04 .40 
1-4% .015 .183 -.50 .53 
5-8% -.081 .170 -.56 .40 
9-12% .036 .176 -.46 .53 
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14. Banks are 
essential to the 
domestic 
economy and 





less than 1% 1-4% .251 .102 -.04 .54 
5-8% .011 .097 -.26 .29 
9-12% -.038 .101 -.32 .25 
12%+ .023 .140 -.37 .42 
1-4% less than 1% -.251 .102 -.54 .04 
5-8% -.240* .087 -.48 .00 
9-12% -.289* .091 -.54 -.04 
12%+ -.228 .133 -.60 .14 
5-8% less than 1% -.011 .097 -.29 .26 
1-4% .240* .087 .00 .48 
9-12% -.049 .085 -.28 .19 
12%+ .012 .129 -.35 .37 
9-12% less than 1% .038 .101 -.25 .32 
1-4% .289* .091 .04 .54 
5-8% .049 .085 -.19 .28 
12%+ .060 .132 -.31 .43 
12%+ less than 1% -.023 .140 -.42 .37 
1-4% .228 .133 -.14 .60 
5-8% -.012 .129 -.37 .35 
9-12% -.060 .132 -.43 .31 
15. The financial 
market is mature 
and competitive. 
less than 1% 1-4% .016 .204 -.57 .60 
5-8% .041 .196 -.52 .60 
9-12% .071 .199 -.50 .64 
12%+ -.036 .223 -.68 .60 
1-4% less than 1% -.016 .204 -.60 .57 
5-8% .025 .092 -.23 .28 
9-12% .055 .099 -.22 .33 
12%+ -.052 .141 -.45 .34 
5-8% less than 1% -.041 .196 -.60 .52 
1-4% -.025 .092 -.28 .23 
9-12% .030 .082 -.20 .26 
12%+ -.077 .130 -.44 .29 
9-12% less than 1% -.071 .199 -.64 .50 
1-4% -.055 .099 -.33 .22 
5-8% -.030 .082 -.26 .20 
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12%+ -.107 .135 -.49 .27 
12%+ less than 1% .036 .223 -.60 .68 
1-4% .052 .141 -.34 .45 
5-8% .077 .130 -.29 .44 
9-12% .107 .135 -.27 .49 
Section 3. 1. 
Global pressures 





less than 1% 1-4% -.427 .221 -1.06 .21 
5-8% -.464 .210 -1.07 .14 
9-12% -.180 .211 -.79 .43 
12%+ -.368 .238 -1.05 .31 
1-4% less than 1% .427 .221 -.21 1.06 
5-8% -.037 .124 -.38 .30 
9-12% .247 .125 -.10 .59 
12%+ .059 .167 -.41 .52 
5-8% less than 1% .464 .210 -.14 1.07 
1-4% .037 .124 -.30 .38 
9-12% .284 .105 -.01 .57 
12%+ .096 .152 -.33 .52 
9-12% less than 1% .180 .211 -.43 .79 
1-4% -.247 .125 -.59 .10 
5-8% -.284 .105 -.57 .01 
12%+ -.188 .153 -.62 .24 
12%+ less than 1% .368 .238 -.31 1.05 
1-4% -.059 .167 -.52 .41 
5-8% -.096 .152 -.52 .33 
9-12% .188 .153 -.24 .62 




risks for our 
nation. 
less than 1% 1-4% .049 .178 -.46 .56 
5-8% -.071 .170 -.56 .42 
9-12% .240 .171 -.25 .73 
12%+ .136 .201 -.44 .71 
1-4% less than 1% -.049 .178 -.56 .46 
5-8% -.121 .110 -.43 .18 
9-12% .190 .112 -.12 .50 
12%+ .087 .154 -.34 .52 
5-8% less than 1% .071 .170 -.42 .56 
1-4% .121 .110 -.18 .43 
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9-12% .311* .098 .04 .58 
12%+ .208 .144 -.20 .61 
9-12% less than 1% -.240 .171 -.73 .25 
1-4% -.190 .112 -.50 .12 
5-8% -.311* .098 -.58 -.04 
12%+ -.103 .145 -.51 .30 
12%+ less than 1% -.136 .201 -.71 .44 
1-4% -.087 .154 -.52 .34 
5-8% -.208 .144 -.61 .20 
9-12% .103 .145 -.30 .51 




decades to allow 
them to mature. 
less than 1% 1-4% -.494 .239 -1.18 .19 
5-8% -.333 .230 -.99 .33 
9-12% -.346 .235 -1.02 .33 
12%+ -.264 .262 -1.02 .49 
1-4% less than 1% .494 .239 -.19 1.18 
5-8% .161 .126 -.19 .51 
9-12% .148 .135 -.22 .52 
12%+ .230 .179 -.27 .73 
5-8% less than 1% .333 .230 -.33 .99 
1-4% -.161 .126 -.51 .19 
9-12% -.014 .118 -.34 .31 
12%+ .069 .167 -.40 .54 
9-12% less than 1% .346 .235 -.33 1.02 
1-4% -.148 .135 -.52 .22 
5-8% .014 .118 -.31 .34 
12%+ .083 .173 -.40 .57 
12%+ less than 1% .264 .262 -.49 1.02 
1-4% -.230 .179 -.73 .27 
5-8% -.069 .167 -.54 .40 
9-12% -.083 .173 -.57 .40 
4. Strategic 
partnerships and 
FDI allow rapid 
exchange of 
knowledge and 
less than 1% 1-4% -.318 .217 -.94 .30 
5-8% -.387 .210 -.99 .22 
9-12% -.146 .210 -.75 .46 
12%+ -.018 .227 -.67 .63 






5-8% -.069 .117 -.39 .25 
9-12% .172 .118 -.15 .50 
12%+ .300 .146 -.11 .71 
5-8% less than 1% .387 .210 -.22 .99 
1-4% .069 .117 -.25 .39 
9-12% .242 .103 -.04 .53 
12%+ .369 .135 -.01 .75 
9-12% less than 1% .146 .210 -.46 .75 
1-4% -.172 .118 -.50 .15 
5-8% -.242 .103 -.53 .04 
12%+ .128 .135 -.25 .51 
12%+ less than 1% .018 .227 -.63 .67 
1-4% -.300 .146 -.71 .11 
5-8% -.369 .135 -.75 .01 
9-12% -.128 .135 -.51 .25 
5. Our bank is 
vulnerable to 
systemic risks. 
less than 1% 1-4% -.111 .210 -.71 .49 
5-8% -.299 .200 -.87 .28 
9-12% -.063 .201 -.64 .52 
12%+ -.195 .242 -.89 .50 
1-4% less than 1% .111 .210 -.49 .71 
5-8% -.189 .108 -.49 .11 
9-12% .048 .111 -.26 .35 
12%+ -.085 .174 -.57 .40 
5-8% less than 1% .299 .200 -.28 .87 
1-4% .189 .108 -.11 .49 
9-12% .237 .091 -.01 .49 
12%+ .104 .162 -.35 .56 
9-12% less than 1% .063 .201 -.52 .64 
1-4% -.048 .111 -.35 .26 
5-8% -.237 .091 -.49 .01 
12%+ -.133 .164 -.59 .33 
12%+ less than 1% .195 .242 -.50 .89 
1-4% .085 .174 -.40 .57 
5-8% -.104 .162 -.56 .35 





support. our bank 




less than 1% 1-4% -.093 .208 -.69 .50 
5-8% -.129 .201 -.71 .45 
9-12% .036 .200 -.54 .61 
12%+ .014 .234 -.66 .68 
1-4% less than 1% .093 .208 -.50 .69 
5-8% -.036 .111 -.34 .27 
9-12% .129 .109 -.17 .43 
12%+ .107 .163 -.35 .56 
5-8% less than 1% .129 .201 -.45 .71 
1-4% .036 .111 -.27 .34 
9-12% .165 .095 -.10 .43 
12%+ .142 .155 -.29 .58 
9-12% less than 1% -.036 .200 -.61 .54 
1-4% -.129 .109 -.43 .17 
5-8% -.165 .095 -.43 .10 
12%+ -.022 .153 -.45 .41 
12%+ less than 1% -.014 .234 -.68 .66 
1-4% -.107 .163 -.56 .35 
5-8% -.142 .155 -.58 .29 
9-12% .022 .153 -.41 .45 
7. Liquidity levels 
are at an all-time 
low. 
less than 1% 1-4% -.263 .230 -.92 .40 
5-8% -.192 .218 -.82 .44 
9-12% .161 .217 -.46 .78 
12%+ .055 .244 -.64 .75 
1-4% less than 1% .263 .230 -.40 .92 
5-8% .071 .130 -.29 .43 
9-12% .424* .127 .07 .78 
12%+ .317 .169 -.16 .79 
5-8% less than 1% .192 .218 -.44 .82 
1-4% -.071 .130 -.43 .29 
9-12% .353* .105 .06 .64 
12%+ .246 .153 -.18 .67 
9-12% less than 1% -.161 .217 -.78 .46 
1-4% -.424* .127 -.78 -.07 
5-8% -.353* .105 -.64 -.06 
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12%+ -.107 .151 -.53 .32 
12%+ less than 1% -.055 .244 -.75 .64 
1-4% -.317 .169 -.79 .16 
5-8% -.246 .153 -.67 .18 
9-12% .107 .151 -.32 .53 
8. When oil prices 
decline. we are 
less likely to lend 
money to private 
enterprises. 
less than 1% 1-4% -.176 .198 -.74 .39 
5-8% -.222 .187 -.76 .32 
9-12% .058 .187 -.48 .59 
12%+ -.245 .214 -.86 .37 
1-4% less than 1% .176 .198 -.39 .74 
5-8% -.046 .115 -.36 .27 
9-12% .234 .114 -.08 .55 
12%+ -.070 .155 -.50 .36 
5-8% less than 1% .222 .187 -.32 .76 
1-4% .046 .115 -.27 .36 
9-12% .280* .095 .02 .54 
12%+ -.023 .142 -.42 .37 
9-12% less than 1% -.058 .187 -.59 .48 
1-4% -.234 .114 -.55 .08 
5-8% -.280* .095 -.54 -.02 
12%+ -.303 .141 -.70 .09 
12%+ less than 1% .245 .214 -.37 .86 
1-4% .070 .155 -.36 .50 
5-8% .023 .142 -.37 .42 
9-12% .303 .141 -.09 .70 
9. Citizens are 
more likely to 
withhold savings 
and investments 
when oil prices 
fluctuate or 
decline. 
less than 1% 1-4% -.180 .213 -.79 .43 
5-8% -.298 .201 -.87 .28 
9-12% -.033 .201 -.61 .54 
12%+ -.186 .231 -.85 .48 
1-4% less than 1% .180 .213 -.43 .79 
5-8% -.118 .120 -.45 .21 
9-12% .147 .120 -.18 .48 
12%+ -.007 .166 -.47 .46 
5-8% less than 1% .298 .201 -.28 .87 
1-4% .118 .120 -.21 .45 
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9-12% .265* .096 .00 .53 
12%+ .112 .150 -.31 .53 
9-12% less than 1% .033 .201 -.54 .61 
1-4% -.147 .120 -.48 .18 
5-8% -.265* .096 -.53 .00 
12%+ -.153 .149 -.57 .27 
12%+ less than 1% .186 .231 -.48 .85 
1-4% .007 .166 -.46 .47 
5-8% -.112 .150 -.53 .31 
9-12% .153 .149 -.27 .57 
10. Investing in 
diversification 
offers a layer of 
stability that we 
desperately need 
at this time. 
less than 1% 1-4% -.249 .219 -.88 .38 
5-8% -.189 .213 -.80 .42 
9-12% -.020 .210 -.63 .59 
12%+ -.227 .237 -.91 .45 
1-4% less than 1% .249 .219 -.38 .88 
5-8% .060 .114 -.26 .38 
9-12% .229 .109 -.07 .53 
12%+ .022 .155 -.41 .45 
5-8% less than 1% .189 .213 -.42 .80 
1-4% -.060 .114 -.38 .26 
9-12% .168 .096 -.10 .43 
12%+ -.038 .146 -.45 .37 
9-12% less than 1% .020 .210 -.59 .63 
1-4% -.229 .109 -.53 .07 
5-8% -.168 .096 -.43 .10 
12%+ -.207 .142 -.60 .19 
12%+ less than 1% .227 .237 -.45 .91 
1-4% -.022 .155 -.45 .41 
5-8% .038 .146 -.37 .45 
9-12% .207 .142 -.19 .60 
11. Intra-bank 
loans create a 
dangerous cycle 
of risk and 
vulnerability. 
less than 1% 1-4% -.435 .220 -1.06 .19 
5-8% -.877* .212 -1.49 -.27 
9-12% -.362 .213 -.97 .25 
12%+ -.450 .236 -1.13 .23 
1-4% less than 1% .435 .220 -.19 1.06 
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5-8% -.442* .117 -.77 -.12 
9-12% .073 .119 -.26 .40 
12%+ -.015 .157 -.45 .42 
5-8% less than 1% .877* .212 .27 1.49 
1-4% .442* .117 .12 .77 
9-12% .515* .105 .23 .80 
12%+ .427* .146 .02 .84 
9-12% less than 1% .362 .213 -.25 .97 
1-4% -.073 .119 -.40 .26 
5-8% -.515* .105 -.80 -.23 
12%+ -.088 .148 -.50 .33 
12%+ less than 1% .450 .236 -.23 1.13 
1-4% .015 .157 -.42 .45 
5-8% -.427* .146 -.84 -.02 
9-12% .088 .148 -.33 .50 
12. The increase 
in lending rates is 
a positive step 
towards industry 
maturity. 
less than 1% 1-4% -.020 .212 -.63 .59 
5-8% -.131 .203 -.71 .45 
9-12% .097 .204 -.49 .68 
12%+ -.105 .235 -.78 .57 
1-4% less than 1% .020 .212 -.59 .63 
5-8% -.112 .117 -.43 .21 
9-12% .117 .120 -.21 .45 
12%+ -.085 .167 -.55 .38 
5-8% less than 1% .131 .203 -.45 .71 
1-4% .112 .117 -.21 .43 
9-12% .229 .103 -.05 .51 
12%+ .027 .155 -.41 .46 
9-12% less than 1% -.097 .204 -.68 .49 
1-4% -.117 .120 -.45 .21 
5-8% -.229 .103 -.51 .05 
12%+ -.202 .157 -.64 .24 
12%+ less than 1% .105 .235 -.57 .78 
1-4% .085 .167 -.38 .55 
5-8% -.027 .155 -.46 .41 
9-12% .202 .157 -.24 .64 
  
539 




based on oil and 
gas exploitation. 
less than 1% 1-4% -.549 .211 -1.15 .05 
5-8% -.375 .201 -.95 .20 
9-12% -.171 .204 -.76 .41 
12%+ -.436 .220 -1.07 .20 
1-4% less than 1% .549 .211 -.05 1.15 
5-8% .175 .117 -.15 .50 
9-12% .379* .121 .04 .71 
12%+ .113 .147 -.30 .52 
5-8% less than 1% .375 .201 -.20 .95 
1-4% -.175 .117 -.50 .15 
9-12% .204 .103 -.08 .49 
12%+ -.062 .133 -.43 .31 
9-12% less than 1% .171 .204 -.41 .76 
1-4% -.379* .121 -.71 -.04 
5-8% -.204 .103 -.49 .08 
12%+ -.266 .137 -.65 .12 
12%+ less than 1% .436 .220 -.20 1.07 
1-4% -.113 .147 -.52 .30 
5-8% .062 .133 -.31 .43 





should remain oil 
and gas. 
less than 1% 1-4% .310 .141 -.09 .71 
5-8% .159 .134 -.22 .54 
9-12% .292 .135 -.09 .68 
12%+ .336 .196 -.22 .89 
1-4% less than 1% -.310 .141 -.71 .09 
5-8% -.151 .109 -.45 .15 
9-12% -.019 .111 -.32 .29 
12%+ .026 .181 -.48 .53 
5-8% less than 1% -.159 .134 -.54 .22 
1-4% .151 .109 -.15 .45 
9-12% .132 .101 -.15 .41 
12%+ .177 .175 -.31 .67 
9-12% less than 1% -.292 .135 -.68 .09 
1-4% .019 .111 -.29 .32 
5-8% -.132 .101 -.41 .15 
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12%+ .045 .176 -.45 .54 
12%+ less than 1% -.336 .196 -.89 .22 
1-4% -.026 .181 -.53 .48 
5-8% -.177 .175 -.67 .31 
9-12% -.045 .176 -.54 .45 




population in our 
nation is worrying. 
less than 1% 1-4% .385 .142 -.02 .79 
5-8% .133 .129 -.24 .50 
9-12% .381 .138 -.01 .77 
12%+ -.086 .149 -.51 .34 
1-4% less than 1% -.385 .142 -.79 .02 
5-8% -.253 .104 -.54 .04 
9-12% -.004 .115 -.32 .31 
12%+ -.472* .128 -.83 -.11 
5-8% less than 1% -.133 .129 -.50 .24 
1-4% .253 .104 -.04 .54 
9-12% .248 .099 -.03 .52 
12%+ -.219 .114 -.54 .10 
9-12% less than 1% -.381 .138 -.77 .01 
1-4% .004 .115 -.31 .32 
5-8% -.248 .099 -.52 .03 
12%+ -.467* .124 -.81 -.12 
12%+ less than 1% .086 .149 -.34 .51 
1-4% .472* .128 .11 .83 
5-8% .219 .114 -.10 .54 
9-12% .467* .124 .12 .81 
16. New 
companies are a 
liability; we would 
prefer to invest in 
tested models. 
less than 1% 1-4% .063 .161 -.40 .52 
5-8% -.038 .157 -.49 .41 
9-12% .144 .157 -.30 .59 
12%+ .105 .204 -.48 .69 
1-4% less than 1% -.063 .161 -.52 .40 
5-8% -.101 .111 -.41 .21 
9-12% .081 .111 -.22 .39 
12%+ .041 .171 -.44 .52 
5-8% less than 1% .038 .157 -.41 .49 
1-4% .101 .111 -.21 .41 
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9-12% .182 .105 -.11 .47 
12%+ .142 .168 -.33 .61 
9-12% less than 1% -.144 .157 -.59 .30 
1-4% -.081 .111 -.39 .22 
5-8% -.182 .105 -.47 .11 
12%+ -.040 .167 -.51 .43 
12%+ less than 1% -.105 .204 -.69 .48 
1-4% -.041 .171 -.52 .44 
5-8% -.142 .168 -.61 .33 
9-12% .040 .167 -.43 .51 
17. Most small 
businesses are 
likely to fail if 
given enough 
time. 
less than 1% 1-4% .338* .104 .04 .63 
5-8% .565* .106 .27 .86 
9-12% .462* .101 .17 .75 
12%+ .673* .143 .27 1.08 
1-4% less than 1% -.338* .104 -.63 -.04 
5-8% .227 .098 -.04 .50 
9-12% .124 .093 -.13 .38 
12%+ .335 .137 -.05 .72 
5-8% less than 1% -.565* .106 -.86 -.27 
1-4% -.227 .098 -.50 .04 
9-12% -.103 .095 -.37 .16 
12%+ .108 .139 -.28 .50 
9-12% less than 1% -.462* .101 -.75 -.17 
1-4% -.124 .093 -.38 .13 
5-8% .103 .095 -.16 .37 
12%+ .210 .135 -.17 .59 
12%+ less than 1% -.673* .143 -1.08 -.27 
1-4% -.335 .137 -.72 .05 
5-8% -.108 .139 -.50 .28 
9-12% -.210 .135 -.59 .17 
18. Our banks 
should invest 
more heavily in 
business 
development and 
less than 1% 1-4% .188 .158 -.26 .64 
5-8% .372 .143 -.04 .78 
9-12% .060 .151 -.37 .49 
12%+ .168 .209 -.43 .76 






5-8% .184 .116 -.14 .50 
9-12% -.128 .125 -.47 .22 
12%+ -.020 .191 -.56 .52 
5-8% less than 1% -.372 .143 -.78 .04 
1-4% -.184 .116 -.50 .14 
9-12% -.312* .105 -.60 -.02 
12%+ -.204 .179 -.71 .30 
9-12% less than 1% -.060 .151 -.49 .37 
1-4% .128 .125 -.22 .47 
5-8% .312* .105 .02 .60 
12%+ .109 .185 -.41 .63 
12%+ less than 1% -.168 .209 -.76 .43 
1-4% .020 .191 -.52 .56 
5-8% .204 .179 -.30 .71 
9-12% -.109 .185 -.63 .41 
19. Without 
sufficient oil and 




less than 1% 1-4% -.043 .197 -.61 .52 
5-8% .015 .187 -.52 .55 
9-12% .017 .186 -.51 .55 
12%+ .250 .216 -.37 .87 
1-4% less than 1% .043 .197 -.52 .61 
5-8% .059 .131 -.30 .42 
9-12% .061 .129 -.29 .42 
12%+ .293 .170 -.18 .77 
5-8% less than 1% -.015 .187 -.55 .52 
1-4% -.059 .131 -.42 .30 
9-12% .002 .113 -.31 .31 
12%+ .235 .158 -.21 .68 
9-12% less than 1% -.017 .186 -.55 .51 
1-4% -.061 .129 -.42 .29 
5-8% -.002 .113 -.31 .31 
12%+ .233 .157 -.21 .67 
12%+ less than 1% -.250 .216 -.87 .37 
1-4% -.293 .170 -.77 .18 
5-8% -.235 .158 -.68 .21 
9-12% -.233 .157 -.67 .21 
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20. The domestic 
financial markets 
are unstable and 
high risk. 
less than 1% 1-4% .196 .157 -.25 .64 
5-8% .246 .145 -.17 .66 
9-12% -.121 .148 -.54 .30 
12%+ .450 .177 -.06 .96 
1-4% less than 1% -.196 .157 -.64 .25 
5-8% .051 .107 -.25 .35 
9-12% -.316* .111 -.62 -.01 
12%+ .254 .148 -.16 .67 
5-8% less than 1% -.246 .145 -.66 .17 
1-4% -.051 .107 -.35 .25 
9-12% -.367* .094 -.62 -.11 
12%+ .204 .135 -.18 .58 
9-12% less than 1% .121 .148 -.30 .54 
1-4% .316* .111 .01 .62 
5-8% .367* .094 .11 .62 
12%+ .571* .138 .18 .96 
12%+ less than 1% -.450 .177 -.96 .06 
1-4% -.254 .148 -.67 .16 
5-8% -.204 .135 -.58 .18 
9-12% -.571* .138 -.96 -.18 
Section 4. 1. Our 
government has a 
long-term vision 
that does not rely 
on oil and gas for 
development. 
less than 1% 1-4% .455 .165 -.02 .93 
5-8% .562* .160 .11 1.02 
9-12% .558* .161 .10 1.02 
12%+ .555 .215 -.06 1.17 
1-4% less than 1% -.455 .165 -.93 .02 
5-8% .108 .122 -.23 .44 
9-12% .103 .123 -.24 .44 
12%+ .100 .188 -.43 .63 
5-8% less than 1% -.562* .160 -1.02 -.11 
1-4% -.108 .122 -.44 .23 
9-12% -.004 .116 -.32 .32 
12%+ -.008 .183 -.52 .50 
9-12% less than 1% -.558* .161 -1.02 -.10 
1-4% -.103 .123 -.44 .24 
5-8% .004 .116 -.32 .32 
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12%+ -.003 .184 -.52 .51 
12%+ less than 1% -.555 .215 -1.17 .06 
1-4% -.100 .188 -.63 .43 
5-8% .008 .183 -.50 .52 
9-12% .003 .184 -.51 .52 
2. The primary 
industry upon 
which lending and 
development 
should focus is: 
less than 1% 1-4% .581 .340 -.39 1.55 
5-8% .010 .330 -.94 .96 
9-12% .329 .333 -.62 1.28 
12%+ .564 .382 -.53 1.66 
1-4% less than 1% -.581 .340 -1.55 .39 
5-8% -.571* .198 -1.12 -.03 
9-12% -.252 .202 -.81 .31 
12%+ -.017 .276 -.79 .76 
5-8% less than 1% -.010 .330 -.96 .94 
1-4% .571* .198 .03 1.12 
9-12% .319 .185 -.19 .83 
12%+ .554 .264 -.19 1.29 
9-12% less than 1% -.329 .333 -1.28 .62 
1-4% .252 .202 -.31 .81 
5-8% -.319 .185 -.83 .19 
12%+ .234 .268 -.52 .98 
12%+ less than 1% -.564 .382 -1.66 .53 
1-4% .017 .276 -.76 .79 
5-8% -.554 .264 -1.29 .19 
9-12% -.234 .268 -.98 .52 
3. The primary 
result of a 
government 
bailout in our 
nation is: 
less than 1% 1-4% -.589 .352 -1.60 .42 
5-8% -.176 .339 -1.15 .80 
9-12% -.770 .339 -1.74 .20 
12%+ -.495 .401 -1.64 .65 
1-4% less than 1% .589 .352 -.42 1.60 
5-8% .413 .203 -.15 .97 
9-12% -.181 .203 -.74 .38 
12%+ .093 .295 -.73 .92 
5-8% less than 1% .176 .339 -.80 1.15 
1-4% -.413 .203 -.97 .15 
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9-12% -.593* .180 -1.09 -.10 
12%+ -.319 .279 -1.10 .46 
9-12% less than 1% .770 .339 -.20 1.74 
1-4% .181 .203 -.38 .74 
5-8% .593* .180 .10 1.09 
12%+ .274 .279 -.51 1.06 
12%+ less than 1% .495 .401 -.65 1.64 
1-4% -.093 .295 -.92 .73 
5-8% .319 .279 -.46 1.10 
9-12% -.274 .279 -1.06 .51 
4. Government 
investment in oil 




less than 1% 1-4% .261 .256 -.47 .99 
5-8% .231 .244 -.47 .93 
9-12% .241 .245 -.46 .95 
12%+ .350 .281 -.45 1.15 
1-4% less than 1% -.261 .256 -.99 .47 
5-8% -.030 .151 -.45 .39 
9-12% -.019 .153 -.44 .40 
12%+ .089 .205 -.48 .66 
5-8% less than 1% -.231 .244 -.93 .47 
1-4% .030 .151 -.39 .45 
9-12% .011 .132 -.35 .37 
12%+ .119 .190 -.41 .65 
9-12% less than 1% -.241 .245 -.95 .46 
1-4% .019 .153 -.40 .44 
5-8% -.011 .132 -.37 .35 
12%+ .109 .191 -.43 .64 
12%+ less than 1% -.350 .281 -1.15 .45 
1-4% -.089 .205 -.66 .48 
5-8% -.119 .190 -.65 .41 
9-12% -.109 .191 -.64 .43 
5. The 
government’s role 
in stabilising the 
domestic 
economy is: 
less than 1% 1-4% .561* .131 .19 .94 
5-8% .340 .135 -.05 .73 
9-12% .392* .132 .01 .77 
12%+ .459* .147 .04 .88 
1-4% less than 1% -.561* .131 -.94 -.19 
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5-8% -.221 .087 -.46 .02 
9-12% -.169 .082 -.40 .06 
12%+ -.102 .104 -.39 .19 
5-8% less than 1% -.340 .135 -.73 .05 
1-4% .221 .087 -.02 .46 
9-12% .052 .088 -.19 .29 
12%+ .119 .109 -.18 .42 
9-12% less than 1% -.392* .132 -.77 -.01 
1-4% .169 .082 -.06 .40 
5-8% -.052 .088 -.29 .19 
12%+ .067 .105 -.23 .36 
12%+ less than 1% -.459* .147 -.88 -.04 
1-4% .102 .104 -.19 .39 
5-8% -.119 .109 -.42 .18 
9-12% -.067 .105 -.36 .23 
6. Our 




less than 1% 1-4% .105 .103 -.19 .40 
5-8% .032 .094 -.24 .30 
9-12% -.022 .094 -.29 .25 
12%+ .009 .099 -.28 .29 
1-4% less than 1% -.105 .103 -.40 .19 
5-8% -.073 .055 -.22 .08 
9-12% -.127 .055 -.28 .02 
12%+ -.096 .063 -.27 .08 
5-8% less than 1% -.032 .094 -.30 .24 
1-4% .073 .055 -.08 .22 
9-12% -.054 .034 -.15 .04 
12%+ -.023 .046 -.15 .10 
9-12% less than 1% .022 .094 -.25 .29 
1-4% .127 .055 -.02 .28 
5-8% .054 .034 -.04 .15 
12%+ .031 .046 -.10 .16 
12%+ less than 1% -.009 .099 -.29 .28 
1-4% .096 .063 -.08 .27 
5-8% .023 .046 -.10 .15 
9-12% -.031 .046 -.16 .10 
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7. The primary 
factor restricting 
the number of 
national citizens 
in private sector 
employment is: 
less than 1% 1-4% .381 .325 -.55 1.31 
5-8% .303 .313 -.60 1.20 
9-12% .566 .318 -.35 1.48 
12%+ .423 .372 -.64 1.49 
1-4% less than 1% -.381 .325 -1.31 .55 
5-8% -.078 .180 -.57 .42 
9-12% .184 .188 -.33 .70 
12%+ .041 .270 -.71 .80 
5-8% less than 1% -.303 .313 -1.20 .60 
1-4% .078 .180 -.42 .57 
9-12% .262 .168 -.20 .72 
12%+ .119 .256 -.60 .84 
9-12% less than 1% -.566 .318 -1.48 .35 
1-4% -.184 .188 -.70 .33 
5-8% -.262 .168 -.72 .20 
12%+ -.143 .262 -.88 .59 
12%+ less than 1% -.423 .372 -1.49 .64 
1-4% -.041 .270 -.80 .71 
5-8% -.119 .256 -.84 .60 
9-12% .143 .262 -.59 .88 
8. The primary 
sector which 
national citizens 
would like to work 
in is: 
less than 1% 1-4% -.802 .358 -1.83 .22 
5-8% -.978 .354 -1.99 .04 
9-12% -.920 .355 -1.94 .10 
12%+ -.655 .399 -1.80 .49 
1-4% less than 1% .802 .358 -.22 1.83 
5-8% -.175 .211 -.76 .41 
9-12% -.118 .214 -.71 .47 
12%+ .148 .281 -.64 .94 
5-8% less than 1% .978 .354 -.04 1.99 
1-4% .175 .211 -.41 .76 
9-12% .058 .207 -.51 .63 
12%+ .323 .276 -.45 1.09 
9-12% less than 1% .920 .355 -.10 1.94 
1-4% .118 .214 -.47 .71 
5-8% -.058 .207 -.63 .51 
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12%+ .266 .278 -.51 1.04 
12%+ less than 1% .655 .399 -.49 1.80 
1-4% -.148 .281 -.94 .64 
5-8% -.323 .276 -1.09 .45 
9-12% -.266 .278 -1.04 .51 
9. Government 
analysts would 
rank the current 
threat level in oil 
and gas as 
follows: 
less than 1% 1-4% -.358* .096 -.63 -.08 
5-8% -.481* .099 -.76 -.20 
9-12% -.469* .098 -.75 -.19 
12%+ -.427* .129 -.79 -.06 
1-4% less than 1% .358* .096 .08 .63 
5-8% -.123 .081 -.35 .10 
9-12% -.111 .080 -.33 .11 
12%+ -.070 .115 -.39 .25 
5-8% less than 1% .481* .099 .20 .76 
1-4% .123 .081 -.10 .35 
9-12% .012 .085 -.22 .25 
12%+ .054 .118 -.28 .38 
9-12% less than 1% .469* .098 .19 .75 
1-4% .111 .080 -.11 .33 
5-8% -.012 .085 -.25 .22 
12%+ .041 .118 -.29 .37 
12%+ less than 1% .427* .129 .06 .79 
1-4% .070 .115 -.25 .39 
5-8% -.054 .118 -.38 .28 
9-12% -.041 .118 -.37 .29 
10. The 
government 
investment in oil 
and gas is based 
on the following 
objective: 
less than 1% 1-4% -.399 .305 -1.27 .48 
5-8% -.566 .300 -1.43 .30 
9-12% -.234 .303 -1.10 .64 
12%+ -.232 .346 -1.22 .76 
1-4% less than 1% .399 .305 -.48 1.27 
5-8% -.167 .162 -.61 .28 
9-12% .166 .166 -.29 .62 
12%+ .167 .237 -.50 .83 
5-8% less than 1% .566 .300 -.30 1.43 
1-4% .167 .162 -.28 .61 
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9-12% .333 .157 -.10 .76 
12%+ .335 .230 -.31 .98 
9-12% less than 1% .234 .303 -.64 1.10 
1-4% -.166 .166 -.62 .29 
5-8% -.333 .157 -.76 .10 
12%+ .002 .234 -.65 .66 
12%+ less than 1% .232 .346 -.76 1.22 
1-4% -.167 .237 -.83 .50 
5-8% -.335 .230 -.98 .31 







the oil and gas 
industry 
less than 1% 1-4% -.233 .109 -.54 .08 
5-8% -.317* .102 -.61 -.03 
9-12% -.174 .103 -.47 .12 
12%+ -.014 .120 -.36 .33 
1-4% less than 1% .233 .109 -.08 .54 
5-8% -.084 .089 -.33 .16 
9-12% .059 .089 -.19 .30 
12%+ .220 .109 -.09 .52 
5-8% less than 1% .317* .102 .03 .61 
1-4% .084 .089 -.16 .33 
9-12% .144 .081 -.08 .37 
12%+ .304* .102 .02 .59 
9-12% less than 1% .174 .103 -.12 .47 
1-4% -.059 .089 -.30 .19 
5-8% -.144 .081 -.37 .08 
12%+ .160 .103 -.13 .45 
12%+ less than 1% .014 .120 -.33 .36 
1-4% -.220 .109 -.52 .09 
5-8% -.304* .102 -.59 -.02 




less than 1% 1-4% .156 .152 -.28 .59 
5-8% .368 .150 -.06 .80 
9-12% .177 .153 -.26 .62 
12%+ .241 .164 -.23 .71 
1-4% less than 1% -.156 .152 -.59 .28 
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5-8% .212 .080 -.01 .43 
9-12% .021 .086 -.22 .26 
12%+ .085 .104 -.21 .38 
5-8% less than 1% -.368 .150 -.80 .06 
1-4% -.212 .080 -.43 .01 
9-12% -.191 .081 -.41 .03 
12%+ -.127 .100 -.41 .15 
9-12% less than 1% -.177 .153 -.62 .26 
1-4% -.021 .086 -.26 .22 
5-8% .191 .081 -.03 .41 
12%+ .064 .105 -.23 .36 
12%+ less than 1% -.241 .164 -.71 .23 
1-4% -.085 .104 -.38 .21 
5-8% .127 .100 -.15 .41 




less than 1% 1-4% .542* .173 .05 1.04 
5-8% .393 .169 -.09 .88 
9-12% .541* .169 .05 1.03 
12%+ .355 .200 -.22 .93 
1-4% less than 1% -.542* .173 -1.04 -.05 
5-8% -.148 .093 -.41 .11 
9-12% -.001 .094 -.26 .26 
12%+ -.187 .142 -.58 .21 
5-8% less than 1% -.393 .169 -.88 .09 
1-4% .148 .093 -.11 .41 
9-12% .148 .086 -.09 .39 
12%+ -.038 .137 -.42 .34 
9-12% less than 1% -.541* .169 -1.03 -.05 
1-4% .001 .094 -.26 .26 
5-8% -.148 .086 -.39 .09 
12%+ -.186 .138 -.57 .20 
12%+ less than 1% -.355 .200 -.93 .22 
1-4% .187 .142 -.21 .58 
5-8% .038 .137 -.34 .42 





less than 1% 1-4% .164 .123 -.19 .52 
5-8% -.112 .126 -.47 .25 
9-12% .152 .127 -.21 .51 
12%+ -.077 .144 -.49 .33 
1-4% less than 1% -.164 .123 -.52 .19 
5-8% -.276* .085 -.51 -.04 
9-12% -.012 .086 -.25 .23 
12%+ -.241 .110 -.55 .07 
5-8% less than 1% .112 .126 -.25 .47 
1-4% .276* .085 .04 .51 
9-12% .264* .090 .02 .51 
12%+ .035 .113 -.28 .35 
9-12% less than 1% -.152 .127 -.51 .21 
1-4% .012 .086 -.23 .25 
5-8% -.264* .090 -.51 -.02 
12%+ -.229 .115 -.55 .09 
12%+ less than 1% .077 .144 -.33 .49 
1-4% .241 .110 -.07 .55 
5-8% -.035 .113 -.35 .28 
9-12% .229 .115 -.09 .55 
Strategic vision or 
agenda for 
national change 
less than 1% 1-4% -.283 .198 -.85 .29 
5-8% -.200 .192 -.75 .35 
9-12% -.121 .193 -.68 .43 
12%+ -.200 .200 -.78 .38 
1-4% less than 1% .283 .198 -.29 .85 
5-8% .083 .088 -.16 .32 
9-12% .162 .089 -.08 .41 
12%+ .083 .105 -.21 .38 
5-8% less than 1% .200 .192 -.35 .75 
1-4% -.083 .088 -.32 .16 
9-12% .079 .076 -.13 .29 
12%+ .000 .094 -.26 .26 
9-12% less than 1% .121 .193 -.43 .68 
1-4% -.162 .089 -.41 .08 
5-8% -.079 .076 -.29 .13 
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12%+ -.079 .095 -.35 .19 
12%+ less than 1% .200 .200 -.38 .78 
1-4% -.083 .105 -.38 .21 
5-8% .000 .094 -.26 .26 
9-12% .079 .095 -.19 .35 
Industry rules and 
regulations 
less than 1% 1-4% -.233 .130 -.61 .14 
5-8% -.302 .124 -.66 .05 
9-12% -.226 .127 -.59 .14 
12%+ -.014 .159 -.47 .44 
1-4% less than 1% .233 .130 -.14 .61 
5-8% -.069 .081 -.29 .15 
9-12% .007 .085 -.23 .24 
12%+ .220 .128 -.14 .58 
5-8% less than 1% .302 .124 -.05 .66 
1-4% .069 .081 -.15 .29 
9-12% .076 .076 -.13 .29 
12%+ .288 .122 -.05 .63 
9-12% less than 1% .226 .127 -.14 .59 
1-4% -.007 .085 -.24 .23 
5-8% -.076 .076 -.29 .13 
12%+ .212 .125 -.14 .56 
12%+ less than 1% .014 .159 -.44 .47 
1-4% -.220 .128 -.58 .14 
5-8% -.288 .122 -.63 .05 




less than 1% 1-4% -.342 .130 -.71 .03 
5-8% -.302 .128 -.67 .06 
9-12% -.502* .136 -.89 -.11 
12%+ -.314 .155 -.75 .13 
1-4% less than 1% .342 .130 -.03 .71 
5-8% .040 .086 -.20 .28 
9-12% -.160 .098 -.43 .11 
12%+ .028 .122 -.31 .37 
5-8% less than 1% .302 .128 -.06 .67 
1-4% -.040 .086 -.28 .20 
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9-12% -.199 .096 -.46 .06 
12%+ -.012 .120 -.35 .32 
9-12% less than 1% .502* .136 .11 .89 
1-4% .160 .098 -.11 .43 
5-8% .199 .096 -.06 .46 
12%+ .188 .129 -.17 .55 
12%+ less than 1% .314 .155 -.13 .75 
1-4% -.028 .122 -.37 .31 
5-8% .012 .120 -.32 .35 




less than 1% 1-4% -.174 .127 -.54 .19 
5-8% -.154 .117 -.49 .18 
9-12% -.190 .123 -.54 .16 
12%+ -.500* .144 -.91 -.09 
1-4% less than 1% .174 .127 -.19 .54 
5-8% .020 .085 -.22 .26 
9-12% -.016 .092 -.27 .24 
12%+ -.326 .119 -.66 .01 
5-8% less than 1% .154 .117 -.18 .49 
1-4% -.020 .085 -.26 .22 
9-12% -.036 .078 -.25 .18 
12%+ -.346* .108 -.65 -.04 
9-12% less than 1% .190 .123 -.16 .54 
1-4% .016 .092 -.24 .27 
5-8% .036 .078 -.18 .25 
12%+ -.310 .114 -.63 .01 
12%+ less than 1% .500* .144 .09 .91 
1-4% .326 .119 -.01 .66 
5-8% .346* .108 .04 .65 
9-12% .310 .114 -.01 .63 
Foreign interests 
and investments 
less than 1% 1-4% .611* .172 .12 1.10 
5-8% .253 .169 -.23 .74 
9-12% .735* .172 .24 1.23 
12%+ .495 .194 -.06 1.05 
1-4% less than 1% -.611* .172 -1.10 -.12 
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5-8% -.358* .092 -.61 -.10 
9-12% .124 .098 -.15 .39 
12%+ -.115 .133 -.49 .26 
5-8% less than 1% -.253 .169 -.74 .23 
1-4% .358* .092 .10 .61 
9-12% .482* .091 .23 .73 
12%+ .242 .128 -.11 .60 
9-12% less than 1% -.735* .172 -1.23 -.24 
1-4% -.124 .098 -.39 .15 
5-8% -.482* .091 -.73 -.23 
12%+ -.240 .132 -.61 .13 
12%+ less than 1% -.495 .194 -1.05 .06 
1-4% .115 .133 -.26 .49 
5-8% -.242 .128 -.60 .11 
9-12% .240 .132 -.13 .61 
Defaults and risks 
in bank 
performance 
less than 1% 1-4% .028 .134 -.35 .41 
5-8% .052 .125 -.31 .41 
9-12% -.139 .128 -.50 .23 
12%+ .286 .136 -.10 .68 
1-4% less than 1% -.028 .134 -.41 .35 
5-8% .024 .087 -.22 .26 
9-12% -.167 .091 -.42 .08 
12%+ .259 .102 -.03 .54 
5-8% less than 1% -.052 .125 -.41 .31 
1-4% -.024 .087 -.26 .22 
9-12% -.191 .078 -.41 .02 
12%+ .235 .091 -.02 .49 
9-12% less than 1% .139 .128 -.23 .50 
1-4% .167 .091 -.08 .42 
5-8% .191 .078 -.02 .41 
12%+ .426* .095 .16 .69 
12%+ less than 1% -.286 .136 -.68 .10 
1-4% -.259 .102 -.54 .03 
5-8% -.235 .091 -.49 .02 






and gas industry 
prices 
less than 1% 1-4% -.334 .149 -.76 .09 
5-8% -.166 .140 -.57 .23 
9-12% -.268 .144 -.68 .14 
12%+ -.132 .159 -.59 .32 
1-4% less than 1% .334 .149 -.09 .76 
5-8% .168 .100 -.11 .44 
9-12% .066 .106 -.23 .36 
12%+ .202 .125 -.15 .55 
5-8% less than 1% .166 .140 -.23 .57 
1-4% -.168 .100 -.44 .11 
9-12% -.102 .092 -.35 .15 
12%+ .035 .113 -.28 .35 
9-12% less than 1% .268 .144 -.14 .68 
1-4% -.066 .106 -.36 .23 
5-8% .102 .092 -.15 .35 
12%+ .136 .119 -.20 .47 
12%+ less than 1% .132 .159 -.32 .59 
1-4% -.202 .125 -.55 .15 
5-8% -.035 .113 -.35 .28 
9-12% -.136 .119 -.47 .20 
Demand for loans 
and innovative 
financing products 
less than 1% 1-4% -.225 .210 -.83 .38 
5-8% -.628* .207 -1.22 -.03 
9-12% -.389 .210 -.99 .21 
12%+ -.632 .227 -1.28 .02 
1-4% less than 1% .225 .210 -.38 .83 
5-8% -.403* .098 -.67 -.13 
9-12% -.163 .104 -.45 .12 
12%+ -.407* .134 -.78 -.03 
5-8% less than 1% .628* .207 .03 1.22 
1-4% .403* .098 .13 .67 
9-12% .239 .097 -.03 .51 
12%+ -.004 .130 -.37 .36 
9-12% less than 1% .389 .210 -.21 .99 
1-4% .163 .104 -.12 .45 
5-8% -.239 .097 -.51 .03 
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12%+ -.243 .134 -.62 .13 
12%+ less than 1% .632 .227 -.02 1.28 
1-4% .407* .134 .03 .78 
5-8% .004 .130 -.36 .37 





less than 1% 1-4% .117 .128 -.25 .48 
5-8% .228 .119 -.11 .57 
9-12% .061 .120 -.28 .40 
12%+ -.218 .151 -.65 .21 
1-4% less than 1% -.117 .128 -.48 .25 
5-8% .111 .100 -.17 .39 
9-12% -.055 .101 -.33 .22 
12%+ -.335 .137 -.72 .05 
5-8% less than 1% -.228 .119 -.57 .11 
1-4% -.111 .100 -.39 .17 
9-12% -.167 .089 -.41 .08 
12%+ -.446* .128 -.80 -.09 
9-12% less than 1% -.061 .120 -.40 .28 
1-4% .055 .101 -.22 .33 
5-8% .167 .089 -.08 .41 
12%+ -.279 .129 -.64 .08 
12%+ less than 1% .218 .151 -.21 .65 
1-4% .335 .137 -.05 .72 
5-8% .446* .128 .09 .80 




less than 1% 1-4% -.277 .142 -.68 .13 
5-8% -.056 .127 -.42 .31 
9-12% .050 .128 -.32 .42 
12%+ -.014 .159 -.47 .44 
1-4% less than 1% .277 .142 -.13 .68 
5-8% .221 .103 -.06 .50 
9-12% .327* .103 .04 .61 
12%+ .263 .140 -.13 .65 
5-8% less than 1% .056 .127 -.31 .42 
1-4% -.221 .103 -.50 .06 
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9-12% .106 .082 -.12 .33 
12%+ .042 .125 -.31 .39 
9-12% less than 1% -.050 .128 -.42 .32 
1-4% -.327* .103 -.61 -.04 
5-8% -.106 .082 -.33 .12 
12%+ -.064 .125 -.42 .29 
12%+ less than 1% .014 .159 -.44 .47 
1-4% -.263 .140 -.65 .13 
5-8% -.042 .125 -.39 .31 




less than 1% 1-4% .460* .157 .01 .91 
5-8% .337 .153 -.10 .78 
9-12% .436* .151 .00 .87 
12%+ .391 .183 -.13 .91 
1-4% less than 1% -.460* .157 -.91 -.01 
5-8% -.123 .093 -.38 .13 
9-12% -.025 .089 -.27 .22 
12%+ -.070 .136 -.45 .31 
5-8% less than 1% -.337 .153 -.78 .10 
1-4% .123 .093 -.13 .38 
9-12% .099 .083 -.13 .33 
12%+ .054 .132 -.32 .42 
9-12% less than 1% -.436* .151 -.87 .00 
1-4% .025 .089 -.22 .27 
5-8% -.099 .083 -.33 .13 
12%+ -.045 .130 -.41 .32 
12%+ less than 1% -.391 .183 -.91 .13 
1-4% .070 .136 -.31 .45 
5-8% -.054 .132 -.42 .32 




less than 1% 1-4% .458* .137 .07 .85 
5-8% .299 .131 -.08 .67 
9-12% .252 .131 -.12 .63 
12%+ .395 .166 -.08 .87 
1-4% less than 1% -.458* .137 -.85 -.07 
  
558 
5-8% -.159 .096 -.42 .10 
9-12% -.206 .096 -.47 .06 
12%+ -.063 .139 -.45 .33 
5-8% less than 1% -.299 .131 -.67 .08 
1-4% .159 .096 -.10 .42 
9-12% -.047 .087 -.29 .19 
12%+ .096 .134 -.28 .47 
9-12% less than 1% -.252 .131 -.63 .12 
1-4% .206 .096 -.06 .47 
5-8% .047 .087 -.19 .29 
12%+ .143 .133 -.23 .52 
12%+ less than 1% -.395 .166 -.87 .08 
1-4% .063 .139 -.33 .45 
5-8% -.096 .134 -.47 .28 
9-12% -.143 .133 -.52 .23 
Infrastructure and 
system 
less than 1% 1-4% -.065 .167 -.54 .41 
5-8% -.031 .164 -.50 .44 
9-12% -.069 .163 -.54 .40 
12%+ -.250 .194 -.81 .31 
1-4% less than 1% .065 .167 -.41 .54 
5-8% .034 .097 -.23 .30 
9-12% -.004 .096 -.27 .26 
12%+ -.185 .142 -.58 .21 
5-8% less than 1% .031 .164 -.44 .50 
1-4% -.034 .097 -.30 .23 
9-12% -.038 .090 -.29 .21 
12%+ -.219 .138 -.61 .17 
9-12% less than 1% .069 .163 -.40 .54 
1-4% .004 .096 -.26 .27 
5-8% .038 .090 -.21 .29 
12%+ -.181 .138 -.57 .21 
12%+ less than 1% .250 .194 -.31 .81 
1-4% .185 .142 -.21 .58 
5-8% .219 .138 -.17 .61 





less than 1% 1-4% .087 .145 -.33 .50 
5-8% -.200 .141 -.61 .21 
9-12% -.017 .144 -.43 .40 
12%+ -.200 .158 -.65 .25 
1-4% less than 1% -.087 .145 -.50 .33 
5-8% -.287* .083 -.52 -.06 
9-12% -.104 .088 -.35 .14 
12%+ -.287 .109 -.59 .02 
5-8% less than 1% .200 .141 -.21 .61 
1-4% .287* .083 .06 .52 
9-12% .183 .081 -.04 .41 
12%+ .000 .103 -.29 .29 
9-12% less than 1% .017 .144 -.40 .43 
1-4% .104 .088 -.14 .35 
5-8% -.183 .081 -.41 .04 
12%+ -.183 .107 -.48 .12 
12%+ less than 1% .200 .158 -.25 .65 
1-4% .287 .109 -.02 .59 
5-8% .000 .103 -.29 .29 
9-12% .183 .107 -.12 .48 
International 
competitive forces 
less than 1% 1-4% -.087 .147 -.51 .34 
5-8% -.108 .141 -.51 .30 
9-12% -.103 .143 -.51 .31 
12%+ .100 .159 -.36 .56 
1-4% less than 1% .087 .147 -.34 .51 
5-8% -.021 .086 -.26 .22 
9-12% -.016 .091 -.27 .23 
12%+ .187 .114 -.13 .51 
5-8% less than 1% .108 .141 -.30 .51 
1-4% .021 .086 -.22 .26 
9-12% .004 .079 -.21 .22 
12%+ .208 .105 -.09 .50 
9-12% less than 1% .103 .143 -.31 .51 
1-4% .016 .091 -.23 .27 
5-8% -.004 .079 -.22 .21 
  
560 
12%+ .203 .109 -.10 .51 
12%+ less than 1% -.100 .159 -.56 .36 
1-4% -.187 .114 -.51 .13 
5-8% -.208 .105 -.50 .09 




less than 1% 1-4% .196 .149 -.23 .62 
5-8% -.077 .144 -.49 .34 
9-12% -.017 .145 -.43 .40 
12%+ -.150 .190 -.69 .39 
1-4% less than 1% -.196 .149 -.62 .23 
5-8% -.273* .095 -.53 -.01 
9-12% -.213 .097 -.48 .05 
12%+ -.346 .156 -.78 .09 
5-8% less than 1% .077 .144 -.34 .49 
1-4% .273* .095 .01 .53 
9-12% .060 .088 -.18 .30 
12%+ -.073 .151 -.50 .35 
9-12% less than 1% .017 .145 -.40 .43 
1-4% .213 .097 -.05 .48 
5-8% -.060 .088 -.30 .18 
12%+ -.133 .152 -.56 .29 
12%+ less than 1% .150 .190 -.39 .69 
1-4% .346 .156 -.09 .78 
5-8% .073 .151 -.35 .50 
9-12% .133 .152 -.29 .56 
 
*. The mean difference is significant at the 0.05 level. 
 
 
 
